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FACTIVE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS*

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The central focus of this article is on a doctrine in the philosophy of perceptual consciousness I call *Phenomenal Naivete*, and a paradox associated with that doctrine.

Phenomenal Naivete is a sort of marriage of a pair of doctrines which have lately received extensive attention separately in the literature in philosophy of mind and epistemology: *representationalism* and *attitude externalism*, respectively. (Central discussions of these doctrines are Siewert 1998 and Williamson 2000.) Roughly and briefly: representationalism is the doctrine that phenomenal characters (various types of consciousness) are belief-like properties, in that they involve commitments to theses about how the world is—in particular, the environment of the subject, furnished with its tables and chairs. And attitude externalism is the doctrine that factive, or knowledge-like properties can be mental: while the instantiation of such a property may metaphysically necessitate some non-mental fact, it still marks out a purely mental natural kind.

Phenomenal Naivete is the doctrine that some phenomenal characters—especially those of visual perceptual experiences—are factive, or knowledge-like properties, in particular involving facts about the here-and-now environment of the subject (with its tables and chairs).[1] Roughly and briefly, viewed from a philosophy of mind perspective, Phenomenal Naivete implies that some modes of consciousness are not merely belief-like: they do not all merely take on commitments about the environment of the subject, but in fact in some cases *entail* facts about the subject's here-and-now environment; while viewed from an epistemology perspective, Phenomenal Naivete implies that not all knowledge-like properties concerning the subject's environment are merely non-conscious: they do not all at best have causal consequences for the form one's conscious experience takes on, but in fact in some cases *constitute* that form of consciousness.

The status of Phenomenal Naivete is significant for a range of branches of philosophy concerned with issues about perceptual consciousness. First, philosophers of consciousness address whether representational phenomenality can accommodate *content* externalism (Block, 1990; Shoemaker, 1994a; Lycan,

2001; Chalmers, 2004); a natural relative of this question is whether, as per Phenomenal Naivete, phenomenality can accommodate *attitude* externalism, on which externalist aspects of mental properties can stem from a factive, knowledge-like attitude borne toward the content. Next, epistemologists regard as prima facie plausible both the "internalist" doctrine that what justifies must be internally available, perhaps by being phenomenal (McDowell, 1982; Conee and Feldman, 2004; Smithies, 2006), and the "externalist" doctrine that what justifies must be factive (McDowell, 1982; Williamson, 2000); Phenomenal Naivete would reconcile these doctrines (at least for perceptual justification). Next, philosophers of perception interested in the metaphysical question of the natural kinds into which perceptual experiences are sorted may take seriously as a constraint on such theory the first-person perspective on perceptual experience (Sturgeon, 2000; Martin, 2004); Phenomenal Naivete concerns the first-person perspective on experience, and so, if true, provides just this sort of constraint. Finally, a central presupposition of the Husserlian tradition in phenomenology seems to be that phenomenal characters are non-factive intentional properties (Smith and Thomasson, 2003);[2] taking the notionally distinct doctrine of Phenomenal Naivete seriously might require addressing significant foundational questions.

Unfortunately, Phenomenal Naivete is also paradoxical. As I will argue, there are both a compelling phenomenological case for it, and a compelling argument from hallucination against it. This pattern—phenomenological argument in favor, argument from hallucination against—is in the tradition Hume established in "Skepticism concerning the senses" (Hume, 1739/1978, 210–11).[3] Accordingly, a goal of this paper is to defend the Humean view that there is indeed a serious conflict in our thinking about perceptual consciousness. If not properly quarantined, this paradoxicality threatens to spread throughout the regions of philosophy concerned with perceptual consciousness.

My plan in this article is as follows. Section 1 characterizes the thesis of Phenomenal Naivete, while section 2 describes the paradox surrounding it. Section 3 lays groundwork for treatment of the paradox, while section 4 assesses one style of such treatment, highlighting certain epistemological and metaphysical commitments of the concept of phenomenal character. Section 5 argues that these commitments are responsible for the *defectiveness* of the concept of phenomenal character, and describes a number of ways of teasing those commitments apart to provide replacements for that concept. Section 6 concludes with some methodological remarks, describing the branches of philosophy of mind in which each of the new concepts already, in effect, finds a home.

1. Phenomenal Naivete

I first explain what I mean by 'phenomenal character'; I then formulate Phenomenal Naivete.

1.1. Phenomenal Character

Among the mental episodes are the episodes of *experiencing*. These are the *conscious* or *phenomenally conscious* mental episodes: episodes which are like something for their subjects.

An *experience* is a particular episode of experiencing. Since it's not entirely clear what metaphysical category "experiences" fall into, I use the word 'episode' to somewhat vaguely label their metaphysical category. At a minimum, they are (on my use) particular or nonrepeatable; plausibly, they are more like events, states, processes, or activities, than like material bodies. I will make the (hopefully harmless) assumption that total experiences have a mereological structure, parts of which are also experiences: so that (for instance) your current total experience has a part which is an experience of seeing this page.

Although experiences come in many varieties—emotional experiences, experiences of thought, perceptual experiences of all modalities—I will be solely concerned with *visual perceptual* experiences. Among the visual perceptual experiences are those which (partially or exhaustively) constitute all episodes of seeing things as they are—the "veridical" experiences. Also included are such episodes of "visually hallucinating" as visual aspects of dreams, hallucinations properly so-called as those resulting from mescaline, such creatures of philosophical fiction as episodes of visual-like experiencing induced by vat-keepers, and the like; and the episodes of "illusion", cases in which one sees things as they aren't (as when one sees a white card spot-illuminated with blue light so that it looks blue; for more on the veridical/illusory/hallucinatory distinction, see Sturgeon 2000).

One way to introduce the terminology of *phenomenal character* is as applying to *determinates* of *phenomenal consciousness*, that property which all and only experiences share. By way of analogy, red, blue, lavender, and the maximally specific shades are determinates of *color*, or more-or-less specific ways for objects to be colored; similarly, the general phenomenal character of seeing a red round thing, the general phenomenal character of humming to oneself, the general phenomenal character of judging that it's raining, and the maximally specific phenomenal character had by my current experience, are determinates of phenomenal consciousness, or more-or-less specific ways for experiences to be phenomenally conscious.[4]

Another way to introduce the terminology is to think of the phenomenal character of an experience is as a part or aspect of what the experience is like for its subject. To get a sense for the relevant grammatical properties of 'phenomenal character', and metaphysical properties of phenomenal character, so understood, consider the following dialogue:

A: what was *e* like for you?
B: *F*.

For instance: Helen: "what was your experience of shooting Whittington like for you?" Dick: "strange and uncomfortable". Dick's answer to the question is given by a *predicate*—this is why I used the schematic letter '*F*' to represent the permissible answers to the initial question. If "*F*" is a true answer to the question "what was *e* like for you", then part of what *e* was like for B is: *F*. Since '*F*' is a predicate, it has a property as its semantic value, the property of *F*ness. So, if we are to reify some entity as a phenomenal character of *e*, the property *F*ness would fit the bill: in Dick's case, strange-and-uncomfortable-ness.[5]

When an experience has *F*ness as a phenomenal character—when it is *F* for its subject—I will sometimes say that the experience is *phenomenally F*.

I have been speaking of *a* phenomenal character of an experience, and *parts or aspects* of what the experience is like for its subject. Undoubtedly the totality of what any experience is like for its subject is tremendously complex, and no linguistic performance ever gives this totality in explicit full detail (though perhaps 'exactly like this' could capture all that detail nonexplicitly). If there is such a thing as *the* phenomenal character of an experience, it would be such a total extremely complex property. I count parts or aspects or determinables of this property as among the many phenomenal characters of an experience.

The terminology 'phenomenal character' has been used in ways that diverge from mine. For instance, sometimes 'phenomenal character' is used so as to apply to properties which are "most immediately present" in perceptual experiences, where putative examples of these are the alleged "ellipticality" of which one is aware when one sees a tilted penny, and the alleged "blueness" of which one is aware when one sees a white card under diffuse blue light. Setting aside concerns the existence of such properties and the intelligibility of the discourse of immediate presence, this usage clearly differs from mine: insofar as I have a grasp on such properties as the relevant sorts of "blueness" and "ellipticality", it seems that prima facie they can be instantiated by objects but cannot be instantiated by episodes; but on my use, "phenomenal characters" can prima facie be instantiated by episodes. (For the usage I reject, see Tye 1992; Dretske 1995; for more on the argument just mentioned, see Hellie 2006.) Similarly, my phenomenal characters include *more* properties than these: judgements lack phenomenal character on this usage, but (in my view) have phenomenal character on my usage.

Sometimes phenomenal character is held to be "ineffable" (Stalnaker, in preparation; Byrne, 2002; Hellie, 2004). A very strong reading of this ineffablist claim is that no predicate could have a phenomenal character as its semantic value; weaker readings are that no *public-language* predicate, or no public-language predicates *with robust contextually-invariant content* (unlike 'like this', the only contextually-invariant content of which is that its semantic value is a property) could do so. While there may be subtle arguments on behalf of one or other of these ineffablist theses, not even the weakest is plausible prima facie: in the dialogue above, Dick uses a public language predicate with robust contextually-invariant content to characterize what his experience was like for him.

1.2. Formulating Phenomenal Naivete

The report '*s* knows that *p*', of course, entails that *p*: knowledge reports are "factive". Williamson has famously argued that, despite this, 'knows that *p*' denotes a *mental* property (Williamson, 2000), even if the subject-matter of *p* is entirely nonmental.

A humdrum way of understanding this claim (which Williamson does not intend) is that knowledge reports *entail* propositions about the mental: it is clear that '*s* knows that *p*' entails that *s* has a mind and (very likely) that *s* believes that *p*. The humdrum sense would be that '*s* knows that *p*' entails the possession by *s* of a *partly* mental property, a property with *believing that p* (or *having a mind*) as a part, and some nonmental property as another part. Plausibly enough, for *F*ness to have *G*ness and *H*ness as parts is for *F*ness to be a conjunctive property with *G*ness and *H*ness as conjuncts; so if '*s* knows that *p*' denotes a partly mental property, it denotes a conjunctive property with *believing that p* as one of its conjuncts and some nonmental property or properties as its other conjunct or conjuncts. The pre-Gettier view that knowledge is justified true belief is a view of this form: on that view 'knows that *p*' denotes the conjunctive property *believing that p and doing so with justification and being such that p*. If *p* is a nonmental fact, being such that *p* is itself nonmental. Accordingly, while what 'knows that *p*' denotes is a partly mental property, it is also a partly nonmental property.

Williamson's view is that this is not how things are: it is rather (as I understand it) that there is a (natural, as opposed to "mere Cambridge" or gerrymandered) property *being a case of knowledge that p*, and this property is a *purely* mental property, with no nonmental conjunct. While it is not possible for this property to be instantiated by a mental episode unless that episode also instantiates the nonmental property *being such that p* and the mental property *being a belief that p*, the source of this necessity is something other than conjunctive structure in *being a case of knowledge that p*.[6]

I will say that a *factive purely mental property* is a property which is, like knowledge, factive and at least partly mental, and lacking any nonmental part. Whether *being a case of knowledge that p* is purely mental is less significant for present purposes than is whether the notion of the factive purely mental property is coherent. Williamson's extensive argumentation suggests to me that it is, hence the notion can be safely presupposed.

With this presupposition, we may consider the view that *some phenomenal characters* are factive purely mental properties. The *pure mentality* condition is important: phenomenal characters are paradigms of purely mental properties, so it would not be especially plausible to think that some phenomenal characters are only partly mental.

Certain ways of implementing the *factivist* view that some phenomenal characters are factive purely mental properties have an ancient if somewhat disreputable pedigree. Recall the Russell-Moore-Price view that "sensation" (perhaps a certain aspect of consciousness) involves "knowledge by acquaintance" (a

sort of knowledge) of "sense-data" (non-external entities, perhaps in the brain or the "cerebro-psychical complex") (Russell, 1912; Moore, 1957; Price, 1932/1950). A close relative of this sense-datum theory is the view that some phenomenal characters are factive purely mental properties, where the complement facts concern the internal world.

However, I want to consider a different implementation of factivism, on which the complement facts concern the *external* world, in particular the subject's here-and-now environment. I will call such a property a *naive* property, since a number of contemporary views in the philosophy of perception going under the rubric "naive realism" seem to make appeal to such properties (Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2006; Crane, 2006; Brewer, in preparation). Explicitly:

- A naive property is a factive purely mental property where the complement fact concerns non-response-dependent features of the subject's here-and-now environment.

