Philosophical Studies (2006)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-0241-0

BENJ HELLIE

HIGHER-ORDER INTENTIONALITY AND HIGHER-ORDER ACQUAINTANCE

ABSTRACT. I argue against such "Higher-Order Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the ground that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness takes the relation of awareness to be nonintentional.

Brentano (1874/1973) set out to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a mental phenomenon. His famous answer (2/1/5): "we can [...] define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves". Immediately after stating this thesis, Brentano went on to recognize "controversies and contradiction"; in particular, Sir William Hamilton, in his first lecture on metaphysics, "denies this characteristic to a whole broad class of mental phenomena, namely, to all those which he characterizes as feelings". Brentano's reply was twofold. First, certain feelings, such as "feel[ing] sorrow or griev[-ing] about something" clearly have *external* intentional objects. Second, with respect to those feelings which *don't*, "the case of pain caused by a cut or a burn, for example", he points out that Hamilton has failed to notice that his own view of pain entails that pain is not, after all, a counterexample. After all, Hamilton's view is that "In the phenomena of Feelings—the phenomena of Pleasure and Pain—on the contrary, consciousness does not place the mental modification or state before itself—as separate from itself—but is, as it were, fused into one"—namely, as Brentano puts it, that "in

a certain sense [a feeling] even refers to itself''. Having dispensed with the obvious counterexamples, Brentano considers his thesis established.

Brentano's taxonomic project is of limited interest to contemporary psychologists and philosophers, who are more concerned with explaining particular mental phenomena, such as perception, emotion, and reasoning, than with all of mentality; the quest for necessary and sufficient conditions may also strike many as quaint. Moreover, Brentano's answer is debatable on grounds he did not consider: as I will discuss below, a number of theorists dispute whether intentionality provides a *sufficient* condition for mentality.[1]

Still, many contemporary philosophers of mind have found much of interest in Brentano's discussion: in particular, the relation between consciousness and mental intentionality is the subject of vigorous investigation. In part, this is because both phenomena are puzzling to those who would locate mentality in the material world; if one could be reduced to the other, the number of questions on the philosopher of mind's exam paper would be reduced by one.

Which direction to take? Due to a profusion in recent decades of partial successes, it might seem that a fully successful naturalization of intentionality is right around the corner. If consciousness could be reduced to intentionality, then, when intentionality is naturalized, consciousness, too, will fall. By contrast, direct attempts at naturalizing consciousness have struck many as less promising. No wonder, then, that while the *Phenomenalist* approach to reducing intentionality to consciousness has garnered few adherents,[2] recent years have witnessed a parade across the philosophical scene of *Intentionalist* attempts to explain consciousness in terms of intentionality.[3]

But I'm afraid I must rain on the Intentionalist parade. The correct view, in my opinion, is that consciousness consists of a bearing a nonintentional relation of awareness to a *diversity* of mental features, some intentional, some not. This view's opposition to Intentionalism stems from two com-

mitments: first, nonintentional mental properties can be conscious; and second, the way such properties get to be conscious is by being the object of a nonintentional relation of awareness.

Each of these two commitments requires defense, but defending either is a big enough task for a single article; here, I restrict myself to the latter. I will thus be arguing against a strand of Intentionalism which I will call *Higher-Order* Intentionalism, which includes, among others, higher-order thought and inner sense theories of consciousness. Expressed with a very low degree of resolution, my complaint is that Higher-Order Intentionalism reverses the proper order of explanation between consciousness and intentionality.

Section 1 of this article addresses some necessary preliminaries, clarifying the Intentionalist's explanans and explanandum, distinguishing Higher-Order Intentionalism from other strands of the view, and detailing the nature of the debate between Higher-Order Intentionalism and an alternative position I will outline. Sections 2 and 3 assess arguments for and against the two positions.

1. INTENTIONALITY, AWARENESS, AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

The goal of a great many Intentionalist theories in the current literature is to explain a certain aspect of consciousness, namely *phenomenal character*. According to such theories, if one's mental state has a certain property as its phenomenal character, intentionality is always involved in the explanation of this fact.[4] I begin by clarifying what I mean by 'intentionality' and 'phenomenal character'. I will then go on to delineate the varieties of Intentionalism, as well as what I take to be its principal rival.

Intentionality. The familiarity of the notion of intentionality is attested by the myriad of philosophical projects for explaining it; the obscurity of the notion is attested by the

limited progress of these projects. The purpose of this article is to assess a project of using the notion as familiarly understood to achieve a certain explanatory goal, a purpose which doesn't require a full blown analysis or explanation of the notion. Still, some clarificatory remarks about my use of the notion will prove useful.

As I understand the notion of intentionality, it applies in the first instance to *relations:* of the relations, only the *non-comparative relations* can be sensibly assessed for their status as intentional or nonintentional.[5] For such a relation to be intentional is for it to be such that sometimes, among its relata are an existent entity and a merely *intentionally inexistent* entity (Brentano, 1874/1973).[6] It suffices for present purposes to say that for an entity to have mere intentional inexistence is for it to be some way, but to not be "real" or "in the world".[7] This explication successfully handles familiar paradigms and foils of intentional relations. A paradigm is *thinking about:* a real entity can think about an unreal entity, as when John thinks about Sherlock Holmes; a foil is *kicking:* a real entity can't kick an unreal entity.[8]

A familiar sort of intentional relation is the intentional mental relation, including such relations as *wanting, seeking, looking for, hoping for, imagining, fearing, expecting, worshiping, believing in, thinking about, hallucinating*, and perhaps *seeming to see*.[9] A number of authors have argued, contra Brentano, that the intentional relations are not exhausted by the mental intentional relations. According to Harman (1998), when mindless grass needs to be watered, the relation of need is intentional; according to Parsons (1990), processes are intentionally directed toward their goals, so that when an acorn is growing into an oak tree, a possibly unreal event of becoming an oak tree is a relatum of the relation *growing toward;* according to Molnar (2004), dispositions are directed toward their manifestations, so that when a glass is disposed to break, a possibly unreal event of breaking is a relatum of the relation *being disposed to manifest*.

Notions of intentionality applying to entities of sorts other than relations can be defined in terms of this notion of an intentional relation. For a state or event to be intentional is for it to be a state in which something stands in an intentional relation to something else. For instance, Max's state of believing in Santa Claus is an intentional state by this standard. Suppose that an intentional relation holds between a real entity and an unreal entity: the *intentional position* of the relation is the one in which the unreal entity stands. By the intentional properties of an intentional state or event, I will mean a property such as *being a belief in Santa Claus*: an aggregate of the property of involving the intentional relation that is in fact involved in that state, and the property of bearing some intentional relation toward the entity that in fact stands in the intentional position of the relation.[10]

Relations of Awareness. A certain class of intentional relation will be of great significance in the coming discussion. Some intentional relations, such as belief-in and seeming seeing (taken to include cases of veridical and nonveridical visual perception), purport to locate their objects in the world; others, such as hoping-for and wishing-for, do not. Suppose that John believes in Santa Claus: from the standpoint of John's state of belief-in, it is not an open question whether Santa Claus is real. Similarly if Anne apparently sees a pink elephant. By contrast, from the standpoint of Bill's *hope for* Santa Claus, it is an open question whether Santa Claus is real. I will call relations of the former sort *intentional relations of awareness*, or IRAs.

