

# The map and the territory

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# The problem and its solution

- Spectral inversion, or considerations of the arbitrariness of the sign more generally, have threatened our prereflective sense of acquaintance with the manifest since Hume.
- But if we both acquiesce in our home language and attend with exquisite care to the use-mention distinction, we can find our way back to daylight.

# The cases

- Sam and Inez are inverted with respect to one another.
- SAME
  - Sam and Inez both see a red object;
  - Internally Sam is R, Inez is G
- DIFFERENT
  - Sam sees red, Inez sees green;
  - Internally Sam is R, Inez is R

# The puzzle

- For SAME:
  1. What it's like for Sam and Inez differs;
  2. And yet they are acquainted with the same stuff
- For DIFFERENT:
  1. What it's like for Sam and Inez is the same;
  2. And yet they are acquainted with different stuff
- Accordingly WIL and objects of acquaintance are independent

# Why it's a puzzle

- WIL concerns the 'contours of subjectivity', the 'kind of exp one is having'
- Objects of acq = one's most basic evidence (in the good case)
- Surely nothing can do the job of basic evidence if contours of subjectivity cannot in the good case

# Supporting the premisses

- Ad (1)
  - These fall out if the inversion scenario is coherent and WIL tracks the internal
  - Surely both are so
- Ad (2)
  - These fall out on the assumption of transparency
  - Internalists jettison it but really their proposals for what we are acquainted with are incomprehensible

# Some mods

- Ad (1):
  - Externalists will say WIL flows in part with what color they see
  - Grant this; can then say that *some salient aspect* of WIL flows as in the premisses;
  - Then modify (2) to say there is *nothing in common* or *there is no difference* in what they are acquainted with;
  - Just as much of a problem to say that WIL and acq are *partly* independent.

# An unfamiliar resolution

- More than one acquaintance relation
- In SAME, Sam is *normal-acquainted* with red while Inez is *inverted-acquainted* with red
- In DIFFERENT, Sam is *normal-acquainted* with red, while Inez is *inverted-acquainted* with green



# What's this then?

- Multiple acquaintance relations are ...
  - Unfamiliar
  - Cheap
  - Hard to understand
  - At odds with the simple, self-presenting character of acquaintance as intuitively understood

# An analogy

- In 1975, Sam is correct that BH is a boy
- In 2010, Sam is incorrect that BH is a boy
- Same thought is correct and incorrect
- Multiple correctness relations:
  - In 1975, Sam is *1975-correct* that BH is a boy
  - In 2010, Sam is *2010-incorrect* that BH is a boy
- A bit like the DIFFERENT case

# Unpacking the analogy

- Here the thought is that semantic relations and properties such as acquaintance and correctness (truth) are ‘imbued with perspective’
- From the outside, we can say that one’s context---when one is thinking, the style with which one encounters the world---is relevant to establishing which semantic R/Ps are appropriate in interpreting one
- From the inside, though, this plurality vanishes: the first-person sees only absolute acquaintance and correctness
- How do the 3P relative and 1P absolute R/Ps interact?

# Absolute semantic R/Ps

- From the first-person:
  - $P \dashv\vdash T(P)$
  - $Lo! X \dashv\vdash A(X)$
- $T(P)$  means ‘it is true that  $P$ ’;  $A(X)$  self-ascribes acquaintance with  $X$
- ‘First-person’ means ‘that which generates Moore/Castaneda style worries’ – includes time, world etc;
- The entailment here is ‘Moore-entailment’ – Moore-paradoxical incoherence of affirming the prem while failing to affirm the conclusion
- I’m going to take these as the most primitive semantic R/Ps

# Perspective shifters

- ‘From the point of view of 1929: P’
- ‘Taking up Inez’s point of view: Q’
- ‘For me now: R’
- In general: ‘From X: P’ (where X is a ‘point of perspective’)
- These are *speech-act operators*:
  - If stacked, all but the innermost one vanishes
  - In general, ‘From Sam: P’ and ‘P’ are independent
  - However ‘From HERE: P’ --| |-- P, where HERE is the transparently unshifted first-person

# Perspective de-shifters

- In engaging in real thinking, we want operator-freedom
- If I think 'From 1929: P' I need to get back to the present somehow.
- We need some thought that I think from the now that captures the import of the speech-act 'From 1929: P'.
- Let's introduce a propositional functor 'To 1929' such that 'From 1929: P' --| |-- 'To 1929[P]'.
- No commitments about what this functor does. That is in effect the subject-matter of the metaphysics of other times.
- The content of P and of To X[P] will in general be very different. After all, in general P and From X:P are independent.