We can then define the target version of factivism as follows:

Phenomenal Naivete
Phenomenal characters of veridical visual experiences are naive properties.[7,8]

For convenience, I will sometimes schematically refer to naive properties as *visual awareness that p*. So an example such naive property, perhaps instantiated by a visual experience as of a white picket fence, would be *being a case of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one*.

Some comments. First, I take no firm stand on what exact form the complement facts take: whether they are singular or general, or which properties they involve; only that they are facts about the subject's here-and-now environment. Second, note the restriction to *veridical* visual experiences, the purpose of which will become clear in section 2. Third, Phenomenal Naivete comes in strong (all phenomenal characters of veridical visual experiences are naive properties) and weak (some phenomenal characters of veridical visual experiences are naive properties) versions. My view is that *all* veridical visual experiences have *sufficiently many* naive properties to allow for highly accurate understanding of what such an experience is like for its subject if the naive properties that are its phenomenal characters are listed, and no such understanding could be acquired otherwise. But the case against Phenomenal Naivete will conclude that *no* possible experience has *any* naive property as a phenomenal character, so for the purpose of establishing that there is a paradox, only weak Phenomenal Naivete need be defended. Since the case for Phenomenal Naivete will support at least weak Phenomenal Naivete, paradox follows anyway; accordingly, I will remain vague about these quantificational issues (and will generally use the generic official formulation to be deliberately vague in this way).

A nearby relative of Phenomenal Naivete is *phenomenal relationism*, on which phenomenal characters of veridical visual experiences are purely mental relations of awareness to entities in the subject's environment (Campbell, 2002)

(I will sometimes write of the relation *awareness-of* as the relation posited by friends of this view): for instance, properties like *awareness of this tomato/some tomato*, or *awareness of this instance of redness*. Such properties are at least notionally distinct from factive properties, as they are not obviously specifiable with predicates involving clausal complements. The paradoxical character of Phenomenal Naivete transfers over straightforwardly to phenomenal relationism. I'm inclined to think that phenomenal relationism is inferior to Phenomenal Naivete in one respect, but superior in another. As we will see in section 2, the phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete actually works a bit better as a case for phenomenal relationism—getting a case for Phenomenal Naivete will require a bit of squinting at the data. On the other hand, Phenomenal Naivete may have certain advantages over phenomenal relationism in terms of yielding phenomenal characters which are sufficiently fine-grained (Hawthorne and Kovakovich, 2006). Efficiency of phrasing recommended choosing only one of these two doctrines as the target of this article; my choice of Phenomenal Naivete was arbitrary.

Phenomenal Naivete can be compared and contrasted with *representationalism* (Siewert, 1998; Byrne, 2001; Chalmers, 2004), the view that phenomenal characters are *representational properties* like *being a visual representation that p*. In turn, a representational property is a property, the instantiation of which by itself makes the instantiator subject to a certain norm of representational correctness. For instance, the property of *being a judgement that the sun is bright* is a representational property, as instantiation of that property by itself makes the instantiator subject to the norm of representational correctness *being representationally correct iff the sun is bright*.

Whether Phenomenal Naivete entails representationalism depends on subtle issues. Knowing that *p* (which is factive) entails believing that *p* (which is representational). But *being a case of visual awareness that p* does not obviously entail *being a visual representation that p*. If not, there is no clear path from Phenomenal Naivete to Representationalism. If so, there are two ways to argue that Phenomenal Naivete entails representationalism.

First, even if visual awareness entails visual representation, it is not obvious that a naive property would *by itself* confer subjection to a representational norm; perhaps this is conferred by the associated representational property, which is not phenomenal. Still, one might be skeptical about the notion of a property *by itself* conferring subjection to a norm; if so, perhaps entailment of the representational property is enough to render the factive property also representational.

Second, if having *F* entails having *G*, it may follow that having *F* as a phenomenal character entails having *G* as a phenomenal character. If this "phenomenality transfer" principle is correct, and if visual awareness entails visual representation, then any experience with a factive property as a phenomenal character would also have a representational property as a phenomenal character. But the transfer principle is not obvious: let *G* be the property of

being such that a certain fancy logical validity is true and let F be the property that my experience has as a phenomenal character; plausibly, F and G isn't a mental property, hence isn't among the phenomenal characters of my experience, despite F being among those phenomenal characters and F entailing F and G.

Limitations of space prevent further discussion of these issues.

2. A Paradox

Unfortunately, paradox looms. In this section, I provide a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete. I then advance a valid argument from hallucination against Phenomenal Naivete, the premisses of which also have strong prima facie support. The premisses of the argument and Phenomenal Naivete are therefore collectively inconsistent; since each of these claims is prima facie plausible, we are in the presence of a paradox in the sense of Sainsbury 1995.

2.1. A Phenomenological Case for Phenomenal Naivete

I will now make a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete (the next subsection will contrast my case with related cases for similar principles). Consider the following judgements:

> In its purely phenomenological aspect *seeing* is [...] ostensibly *prehensive* of the surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extended. [...] It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of speaking to say that seeing seems to "bring one into direct *contact* with *remote* objects" and to reveal their shapes and colours. (Broad, 1952, 32, 33)

> Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [...] an *immediate* consciousness of the existence of things outside of us. (Strawson, 1979, 97)

> When someone has a fact made manifest to him, [...] the obtaining of the fact is precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity. (McDowell, 1982, 390–1)

> Visual phenomenology makes it for a subject as if a scene is simply presented. Veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination seem to place objects and their features directly before the mind. (Sturgeon, 2000, 9)

> The ripe tomato seems immediately present to me in experience. I am not in any way aware of any cognitive distance between me and the scene in front of me; the fact that what I'm doing is representing the world is clearly not itself part of the experience. The world is just there. (Levine, 2006, 179)

Call this list of judgements *list L*. I contend that reflection on list L provides strong support for Phenomenal Naivete. Roughly and briefly, the line of

thought runs: the experts find something like Phenomenal Naivete obvious upon introspection; therefore we should accept it.

We can make this line of thought more precise and explicit. First, let "phenomenological study" be, roughly, the standard way we find out about phenomenal character from the first-person perspective, and any of its refinements (I will return to the notion of phenomenological study at greater length in section 3). Then, the case consists of the following two premisses:

I. If a judgement ascribes a property to an experience, and that judgement is the result of expert phenomenological study under ideal circumstances, then that property is among the experience's phenomenal characters.

(By "ideal circumstances", I mean those which are in general optimal for phenomenological study—one is not drunk, has enough time to make the judgement, understands what one is doing, has given enough attention to a variety of alternate descriptions, and so forth.[9]) And second:

II. The judgements on list *L* . . .
   (a) . . . were made concerning veridical experiences under ideal circumstances by experts at phenomenological study;
   (b) . . . are the results of phenomenological study;
   (c) . . . attribute naive properties.

Phenomenal Naivete follows validly (at least restricted to the experiences addressed on list *L*; and since, plausibly, nothing is special about those experiences, also unrestrictedly).

Concerning premiss (I). One line of defense of this premiss would run as follows: phenomenological study is specially well suited to find out which phenomenal characters experiences have. Judgements reached by phenomenological study are, of course, fallible: otherwise there would not be phenomenological dispute. But this is what we should anticipate from any empirical discipline: there is always room for dispute about how to describe the data. Still, under ideal circumstances, misdescription will be eliminated. Accordingly, under such circumstances, a judgement about an experience to the effect that it is *F* based on phenomenological study will be accurate, so that *F*ness is among the phenomenal characters of the experience.

Now to premiss (II). Concerning part (a): prima facie, we should regard Broad and the rest as experts at phenomenological study, and there is no reason to doubt that their circumstances were ideal for phenomenological study. Of course it is coherent to suppose that the judgements on list *L* all embed some error, and so count as misdescriptions of experience: in Hellie 2006, I present a candidate explanation of the prevalence of the type of judgement on list *L* in light of its falsity (so that either Broad and the rest were not really experts

or their circumstances were not really ideal). Still, in this article I will give the judgements on list *L* the benefit of the doubt.

Concerning part (b): is what each of these authors up to "phenomenological study" in the relevant sense? Each is clearly engaging in first-person reporting: this is suggested by the language of the "purely phenomenological aspect", how experience "presents itself", and of the subject's "subjectivity", of how "visual phenomenology makes it" for the subject, of the "phenomenal character" of the visual experience, of how things "seem in the experience". None of this suggests that the remarks are based on anything other than first-person warrant. Moreover, at least several of these remarks strongly suggest that getting *behind* or *beyond* the phenomena is no part of the author's intention. Consider the language of "*purely* phenomenological aspect", how experience "*presents* itself", and of how "visual *phenomenology* makes it". None of this suggests an attempt to bring in, say, knowledge of cognitive science, or even the knowledge that the experience is veridical on the basis of its coherence with past experience, or any other knowledge. The most natural interpretation is that they are trying to describe a determinate of *phenomenal consciousness* instantiated by their perceptual experience.

Finally, concerning part (c): note the metaphors of "prehension", "contact", "immediacy", "non-externality", "simple presentation", "placement directly before the mind", "immediate presence", absence of "distance", and being "just there". Of course, these authors differ on just what it is that is presented—McDowell takes the objects of presentation to be facts, the rest take them to be more like objects and "their properties" (perhaps tropes), "things", and "scenes". (This is why I announced earlier that phenomenal relationism may have superior phenomenological credentials to Phenomenal Naivete.) Still, the thrust of the metaphorical language they choose seems to revolve around a common core of a metaphor of *direct presence*. The pervasiveness of this metaphor is not a mere artifact of recent anglophone philosophy: I argue elsewhere that it is also a feature of early modern discourse about perceptual experience (Hellie, 2001).[10]

As for myself, I also find these metaphors appropriate upon phenomenological study. I would do so even if my current experience had been—bizarrely—discontinuously preceded by an experience as of floating above a meadow.

By way of contrast, compare the experience of seeing your mother with that of merely imagining her, or thinking about her. Hume famously observed the excess in "force and vivacity" of the former sort of experience over the latter. I don't think this is a fully general way of getting at the difference between perceptual and imaginative or thought phenomenology: a faint glimpse may be less forceful as an experience than a powerful visual memory or a thought one cannot shake. Still, another contrast seems to me to be undeniable. Namely, in seeing my mother, we judge on the basis of phenomenological study that the experience makes my mother directly present to me, but in imagining or thinking of my mother, she is "outside" the mental episode: my awareness of her is mediated by a mental image, or by a condition of representational correctness.

What then does the metaphor of direct presence amount to? I find it hard to resist interpreting it as concerning the possession by perceptual experiences of naive properties. Naive properties are purely mental, not consisting of a mental part and a nonmental part. Accordingly, when a subject's experience instantiates a naive property, the fact about the subject's environment that the naive property involves is a constituent of one's mental life: the status as mental of the naive property spreads all the way out to the fact. It is in this sense of mental encompassment of facts about the environment that experiences with naive properties place one in "contact" with the environment, or make it "immediately present" to one.

By contrast, if one's experience merely represents that *p* while *p* is true, there must be a fact that *p*, but—since true representing that *p* is not a purely mental property—this fact is beyond the domain of the mental. The mental, in this case, extends only as far as establishing a condition of representational correctness. As it happens, since the representing is true, this condition "meshes" with a fact, but this fact is not itself brought within the domain of the mental. So it seems that nothing less than factivity (or relationality) will suffice for the sort of contact the metaphors suggest.

2.2. Comparison and Contrast

I will briefly contrast the style and conclusion of my argument with those of others that might be given for views similar to Phenomenal Naivete.

First, Phenomenal Naivete should be contrasted with the popular view that visual experience has a phenomenology of "diaphanousness" or "transparency".[11] It is not always entirely clear what this view amounts to, but we can distinguish two interpretations. The *severe* interpretation is that when one experiences as of a green tree, phenomenological study does not reveal any features which are not features of the tree (its color, shape, and such): no mental features are apparent. In particular, one's being visually aware of the tree's color and shape (or that the tree has a certain color and shape) is not revealed. The *mild* interpretation is that while certain mental features are revealed by phenomenological study, these are such nonspecific features as that one is in some way aware of the tree's greenness, shape, and the like: the form of this awareness—whether it is representational or factive—is not revealed.