There is a class of nonintentional relations which I will call the *nonintentional relations of awareness*, or NIRAs, the members of which bear a strong resemblance to the IRAs.[11] Consider, for instance, *knowing-of*: it is a nonintentional relation: if John knows of Bill, or Robespierre's beheading, it follows that Bill, or Robespierre's beheading, is real. In other significant respects, however, the NIRA knowing–of is connected to the IRA believing-in. There is a *metaphysical* connection in that knowing-of entails believing-in: John's

knowing of the beheading of Robespierre entails John's believing in the beheading of Robespierre.[12] (The converse entailment does not hold, of course: one can believe in an unreal entity, such as Robespierre's death in his bed, but can only know of real entities.) And there is an *epistemic* connection in that those who believe, like those who know, take themselves to know—if they consider it, in the absence of evidence that they don't.[13]

The same goes for the NIRA *seeing* and the IRA *seeming seeing*: seeing entails seeming seeing; those who seem to see (or hallucinate) take themselves to see—once again, if they consider it, in the absence of evidence that they don't.[14] And the same for the NIRA *remembering* and the IRA *quasi-remembering* (Shoemaker, 1970). Moreover, I conjecture that for any IRA, there is a NIRA which stands to it in these metaphysical and epistemic relations. NIRAs are "broad" states; IRAs "narrow". For this reason I will call seeing the *broadening* of seeming-seeing and the latter the *narrowing* of the former; mutatis mutandis for knowing-of and believing-in; etc. The "star/dagger" notation of Harman (1990, pp. 248–249) will prove useful here: if a NIRA and an IRA are related as broadening and narrowing, I will use a name like 'seeing*' for the former and 'seeing†' for the latter.[15]

One way to explain these phenomena is to assume certain narrow psychological features, features constituting the subject's perspective, which I will call the *narrow marks* of bearing a NIRA to an *F*, and which are subject to the following principles:

> **NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ Marks** Bearing a NIRA to an *F* is always accompanied by (but might, for certain NIRAs, not always accompany) the narrow marks of bearing that NIRA to an *F*.
> **IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ Marks** Bearing an IRA to an *F* always accompanies, and is accompanied by, the narrow marks of bearing its broadening to an *F*.[16]

The metaphysical entailment by a NIRA to its narrowing and the failure of the converse falls right out of these princi-

ples. The epistemic connection can be explained if a further principle is assumed:

Marks are Evidence The narrow marks of bearing a NIRA to an *F* are (or provide, or constitute) *defeasible evidence* that one bears that NIRA to an *F*.

If so, then one who bears a NIRA or an IRA to an *F*, and who considers whether he bears a NIRA to an *F*, will be in a position to introspectively detect certain narrow psychological features which constitute defeasible evidence that he does; lacking evidence to the contrary, one will take oneself to do so.

Phenomenal Character. As I understand the notion of phenomenal character, the phenomenal character of an experience is a property: what that experience is like to or for its subject—a property which is "to" or "for" the subject of the experience (cf. Nagel, 1974). Experiences are events, so phenomenal characters are among the kinds of properties events can have (or coherently seem to have). I won't suppose outright that experiences *instantiate* their phenomenal characters: maybe being a phenomenal character is like being an apparent property, in that something might or might not instantiate an apparent property. Sometimes I will talk of phenomenal-character *instances*: the phenomenal character of my present experience is a nonrepeatable particular, which may be of the same kind as but cannot be identical to the phenomenal character of any other experience. To avoid begging questions for or against the Intentionalist. I avoid speculation at this early stage as to what sorts of properties are ever phenomenal characters.

A phenomenal character is "to" or "for" a subject. When a token of a property stands in this relation to a subject, I will say that the subject is *conscious* of the property. I use this expression as a term of art. In the ordinary sense, one can be conscious of things other than phenomenal characters—for instance, one might be conscious of the primeness of 17. Moreover, in the ordinary sense, consciousness of is a sort of awareness, perhaps an attentive awareness. I don't, at this stage, want to commit to whether consciousness-of, in my

sense, requires awareness. It might be a relation as homely as *instantiation*. If so, all the distinctive features of having a certain property as phenomenal character would stem from the nature of the property. (At the opposite extreme, phenomenal characters might be homely brain properties; if so, all the distinctive features of having a certain property as phenomenal character would stem from the relation of *consciousness-of*.)

In the argumentation below, it will prove useful to have established a certain tight connection between phenomenal character and the subject's perspective, as discussed in the treatment of principles NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ MARKS and IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ MARKS. To see this, consider the sort of "four brains" example sometimes employed to defend epistemic internalism (Cohen, 1984; Pryor, 2001), the position that what is relevant for epistemic justification is exhausted by a subject's perspective (Alston, 1989). Suppose that there are four brains-in-vats; brains A and B have the phenomenal character of a very reasonable person—say, David Lewis—brains C and D of a very unreasonable person—say, Bill O'Reilly. Internalists think the Lewis-brains are standardly justified in forming beliefs, the O'Reilly-brains standardly unjustified. Now suppose that in their *un*conscious mental properties, or brain properties failing to directly constitute aspects of phenomenal character, brains A and C are both duplicates of Lewis, while B and D are duplicates of O'Reilly (to the extent that this is consistent with the previous stipulations). Internalists won't change their view that A and B are justified and C and D aren't. This suggests that internalist justification is determined only by phenomenal character—we already knew that it was determined only by narrow mental features, and it seems to track phenomenal character and be independent of unconscious narrow mental features. The simplest explanation of this is that subjective perspectives just *are* total time-slices of phenomenal characters, where these may include intrinsically meaningful properties, not only mere meaningless qualities. Hence, there can't be anything to the narrow marks of a mental state aside from phenomenal character.

If all this is granted, principles NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ MARKS and IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ MARKS above reduce to the following:

NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ PC Bearing a NIRA to an *F* is always accompanied by (but might, for certain NIRAs, not always accompany) a certain phenomenal character characteristic of bearing that NIRA to an *F*.
IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC Bearing an IRA to an *F* always accompanies, and is accompanied by, the phenomenal character characteristic of bearing its broadening to an *F*.

These principles are compatible with MARKS ARE EVIDENCE.

Intentionalism and Anti-Intentionalism. Since for one's mental state to have *F* as its phenomenal character is for one to bear *consciousness-of* to *F*ness, intentionality would be involved in the explanation of one's mental state's having *F* as its phenomenal character if either *F*ness is an intentional property, or *consciousness-of* is an intentional relation, or both. I will call the claim that phenomenal characters are intentional properties *Property Intentionalism* and the claim that consciousness of is an intentional relation *Higher-Order Intentionalism*. These positions are independent. One could hold that some phenomenal characters are not intentional properties while holding that for an instance of one of these properties to be a phenomenal character of an experience is for the subject of the experience to bear an intentional relation to the instance: one would then be a Higher-Order Intentionalist but not a Property Intentionalist. Alternatively, one could hold that all phenomenal characters are intentional properties while also thinking that all that is required for an instance of one of these properties to be a phenomenal character of an experience is for it to be a property of the experience.

Focusing on *identity* as the relation between phenomenal explanandum and intentional explanans might seem to load my Intentionalist opponent with a strong position—wouldn't it be more fair to focus on a weaker relation, such as constitution, or supervenience? I do so because first, a constitution version of Intentionalism is unacceptable as a complete explanation of

consciousness (not, at least, without a specification of the natures of the constituting basis and the relation of constitution); and second, as I shall argue, a supervenience version of the position is correct, but only in a trivial sense.

Opposition to Intentionalism thus requires two commitments. First, one must reject Property Intentionalism, by holding that at least some phenomenal characters are nonintentional properties: call this view *Qualia Theory*.[17] In my view, the phenomenal characters are diverse, and can't all be shoehorned into a single mold. Some are intentional properties; others are nonintentional properties. This point is (to me, at least) convincingly argued in the literature on Property Intentionalism;[18] here I will assume the truth of the view and will usually intend Higher-Order Intentionalism by 'Intentionalism'; context should make clear when I use the term more inclusively.

Second, one must reject Higher-Order Intentionalism. As I will argue below, the principal motivation for Higher-Order Intentionalism supports the view that if consciousness-of is intentional, it is an IRA. Hence, an anti-Intentionalist must hold that consciousness-of is not an IRA. There are two ways to endorse this latter commitment: *Resolute Theorists* hold that consciousness-of is not a relation of awareness at all. One way to be resolute is to hold that, if a certain property-instance is of a kind instances of which *can be* phenomenal characters, it suffices for it to be a phenomenal character of one's mental state that it be a property of one's mental state (a position not easily squared with a diversity of phenomenal characters); another way to be resolute is to hold that it suffices for such a property-instance (or perhaps for any property-instance) to be a phenomenal character that it stand in the right functional relations, such as being poised to influence cognition or action (Tye, 1995). There are likely other options. Clearly, one can be a Resolute Property Intentionalist.[19]

The second way to endorse the commitment that consciousness-of is not an IRA is to take it to be a NIRA: call this view *Acquaintance Theory*. I don't know of any explicit

advocates of Acquaintance Theory in the contemporary literature on consciousness. Acquaintance/Qualia Theory is the conjunction of Acquaintance Theory and Qualia Theory.