# Deshifting psychologically

- Similarly, if we can shift to Inez with ‘From Inez: P’, we can shift back with ‘To Inez[P]’, where ‘From Inez: P’ --| |-- ‘To Inez[P]’.
- The ordinary language claim ‘Inez believes that P’ has content something like our ‘To Inez[BP]’, where ‘BP’ is the first-person belief avowal that is Moore-equivalent to P.
- What exactly this content is is up for grabs. That is the metaphysics of belief. Maybe we mean different things by it at different times.

# Shifting and deshifting in SAME

- Let's interpret the spectral inversion situation in this framework:
  - Inez is acquainted with red (in the ordinary sense) --| |-- From Inez: A(red) --| |-- From Inez: Lo! red --| |-- To Inez[A(red)]
  - Sam is acquainted with red (in the ordinary sense) --| |-- From Sam: A(red) --| |-- From Sam: Lo! red --| |-- To Sam[A(red)]
- What I mean by 'To Inez[A(red)]' and 'To Sam[A(red)]' is to some degree up in the air. I see no reason, however, that what is meant may not differ by more than the bare particularity of the subjects involved:
- Eg, by involving the relativized acquaintance relations we started out with.



# Humean skepticism?

- We might at this point argue that neither 'To Inez[A(red)]' nor 'To Sam[A(red)]' has a distinctive claim to express a situation in which the subject grasps the nature of red.
- After all, they appear to be entirely symmetric.
- So no one can grasp the nature of red.
- Paradox regained, as it were ...

# Toward a resolution

- Roughly the idea is that we should not look for facts about acquaintance among those expressed by ‘To X[A(red)]’.
- Rather, these facts are to be grasped by ‘From X: A(red)’ -- or, fundamentally, by ‘A(red)’.
- We understand psychological properties solely from the first-person; third-person psych-reports have a different subject-matter.

# Analogy

- Militant A-theory:
  - The fundamental facts of temporality are the A-theoretic facts about how things are from the perspective of the now (or the shifted perspectives of the various nows);
  - The B-theoretic temporal manifold is a helpful model but is not an adequate story about temporality.

# Fixing Humean skepticism

- The previous try misfired, because it looked for facts on which it would be fair to run a 'nothing special' argument among the deshifted simulacra for shifted thoughts.
- An argument that does not change the subject would be based on the symmetry between 'From Sam: A(red)' and 'From Inez: A(red)'.

# But ...

- This argument can't be given: from whose perspective is there supposed to be a symmetry?
  - Sam's? No: Sam's perspective is self-confident in its grasp of the nature of red.
  - Inez's? No: Sam's perspective is self-confident in *its* grasp of the nature of red.
  - Mine? No: my perspective is self-confident in its grasp of the nature of red.
- No matter which perspective we take up, it accords itself metaphysical privilege.

# It gets worse ...

- The argument can't be given from *any* perspective.
- To do so requires a shift to Sam's perspective and to Inez's perspective.
- But you can only occupy one perspective at once!
- To retain what was learned during the shift, one needs to deshift;
- But as we have seen, that changes the subject.

Summing up ...

# Ambiguity in the puzzle for SAME:

## A. The deshifted puzzle:

1. What it's like for Sam and Inez differs
2. To Sam[A(red)] and To Inez[A(red)]

## B. The shifted puzzle:

1. What it's like for Sam and Inez differs
2. From Sam: A(red) and From Inez: A(red)



# Problem with each

- A. The deshifted puzzle changes the subject
  - B. The shifted puzzle can't be thought
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- Accordingly I never have a reason to suppose that I fail to grasp the nature of red in the good case

# Some context

- The distinction between the shifted and deshifted arguments is something like the distinction between use and mention. We should not be too surprised that it has been elusive.
- The notion of the deshifted psych claim as contrasted with a simple unshifted 1P claim is somewhat akin to Carnap's line in 'psychology in physical language'. Carnap does not recognize the shifted claim.
- The line on the shifted paradox is something like a 'Frege-Schlick' position. The anxiety raised by that view is mitigated by (a) a capacity for projection into the perspective of others and (b) the capacity to deshift.