These views may well be closer to the truth than are the natural phenomenological predictions of the sense-datum theory, or the view that all phenomenal characters are rationally-neutral qualities. Still, by comparison with Phenomenal Naivete, diaphanousness seems both less well supported by phenomenological study and less in line with a long history of expert testimony.[12]

Next, Phenomenal Naivete should be contrasted with the claim that phenomenal characters of visual experience are de re representational properties. At least some of the phenomenal characters of visual experience do not seem to be such properties: prima facie, when I imagine my cat Ben, the phenomenal

character of my imaginative experience involves de re representation of Ben, But this phenomenal character is very different from that of any visual experience. De re representation is insufficient to generate a phenomenology of direct presence. (That said, some of the phenomenal characters of visual experience may be de re *naive* properties.)

Next, my argument does not involve the assumption that it is an article of common sense that veridical experiences have naive properties (cf. Hawthorne and Kovakovich, 2006). Premiss (II) in the case for Phenomenal Naivete explicitly concerns the view of experts, upon engaging in a style of investigation which, for all the argument is committed to, may be esoteric. Still, I also do not *deny* that it is an article of common sense that veridical experiences have naive properties; if it is, this may be due to phenomenological study not being so esoteric after all, and our all being experts. Still, my argument stands or falls independently of considerations about common sense.

Next, other sorts of case for Phenomenal Naivete (or its relatives) may be available. For instance, Campbell (2002) advances a semantic case for phenomenal relationism. If they are concerned with the phenomenal, in my sense, McDowell (1982) and Martin (2006, p. 355, on "Humean skepticism") advance epistemological cases for Phenomenal Naivete/relationism (respectively). Whether these arguments succeed is beyond the scope of this article.

Next, Peacocke (1993) and Williamson (2000) advance a case that veridical experiences have factive (or relational) purely mental features, based on general considerations about the "externalist" character of much psychological causal explanation of successful action. Further argumentation would be required to extract Phenomenal Naivete from such considerations, since such explanations may concern only nonphenomenal functional properties.

Finally, the argument does not establish anything as strong as the view that veridical experiences have naive properties *essentially*, or that naive properties mark out the *fundamental kinds* of such experiences (Martin, 2004, 2006). Clearly, to advance these views at this stage would require further argumentation (perhaps involving a defense of the Husserlian view that the phenomenal character of an experience gives its essence, or the more contemporary view that experiences are "typed" by their phenomenal character).

2.3. An Argument from Hallucination

The argument against Phenomenal Naivete that I will now present is a version of the "argument from hallucination" (the next subsection will contrast my argument with other versions of the argument from hallucination). As Snowdon (1992) has argued, classical versions of this argument can be interpreted as proceeding in two stages, a "base case" in which it is argued that hallucinatory experience is a certain way, and a "spreading step" in which it is argued that if hallucinatory experience is that way, so is veridical experience; my argument too will have that form.

Here are my premisses (the quantifiers range over both actual and possible experiences):

Base
No phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience is a naive property.

Spreading
If some phenomenal character of a veridical experience is a naive property, some phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience is that same naive property.

The negation of Phenomenal Naivete follows validly from Base and Spreading. In Snowdonesque form, Base establishes that hallucinatory experience has a certain feature (lacking naive phenomenal characters); the contrapositive of Spreading then spreads that feature over to veridical experience.

Each of Base and Spreading seems to me to have strong prima facie plausibility. First, consider Base. Suppose that Bill falls asleep on a lawn facing a white picket fence, and dreams of lying on a lawn facing a white picket fence. Is Bill visually aware, in his dream, that a white picket fence is before him? No! To accept this would be to accept that dreams (or, analogously, visual experiences resulting from ingesting hallucinogenic drugs or from the machinations of short-term vat-keepers) can provide us with the same sort of psychological contact with our environments as veridical experiences. Rejection of this sort of superstitious collapse of the distinction between seeing and dreaming is central to a reasonable world-view.

Now, consider Spreading. A straightforward way to establish this premiss appeals to an intuition concerning phenomenal character, and a modal claim. The intuition is the doctrine of *phenomenal internalism*, the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is necessitated (metaphysically, or at least among worlds sharing the actual psychophysical laws) by the physiological features of the brain of the subject undergoing the experience. The modal claim is that for any possible experience (at least any experience in a subject with a brain), a duplicate of the experiencing brain could be undergoing neither veridical nor illusory experience (for instance, if it were floating in a vat of nutrients while being appropriately electrically stimulated, it would not be seeing any objects in its here-and-now environment, hence neither veridically nor illusorily experiencing). Phenomenal internalism and the modal claim clearly entail Spreading (take my current experience; by the modal claim, I have a vat duplicate who is, if experiencing at all, hallucinating; by phenomenal internalism, the vat duplicate is experiencing, and its experience has the same phenomenal character as mine).

Unfortunately, phenomenal internalism is highly controversial (adherents are Shoemaker (1994a); Thau (2002); Chalmers (2004); opponents are Tye (2000); Lycan (2001); Fish (in preparation)).

For those who reject phenomenal internalism, another case for Spreading goes by reflection on the possibility of the sort of dream skeptics discuss: plausibly, one could have a dream which had no "phenomenal bulge" over one's current experience of seeing, and vice versa. But one's current experience and such a dream would share all their phenomenal characters, in line with Spreading.

For those who lack the intuition about phenomenal bulge, or regard it as nonprobative, the appendix contains a painstaking case for Spreading.

Base, Spreading, and Phenomenal Naivete are jointly inconsistent; each is prima facie plausible; so we have a paradox. The idea that there is something paradoxical about the sense of immediate perceptual presence of the external world originates in Hume's view that the "universal and primary opinion of all men" that those things "presented by the senses" are entities in the external world is "soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy", and is advanced in the analytic tradition by Russell (1912); Moore (1925); Broad (1923); Price (1932/1950); Ayer (1940); Valberg (1992); Robinson (1994); Martin (2004); and Sturgeon (2008). Limitations of space prevent detailed discussion of the arguments of each of these authors.

2.4. Comparison and Contrast

I briefly contrast my argument with other arguments from hallucination.

First, the conclusion of my argument is purely negative. It does not attempt to establish any particular set of assumptions about what the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences *are*. There are many alternative features experiences might have as their phenomenal characters (representational features, rationally-neutral qualities, sense-datum properties), so no determinate positive conclusion on these issues could be returned without comparison of these alternatives.

Next, the conclusion of my negative case concerns only the *phenomenal* features of visual experiences. It is commonplace to distinguish between phenomenal and nonphenomenal representation; clearly when knowledge is stored in a nonconscious belief, that counts as nonphenomenal knowledge (and if it is purely mental and concerns the environment, it is also in our sense "naive"). So for all the negative case is concerned, veridical experiences may still have naive features *nonphenomenally*. Indeed, such features may even mark out the essences of such experiences, or the "fundamental kinds" to which they belong. For while the direct analogue of Base for such properties is extremely plausible, the analogue of Spreading lacks any immediate plausibility: attitude externalists will not hesitate to accept that veridical and hallucinatory experiences could differ in their nonphenomenal properties.

To extend my argument to establish that veridical experiences do not instantiate naive features (even nonphenomenally), the implausible claim is needed that for properties in some class including the naive properties, if an experience instantiates one of these properties, it has it as a phenomenal

character. To establish that naive properties do not mark out the essences or fundamental kinds of veridical experiences, the more plausible claim would be required that for properties in a class including the naive properties, if one of these properties marks out the essence or "fundamental kind" of an experience, the experience has it as a phenomenal character, perhaps along the "Husserlian" lines gestured at in section 2.2.

Next, the conclusions of my argument concern the status as phenomenal characters of *naive properties*, as contrasted with, notably, representational properties with wide content. To tweak my argument to establish that veridical experiences do not have representational phenomenal characters with, say, singular content, or wide color content, would require strong assumptions to establish the appropriate analogue of either Base or Spreading.[13]

If *dreams* are the exemplars of hallucinations, there is difficulty establishing the analogue of Base. For wide color content, the analogue would be that no hallucinatory experience has a representational phenomenal property with wide color content. But this is obviously much less plausible than Base: the ability to entertain a wide color content is acquired through a pattern of interactions with the whole world over a long time; conditions in the here and now are not so important. By contrast, the ability to instantiate a naive property is highly dependent on the here and now. For singular content, the analogue would be that no hallucinatory experience instantiates a representational phenomenal property with content *de re* concerning a particular figure. Here matters are a bit more controversial, but my intuition is that singular representation in dreams is no more problematic than singular representation in veridical experience: if my veridical perceptions of my cat Ben represent him de re, then, plausibly, so do my dreams about that cat. Once again, the dreams can acquire this singular content due to a history of interactions with Ben, regardless of my lack of here and now contact.

Alternatively, suppose the exemplars of hallucinations are cases in which one is cut off from the normal widespread patterns undergirding content, such as the hallucinations of the envatted brain in a colorless and Ben-less world. While the relevant analogue of Base is then quite obviously correct, the relevant analogue of Spreading is much less so. After all, it is hard to see how any principle weaker than phenomenal internalism (as discussed in the previous subsection) would generate the spreading analogue, but phenomenal internalism is controversial.

Brentano held that intentionality is the "mark of the mental". Perhaps Brentano was attracted to this view due to a recognition that if it were true, hallucination would not have much bearing on claims about the phenomenal.

If Phenomenal Naivete is weakened by abandoning either the requirement of phenomenality or the requirement of factivity, the resulting doctrine seems, therefore, to be immune to direct attack by any argument of the form I have presented here. I wager that Phenomenal Naivete is the weakest view vulnerable to such attack, and accordingly to Humean paradox.

3. Phenomenal Appearance

Prior to discussing strategies for resolving the paradox, I will describe a notion that will be central in that discussion, the notion of *phenomenal appearance*. (This will be seen to not obviously be a mere relabeling of phenomenal character.) Roughly and briefly, the phenomenal appearance of an experience is that to which "phenomenological study" (as discussed in section 2.1) of that experience is correctly aligned. After expanding on that description in greater detail, I will describe a certain thesis about the relation between phenomenal appearance and phenomenological study, arguing that this thesis explains certain significant features of phenomenological study. This consequence will be used to argue for a certain thesis about the distribution of phenomenal appearances: roughly, every experience of every mature human subject has a phenomenal appearance.

Now to phenomenal appearance: begin by considering appearance more generally. As I write this, it looks to me as if there is a computer before me and sounds to me as if fingers are clicking on a keyboard. Plausibly, the fact that it looks to me as if p and the fact that it visually appears to me are the same fact, and the fact that it sounds to me as if p and the fact that it auditorily appears to me are the same fact. This suggests that looking-to-one and sounding-to-one are determinates of a more general phenomenon of *appearing-to-one*. Plausibly appearance-to-one extends beyond the perceptual, to include apparent memory, as well as perhaps a priori intuitions of certain mathematical or philosophical principles. Three features of appearing-to-one will be significant.

First, appearing-to-one has a sort of basic justificatory power. On a "liberal" conception (Pryor, 2004), this justificatory power works along the following lines, which I adapt from Pryor 2000:[14]

> When o appears F to you, you consciously have a kind of justification for believing of o that it is F that does not presuppose or rest on your justification for anything else. To have this prima facie justification for believing of o that it is F, o need only appear F to you. No further awareness or reflection or background beliefs are required. Of course, other beliefs you have might defeat or undermine this justification. But no other beliefs are required for it to be in place.

This story is prima facie plausible as an elucidation of the connection between appearance-to-one and justification; for sake of concreteness, I will assume it.[15]

Second, episodes of appearing-to-one are themselves conscious. When something visually appears red to me, that it does so is not a fact of which I am entirely unaware.

Third, the determinates of appearing-to-one are distinguished by their *manners*: *visually* appearing-to-one (looking-to-one), *auditorily* appearing-to-one (sounding-to-one), *memorially* appearing-to-one, perhaps *intuitively*

appearing-to-one, and so forth. Plausibly, the distinction between the visual and tactual manners of appearing amounts to the justification one possesses resulting from mental capacities falling into *numerically differing mental kinds*: for *o* to *visually* appear-to-one *F* is for one's possession of the relevant justification to stem from a mental capacity falling into one kind (namely, vision); for *o* to *tactually* appear-to-one *F* is for one's possession of the relevant justification to stem from a mental capacity falling into a different kind (namely, hearing); and so forth. The age-old problem of distinguishes these kinds (Grice, 1962) is still debated; fortunately, my characterization does not take sides in this debate.