Higher-Order Intentionalism and Acquaintance Theory Compared. Acquaintance Theory has a trio of advantages over Higher-Order Intentionalism.

First, a reason for reductively-minded naturalists to prefer Acquaintance Theory to Higher-Order Intentionalism is that the latter involves intentional relations and the former doesn't. Maybe intentional relations can be reduced, maybe they can't; but introducing them into the mix raises a *prima facie* difficulty for reductivism.

Second, Acquaintance Theory arguably is the view of common sense. As Lewis (1980, p. 130) once insisted, "Pain is a feeling. Surely that is uncontroversial. To have pain and to feel pain are one and the same. For a state [property] to be pain and for it to feel painful are likewise one and the same". More generally, it seems an article of common sense that no mental state can have phenomenal character *K* unless the subject is somehow aware of (or "feels") its instance of *K*; and that if a subject is aware of, in the relevant way, an instance of *K*, the subject's mental state has *K* as its phenomenal character—there cannot be phenomenal illusions of the sort Higher-Order Intentionalism predicts.

Third, a number of concerns about the view that consciousness-of is a form of awareness either misfire unless it is an IRA, or are much more easily rebutted if it is a NIRA.[20] To the extent that one finds the view attractive but the concerns worrisome, one has reason to endorse the Acquaintance Theory.

Other Conceptions of Intentionality. I have characterized intentionality, and therefore Intentionalism, in terms of intentional relations. This is consistent with its original use by Brentano, as well as with its use by Harman (1990), the originator of the recent surge of popularity experienced by Intentionalism, and such mid-century Intentionalists as Anscombe (1965).

But other authors understand different things by the terminology. One thing that might be meant is a more generic form of mental relatedness to external entities which includes NIRAs. Clearly the Acquaintance/Qualia Theory is not at odds with such an expansive "Intentionalism", though Resolute Qualia Theory is still a genuine competitor. Still, no Intentionalist I know of explicitly recognizes the compatibility of his view with the Acquaintance/Qualia Theory.

A phenomenon a number of Intentionalists explicitly endorse as answering to 'intentionality' is what I will call *representation*, or the association of certain mental states with correctness-conditions, or circumstances with respect to which they are accurate or inaccurate. John's belief that snow is white puts forth a certain picture of the world as true, and therefore has a correctness-condition, namely, it is correct just in case snow is white. In a more expansive sense, Bill's hope that it doesn't rain has a correctness-condition. Although the state of hoping is never either correct or incorrect, it still encodes a picture of the world—that it doesn't rain—which may or may not match up with the world as it is. (These cases correspond to Martin's (2002) distinction between the (narrow) "stative" and (broad) "semantic" conceptions of representation.)

For instance, Siewert (1998, ch. 6.2), after dismissing the explanation of intentionality in terms of "aboutness" as obscure, proceeds to identify intentionality with representation in my sense. Similarly, Byrne (2001) characterizes Intentionalism as the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content, where, according to Byrne, the representational content of a mental state is an abstract entity which projects onto the correctness condition of that state.[21] There are even traces of this conception in Harman 1990 (cf. 246).

Still, I tentatively suspect that the differences between the intentional-relation and representation interpretations of intentionality may be minor. The former seems slightly more expansive: under rare circumstances, one might think about Vienna without thinking anything about it ("hm, Vienna").

But, arguably (den Dikken et al., 1996), this is the extent of the divergence: whenever one desires something, one's desire encodes a particular picture of the world concerning that thing—that one possess it, or that it be in a certain place at a certain time, or that it be real. And whenever one believes in or sees† something, this state encodes a particular picture of the world—that the thing be real, or, perhaps that one additionally know of or see* the thing.[22] Conversely, it is plausible that for any representational state—desiring that every dog have its day, having a visual experience with the correctness condition that Brutus is stabbing Caesar—there is a corresponding intentional relational state—desiring every dog's having its day, seeing† Brutus stab Caesar.

A Road Map of the Coming Argument. In Section 2, I will address a budget of arguments that have been given for two versions of Higher-Order Intentionalism, higher-order-thought theory and inner sense theory. My point will be to show that many arguments that have been brought on behalf of these theories do not even purport to discriminate between these theories, which appeal to IRAs, and their non-Intentionalist variants, which appeal rather to NIRAs. In Section 3, I address arguments which do purport to have this power, including the vexed issue of whether there can be illusions of phenomenal character. Ultimately, I will argue for Acquaintance Theory on the grounds that it provides a superior explanation of the principles NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ MARKS and IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ MARKS.

2. ON THE CASE FOR HIGHER-ORDER INTENTIONALISM

Higher-Order Intentionalism and Acquaintance Theory have in common the view that being a phenomenal character is an extrinsic higher-order property, which a property-instance has just when its subject stands in the relation of *consciousness-of* to it. What sort of relation could make a property-instance into a phenomenal character? The principal attraction of the view that only a relation of *awareness* could is that if a mental state is *F* to or for its subject, the subject cannot be totally unaware

of *F*ness; this could be explained if for a state to be *F* to or for one were just for one to be aware of its *F*ness.[23]

Suppose that the relation of awareness in question is intentional: then the relation is, in the terminology from sec. 1, an IRA—more like belief-in than desire. After all, from the standpoint of consciousness, there is no doubt whether one's mental state has the phenomenal character one is aware of it as having: analogously, a state of belief-in purports the existence of its object: there is no doubt whether its object exists, from the standpoint of the state; not so for desire.

Higher-Order Intentionalists enter into debate with one another over which IRA consciousness-of is. According to *higher-order thought* theorists, consciousness-of is the intentional relation of occurrent belief-in; according to *inner sense* theorists, consciousness-of is some form of relation of perceiving†; a sui generis position on which it is neither is also available, though not much to my knowledge availed of. These views come in both higher-order and reflexive variants, with the dispute being whether the token phenomenal character isn't, or is, a (proper or improper) constituent of the state of occurrent belief-in, perceiving†, or sui generis awareness. Each of the versions of Higher-Order Intentionalism has spawned a vast literature. Much of this literature is concerned with specific implementations of the Higher-Order Intentionalist program. I won't rehearse these considerations, since I think the literature has largely missed the essential point about Higher-Order Intentionalism, namely that it has a competitor in the Acquaintance Theory: the motivation given for Higher-Order Intentionalism is that consciousness-of is a relation of Awareness, but this doesn't establish that it is an IRA rather than a NIRA.

I will consider for the balance of this section a number of humdrum arguments in favor of Higher-Order Intentionalism and show them powerless to discriminate between Higher-Order Intentionalism and Acquaintance Theory. In the next section I will consider arguments with the power to perform this discrimination.

2.1. *Rosenthal on Higher-Order Thought Theories*

Rosenthal has produced an extensive body of work in defense of the view, more-or-less (the ins and outs of the view don't matter much for present purposes), that consciousness-of is a form of *thought*, along the lines of *occurrent belief-in, judging to exist*, or *positing*.

In a recent survey of the literature on the view (Rosenthal, 2002), he provides two arguments for the view, the first of which is an argument by elimination:

> A state's being conscious involves one's being noninferentially conscious of that state. Can we pin down any further the way we are transitively conscious of our conscious states? There are two broad ways of being transitively conscious of things. We are conscious of something when we see it or hear it, or perceive it in some other way. And we are conscious of something when we have a thought about it. Which kind of transitive consciousness is relevant here? When our mental states are conscious, do we somehow sense those states or do we have thoughts about them? (409)

He argues that we don't sense them; hence "[t]he only alternative is that we are conscious of our conscious states by virtue of having thoughts about them" (409), where the thought captures an occurrent ("since merely being disposed to have a thought about something does not make one conscious of that thing, the higher-order thought must be an occurrent thought, rather than just a disposition to think that one is in the target state" (409–410)) "assertoric" or statively representational ("being in an intentional state whose mental attitude is not assertoric does not result in one's being conscious of the thing the intentional state is about" (410)) mental state to the effect "that the object is there, or exists" (fn. 22)—more or less, a belief in the object.