Phenomenal appearances are no exception: *o* phenomenally appears *F* to one just in case one has the relevant sort of conscious justification, and this justification is generated by a certain distinctive capacity; specifically a capacity meeting the following three conditions. First, the capacity is numerically distinct from the perceptual capacities (it is "first-personal"), as well as the memorial, and intuitive capacities (though it might "borrow" elements from these other capacities, as on certain "displaced perception" theories of introspection); second, it provides one with appearances of only conscious episodes in one's own mental life; and third, if an episode appears *F* thanks to that capacity, *F*ness is presented as a determinate of the property *phenomenal consciousness*. These last two criteria together imply that the sorts of judgement justified by a capacity of the right sort have form '*F*ness is a determinate of *phenomenal consciousness* and is instantiated by this conscious episode in my mental life'.[16]

Are there any phenomenal appearances? Indeed there are: as I will argue, a number of features of phenomenological study can be explained on the assumption that phenomenological study involves a certain relation (to be specified) to phenomenal appearances. Let's take a closer look at phenomenological study. Four features stand out.

First, phenomenological study is not a matter of making up a judgement willynilly where anything goes: rather, it is a form of investigation, in which one's judgement can be epistemically justified or epistemically unjustified. If, in the course of phenomenological study of my current visual experience, I judge that my visual experience is *auditory*, or *fourteen pounds in weight*, or *divisible by 5*, my judgement would be wild, unconstrained, unreasonable, without epistemic justification. (Analogously, if, in the course of visually describing a certain postage stamp with a normal visual appearance, I judge it to have any of these properties, my judgement would be similarly without epistemic justification.) By contrast, if I judge it to be a case of seeing text appear on a computer screen, this judgement would seem reasonable.

Second, I have this epistemic justification *consciously*: I am not entirely unaware of it.

Third, phenomenological study involves a certain distinctive method or capacity. By this I don't mean to make any specially precise pronouncements about what this method is, any more than I would dare to make specially precise pronouncements about any other empirical epistemic method. Still, somewhat

vague pronouncements can be made. Phenomenological study is "first-personal", in the sense that the object of inquiry does not extend beyond episodes in one's own mental life, and the sources of epistemic justification in such inquiry exclude sources which can justify judgements about other issues, such as perception or memory.

Fourth, in contrast with a broader notion of "introspection", legitimate outcomes of phenomenological study are further restricted, to include only judgements about one's own *conscious* episodes, to the effect that they instantiate certain determinates of *phenomenal consciousness*.

These features are explicable on the basis of the following plausible supposition about the nature of phenomenological study:

- To engage in phenomenological study is to attempt to judge in such a way that the contents of one's judgements duplicate the contents of the phenomenal appearances-to-one.[17]

The applicability of standards of epistemic justification to phenomenological study is then explained by the fact that phenomenal appearances are appearances, and can therefore justify or fail to justify judgements. The status of these standards as conscious is explained by the fact that phenomenal appearances are appearances, and therefore conscious. The first-person character of phenomenological study is explained by the distinctness of any capacity that generates phenomenal appearances from perception, memory, and rational intuition. And the restriction on the contents of the judgements reasonably formed in phenomenological study is explained by the restriction on the contents of phenomenal appearances.

If this argument is on track, it follows that:

(1) No mental episode is a potential object of phenomenological study by one unless that episode phenomenally appears some way to one.

We can use (1) to yield a further result about the distribution of phenomenal appearances:

(2) If one is a mature human being with a reasonable degree of "rationality, intelligence, and so on" (Shoemaker, 1994b, p. 244), then all and only one's experiences phenomenally appear some way to one.

I will argue that (2) provides a clear replacement for an alluring but unclear claim.

Anyone who has thought about consciousness and phenomenological study for a reasonable amount of time has doubtless found something like the following thought attractive:

(3) If one is a mature human being with a reasonable degree of rationality, intelligence, and so on, then all and only one's experiences are potential objects of phenomenological study by one.

Something in the ballpark of (3) is doubtless correct. Still, thanks to the modal 'potential', it is crucially unclear: if one is being chased by a tiger, hence very unlikely to turn one's attention inward, in what sense is one's experience a "potential" object of phenomenological study?

I think the allure of (3) can be explained by (2): the latter is a highly natural claim in the ballpark of the former but without any of the unclarity due to the existence of the modal; in light of (1), the truth of (2) would establish a bright line outer limit of availability for phenomenological study of the sort we might well have had in mind when contemplating (3).

Moreover, I can't think of any obvious counterexamples to (2): the nonconscious mental episodes posited by cognitive scientists, or the nonconscious contents of one's conscious thoughts, do not phenomenally appear any way to me, though I may be able to infer to them from features which phenomenally appear to me; conversely, even the faintest sensation of tingling in my elbow is phenomenally apparent to me; and it is at least not obvious that when one is being chased by a tiger, one's visual experiences do not phenomenally appear some way to one.

I don't know whether (2) is plausibly extended to other subjects, such as dogs or small children. Since facts about the distribution of phenomenal appearance will prove central to the remainder of the discussion, I will henceforth restrict the discussion to experiences of mature humans with a reasonable degree of rationality, intelligence, and so on (so if I say 'all experiences are *F*', I mean 'all experiences in mature humans with … are *F*'; in fn. 34, I will discuss the consequences of withdrawing this restriction). Also, for convenience I will usually drop the qualifier 'to its subject' from ascriptions of phenomenal appearance.

4. Rejectionism

How should we react to a transparently valid paradox? The most straightforward approach is *rejectionism*: the strategy of arguing that one of the premisses in the paradox is false while explaining away the allure of that premiss. In this section, I will canvas what seem to me to be the most serious options for a rejectionist treatment of our paradox. I first describe a way to reject Base by appeal to a doctrine in the metaphysics of consciousness; I then describe a way to reject either Spreading or Phenomenal Naivete by appeal to a doctrine in the epistemology of consciousness. Unfortunately for the rejectionist, neither of these doctrines is plausible.

4.1. Metaphysical Rejectionism

Our first rejectionist weakens the premiss in the inconsistent triad which *deprives* certain experiences of certain phenomenal characters, namely Base. According to this approach, the premiss is false because phenomenality is grounded in phenomenal appearance; accordingly, I call this approach *metaphysical rejectionism*.

The metaphysical rejectionist supplies the following claim in lieu of Base:

Instantial Base

No hallucinatory experience *instantiates* any naive property.

Instantial Base is without a doubt true. But it is distinct from Base only if the following claim is false:

Instantiation

If an experience has a property as a phenomenal character, it instantiates that property.

Maybe Instantiation looks like a tautology. There is a way of interpreting its "grammar" on which it would: if 'phenomenal' is interpreted as restricting the *type* or *determinable* to which the properties quantified over belong. Analogously: 'If an object has a property as a *biological* character, it instantiates that property'. Here 'biological' restricts the properties quantified over to such instances as *being a cat*; accordingly, instances of the principle would be conditionals like 'if Ben has *being a cat* as his biological character, he instantiates *being a cat*'. Obviously, all such instances are true.

However, perhaps 'phenomenal' is *intensional*, like 'apparent'. Analogously: 'If an entity has a property as an *apparent* character, it instantiates that property'. This principle has such false instances as 'if this white card under a blue spotlight has *being blue* as its apparent character, it instantiates *being blue*'.

Here's another example (this time somewhat contrived) of a discourse within which a principle similar in form to the denial of Instantiation is coherent. A color agnostic who (sensibly) accepts that things appear and are believed to be colored might express a claim they take to be epistemically possible by saying 'the sky has blueness *as its color*, but the sky is not blue'. This theorist would be using 'as its color' to mean something like 'assuming (perhaps contrary to fact) that things are as they appear in regard to color' or 'according to the (perhaps false) theory of color believed by the folk'. Unpacking, the sensible agnostic's claim would amount to something like 'assuming that things are as they appear in regard to color, the sky has blueness, but (canceling the assumption) the sky is not blue', or 'according to the fictional theory of color believed by the folk, the sky has blueness, but (outside the fiction) the sky is not blue'.

The sensible color agnostic thinks of colors as *fictions*: characters in a story about the truth-value of which the theorist remains neutral; in this case, the story is the theory of color believed by the folk.

The metaphysical rejectionist can take a page from the sensible color agnostic, and regard phenomenal characters as fictions in this sense. What is the story within which phenomenal characters are characters? A natural answer is suggested by (2): according to that principle, all and only conscious experiences have phenomenal appearances; regarding the phenomenal characters of an experience to be the properties it phenomenally appears to have would therefore be consistent with the prima facie true claim that all and only conscious experiences have phenomenal characters. So, the fictionalist about phenomenal characters says that for e to have Fness as a phenomenal character is for e to phenomenally appear F.[18]

This fictionalist doctrine can serve as the basis of a rejectionist approach to the paradox. On the fictionalist view, Instantiation says in effect that if an experience phenomenally appears F, it is F. If phenomenal appearance can mislead, this will have false instances. Since we have no argument that it cannot, there is no sound argument on the table from Instantial Base to Base; hence paradox is avoided. The allure of Base can be explained as follows. Instantial Base is obviously correct, and Instantiation is alluring: if something appears F, we tend to judge that it is that way; accordingly, we notice no counterexamples to Instantiation; hence we tend to go along with it.

4.2. Against Metaphysical Rejectionism

Unfortunately, this fictionalist view of phenomenal characters is incompatible with a partial definition of 'phenomenal character', the first way we introduced that concept in section 1.1 (along with a bit of metaphysics and the obvious truth that some experiences are phenomenally conscious).

Plausibly, if a given token of a determinable is instantiated in x, and that token is determined in a certain way, x also instantiates some token of that determinate. (Consider a red paint chip: that chip's token of redness is determined in a certain way—say, as scarletness—so that chip instantiates a scarletness token.) Even if our experiences have fictional aspects, they surely instantiate the determinable *phenomenal consciousness*. So if a certain token of this is instantiated in e, and that token is determined as Fness, then e instantiates an Fness token, hence Fness. The first way we introduced the concept of phenomenal character was as applying to the determinates of *phenomenal consciousness*; by this definition, Fness is e's phenomenal character. So e instantiates its phenomenal character, against the fictionalist.

Our first way of introducing the concept of phenomenal character is not parochial to the current discussion; rather, this concept of phenomenal character is in play elsewhere in the literature on consciousness. Consider

the literature on arguments against materialism (Chalmers, 2006): the central arguments run as follows. A first step dispatches consciousness eliminativists on the ground of a posteriori evidence that our experiences instantiate *phenomenal consciousness*. A second step argues that phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to any physical property: for instance, the zombie argument proceeds from the conceivability of experiences microphysically identical to ours but lacking phenomenal consciousness; the inversion argument proceeds from the conceivability of microphysically identical subjects whose experiences take on the same determinate of *phenomenal consciousness* when they see red as ours do when we see green; the knowledge argument proceeds from the lack of a priori deducibility from the physical of the specific determinate of consciousness our experiences instantiate when we see red. So some instantiated property is not reducible to any physical property, so physicalism is actually false.

The concept of phenomenal character is employed in this literature, but it is only useful in the inversion and knowledge arguments; in those arguments, the only relevant entities to serve as its semantic values are the determinates of *phenomenal consciousness*.

4.3. Epistemological Rejectionism

Our second rejectionist weakens one or both of the premisses in the inconsistent triad which *ascribe* phenomenal characters to experiences, namely Phenomenal Naivete and Spreading. According to this approach, though the premiss is false, it phenomenally appears true. This rift between appearance and reality earns the approach the name *epistemological rejectionism*. (This sort of approach is discussed at length in Martin 2004, 2006.)

The epistemological rejectionist supplies one (or both) of the following claims in lieu of the rejected premiss:

> **Apparent Naivete**
> Veridical visual experiences phenomenally appear to have naive properties.

> **Apparent Spreading**
> If some veridical experience phenomenally appears to have a naive property, some hallucinatory experience phenomenally appears to have that same naive property.

If phenomenal appearances can be misleading, Apparent Naivete fails to imply Phenomenal Naivete, and Apparent Spreading fails to imply Spreading.

These replacement principles are plausible. By (2), the appeal to phenomenal appearances is not grounds for objection. Apparent Spreading is defended at

length in the appendix. Apparent Naivete follows validly from premiss (II) from section 2.1 and the following modification of premiss (I):

I*. If a judgement ascribes a property to an experience, and that judgement is the result of expert phenomenological study under ideal circumstances, then the experience phenomenally appears to have that property.

On behalf of (I*), I argued in section 3 that to engage in phenomenal study is to attempt to judge in such a way that the contents of one's judgements duplicate the contents of the phenomenal appearances-to-one. Plausibly, departures from expertise and ideal conditions are undesirable just for the reason that one's attempts are liable to fail; if so, then experts in ideal conditions succeed in these attempts. (I*) is therefore a straightforward consequence of the concept of ideal expert phenomenological study.