Set aside the slippage from "there are two broad ways of being transitively conscious of things" to there are *only* two such ways—maybe consciousness-of is just what it is and not anything else—as well as whether the arguments against the inner-sense view succeed. Still, if capturing in a thought a belief in an entity suffices to make one conscious of the entity, so does capturing in a thought knowledge of the entity. This

first argument, then, fails to discriminate between Higher-Order Intentionalism and the Acquaintance Theory.

Does the second argument do any better?

> When a mental state is conscious, one can noninferentially report being in that state, whereas one cannot report one's nonconscious mental states. Every speech act, moreover, expresses an intentional state with the same content as that of the speech act and a mental attitude that corresponds to its illocutionary force. So a noninferential report that one is in a mental state will express a noninferential thought that one is in that state, that is, a higher-order thought about that state. We can best explain this ability noninferentially to report our conscious states by supposing that the relevant higher-order thought is there to be expressed. Correspondingly, the best explanation of our inability to report nonconscious states is that no higher-order thoughts accompany them. (410)

Set aside again the question whether consciousness merely disposes one to have the thought which is then asserted (Rosenthal considers this objection but instead of replying to it changes the subject to the merits of the view that consciousness-of *is* the disposition to have a higher-order thought). True enough that one's having a thought capturing believing in one's mental state *s*'s being *F* explains one's asserting that *s* is *F*. Still, so does one's having a thought capturing *knowing of s*'s *F*-ness. It is not obvious that the former is better as an explanation of our ability to report on conscious states and our inability to report on unconscious states than the latter. Hence, this argument too fails to discriminate between Higher-Order Intentionalism and Acquaintance Theory.

2.2. *Lycan on Inner Sense Theories*

Lycan is one of a number of contemporary authors, including Armstrong (1980) and Lormand (1994), who have defended the *inner sense* view that consciousness-of is *perceiving*[†]. Lycan's survey of the case for and against the inner sense view (Lycan, 1997) turns up four arguments for inner sense theory.

First: "the Inner Sense view of consciousness [...] does distinguish awareness from mere psychology and conscious states/events [...] from mere mentation. We may plausibly

suppose that many lower animals have psychologies and mentation, or at least internal representation, without awareness'' (756). A view on which consciousness-of is a sui generis relation would also be able to make this distinction: mental events are ''mere mentation'' when their subject is not conscious of their properties, conscious otherwise. Moreover, so would a view on which consciousness-of is perceiving*: mental events are ''mere mentation'' when not perceived*, conscious otherwise.

Second: ''the view affords some grades of un- or subconsciousness; for example, a state/event may be unconscious just because it is unattended, but a Freudian wish to kill one's father may have been rendered unattend*able* by some masterful Censor'' (756). Once again, a sui generis relation of consciousness serving as the categorical basis of the possibility of attention would provide for this distinction (although Lycan might protest that this is all he means by inner sense), as would a relation of perceiving*: seeing* something explains one's ability to attend to it just as well as does seeing† something.

Third: ''the Inner Sense account affords the best solution I know to the problem of subjectivity and ''knowing what it's like''. [...] It involves the behavior of indexical terms in the proprietary vocabulary mobilized by the relevant attention mechanisms'' (756). Ditto.

Fourth

> the Inner Sense view sorts out a long-standing issue about sensations and feeling. Consider pain. A minor pain may go unfelt, or so we sometimes say. Even quite a bad pain may not be felt if attention is distracted by sufficiently pressing concerns. Yet such assertions as my last two can sound anomalous. As David Lewis once said, meaning to tautologize, ''Pain is a feeling''. When one person's commonplace sounds to another contradictory on its face, we should expect equivocation, and the Inner Sense model delivers. Sometimes the word ''pain'' is used to mean just the first-order representation of damage or disorder, a representation that can go unnoticed. But sometimes ''pain'' means a conscious feeling or mode of awareness, and on that usage the phrase ''unfelt pain'' is simply self-contradictory; it comprehends both the first-order representation and the second-order scanning together. Thus the equivocation, which gave rise to the issue; the issue is dissolved. (756)

Set aside the questions whether pain is a representation of anything; whether "unfelt" pain wouldn't be better treated as unattended pain than as pain of which one is not conscious; and whether consciousness-of needs to be treated as a sort of perception. Still, since feeling* does not require that *everything* is felt*—only that everything felt* is felt* accurately—the advocate of Acquaintance Theory is in as good a position as Lycan to explain this distinction.

Lycan's arguments, too, fail to discriminate between the Intentionalist view that consciousness-of is perceiving† and the Acquaintance view that consciousness-of is perceiving*.[24]

3. THE CASE FOR ACQUAINTANCE THEORY

So much for the humdrum arguments. In this section I will assess arguments powerful enough to make the needed discriminations. First, an *explanation argument* due to the Intentionalists Byrne (2001, sec. 6) and Thau (2002, pp. 31–32), which I will show to collapse into an argument from *illusions of phenomenal character*. This second argument cuts both ways: if there can be such illusions, the Higher-Order Intentionalist wins; if not, the Acquaintance Theorist wins. Given the difficulty in assessing the prima facie case for or against such illusions, I turn to a third argument from *explanatory priority*, which makes a very strong case for Acquaintance Theory.

3.1. *The Explanation Argument*

According to Acquaintance Theory, to have *F* as the phenomenal character of one's experience is to bear acquaintance (a NIRA) to an instance of *F* ness; it follows that on the Acquaintance Theory, the fact that one is acquainted with the instance (noncausally) *explains* the fact about one's phenomenal character. But, according to the explanation objection, the fact that one bears a NIRA to some entity *cannot* explain the fact that one's experience has a certain phenomenal character. Why can't which entities one sees* explain which phenomenal character one's (visual) experience has?

> Suppose that you and I are both seeing a square object, but [...] the object looks circular to me. [...] [T]he different ways the object appears to us can't be explained by the features that the object we are aware of actually has. [...] In order to explain the difference in how the object appears to us, one must advert to a difference in the way the object seems. (Thau, 2002, p. 31)

There are two claims here:

(1) Which sorts of entities one sees* can't explain which phenomenal character one's experience has;
(2) Which sorts of entities one sees† can explain which phenomenal character one's experience has.[25]

Thau takes (1) to generalize to all NIRAs: for any phenomenal character and any NIRA, including *acquaintance*, one's experience's having phenomenal character *F* cannot be explained by one's bearing that NIRA to a certain sort of entity. If (1) is correct, and the generalizing step succeeds, bad news for Acquaintance Theory.

Still, why believe (1)? Support seems to be intended to stem from the case of illusion, though Thau is very sketchy about the relevance of the case.[26] I can think of two interpretations.

Interpretation I: Underdetermination. On the first interpretation, the possibility of illusion shows that which sorts of entities one sees* *underdetermines* which phenomenal character one's experience has. If so, some *further fact* is needed to completely explain which phenomenal character one's experience has.

The claim of underdetermination seems false. To begin with, note that to establish that which sorts of *whole material objects* one sees* underdetermines phenomenal character, appeal to illusion is not necessary. After all, two subjects might see* different *parts* or *aspects* of a single object—one might see* the object's curved top while the other sees* its flat bottom; one might see* the object's color but not its shape while the other sees* its shape but not its color.

Still, this sort of aspectuality can be easily accommodated by taking *property-instances* (or property-instances of parts) to be the entities which, when seen*, determine phenomenal

character. Further refinements of this theory would be necessary to explain variation in phenomenal character due to still further manifestations of aspectuality. I describe some such refinements in this footnote.[27]

What is needed to establish the underdetermination claim against the property-instance variant is the possibility of *property-instance illusion*: seeing* a squareness as something other than a squareness—for instance, a roundness. If property-instance illusions were possible, then, plausibly, any list of which property-instances one sees*, subject to any number of refinements of the sorts described in the previous footnote, would still underdetermine phenomenal character—one might fail to see* those property-instances *as* what they are. But I see no reason to accept that property-instance illusion is possible.

Moreover, (2)—that which sorts of entities one sees† *does* explain (and therefore determine) which phenomenal character one's experience has—places considerable theoretical pressure on the claim that property-instance illusion is possible. To see this, ask: is (2) supposed to mean that phenomenal character is determined by the sorts of *first-order* property-instances one sees†, such as instances of squareness, or that it is determined by the sorts of *second-order* property-instances one sees†, such as instances of *being an instance of squareness?* Consider the first alternative. Then, if one sees* a squareness as a roundness, what determines the phenomenal character of one's experience is that one sees† a roundness. So, one sees† a roundness. But now recall the thesis defended in Section 1 that whenever one sees* something, one also sees† it. If this is right, then since one sees* a squareness, one also sees† that squareness. But this relation of seeing† has no impact on one's phenomenal character at all. Still, sometimes seeing† a squareness does have a characteristic impact on phenomenal character—such as when one mistakenly sees* a roundness as a squareness. It follows that the fact that one sees† a squareness does not determine phenomenal character after all; (2) can't be held consistently with property-instance illusion, if phenomenal character is determined by seen† first-order property-instances.

So suppose that phenomenal character is held to be determined by the sorts of *second-order* property-instances one sees†. Here, the advocate of Seeing* Theory should grant this, but switch to the view that phenomenal character is determined by relations of seeing* borne to *second-order* property-instances. If Thau claims that there can be illusion about *these* sorts of property-instances, the concern about the initial claim is recapitulated at the higher level. Ultimately, (1) cannot be consistently endorsed while maintaining (2). It is to the advantage of both sides to block the regress by allowing seeing* property-instances to have characteristic effects on phenomenal character. So I am inclined to think that the underdetermination claim is not true, and Thau's argument, on the first interpretation, fails.

Interpretation II: Illusions in Acquaintance. Still, on a second, simpler, interpretation, the argument succeeds. There is a noncausal sense of 'explains' on which the claim that *a* explains *b* just means that *b* is metaphysically constituted by, or reduces to, or is ''really only'', or is identical to, *a*. Perhaps Thau intended this sense of explanation. If so, then there is a direct argument from the possibility of illusion to the nonidentity of one's experience's having the phenomenal character characteristic of seeing* a red thing with one's seeing* a red thing: if one is subject to illusion, one's experience can have the phenomenal character even though one does not see*, but merely sees†, the red thing; but then one's experience's having the phenomenal character can't be identical to one's seeing* the red thing, since the latter is not a necessary condition for the former.

But still, even if the possibility of illusion in visual perception shows that seeing* a certain sort of entity is not necessary for one's experience's having a certain phenomenal character, in order for similar reasoning to show that being *acquainted* with is not necessary for one's experience's having a certain phenomenal character, the possibility of an illusion in *acquaintance* needs to be established.

What would an ''illusion in acquaintance'' be? According to the Higher-Order Intentionalist, consciousness-of is a

certain IRA *I*: one's experience's having phenomenal character *F* is just one's bearing *I* to an instance of *F* ness. Since *I* is intentional, it is possible that the "intentional position" of *I* is saturated by an unreal instance of *F*ness. If so, then, it is possible that one's experience has phenomenal character *F* but is not *F*: this is what an illusion in acquaintance would be. If there can be illusions in acquaintance in this sense, 'phenomenal character' functions rather like 'apparent property': John's apparent property is *being an electronics importer* when in fact he lacks this property and is rather a CIA employee.

By contrast, according to the Acquaintance Theorist, consciousness-of is acquaintance, a NIRA. Since acquaintance is nonintentional, if one's experience has phenomenal character *F*, it is *F*. There cannot be illusions in acquaintance, according to the Acquaintance Theorist. So, whether consciousness-of is a NIRA or an IRA is determined by whether there cannot, or can, be illusions in acquaintance.[28]

Whether there can be illusions in acquaintance is the subject of considerable debate.[29] I am on the side of those who refuse to accept such a possibility: when the dentist informs the nervous patient he hadn't started drilling yet and the patient says 'ah, so I didn't feel pain after all', this reveals in my view either that there is more to pain than a phenomenal character or that dentistry patients are easily shamed into behaving solicitously. Such cases are exquisitely difficult to reach any sort of agreement on. The debate would be advanced considerably if whether such illusions are possible could be established by appeal to deeper principles.

3.2. *Explanatory Priority*

Principles of the requisite depth are appealed to in the *explanatory priority argument*. Consider once again principles NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ PC and IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC:

> **NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ PC** Bearing a NIRA to an is always accompanied by (but might, for certain NIRAs, not always accompany) a certain characteristic phenomenal character.

IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC Bearing an IRA to an *F* always accompanies, and is accompanied by, the phenomenal character characteristic of bearing its broadening to an *F*.

There seem to be two strategies for explaining these necessary truths. An "IRA-first" strategy explains NIRAs in terms of IRAs; a "NIRA-first" strategy explains IRAs in terms of NIRAs.

An IRA-first strategy takes the IRA and its characteristic features as primitive, and declares its broadening to be that IRA *plus*—plus, for instance, appropriate external causation. So, for example, knowledge-of is belief-in *plus*; seeing is seeming-seeing *plus*. Research in the Gettierological project of explaining knowledge as belief *plus* describes various versions of a belief-first strategy to explaining the nature of knowledge. (IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC) can be stipulated as among the characteristic features of the IRA; (NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ PC) is a consequence of the fact that the IRA's broadening is the IRA *plus*. IRA-first strategies thus embody *conjunctive* conceptions of NIRAs.

A NIRA-first strategy[30] takes the NIRA and its characteristic features as primitive, and declares its narrowing to be a functionally-defined state: to be in the narrowing of a NIRA is to be in some "realizer" state which is from the subject's perspective like being in the NIRA. I have analyzed the notion of how a mental state is from its subject's perspective in terms of the phenomenal character characteristic of that state. Although there are doubtless alternatives to my analysis, if my analysis is correct, then what it is for one to be in the narrowing of a given NIRA is for one to be in some or other realizer state with the phenomenal character characteristic of the NIRA. So, for instance, to be in a state of belief-in is just to be in some or other realizer state with the phenomenal character characteristic of a state of knowledge-of. IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC follows immediately from this functional characterization. NIRA-first strategies thus embody *quantificational* conceptions of IRAs.[31]

There is much to be said for the NIRA-first strategy. First of all, the IRA-first strategy remains a research program, since we have no idea what the *plus* is for any broadening of

any IRA (cf. Williamson 2000, ch. 1, which provides a number of further arguments on behalf of the NIRA-first strategy). By contrast, modulo concerns about the appropriate clarification of the notion of a subject's perspective, the NIRA-first strategy is reasonably completely specified. Second, IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ PC seems somewhat more difficult to justify as a basic postulate than does NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ PC. When one bears a NIRA, things are going right: knowledge and seeing* have a certain excellence that belief and seeing† need not have; bearing an IRA is compatible with things going wrong. It is prima facie plausible both that when things go right, this should be clear, and that when things go wrong, one should be subject to further delusions, such as that things are going right; but why should it be in the nature of a state compatible both with things going right and with things going wrong that it strike one that things are going right?[32] (This might also serve to explain MARKS ARE EVIDENCE.) By contrast, I can think of no argument that has been advanced on behalf of the IRA-first strategy over the NIRA-first strategy.

But if the NIRA-first strategy is granted across the board, the direction of explanation running between phenomenal character and intentionality is the opposite of that which the Higher-Order Intentionalist claims. On the NIRA-first strategy, to be acquainted† with an instance of *K*ness is just to be in some state or other which has the phenomenal character characteristic of acquaintance* with an instance of *K*ness. Surely the phenomenal character characteristic of acquaintance* with states of *K*ness is just *K*. It follows, therefore, that to be acquainted† with an instance of *K*ness is just to be in some state with the phenomenal character *K*. That is, if the NIRA-first strategy is correct, phenomenal character *explains* acquaintance†. But according to Higher-Order Intentionalism, to have *K* as the phenomenal character of one's experience is just to bear acquaintance† to an instance of *K*ness: acquaintance† *explains* phenomenal character.