Which replacement principle the epistemological rejectionist advances will covary with commitments on phenomenal similarity of veridical and hallucinatory experiences. A *common factor* theorist thinks that veridical and hallucinatory experiences that phenomenally appear the same have duplicate phenomenal natures (for instance, both share certain phenomenal representational properties and lack any phenomenal naive properties). Since this theorist thinks that whatever psychological features the veridical experience instantiates, the hallucinatory experience instantiates, they should accept Spreading. This theorist would also advance Apparent Naivete in lieu of Phenomenal Naivete: the veridical experience fails to instantiate the naive phenomenal it phenomenally appears to have. By contrast, a *disjunctive* theorist denies that such veridical and hallucinatory experiences will have duplicate phenomenal natures (thinking, for instance, that the veridical experience has phenomenal naive properties but the hallucinatory experience does not). This theorist would accept Phenomenal Naivete (thinking that the veridical experience phenomenally appears to have and has phenomenal naive properties), but reject Spreading for Apparent Spreading, thinking that the hallucinatory experience phenomenally appears the same as the veridical experience, but the phenomenal appearance of the hallucinatory experience is misleading. (For more on disjunctive and common factor views, see Sturgeon 2000; Byrne and Logue 2008.)

Either way, the epistemological rejectionist has a straightforward explanation of the allure of the rejected premiss(es): it *phenomenally appears* to be true, and we tend to take phenomenal appearance for granted when making judgements of phenomenal character.

Of course, epistemological rejectionism is an option only if the following principle is false:

Revelation
An experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property just in case it has that property as a phenomenal character.[19]

Adding Revelation to the replacement premisses brings back the original premisses.

Actually, Revelation is stronger than needed. Revelation is the conjunction of these claims:

> **Infallibility**
> If an experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property, it has that property as a phenomenal character;

> **Self-intimation**
> An experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property if it has that property as a phenomenal character.

According to Infallibility, phenomenal appearance cannot *mislead* about phenomenal character. Phenomenal appearance also cannot *extend beyond* phenomenal character: it cannot happen that phenomenal appearance reveals some *non-phenomenal* mental property of an experience. According to Self-intimation, phenomenal character cannot be *hidden* from phenomenal appearance: it cannot happen that, while some property is a phenomenal character of an experience, the experience does not phenomenally appear to have it.

The epistemological rejectionist can happily endorse Self-intimation, but must reject Infallibility. It is Infallibility which, together with Apparent Naivete, entails Phenomenal Naivete, and, together with Apparent Spreading, entails Spreading.

The name 'Revelation' is borrowed from Johnston 1992. The discussion of Revelation-like theses has been most popular in Johnston's original context, namely the metaphysics of color.[20] The status of the present Revelation thesis is at least as deserving of attention as its relative concerning the metaphysics of color: while colors are prima facie external to the mind, what is a better candidate for full revelation to consciousness than consciousness itself?

4.4. Against Epistemological Rejectionism

Unfortunately for the epistemological rejectionist, Revelation seems true.[21]

First, consider the second way we introduced the concept of phenomenal character, as *part of what an experience is like for its subject*. I tend to hear this slippery notion as meaning something like *how the experience is from its subject's perspective*; and this in turn in terms of *how the experience appears to the subject* in some respect. The only plausible such respect is *phenomenal* appearance; so to my ear, the phenomenal characters are just the phenomenally apparent features, in line with Revelation.[22] Consider also the terminology of *phenomenal* character: in its original sense, 'phenomenal' means 'apparent'; perhaps we find this terminology attractive because of a tacit commitment to Revelation.

Second, counterexamples to Revelation seem to be very difficult to envisage or conceive of, and indeed we vigorously reject the idea that there might be a counterexample.

Consider counterexamples to Infallibility. While not *everything* is the way it appears (if a white card is illuminated with a blue spotlight, and someone looks at it, it will look blue to that person but not be blue), there is a strong intuition that the analogous situation cannot occur in the phenomenal domain. Suppose someone told me: although your experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property (perhaps, to be a pain or a case where something looks red or a case of seeing a computer), that property isn't a phenomenal character of your experience. I would be most puzzled: after all, the property is consciously presented by a basically justifying, first-person epistemic capacity as a determinate of *phenomenal consciousness*; and it is difficult to see any daylight between being a property which is so presented and being a phenomenal character of my experience.

Conversely, consider counterexamples to Self-intimation: while sometimes something has a feature it does not appear to have (the white card illuminated by a blue spotlight *is white*, but fails to look that way to one who looks at it), there is a strong intuition that the analogous situation cannot occur in the phenomenal domain. Suppose someone told me: right now, though it doesn't phenomenally appear that way to you, your experience has the phenomenal character of a dream of floating over a meadow. I would be similarly puzzled.

Third, the ordinary concept of mentality involves some sort of commitment to privileged access, although the exact nature of this commitment has been the subject of considerable philosophical debate (see the papers in Gertler 2003). There is strong reason to suspect Revelation to be the thesis to which we were committed all along: Revelation is interestingly strong, and the only privileged access thesis I can think of which seems free from counterexample.

To see this, contrast Revelation with certain similar privileged access theses: each has straightforward and familiar counterexamples which Revelation escapes. (a) Altering the right hand side: "*e* phenomenally appears *F* just in case *F*ness is among *e*'s mental properties"—against right-to-left, non-phenomenally apparent mental properties (cog sci properties and nonconscious properties of conscious episodes: perhaps, wide contents of conscious judgements). (b) Altering the left hand side: "*e* is *(disposed to be) judged from the first-person* to be *F* just in case *e* is phenomenally *F*". Against left-to-right: first, accurate judgements about nonconscious beliefs by the inference "*p*, therefore I believe that *p*"; second, introspective judgement disposed to be inaccurate because made under unfavorable circumstances (a dental patient mistakes a vibration for a pain; in a hurry, one confuses an experience of twelve lights for an experience of eleven lights). Against right-to-left: one lacks a disposition to judge one's mental state to have its phenomenal character (due to lack of concepts of the relevant properties, lack of attention, lack of interest, the great complexity of one's total phenomenal character). Revelation is immune to all these counterexamples.

4.5. Against Rejectionism

The three principles involved in the original paradox have now expanded to five: Apparent Naivete, Instantial Base, Apparent Spreading, Instantiation, and Infallibility. I can't see much hope for explaining away the allure of any of the first three.[23] As for Instantiation and Infallibility, I have argued that each of them is a good candidate for being quasi-definitional of the concept of phenomenal character. Rejecting one but not the other would require privileging either the metaphysical or the epistemological commitments of phenomenal character at the expense of the other; it is hard to see what would break the apparent symmetry. And rejecting both would leave an all-but-unrecognizable concept of phenomenal character.

While we prefer any of these forms of rejectionism to contradiction, we will keep looking.

5. Defectivism

This section provides a superior alternative in the *defectivist* view that some concept used in the generation of the paradox is defective. After sketching the idea that the concept of *phenomenal character* is defective, I address the question whether the concept is salvageable, perhaps by modifying it to some similar nondefective concept. I argue that there are *three* such concepts.

5.1. The Concept of Phenomenal Character as Defective

An alternative to rejecting any of the principles as false would be to regard one or more as containing a concept which is *defective*. I will assume, with Eklund (2002), that defectiveness can result from association with unsatisfiable conditions on extension.

Which concept? In addition to such concepts of universal philosophical applicability as *property* and *instantiation*, the concepts employed in the five principles are: *phenomenal character*, *phenomenal appearance*, *naive property*, and *veridical* and *hallucinatory* visual experience.

My suspicion is that the culprit here is *phenomenal character*. First, each of the remaining concepts looks innocuous (at least in application to present issues). Second, phenomenal character has both epistemological and metaphysical commitments, and one of the central philosophical lessons of recent decades is to be careful about the interaction of metaphysics and epistemology (Soames, 2003). Third, phenomenal character provides the bridge between Infallibility and Instantiation, which together imply that phenomenal appearances can never be misleading: the hope that there might be a realm of such appearances, presumably associated with the mental, is a strong philosophical current, but attitude externalism cuts against this hope.

Let us adopt as a working hypothesis the view that the concept of phenomenal character is defective, due to its association with both Instantiation and Revelation, which are collectively incompatible with the facts Apparent Naivete, Apparent Spreading, and Instantial Base.[24] Unlike rejectionism, defectivism grants no invidious privilege to either metaphysics and epistemology.

Should we be worried if the concept of phenomenal character is defective in this way? Plausibly, life would not be worth living if we had no phenomenally conscious experiences (Siewert, 1998). Still, eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness does not follow. A concept without a perfect semantic value can still have an imperfect semantic value: roughly, a perfect semantic value of a concept with weaker but similar conditions on extension. And another important recent lesson is that a concept's imperfect semantic value can still be its semantic value, against the eliminativist (Johnston, 1992; Lewis, 1995; Eklund, 2002).

In the remainder of the section, I will first do some metaphysics, to provide a range of candidate perfect semantic values for concepts weaker than 'phenomenal character'. I will then characterize three perfectly satisfiable weakenings of 'phenomenal character', and select their perfect semantic values from among the ontology of the metaphysical story.

5.2. Metaphysics of Perceptual Consciousness

We want to specify which features veridical and hallucinatory experiences have without using the expression 'phenomenal character'.

For a standard veridical experience of a white picket fence, the answer is straightforward.

First, as nonrejectionists, we accept Apparent Naivete: hence, this experience phenomenally appears to be a case of visual awareness that *p* for some *p* concerning one's here-and-now environment; we can safely suppose that *p* is *a white picket fence is before one*.

Second, we should also accept that the experience *is* a case of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one. Hallucinatory experience causes all the trouble: if we only ever applied the full concept of phenomenal character to veridical experiences, there would be no inconsistency. So it is safe to assume both Infallibility and Instantiation restricted to veridical experience, and the desirability of preserving as much of the original concept as possible suggests that we do so. Infallibility and Instantiation restricted in this way together entail that as a veridical experience phenomenally appears, so it is: accordingly, the experience both phenomenally appears to be, and is, a case of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one.[25]

Next, by Apparent Spreading, some hallucinatory experience phenomenally appears to be an episode of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one. But Instantial Base requires that that experience is *not* an episode of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one.

Call these experiences *v* and *h*. And let *N* be the naive property *being a case of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one*. Then the following model illustrates the general basic metaphysical story:

- *v* . . .
  – . . . phenomenally appears *N*, and
  – . . . is *N*.
- *h* . . .
  – . . . phenomenally appears *N*, but
  – . . . *isn't N*.

I will call this *the v-h-N model*.

This spartan metaphysical story can be embellished in a number of ways, depending on various issues in the philosophy of perception on which we have not taken sides here. For instance:

Questions about how *h* is (beyond how it appears)

Does *h* have any further mental property which "grounds" (Martin, 2004, p. 82) its phenomenally appearing *N*, in a way analogous to that in which *N* "grounds" *v*'s phenomenally appearing *N*? If so, does *v* also have this property (despite not phenomenally appearing to do so)?[26] And is that mental property more like a representational property (concerning a white picket fence) or more like a factive property (concerning an internal sense-datum)? Somewhat relatedly, how are illusory experiences to be treated?

Questions about the nature of phenomenal appearance

Does *x*'s phenomenally appearing *F* to one involve one's *representing x* to be *F*? Does *x*'s phenomenally appearing *F* to one *bestow* phenomenality on *x*, or on *x*'s instance of *F*ness (real or fictional)? If *v*'s appearing *N* is grounded in its being *N*, how does this grounding work? If so, since the story for *h* must be different, how does it work?[27]

Questions about *phenomenal consciousness*

Which properties instantiated in *v* and *h* are its determinates: *N*? *Phenomenally appearing N*? Some other property in *h*? All of these? Something else?

Limitations of space prevent further discussion of these questions.

5.3. Three Concepts of Phenomenal Character

Obviously, there are ever so many weakenings of 'phenomenal character'. Of these, three are especially deserving of attention as maximizing a balance of strength—closeness to the full unsatisfiable concept—and usefulness in various

philosophical projects. These are rough analogues to, respectively, the projective, subjective/secondary quality, and objective/primary quality theories in the philosophy of color; accordingly I will refer to the relevant concepts as *projective* phenomenal character, *subjective* phenomenal character, and *objective* phenomenal character. (Limitations of space require elaboration of these analogies to be brief and confined to footnotes; hopefully they will be of pedagogical value to those familiar with the positions on color.) The unity among these concepts involves their each positing a distinctive connection between phenomenal character and phenomenal appearance; their diversity involves their differing as to the nature of this connection.

Objective Phenomenal Character

First, consider *objective* phenomenal character. The objective phenomenal character of an experience is what Martin refers to, as noted in the previous subsection, as the property of an experience which "grounds" the experience's phenomenal appearance; by way of analogy, when a white card under a blue spotlight appears blue, the ground of its appearance is its white color and blue illumination.[28] Different explanations of "ground" may be available, and our purposes don't require choosing one; a plausible one is discussed in this footnote.[29]

Let us now locate objective phenomenal characters in the *v*-*h*-*N* model. Both *v* and *h* have phenomenal appearances to their subjects. *v* is *N* (it is a case of visual awareness that a white picket fence is before one); plausibly, its being that way grounds its appearing that way (when something blue appears blue, its blueness grounds its appearance). So *N* is *v*'s objective phenomenal character.

Since we have not settled on a ground of *h*'s phenomenal appearance, we aren't in a position to specify its objective phenomenal character. Suppose that *h* has the representational property *visually representing that a white picket fence is before one*. This could be a ground of *h*'s phenomenal appearance, and thus *h*'s objective phenomenal character.[30]

Instantiation, hence Base, and Phenomenal Naivete are clearly true of objective phenomenal characters. The concept is consistent because Infallibility is false of objective phenomenal characters in a way that falsifies Spreading: *h* phenomenal appears a way it isn't, hence from the ground of its appearance, hence the way it phenomenally appears isn't its objective phenomenal character.

Self-intimation may also be false of objective phenomenal characters. If *h*'s phenomenal appearance is grounded in the property of representing that a white picket fence is before one, and if this property is not phenomenally apparent, then *h* will have an objective phenomenal character which it does not phenomenally appear to have.[31]

Subjective Phenomenal Character

Next, consider *subjective* phenomenal character. The subjective phenomenal characters of an experience are whatever properties it instantiates of form *phenomenally appearing F*.[32]

In the *v*-*h*-*N* model, both *v* and *h* phenomenally appear *N*, so each has the subjective phenomenal character *phenomenally appearing N*.

Instantiation, hence Base, and Spreading are true of subjective phenomenal characters. The concept is consistent since Infallibility is false of subjective phenomenal characters in a way that falsifies Phenomenal Naivete: while *h* and *v* both phenomenally appear *N*, *N* is not among either *h*'s or *v*'s subjective phenomenal characters.

The discussion so far leaves it indeterminate whether Infallibility has any true instances for subjective phenomenal characters. Still, consider the following plausible principle:

AA
If *e* phenomenally appears *F*, *e* phenomenally appears to phenomenally appear *F*.

If the AA principle is assumed unrestrictedly, then both *v* and *h* phenomenally appear to phenomenally appear *N*. Since *phenomenally appearing N* is among the phenomenal characters of both *v* and *h*, this property will be both phenomenally apparent and a phenomenal character of both; hence, a true instance of Infallibility (and so on up the hierarchy).

Concerning Self-intimation: since *phenomenally appearing N* is among the phenomenal characters of both *v* and *h*, this will be a counterexample to Self-intimation unless both *v* and *h* phenomenally appear to phenomenally appear *N*. The relevant instance of the AA principle would yield this result. If the unrestricted AA principle is true, all instances of Self-intimation will be true of subjective phenomenal characters.

Projective Phenomenal Character

Finally, consider *projective* phenomenal character. The projective phenomenal characters of an experience are just the properties the experience phenomenally appears to have.[33]

Locating projective phenomenal characters in the *v*-*h*-*N* model is also straightforward. Both *v* and *h* phenomenally appear *N*, so *N* is the projective phenomenal character of each.

Both directions of Revelation are true of projective phenomenal characters: to have a property as a projective phenomenal character is just to phenomenally appear to have the property, so there cannot be either cases in which an

experience phenomenally appears *F* but does not have *F* as a phenomenal character (counterexamples to Infallibility), or cases in which an experience has *F* as a phenomenal character but does not phenomenally appear *F* (counterexamples to Self-intimation). Hence both Spreading and Phenomenal Naivete are true of projective phenomenal characters. The concept is consistent since Base, hence Instantiation, is not true of projective phenomenal characters. Projective phenomenal characters are characters in the story told by phenomenal appearance, and accordingly may fail to be instantiated. In fact, while *N* is a phenomenal character of *h*, *h* fails to instantiate *N*; no violation of Instantial Base is consequent.[34]

6. Closing Methodological Remarks

What to make of these many satisfiable weakenings of the concept of phenomenal character? I will suggest that the various weakenings are well-suited for use in different branches of the philosophy of mind.[35]

Caveat: in this discussion, I will say things like "metaphysicians of perception believe that *p*/are trying to achieve *G*". Obviously such talk is false of the diversity of opinion and goals to be found in any subfield of philosophy. My intention is to describe what seem to me to be sociologically and theoretically central currents in the various subfields; briskness recommends my broad brush approach.

Consider first objective phenomenal character. Objective phenomenal characters are actually instantiated properties, rather than fictions. The privilege given to the first-person perspective as understood in terms of phenomenal appearance is fairly weak: there are first-person inaccessible asymmetries in objective phenomenal character between veridical and hallucinatory cases (although *v* and *h* phenomenally appear the same, *v*'s objective phenomenal character is *N*, but *h*'s isn't), and both directions of Revelation may be false of objective phenomenal characters. Still, any counterexamples to Revelation are limited to the already defective hallucinatory case.

These are features that *metaphysicians of perception* would tend to ascribe to the features of conscious experiences that they regard as of the greatest theoretical significance. Metaphysicians of perception want to know what the essences or fundamental kinds of veridical and hallucinatory experiences are. Essences or fundamental kinds are actually instantiated, and not mere fictions. At the same time, externalists will not be put off by the first-person inaccessible asymmetries or the limited violations of both directions of Revelation.

Perceptual epistemologists are in a similar position. They want to know the features of perceptual experiences which confer their epistemic powers. Plausibly, epistemic powers are conferred by actually instantiated features, and not by mere fictions. Concerning the first-person inaccessible asymmetries, no antiskeptic doubts that there can be first-person inaccessible asymmetries in the ability of experiences to promote beliefs to knowledge, and externalists will think the

same about justification. Similarly, the limited violations of both directions of Revelation will not be at all surprising with respect to knowledge-conferring powers, and will also be fine with externalistically-inclined epistemologists with respect to justificatory powers.

Now consider subjective phenomenal character. Subjective phenomenal characters are also instantiated properties, rather than fictions. But subjective phenomenal characters are more closely tied to the first-person than are objective phenomenal characters, in two ways. First, there are no first-person inaccessible asymmetries between veridical and hallucinatory phenomenal characters. Second (assuming the AA principle from section 5.3), there are no counterexamples to Self-intimation, and counterexamples to Infallibility are limited to first-order properties.

These are features that *metaphysicians of consciousness* would be happy with. First, as metaphysicians, metaphysicians of consciousness are primarily interested in the fundamental nature of consciousness; if consciousness involves fictions of phenomenal appearance, these are less fundamental than the appearances themselves. Second, a central issue for the metaphysics of consciousness is locating first-person accessible features in the causal order. First-person inaccessible features are therefore not part of the explanandum. It is hard to motivate general first-person infallibility as a central theoretical requirement, although work in this field tends to favor certain localized infallibility theses.

Finally, consider projective phenomenal character. Projective phenomenal characters are fictions; the projective phenomenal characters of an experience are exactly the features it phenomenally appears to have. Accordingly, failures of Revelation are impossible, but if phenomenal appearance can mislead, failures of Instantiation are possible.

These are features that *phenomenologists* would be happy with. The goal of phenomenology is to describe experience in a way that is completely faithful to the first-person take, purifying the description of and "bracketing" any information about the experience that is not found in phenomenal appearances. This project seems to require tethering the features mentioned in such description to phenomenal appearance, in accord with Revelation, and accepting error-theoretic fictionalism if necessary.

Appendix: The Case for Spreading

In section 2.3 I promised a detailed case for Spreading. The argument I now give uses the following principles, as discussed in section 4.3 (see section 3 for discussion of phenomenal appearance):

Apparent Spreading
If some veridical experience phenomenally appears to have a naive property, some hallucinatory experience phenomenally appears to have that same naive property;

Infallibility
If an experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property, it has that property as a phenomenal character.

I defend Infallibility in section 4.4; the remainder of this appendix defends Apparent Spreading.

Concerning the following principles, I will argue that we should accept (1), and that if one accepts principle (n), one should accept principle ($n + 1$) (I will clarify the terminology used in these principles in the course of defending the steps in the argument):

- For any possible visual experience, there is a possible hallucinatory experience which . . .

    1. . . . matches it;
    2. . . . is in some sense indiscriminable from it;
    3. . . . is in some sense indiscriminable from it by phenomenological study and projection;
    4. . . . is such that it's unknowable by a mix of phenomenological study and projection that $t \neq o$ (where the experiences are presented as t and o, respectively);
    5. . . . is such that the phenomenal appearance of the former and the projective appearance of the latter do not justify judging them distinct;
    6. . . . is such that the phenomenal appearance of the former and the projective appearance of the latter overlap;
    7. . . . is such that if the former phenomenally appears to have a naive property, the latter projectively appears to have a similar naive property;
    8. . . . is such that if the former phenomenally appears to have a naive property, the latter phenomenally appears to have a similar naive property.

While (8) is weaker than Apparent Spreading, it has enough punch to yield the paradox.

For (1)

A Cartesian argument that my current visual experience does not provide me with knowledge about my immediate environment gets rolling with a skeptic's story like the following:

> Last night as I slept, I dreamt. My dream was of writing this paper. In my dream, I saw fingers moving over a keyboard and text appearing on the screen of a laptop sitting on a messy desk. It was all very realistic.

Say that my current experience "matches", or is a "Cartesian alternative to" the dream in the skeptic's story. Here I'm giving "match" a sort of ostensive definition, as *that relation in which experiences stand to each other when the possibility of one would be reasonably used in the course of an attempt to raise skeptical doubts about the other*. Stages 2–6 in the argument will count as successive stages in an attempt to reveal the nature of the match relation.

Forget about whether we can extract skeptical conclusions from this sort of story, and focus on the story itself. Even if the story is false, it is certainly coherent; an antiskeptic who attempted to smother the skeptical argument in its crib by challenging the coherence of the skeptic's story would be appropriately dismissed.

Nothing is special about my present experience in respect of having a matching hallucination. Skeptical doubt could be raised about *any* possible visual experience by concocting a skeptic's story about a matching dream, and any such story would be coherent. So for any possible experience, some possible hallucination matches it. That's (1).

From (1) to (2)

What is match? Section 2.3 suggests a prima facie plausible answer: for two experiences to match is for them to share all their phenomenal characters. Reflecting on my current experience and recalling or imagining my (real or imagined) dream, I do not notice any respect with which one of the experiences "bulges out" over the other in respect of phenomenal character.

Still, despite their awareness of this consideration, certain theorists (Martin, 2006; Sturgeon, 2008; Brewer, in preparation; Fish, in preparation) still deny that a veridical and a hallucinatory experience cannot share all their phenomenal characters. Also, the case for the account—that I *don't notice* any phenomenal bulge—is not probative: maybe a phenomenal bulge can lurk about unnoticed.

A more widely accepted view about match is suggested by the following remarks:

> [We cannot reason that] 'delusive and veridical experiences' are not (as such) 'qualitatively' or 'intrinsically' distinguishable—for if they were distinguishable, we should never be deluded. [. . .] [I]t may be true that we can't distinguish; [. . .] but even this doesn't mean that the two cases are exactly alike. (Austin, 1962, pp. 51–2)

> Consider your current perception of the environment around you. Perhaps you are staring out at a late spring evening; or lying in summer grass; or sitting in a dusky office reading a philosophy paper. It is quite conceivable for you that there should be a situation in which you could not tell that things were not as they are now [. . .]. And surely it is at least cases like these which we have in mind when

> we think about examples of sensory experience which are not cases of veridical perception. (Martin, 2006, p. 363)
>
> At least in principle, for any veridical experience one enjoys there could be a hallucination that one could not distinguish from it. (Johnston, 2006, p. 287)
>
> The surgical patient [in a certain skeptic's story] cannot know—at least not without the assistance of sources of information distinct from his own thinking or experience—which of seeing or hallucinating he's undergoing at any particular moment. (Neta, 2008)

Suppressing nuance a bit, each of these authors suggests that matching experiences are *indistinguishable* or *indiscriminable*. In this they agree with Descartes himself, in whose view the skeptical ball gets rolling thanks to the fact that "there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep". This suggests taking match to be understood as indiscriminability of some sort. That gets us to (2).