This reversal of the order of explanation has two consequences. First, it shows that Higher-Order Intentionalism is

false. Rather than facts about phenomenal character being explained by facts about a certain sort of intentionality, the bearing of an IRA, the truth of the matter is that facts about this sort of intentionality are rather explained by facts about phenomenal character.

Suppose (i) that the NIRA-first strategy is correct: then the fact that one bears an IRA to an instance of *F* is explained by the fact that one's mental state has the phenomenal character characteristic of bearing the broadening of that IRA to an instance of *F*. And suppose for reductio (ii) that John suffers an illusion of acquaintance: that John's mental state has the *phenomenal* character *K*, but is not in fact *K* (recall, from the discussion on p. 8, that it may or may not be the case that a mental state must *have* its phenomenal character: perhaps a phenomenal character is like an apparent property). The fact that John suffers this particular illusion of acquaintance is just the fact that John bears a certain IRA, *I*, to an instance of *K*. On the NIRA-first strategy, this fact is explained by the fact that John's mental state has a certain phenomenal character: namely, the phenomenal character characteristic of bearing the broadening of *I* to an instance of *K*[33]

But what phenomenal character is *that?* Surely, *K*. After all, the phenomenal character of a state with *K* as its phenomenal character is none other than *K* itself. So it follows from (i) and (ii) that the fact that John's mental state has the phenomenal character *K* is just explained by the fact that John's mental state has the phenomenal character *K*. But surely explanation is an antisymmetric relation: no fact can explain itself. So the absurdity of a fact explaining itself follows from (i) and (ii); so the NIRA-first strategy (assumption (i)) is incompatible with illusion of acquaintance (assumption (ii)).

Note that my case against Higher-Order Intentionalism is not directed against a version of the view understood as a thesis of the *supervenience* of phenomenal character on intentional properties, to the effect that two metaphysically possible subjects with differing phenomenal characters differ in

their intentional properties. Bearing a NIRA toward an *F* entails bearing its narrowing toward an *F*. Consequently, if having *K* as the phenomenal character of one's experience is identical to being acquainted* with an instance of *K*ness, having *K* as the phenomenal character of one's experience entails bearing acquaintance† toward an instance of *K*ness; the supervenience thesis is established. Still, phenomenal character also supervenes on nonintentional relations of acquaintance; and, as I have argued, the nonintentional supervenience base is metaphysically more fundamental than the intentional supervenience base.

4. TAKING STOCK

I have argued that what it is for a property to be a phenomenal character is that one bear a certain nonintentional relation of acquaintance to it. The argument was somewhat intricate, and relied on powerful theses about the relations among phenomenal character and intentionality: NIRA $\Longrightarrow$ MARKS, IRA $\Longleftrightarrow$ MARKS, and the identification of a subject's perspective with the phenomenal character of his or her total mental state. The power of the theses may be to the discredit of the argument; still, it often happens that when two things are very similar, as Acquaintance Theory and Higher-Order Intentionalism are, they are only discriminable with the aid of powerful instruments. Nevertheless, it would be nice to take a step back from the specifics of the argument and assess whether there are more general theoretical reasons motivating a jaundiced attitude toward the ability of intentionality to ground consciousness.

Intentionalism promised to leave us with one unsolved problem in the philosophy of mind where there were previously two. It doesn't do this. Intentionality is all over the place in the world, including: the intentionality of organismal processes, as when an acorn is growing into a mighty oak; the intentionality of thermodynamic processes in closed systems, with entropy always increasing; the intentionality of dynamical processes, which proceed so as to minimize the use

of energy. Most of these do not—barring an absurd panpsychism—exhibit consciousness. The Intentionalist is thus left with the problem of explaining why certain varieties of intentionality give rise to consciousness when others don't. A healthy pessimism about the prospects of such an approach leaves one suspicious that the Intentionalist can only explain consciousness in terms of *conscious* intentionality.[34]

By contrast, a strategy which reduces *certain* manifestations of mental intentionality—the IRAs—to consciousness is in line with a broad, piecemeal strategy across the natural sciences of providing domain-specific reductions for the many manifestations of intentionality. The Phenomenalist's reduction of IRAs to consciousness thus only takes a tiny bite out of the global problem of intentionality. But then the same is true for the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. The diversity of intentionality strongly indicates that there is no way to simultaneously reduce away all its manifestations.

Finally, the non-domain-specificity of intentionality makes it plausible that intentionality is a *merely superficial* phenomenon, an artifact of our way of thinking about things. While taking the "intentional stance" (Dennett, 1987) may be useful, such discourse fails to "latch on" to any objective ingredient of the world.[35] By contrast, this sort of anti-realism as applied to phenomenal character seems not at all plausible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for comments; thanks to Susanna Siegel for discussion; and thanks to David Jehle, and special thanks to Jessica Wilson, for comments and discussion.

NOTES

[1] Moreover, a significant Chomskian (Chomsky, 2000; Mausfeld, 2003) trend in contemporary psychology regards intentional discourse as of at best instrumental significance, corresponding to no joint in reality. This point will reemerge toward the end of the paper.

[2] Though McGinn (1988), Searle (1990), Siewert (1998), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Loar (2003), and Chalmers (2005) are sympathetic to this order of explanation.

[3] Variants of Intentionalism include so-called first-order representationalist views (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000; Dretske, 1995); higher-order thought theories (Rosenthal, 2002); dispositional higher-order thought theories (Carruthers, 2000); inner-sense theories (Armstrong, 1980; Block 1997; Lormand, 1994; Lycan, 1997); and self-representation theories (Kriegel, 2006). (The cited authors are just representative advocates of their views; more citations may be found in the cited texts.)

Alternative possibilities for the relation between consciousness and intentionality are that neither reduces to the other, either because they are intertwined (Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Chalmers, 2005); or because they are independent (Fodor, 1991).

[4] An anonymous reviewer points out an exception: according to Rosenthal (2002), a nonconscious mental state can have a phenomenal character; when the state is conscious, this character is what the state is like. I'm inclined to doubt there is more than a terminological distinction between Rosenthal's view and my view: I reserve "phenomenal character" for what a mental state is like; Rosenthal seems to be using it somehow more expansively.

As formulated by Byrne (2001, sec. 2), Intentionalism is the weaker thesis that phenomenal character *supervenes* on intentionality. Still, first, each of the authors to whom Byrne attributes this goal also has a stronger, explanatory purpose in mind. Second, it is difficult to see what the interest of the supervenience thesis would be were the explanatory thesis false (and Byrne justifies the interest of the supervenience thesis on the grounds that it blocks nonsupervenience worries about the explanatory thesis (200)). Third, if my analysis of the situation is correct, the supervenience thesis is true but trivial.

[5] Noncomparative relations include *kicking, building, loading, begetting, thinking about, and seeing*; comparative relations include *being taller than, being older than*, and *being smarter than*. I make this restriction because although David Lewis was smarter than Doctor Watson, it is still not plausible that *being smarter than* is an intentional relation; still, I don't want to say it's nonintentional either.

[6] I don't intend that relations to intentionally inexistent entities are to be taken as either semantically or metaphysically primitive. Any of a number of well-worn paths for eliminating them might succeed in doing so. I am neutral on whether the speech in common parlance about such entities has a misleading logical form, or involves metaphor or pretense, for instance. Supposing that speech about intentional inexistents is literally committing, it might be false but still useful; or might be true but "really only" about something else. In the final section of this paper I offer a

strategy for eliminating the sort of intentionality most relevant to the present discussion.

[7] Although this is plausibly a necessary condition on having mere intentional inexistence, it is perhaps not sufficient, since past and merely possible entities are, perhaps, not in the world; and, perhaps, past and merely possible entities which are not the object of any cognition, narrative, or goal do not have mere intentional inexistence.

[8] Although one unreal entity can kick another, as if Holmes kicks the hound of the Baskervilles.

[9] This last might be a compound state, involving a propositional attitude of seeming with object a proposition concerning what one sees.