From (2) to (3)

What sort of indiscriminability is at issue? Clearly my current experience and my dream are discriminable to the external observer: they could think of my dream experience as "that experience Hellie underwent last night" and my current experience as "that experience Hellie is undergoing now"; the differing times at which they are undergone (and the differing ways they look to the external observer) would suffice for his discriminating them.

Clearly then just any old sort of indiscriminability is not necessary for match. Rather, consider how we react to skeptical stories: we focus on our current experience from the inside, by phenomenological study, and focus on the experience in the skeptic's story as we envisage it to be when we project ourselves into having it, from the inside, imaginatively. We find that when we do this, the experiences are indiscriminable. That mix of phenomenological study and projection can't make for discriminating the experiences. That gets us to (3).

From (3) to (4)

What is it to discriminate x and y? On Williamson's classic analysis of de re discrimination (Williamson, 1990), it is to know that $x \neq y$; a bit more sharply, since knowledge is always under some mode of presentation or other, it is to know that $m \neq n$ (where m presents x and n presents y).

For our current example, the mode under which one's current experience is presented is something like 'this experience I am undergoing now', while the

mode under which the experience in the skeptic's story is presented is something like 'this experience I am projecting myself into now'. We can call these modes of presentation *t* (for 'this') and *o* (for 'other'), respectively.

Then, the impossibility of discriminating one's current experience from the experience in the skeptic's story amounts to the impossibility of knowing, by a mix of phenomenological study and projection, that $t \neq o$. That gets us to (4).

From (4) to (5)

Should the widespread talk of indiscriminability in discussion of Cartesian alternatives be taken to indicate that the impossibility of phenomenological/projective knowledge that $t \neq o$ is a bedrock analysis of match? Or should it rather be taken as *programming* for some other more fundamental analysis—perhaps in terms of some more categorical base of the impossibility of this knowledge?[36]

The former is not especially plausible. For one thing, modals are notoriously shifty: for a great many *p*, easily affected alterations of aspects of context make 'possibly, *p*' shift truth-value. If all we meant by the claim that *t* and *o* are Cartesian alternatives is that it is not possible to know them distinct by a mix of phenomenological study and projection, we would expect a comparable degree of shiftiness in our judgements whether two experiences are Cartesian alternatives. But I do not notice such shiftiness. The absence of shiftiness would be explained if the context is tied down by a specific categorical basis for which the talk of unknowability programs.

So let us suppose that talk of indiscriminability programs for some specific categorical basis: for the failure of some necessary condition for knowledge that $t \neq o$ whenever *t* and *o* are Cartesian alternatives. The necessary conditions for knowledge (and accordingly the sufficient conditions for absence of knowledge) are a heterogeneous bunch: potentially among these are truth, belief, justification, safety, sensitivity, reliability, absence of (possessed or unpossessed) defeaters, failure to be based on false (or unknown) lemmas, and doubtless others. Which one?

The answer seems quite clearly to be the *justification* condition, in the following sense: the way *t* and *o* phenomenally appear and "projectively appear", respectively, to the subject do not justify judging that $t \neq o$. Think of projective appearance on analogy to phenomenal appearance: when I imagine an experience of seeing a white picket fence, I am aware of the dream in a way that immediately justifies judging it to have certain properties. When thinking about projective appearance, it is important to avoid a use-mention confusion. When I think projectively about *o*, this is a conscious episode; let *e* be that episode. Since *e* is conscious, it has a certain phenomenal appearance. But this phenomenal appearance is not the same as *o*'s projective appearance *in the course of e*: *e* phenomenally appears to be a case of imagining or projecting; *o* projectively appears to be a case of seeing. These are, of course, different ways to appear. By

way of analogy, the name 'Cheney' appears different from Cheney himself, of course; think of the phenomenal appearance of *e* on analogy with the appearance of 'Cheney', and the projective appearance of *o* in *e* on analogy with the appearance of Cheney.

I can't think of any pairs of experiences concerning which this justification condition is met which are not clear Cartesian alternatives; and I can't think of any pairs of clear Cartesian alternatives concerning which this justification condition is not met.

By contrast, for every other necessary condition for knowledge that $t \neq o$, it seems either that its failure would not always make *t* and *o* match (its failure is insufficient for match), or that its success would not always make *t* and *o* *not* match (its failure is unnecessary for match). I won't explicitly consider every known necessary condition (the interested reader may verify the claim), but I will offer examples of an insufficient condition and an unnecessary condition.

Failure of the belief condition is insufficient for *t* and *o* to match:

> Bill is arguing with a debt collector. This prevents him from making phenomenological judgements. Accordingly, Bill is unable to know that his current experience is distinct from a dream of floating above a meadow; but the experience of arguing and the experience of judging are not Cartesian alternatives.

It might be objected that it is still in *some* sense possible for Bill to know that the experiences are distinct. That seems correct. But it suggests that, if the sense in which this is so is made explicit, doing so would provide the bedrock analysis of match. Intuitively, Bill has phenomenological/projective justification for $t \neq o$ (even if he does not make use of it); this could provide the sense in which it is possible for Bill to know that $t \neq o$. Of course, this is just what my analysis suggests.

Failure of the safety condition is unnecessary for *t* and *o* to match (recall that a belief is safe, roughly, just in case it could not have easily been false; cf. Williamson 2000; Goldman's (1976) "fake barns" case is a paradigm illustration that safety is necessary for knowledge):

> Charles only considers whether experiences are distinct if prompted to do so by skeptics; in such circumstances, Charles is constitutionally strongly disposed to judge experiences to be distinct. Helen, the only skeptic in the marketplace in Charles's town, is strongly disposed to present Cartesian alternatives which are in fact distinct.
>
> Charles encounters Helen, who presents (as is her habit) a pair of distinct experiences for Charles's consideration; Charles (as is his habit) judges them to be distinct. Charles's belief is true, and could not have easily been false: there could not easily have been a circumstance where Charles considered Cartesian alternatives which were not distinct, and by his habit mistakenly judged them distinct.

> (By contrast, suppose nine other skeptics are in the marketplace, and they are, unlike Helen, disposed to pick the same experience twice over as their favorite pairs of Cartesian alternatives. Suppose Charles luckily ends up chatting with Helen; then his tendency to judge Cartesian alternatives distinct would generate a true belief, which could have been false if he had stumbled across one of the other skeptics.)
>
> Charles is presented with distinct Cartesian alternatives and safely believes them to be distinct; so failure of safe belief that $t \neq o$ isn't necessary for t and o to match.

In Bill's case, the justification condition is not met, but in Charles's case, it is. These conditions suggest, if they do not prove, that two experiences match just if the phenomenal appearance of one and the projective appearance of the other do not justify judging them distinct. That's (5).

From (5) to (6)

What would the phenomenological and projective appearances of t and o have to be like in order for these appearances not to justify judging t and o distinct?

One way for this to happen would be for either t or o to lack the relevant sort of appearance entirely—if I have no evidence about o, say, I would not be in a position to assess whether it is distinct from t. But principle (2) from section 3 entails that t has a phenomenal appearance, and it seems equally clear that when I imaginatively project myself into o, it has a projective appearance.

Since both t and o have appearances, it is useful to compare a case in which serial visual inspection of two paint chips does not justify judging them to be distinct.[37] When the second chip is presented, one remembers the features of the first at some degree of precision and perceives the features of the second at some degree of precision. Since it is unlikely that evidence of distinctness is ever due to a direct impression of nonidentity, but must always stem from evidence of some violation of Leibniz's law, one would be justified in judging them distinct just in case the first is remembered to have some property that the second is seen to lack (or vice versa)—for instance, the first is remembered to be red (or triangular) and the second is seen to be blue (or circular). Contrapositively, one would *lack* justification for judging them distinct just in case there is no property one appears to have that the other appears to lack.

This does not require either that the chips appear to have exactly the same property, or that the way they appear is exactly the same. (Indeed, we may be confident that neither condition is met: surely we do not remember exactly which color the earlier-viewed chip has, and surely the way the later-viewed chip looks is more specific than the way the earlier-viewed chip is remembered to be.) This is compatible with each appearing to have one among some extended range of colors: if each appears mid-to-light red, then each appears to lack every

other shade, but there is no determinate shade each appears to have. And it is compatible with the range for one differing from the range for the other: if one appears mid-to-dark red and the other appears mid-to-light red, then while the former appears not to be light red, the latter does not appear to be light red. It requires only that the range of maximally determinate colors which the color of one appears to occupy *overlaps* the range the color of the other appears to occupy, or that they contain at least one maximally determinate color in common.[38] In the absence of overlap, however, the appearances of *t* and *o would* justify judging them distinct: appearances would then rule out that they share all their properties.

We can generalize this account to treat *t* and *o*. There is some range of maximally determinate properties that the property of *t* appears to occupy, and some range of determinate properties that the property of *o* appears to occupy. These ranges overlap just in case their appearances do not justify one in judging that $t \neq o$. That gets us to (6).

From (6) to (7)

We know that *t* phenomenally appears to have a certain naive property (perhaps one among a certain range of maximally determinate naive properties). If *o* projectively appears to have a property in some overlapping range, what are the boundaries of that range?

Overlap is a weak requirement: it is compatible, for instance, with *o* appearing merely to have some property or other. Still, I find that when I project myself into an experience, I can do so with a considerably higher degree of determinacy than that. (If not, we would not be able to share our dreams or feel the pain of another, but share merely that we had some sort of experience or be aware merely that the other undergoes some sort of experience.)

We certainly seem to do better than this when we project into the experiences described in skeptical stories. While the projective appearance of the experience I imagine is doubtless significantly less determinate than the phenomenal appearance of my current experience, it is still reasonably determinate as regards certain features: the dream I imagine projectively appears to be an experience as of hearing fingers clicking on a keyboard, and seeing characters appearing on a screen. (Of course, the experience of imagining the dream *phenomenally* appears to be a case of *imagining* an experience, but as I warned above, we should avoid confusing the phenomenal appearance of an experience of projecting with the projective appearance of the projected experience.)

In particular, the range of properties to which the dream projectively appears to belong excludes all non-naive properties. The dream does not, for instance, projectively appear to be *either* a case of visual awareness that characters are appearing on a screen *or* a case of visual representation—perhaps of the sort apparent in imagination, as discussed in section 2.1—that characters are

appearing on a screen. After all, if it did, the following sort of skepticism would seem to get a grip: close your eyes and imagine you are seeing letters appearing on a screen; but wait, how do you know you are not *dreaming* as of letters appearing on a screen? Such a skepticism gets no grip, since the phenomenal appearance of a case of imagining does not overlap with the projective appearance of a dream. The content is not at fault; what is at fault is rather the absence of apparent immediate presence of letters on a screen in the case of imagination as contrasted with the presence of apparent immediate presence of letters on a screen in the case of the dream.

So if my current visual experience phenomenally appears to have a property in a certain range of naive properties, any plausible Cartesian alternative to it must projectively appear to have a property in a certain range of naive properties—due to the reduced determinacy of projection, the latter may be a bit more inclusive than the former, but not too much so. That gets us to (7).

From (7) to (8)

How similar to one another are the projective appearance of an experience and its phenomenal appearance? On pain of skepticism about knowledge of other minds, our past experiences, and merely possible experiences, we need to accept that projective appearance is a reasonably accurate guide to phenomenal appearance, under good circumstances. Something like the following, that is, had better be true. Suppose that one has done one's best, in good circumstances, to project oneself into one's past experience, someone else's experience, or some possible experience; and suppose that it projectively appears F: then, roughly, the experience phenomenally appears to have a property similar to F. Projection under the best circumstances might be a bit inaccurate and a bit inexact, but it won't be far from the truth.

Compare the case of visual appearance and memorial appearance. One sees a red paint chip; it visually appears to have a shade of red in a certain tight range. Later on, one recalls back to the paint chip's color (as one saw it). If things have gone right with one's memory, one will recall it as red; presumably the range of shades of red one will recall its shade as having occupied will be somewhat larger than the range its shade initially visually appeared to occupy, but it will not be drastically larger (so as to include green, for instance). Of course things might not have gone right: one's memory might have encountered a glitch, in which case one might recall the chip as some or other shade of blue. None of this story would be affected if the initial visual appearance of the chip had been misleading—if the chip were, in fact, blue. That is to say that visual appearance of color sets the standard for memory of color as one saw it.

So, suppose that, as I project myself into o, things go right with that projection. Then, since o projectively appears to have a property in a certain range R of naive properties, o phenomenally appears to have a property in a range of properties R' that is similar to R.