[10] An intentional mental state or event will always be associated with the tokening of nonintentional psychological features, such as the manner of computational realization of the state or event. Sometimes these features will be rationally significant. For instance, contrast a belief that Clark Kent flies and a belief that Superman flies: one might rationally have the latter while lacking the former. Still, this is not due to their intentional features: the intentional features of the former are that it is a state of belief in Clark Kent's flying; those of the latter that it is a state of belief in Superman's flying; and I, for one, find these to be the same. (Here I am taking 'belief-in' locutions to be referentially transparent or "Russellian" while 'belief-that' locutions are referentially opaque or "Fregean"; my intuitions and those of others support this asymmetry.)

I will call such rationally significant nonintentional features *Fregean* features. I take no position on the metaphysical question of whether intentional states themselves have Fregean features, or rather whether the Fregean features inhere in some state merely associated with the intentional state.

[11] If NIRAs are mental relations, this marks another blow for Brentano's definition of mentality. Considerations on behalf of their being such can be extracted without much mutilation from Williamson's defense of propositional knowledge as a mental state (Williamson, 2000, ch. 1).

[12] A student who has studied carefully but won't speak up due to timidity about his mastery of the material (Radford, 1966) is a suggestive source of doubt about this claim; for debate over this example see Williamson 2000, ch. 1.

[13] The evidence might stem from factors internal to the belief itself. Suppose one has some bizarre opinion which upon reflection one fails to take to be knowledge. Perhaps the epistemic structure of one's failure to do so involves the following progression of reasoning: *p*; hm, that's at odds with the rest of what I know about the world; hence *p* must be a mere opinion of mine which can't count as knowledge.

[14] As above, the evidence might stem from factors internal to the perceptual experience itself. Suppose that one hallucinates bizarrely and for

this reason does not take oneself to see. Perhaps the epistemic structure of one's failure to do so involves the following progression of reasoning: suppose that I see; in this case, the world would be so-and-so; but the world never is so-and-so; hence I do not see. The lack of coherence of the "evidence of the senses" with one's background picture of the world counts as a sort of evidence against one's seeing.

[15] More explicitly, for a NIRA and an IRA related to one another as broadening and narrowing, I will use an expression of form $\ulcorner C\text{ing}^{*}\urcorner$ to name the NIRA and an expression of form $\ulcorner C\text{ing}^{\dagger}\urcorner$ to name the IRA.

[16] One way to assure this principle would be for the bearing of the IRA to be identical to the aggregate of the marks.

[17] This is merely a convenient label, since by it I mean to include views on which some phenomenal characters are functional properties as well as versions of "naive realism" on which some phenomenal characters are NIRA-instances.

[18] Block (forthcoming) cites "phosphene" experience resulting from pressing on closed eyelids as an instance of a visual experience without representational content; consider also the general feeling of lowness of spirit and fuzziness of mind of every experience when one suffers a cold.

[19] The author closest to advocating the former position is Siewert (1998); Siewert does not seem to believe that consciousness is *explicable* in terms of intentionality. Tye (1995, 2000) advocates the latter position.

[20] For an instance of the former sort, consider Neander's objection to Lycan's Inner Sense view: if a mental state is R, but is mistakenly sensed as having a property $G \neq R$, does it have as its phenomenal character Rness or Gness (Neander, 1998)? Each view has unhappy consequences. But if consciousness-of is a NIRA, such mistakes are impossible, and the dilemma does not arise.

For an instance of the latter, consider the concern that awareness of phenomenal character is not distinct from phenomenal character itself (Searle, 1992, p. 171; Shoemaker, 1994, p. 289). It is hard to see how this claim can be maintained if the awareness is possible in the absence of the phenomenal character, as on the Higher-Order Intentionalist view. But on the Acquaintance Theory, a natural explanation for the necessitation of the phenomenal character by the awareness is that the phenomenal character is not distinct from the awareness.

[21] Byrne notes that one of his canonical Intentionalists, Dretske, "often writes as if experiences do not have propositional content, preferring to use such locutions as 'hearing the piano being played', 'being visually aware of the shirt's color', rather than 'hearing that there is a loud noise', 'being visually aware that it is blue', and so on". Byrne "*think*[s] this just reflects Dretske's recognition that that-clauses often do a very poor job of specifying the content of experience, rather than any antipathy toward experiences having propositional content in the thin sense I intend"

(fn. 5). Or it might reflect Dretske conceiving of intentionality as primarily involving intentional relations rather than representation.

[22] Compare Williamson's view that propositional belief purports to be propositional knowledge (Williamson, 2000).

[23] For a similar argument, see Kriegel (2006, sec. 2). For a rebuttal of this argument, see Siewert (1998, ch. 6). But Siewert's arguments seem to me to be directed against Higher-Order Intentionalism and overlook the possibility of Acquaintance Theory.

The principal difficulty for the view that consciousness-of is a relation of awareness is that of making sense of a *nonconceptual, preattentive* relation of awareness which animals and unintrospective humans may bear to phenomenal characters. I will follow the Higher-Order Intentionalist in supposing this relation can be made sense of; if it cannot, Higher-Order Intentionalism falls if there are unintrospected phenomenal characters. If it cannot, I am happy to adopt Resolute Qualia Theory.

A view intermediate between Resolute Theory and Higher-Order Intentionalism is Carruthers's ''dispositional higher-order-thought'' theory, on which consciousness of is a dispositional relation: for a token to be a phenomenal character for one is for one to be disposed to bear an IRA toward it (Carruthers, 2000). There is also an Acquaintance-Theory-like version of this position, on which for a token to be a phenomenal character for one is for one to be disposed to bear a NIRA toward it.

[24] Advocates of higher-order thought and inner sense theories debate whether the relevant sort of self-monitoring is done by an entity wholly independent of the monitored state or rather by the monitored state itself or an entity with that state as a constituent. The latter ''self-representation'' or ''same-order monitoring'' theory has been defended recently by, among others, Kriegel (2006).Still, the credentials of the self-representation theory as a version of Intentionalism are questionable. If the claim of the self-representation theory is that one's total mental state has phenomenal character *K* just in case one is conscious of an instance of *K*-ness-that is, just in case one is in some monitoring state which either is identical to that instance of *K*-ness or has that instance of *K*-ness as a part–the view is transparently not a version of Intentionalism: if the monitoring state exists, so does the monitored state, since the former cannot exist without the latter.The only way to avoid this result is to take something aside from token phenomenal characters as the monitored entities—bearers of the phenomenal characters, for instance. Although there is no room to substantiate the claim here, this seems at odds with the motivations for self-representation theory.

[25] Thau actually takes which singular propositions one perceptually represents as true to explain which phenomenal character one's experience has. As I argued in Section 1, this claim is probably equivalent to (2).

[26] I suspect that Byrne may have the same thought in mind as Thau: his claim that ''clearly the common phenomenal character in the examples of

seeing and hallucinating a tomato is explained not just by the subjects' awareness of a red′ sense-datum, but by their awareness, of a red′ sense-datum, *that it is red′* " (Byrne, 2001, p. 226) is preceded by a discussion of sense-datum illusions (224).

[27] Perhaps *bundles* of seen* property-instances determine phenomenal character: one subject might see* the square object's color but the second not; one might see* it tilted and the other flat. One's experience might involve a different "proximal mode" (Rock, 1983) representation from that of the other–one sees the square object presented flat, while the other sees it presented at a tilt, so that for the first subject, the square occupies a "square′" region of the "visual field" whereas for the second, it occupies a "trapezoidal′" region (to use the terminology of Peacocke 1983 though without the interpretation of this terminology as concerning sense-data and their properties). Or perhaps *higher-order* property-instances are involved in the determination of phenomenal character: one subject might see* one pair of symmetries of the squareness while another sees* the other pair.

Note that Thau neglects discussion of these points, seeming to claim that perceptually representing the truth of the singular proposition $\langle a, F \rangle$ can fix phenomenal character.

[28] Byrne (2001) considers an argument from infallibility a sense-datum theorist might bring against Property Intentionalism:

> It might be objected that where there is representation, there is the possibility of *mis*representation. But there is no room for error about a sense-datum: it cannot *mistakenly* appear to one that a sense-datum is red′. Hence a (mere) sense-datum experience is not representational or intentional. There is no obvious reason, though, to accept the claim about the possibility of misrepresentation. Many have thought that one cannot mistakenly believe that one is in pain, without taking the strange position that such a belief is not an intentional state; the *cogito* and beliefs in necessary truths provide other examples. Therefore even if the experience as of a red′ sense-datum is infallible, the experience still has contentnamely, that the sense-datum is red′. (225)

States of bearing a relation of awareness-of to a certain entity are characterized by the relation borne and the entity to which it is borne. My objection to Higher-Order Intentionalism is that states of consciousness-of are infallible in virtue of their *relation* of awareness, and that this relation should therefore be regarded as nonintentional. Byrne's observation that there are some intentional mental states immune to error in virtue of their *object of awareness* is tangential.

[29] The passage from Lewis quoted on p. 13 expresses incredulity at this possibility. Of course, a number of Higher-Order Intentionalists have also

taken the possibility to be genuine: compare, for instance, Armstrong (1980, pp. 724, 725); also Lycan 1997, Lormand (2005). A locus classicus of support for the pro-illusion side is Dennett 1998.

[30] Harman (1964, 1988), Williamson (1995, 1998, 2000), and Martin (1997, 2002, 2005) adopt views more-or-less like the NIRA-first strategy.

[31] How is my view related to a no-common-factor or *disjunctive* conception of experience (McDowell, 1994; Martin, 2002)? Disjunctivism is a view about the relations between veridical and hallucinatory experiences: according to the disjunctivist, a veridical experience *v* and an introspectively indiscriminable hallucinatory experience *h* share no intrinsic features; they are alike only in the extrinsic respect that the subject can't discriminate *v* and *h* by introspection. There is some *G* such that *G* exhausts the way *v* introspectively strikes the subject and exhausts the way *h* introspectively strikes the subject. Still, there need not be any feature *F* intrinsic to experiences such that *v* and *h* share *F*. Consider a veridical experience *v* of seeing* a state of squareness (which is also an experience of seeing† a state of squareness), and a subjectively indiscriminable hallucinatory experience *h* of seeing† a state of squareness. According to my views, *v* and *h* share a phenomenal character *F*. If I am correct in this view, the disjunctivist must hold that *F* is *merely* a property of striking the subject as a certain way (or, still more etiolated, a property of being indiscriminable from a veridical experience of seeing* a state of squareness), and not an intrinsic feature (cf. Martin 2005). By contrast, a NIRA-first approach can avoid disjunctivism by taking phenomenal characters to be intrinsic properties of experiences.

[32] Cf. Martin 1997.

[33] On the IRA-first strategy, this step does not go through: the former fact might be primitive, or it might be explained by some other fact, but there is no reason to suppose that it is explained by a fact about the phenomenal character of John's mental state.

[34] This difficulty with Intentionalism is broadly recognized (Chalmers 1996, p. 378, fn. 38; Carruthers 2000; Sturgeon 2000; Jehle and Kriegel forthcoming), though Intentionalists have not done much to dispel it convincingly.

[35] Plausibly, Chomsky's concern about truth-conditional semantics (Chomsky, 2000) takes something like this form.

REFERENCES

Alston, W. (1989): *Epistemic Justification*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Anscombe, E. (1965): The Intentionality of Sensation: Some Grammatical Features, in R.J. Butler (ed.), *Analytical Philosophy,* second series, Oxford: Blackwell.

Armstrong, D.M. (1980): *The Nature of Mind*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Selection, The Nature of Consciousness, reprinted in Block et al. 1997.

Block, N. (2003): Mental Paint, in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), *Reflections and Replies*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (1997): *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Brentano, F.C. (1874/1973): *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, New York: Routledge.

Byrne, A. (2001): Intentionalism Defended, *The Philosophical Review* 110, 199–240.

Carruthers, P. (2000): *Phenomenal Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (1996): *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2005): The Representational Character of Experience, in B. Leiter (ed.), *The Future for Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chomsky, N. (2000): *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Cohen, S. (1984): Justification and Truth, *Philosophical Studies* 46, 279–95.

den Dikken, Marcel, R.L. and Ludlow, P., (1996): Intentional "Transitive" Verbs and Concealed Complement Clauses. *Revista de Linguistica*, 8.

Dennett, D. (1987): *The Intentional Stance*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. (1988): Quining Qualia, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).

Dretske, F.I. (1995): *Naturalizing the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Fodor, J.A. (1991): Too Hard for Our Kind of Mind?, *London Review of Books* 13, 12.

Harman, G. (1964): *Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ph.D. thesis.

Harman, G. (1988): Wide Functionalism, in S. Schiffer and S. Steele (eds.), *Cognition and Representation*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Reprinted in Harman 1999.

Harman, G. (1990): The Intrinsic Quality of Experience, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind,* volume 4 of *Philosophical Perspectives* (pp. 31–52), Atascadero: Ridgeview. Reprinted in Harman 1999.

Harman, G. (1998): Intentionality, in W. Bechtel and G. Graham (eds.), *A Companion to Cognitive Science*, New York: Blackwell.

Harman, G. (1999): *Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horgan, T. and John, T. (2002): The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy*

of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jehle, D. and U. Kriegel (Forthcoming): Carruthers's DHOT Theory of Consciousness. *Philosophical Psychology*.

Kriegel, U. (2006): The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness, in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), *Consciousness and Self-Reference*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Lewis, D. (1980): Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 58, 239–249. Reprinted, with postscripts, in Lewis 1986.

Lewis, D. (1986): *Philosophical Papers, Volume II*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loar, B. (2003): Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content, in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), *Reflections and Replies*, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.

Lormand, E. (1994): Qualia! Now Showing at a Theater Near You, in C. Hill (ed.), *The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett*, volume 22 of *Philosophical Topics* (pp. 127–56), Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press.

Lormand, E. (2005): Phenomenal Impressions, in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lycan, W.G. (1997): Consciousness as Internal Monitoring, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Martin, M.G.F. (1997): The Reality of Appearances, in M. Sainsbury (ed.), *Thought and Ontology*, Milan: FrancoAngeli.

Martin, M.G.F. (2002): The Transparency of Experience, *Mind and Language* 17, 376–425.

Martin, M.G.F. (2005): On Being Alienated, in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mausfeld, Rainer (2003): Conjoint Representations and the Mental Capacity for Multiple Simultaneous Perspectives, in H. Hecht, R. Schwartz and M. Atherton (eds.), *Looking into Pictures*., Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

McDowell, J.H. (1994): *Mind and World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McGinn, C. (1988): Consciousness and Content, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 74, 219–239.

Molnar, G. (2004): *Powers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T. (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, *The Philosophical Review* 83, 435–50.

Neander, K. (1998): The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness, in J. Tomberlin (ed.),

Language, Mind, and Ontology, volume 12 of *Philosophical Perspectives* (pp. 411–434), Oxford: Blackwell.
Parsons, T. (1990): *Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1983): *Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pryor, J. (2001): Highlights of Recent Epistemology, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52, 95–124.
Radford, C. (1966): Knowledge—by Examples, *Analysis* 27, 1–11.
Rock, I. (1983): *The Logic of Perception*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Rosenthal, D.M. (2002): Explaining Consciousness, in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (1990): Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 13, 585–642.
Searle, J. (1992): *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Shoemaker, Sydney (1970): Persons and Their Pasts, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 7, 269–285.
Shoemaker, S. (1994): Self-Knowledge and 'Inner-Sense': The Royce Lectures, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, 249–314.
Siewert, C. (1998): *The Significance of Consciousness*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sturgeon, S. (2000): *Matters of Mind*, London: Routledge.
Thau, M. (2002): *Consciousness and Cognition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (1995): *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000): *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Williamson, T. (1995): Is Knowing a State of Mind?, *Mind* 104, 533–65.
Williamson, T. (1998): The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Ontology,* volume 12 of *Philosophical Perspectives* (pp. 388–410), Oxford: Blackwell.
Williamson, T. (2000): *Knowledge and its Limits*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
215 Huron, rm. 1008
Toronto, ON M5S1A2
Canada
E-mail: hellie@utsc.utoronto.ca