The transition to Apparent Spreading would be threatened if some non-naive properties are in R': for then o would not phenomenally appears to have a naive property; rather, o would phenomenally appear to have *either* some naive property or some other sort of property. Applications of Infallibility and Instantiation would show only that o instantiates either a naive property or property of the other sort; and there might be no problem with o instantiating the other sort of property.

Still, this threat can plausibly be ruled out. Perhaps, the best projection into the experience of another could do by way of presenting the nature of the experience *differs* from the best that phenomenological study can do to present that nature. But plausibly, projection would have to be either *exactly the same* at presenting that nature, or, more likely, *strictly worse*. Projection should not provide for justified ruling out of possibilities about how the experience is that phenomenological study does not: it should not be that phenomenal appearance justifies belief that a certain experience is either a pain or an itch, but projection justifies belief that it is a pain or a tingle.

I don't mean to suggest that we cannot apply third-person methods to learn facts about experiences that the subject cannot learn about through the first-person: clearly, even if a brain in a vat reasonably takes his visual experience to be factive, we who know that the brain is envatted can know otherwise. But projection is a distinctive variety of third-person knowledge, which seeks to *simulate* the first-person take on experience. Projection might inevitably fall short of the first-person take by having reduced accuracy. But any information about the experience not available from the first-person would not count as part of a proper *simulation*: rather, it would involve illicit information unavailable from inside the first-person take. *Of course* I can discriminate last night's dream from today's seeing if I am allowed to help myself to the knowledge that the dream is a dream. But that knowledge is no part of the skeptical game, no part of the basis for discrimination of the sort which intuitively characterizes the relation of match.

So $R' \subseteq R$: the range of properties to which the features of o phenomenally appear to belong includes no properties not included in the range of properties to which the features of o *projectively* appear to belong. So since the latter range includes only naive properties, so does the former. That is to say, o phenomenally appears to have some naive property. That gets us to (8).

Notes

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1. The doctrine is named to emphasize both its phenomenal aspects and its affiliation to "naive realism" as discussed in the philosophy of perception (Martin, 2006).
2. Although Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002, III/1) rejects this presupposition, noting the apparent factivity of experience. Thanks to Charles Siewert for this citation.
3. This pattern is also discussed by Martin (2004).
4. Sometimes phenomenal characters are taken to be properties of *subjects*: e.g., the phenomenal character of bat *b* is what it is like to be bat *b*. While we speak of what being *b* is like, this seems to concern a property of episodes of *being b*, rather than of the object *b*. We do not, in this context, by contrast, ask questions like 'what is *b* like' or 'what are you like'. Hence, I am inclined to doubt that there is a non-derivative ordinary language notion of a phenomenal character of a subject.
5. For more on the linguistic properties of this discourse, see Hellie 2004, 2007b.
6. It is natural to regard a factive purely mental property as a mental relation to a fact, where the fact that *p* is either identical to the true proposition that *p*, or else is some entity the existence of which metaphysically necessitates the truth of the proposition that *p*.
7. Chalmers (2004) distinguishes "pure" and "impure" representational properties: the property of representing that *p* as against the property of *visually, blurredly, noisily* representing that *p*. This distinction applies to naive properties; I will ignore this issue here.

   I also take no position on issues of physical or functional reducibility.
8. Phenomenal Naivete may conflict with Williamson's view that 'know' is the *most general* factive mental state operator: plausibly, phenomenal characters are, unlike knowledge, predoxastic.
9. This is no precise statement of what counts as ideal and who counts as expert, but the logic of the argument requires only a condition which is (i) sufficient for fidelity to phenomenal character and (ii) applicable to the judgements on list *L*, a condition which might be tedious if straightforward to describe. See Siewert in preparation for discussion of the elimination of misdescription.
10. As Jim John has pointed out to me, Harman (1996) is a representationalist by way of official doctrine, but when describing the phenomenology repeatedly says that that experience "presents or represents" features. This interesting rhetoric suggests that Harman feels the pull of the metaphor of direct presence but is trying to incorporate this within his official theoretical commitments.

    Merleau-Ponty apparently makes a distinct case for Phenomenal Naivete: see fn. 2.
11. For a list of papers alluding to this view, see my Hellie forthcoming.
12. I argue elsewhere (Hellie, forthcoming) that Moore (1903) himself endorses the view that relational awareness properties are phenomenally apparent, where whether the relatum is external is not phenomenally apparent (also that Moore is opposed to representationalism). Since relational awareness properties are mental properties, Moore rejects the severe transparency thesis; since Moore thinks the

form of awareness is phenomenally apparent, he also rejects the mild transparency thesis. In light of his view that whether the objects of awareness are external is not phenomenally apparent, I see *no* similarity to the views of contemporary fans of diaphanousness.

13. Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006) and Byrne and Logue (2008) set up the central dialectic over hallucination in the metaphysics of perception as concerned with singular content. Discussion of wide color content is more prevalent in the literature on representational theories of consciousness: see for instance Block 1990; Lycan 2001; Chalmers 2004.
14. I diverge from Pryor in three ways: first, his discussion solely concerns perceptual appearance, rather than appearance more generally; second, Pryor takes appearance to involve representation, whereas I do not import this assumption; third, I make explicit the connection to consciousness.
15. See Silins in preparation for the pros and cons of this view and its competitors.
16. This definition is neutral on such metaphysical issues as: whether phenomenal appearance is more or less fundamental than consciousness or phenomenal character; whether the experience which appears is distinct from its appearance; which episodes have phenomenal appearances; whether there is an "organ" involved in phenomenal appearance; whether there are analogies beyond those I have mentioned between perceptual and phenomenal appearance; whether phenomenal appearance involves representation; whether there is more than one capacity which is Φ.

    It is also neutral on such epistemological issues as: the degree of reliability of phenomenal appearances; whether the justification provided by phenomenal appearances is defeasible.
17. This characterization is, as far as I can tell, neutral on the status of the view that phenomenological study involves the deployment of "quotational phenomenal concepts" (Chalmers, 2003). It seems to be opposed to the view that phenomenological study does not involve any distinctive first-person methods, as on certain very strong "displaced perception" accounts of phenomenological study (Tye, 2000); however, such accounts run into insuperable problems in my view, and certain more moderate displaced perception accounts (Chalmers, 2004) seem compatible with it.
18. This claim is stronger than a necessarily true biconditional, as the 'for φ is for ψ' locution requires constitution of φ by ψ.

    The "Byrne-Neander objection" against higher-order representationalism (Byrne, 1997; Neander, 1998; Kriegel, 2007), though somewhat obscure, seems to be fundamentally directed against this sort of fictionalist approach. I think the objection can perhaps be blocked.
19. Revelation involves no commitment as to the explanation of this equivalence; the friend of Revelation is therefore not automatically a fictionalist.
20. Johnston's principle concerned the revelation of *higher-order properties* of *first-order properties*: the *natures* of *colors*. By contrast, my principle concerns the revelation of *first-order properties* of *particulars*. My thesis does not obviously bear on the status of a Revelation-like thesis about the natures of phenomenal characters: Lewis 1995 discusses revelation of the natures of "qualia".
21. The metaphysical rejectionist can grant this, denying the inference from the right side of Revelation to 'it instantiates that property'.

22. See Hellie 2004, 2007*b* on the linguistic properties of 'what *e* is like for its subject'.
23. *Pace* Hellie 2006, concerning Apparent Naivete.
24. A *contextualist* would say that at least one concept of phenomenal character is associated with each of Instantiation and Revelation, none with both. This view is doubtful in light of the widespread tendency to advance simultaneously both the "determinate of consciousness" and the "what it's like for the subject" characterizations as definitions.
25. For another argument: antiskeptical fallibilists believe that under good circumstances, things appear close to the way they are; hence that if veridical experience is a good circumstance, veridical experience phenomenally appears the way it is.
26. For aficionados of the perception literature: *negative disjunctivists* answer 'no' to the first question; *positive* disjunctivists answer 'yes' to just the first; advocates of the *moderate view* answer 'yes' to both: see Martin 2006; Sturgeon 2008; Byrne and Logue 2008.
27. See Hellie 2007a on the first question.
28. Two sorts of "realist" theory of color are *physicalism* and *primitivism*: roughly, the natures of colors are revealed, on the former view, by science, and on the latter view, by vision. On both views, colors are instantiated properties (rather than fictions) whose natures do not involve relations to perceptual appearance. Similarly, objective phenomenal characters are instantiated properties whose natures do not involve relations to phenomenal appearance.
29. Think of ground as what I will call the *target* of a phenomenal appearance. To see what I mean by this, suppose that Bill sees a square card; the card will have a certain *shape appearance* to Bill. This appearance will be misleading unless it is *squareness*, since the card is, in fact, square. Accordingly, squareness is the target of the card's shape appearance to Bill (even if the card appears some other shape). More generally, the target of a certain appearance to someone is the property which the appearance must be if it is not misleading.

    Some of the main text claims about ground follow. First, if *v*'s phenomenal appearance is not to be misleading, that appearance must be *N*. So *N* is the target of *v*'s phenomenal appearance. Second, in order for *h*'s phenomenal appearance not to be misleading, that appearance must be *visually representing that a white picket fence is before one*. This property would then be the target of *h*'s phenomenal appearance, and would thus be its objective phenomenal character.
30. Negative disjunctivists (Martin, 2006; Sturgeon, 2008) think that *h* has no further property which grounds its phenomenal appearance, so that if grounding is antisymmetric, *h* has no objective phenomenal character.
31. If *h* lacks objective phenomenal character (see previous fn.), Self-intimation is vacuously true of it.
32. On *response-dispositional* theories of color, roughly, colors are instantiated properties (rather than fictions), the natures of which involve relations to perceptual appearances. Similarly, subjective phenomenal characters are instantiated properties, the natures of which involve relations to phenomenal appearances.
33. The standard *projective error* theory of color is that colors are properties of sense-data which experience misascribes to external surfaces; on a less complex view, colors are just properties of some sort which experience misascribes to surfaces; on a still less complex view, to be a surface's color is to be ascribed by

color experience to that surface (regardless of veridicality). On this fictionalist view, colors themselves need not be response-dispositional properties, but what makes it correct to predicate a color of something is a fact about color appearance. Similarly, projective phenomenal characters are fictions of phenomenal appearance, the natures of which do not involve relations to perceiving subjects.

34. Up to now quantifiers over experiences have been restricted to those in mature humans with a reasonable degree of rationality, intelligence, and so on (see section 3), due to uncertainty whether experiences of other subjects, such as dogs, have phenomenal appearances. The theses defended with the restriction on can be extended to other subjects (who, we may assume, do not focus on their experiences) under either of the following circumstances. First, if some sort of inner awareness theory of consciousness is correct, so that any conscious episode phenomenally appears some way to its subject.

    Second, perhaps *o* can appear *F* simpliciter without appearing that way to anyone (compare Martin (2004) and Sturgeon (2008) on "impersonal indiscriminability"; also Austin's (1962, p. 43) famous remark that "the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world [. . .] as the way things are. I am not disclosing a fact about *myself*, but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water"). Recall that the original Apparent Naivete was intended to be read 'veridical visual experiences phenomenally appear *to their subjects* to have naive properties'; here we would need to defend the related claim that they appear this way simpliciter, and so forth.

    Otherwise, it may be that experiences of other subjects do not have phenomenal appearances. If not, they also lack projective and subjective phenomenal characters. If any legitimate notion of phenomenal character applies to features of experiences of dogs, the only legitimate notion of phenomenal character would be objective phenomenal character. I bet against our getting to the point where we conclude this.
35. In conversation about Phenomenal Naivete with colleagues more concerned with metaphysics of perception, metaphysics of consciousness, or phenomenology, their initial reactions tend to work out as would be predicted on the basis of the remarks in this section.
36. If the latter, which categorical base is programmed for could either be contextually variable or contextually constant. Contextual constancy seems much more plausible, as we observe no cross-contextual disagreement over which pairs of experiences are Cartesian alternatives; by contrast, there is cross-contextual disagreement over whether a five foot kindergartner is tall.
37. Here I adapt my story from Hellie 2005.
38. The restriction to maximal determinacy is imposed to block the following argument: suppose that whatever looks red or looks blue looks red-or-blue; then if *a* looks red and *b* looks blue, the region the color of *a* looks to be in includes all the reds and all the blues, and so does the region the color of *b* looks to be in. Hence the appearances of *a* and *b* do not justify judging them to have different colors, absurdly. Alternatively, block the argument with *naturalness*.

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