

How to color McTaggart

Benj Hellie
University of Toronto

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Plan

- We can preserve:
 - Inversion without illusion
 - Standard russellianism
 - The common sense view of colors
 - Color realism
- If we accept:
 - A slightly heterodox semantical view
 - A fairly heterodox metaphysical view
- Color--tense analogies will be helpful

Inversion without illusion

- Some intuitions:
 - My experience of the stop sign is phenomenal red
 - Invert's experience of the stop sign is phenomenal green
 - Both of us correctly perceptually represent



What's correct representation?

- Suppose it is true representation
- This constrains our theory of what phenomenal redness/greenness might be

Standard russellianism

- Phenomenal greenness is perceptual representation of green
- Phenomenal redness is perceptual representation of red
- So:
 - If both Invert and I correctly represent
 - And correct representation is true representation
 - Then the stop sign is both red and green. !?!?!?!?

Beyond standard russellianism

- Phenomenal redness is . . .
 - . . . some property not bearing on representation (qualia theory: Block)
 - . . . representation of some property other than redness (extended russellianism: Shoemaker, Thau)
 - . . . selection of epistemic rather than alethic possibilities (fregeanism: Thompson, Chalmers)
- But each such view clashes with a strong “diaphanousness” phenomenology

Maybe correctness isn't truth

- Rather, it's truth *from one's perspective*.
- (*This is the slightly heterodox semantical view.*)

Tense and perspective

- Suppose Bill judges in 2006, ‘2006 is now’.
- We should say:
 - Bill’s judgement is correct
 - Bill’s judgement is not true
- Hence correctness isn’t truth.
- From Bill’s perspective, 2006 is now.
- Bill’s judgement is true from his perspective.
- Hence correct representation is truth from the perspective of the representing.

Back to inversion

- How things are with me:
 - The stop sign is red from my perspective
 - I represent it correctly, hence as red
 - My phenomenal character is: being red-representing
- How things are with Invert:
 - The stop sign is green from his perspective
 - He represents it correctly, hence as green
 - His phenomenal character is: being green-representing
- Intuitions preserved!

Common sense on color

- Revelation (Johnston)
- If something is red, it is not green (etc.)

Revelation

- “The intrinsic nature of redness is fully revealed by an experience representing something as red”.
 - Hence redness is *fundamental*: to make the world, God has to put redness in it. It doesn’t come in virtue of some deeper nature, because there isn’t one.
 - Hence redness is *monadic*: *God commands redness into the world with a monadic predicate.*
- *Here’s where McTaggart comes in . . .*

Tense Realism

- Nowness (pastness, futurity) is fundamental: it doesn't reduce to a relation between an event and an utterance.
- Nowness (pastness, futurity) is monadic: it isn't a relation between an event and an utterance.

Tense Exclusion

- If nowness is monadic, if something is now, it is not past or future
- If pastness is monadic, if something is past, it is not now or future
- If futurity is monadic, if something is future, it is not past or now
 - These are not so obvious if tenses are polyadic: 2006 is now (wrt 2006) and past (wrt 2007)

Transparency

- Electron e has negative (positive) charge. That's fundamental, and true (false), and differing perspectives have no say in the matter.
- **For all fundamental propositions p , for all perspectives X , p iff from X 's perspective, p .**
 - (A fundamental proposition is one God *could have commanded to be true.*)
 - *Perspective operators are “transparent”, like ‘true’ or ‘actually’.*
- *Slogan: “Merely perspectival differences disappear at the fundamental level.”*

McTaggart against Tense Realism

- From the perspective of 2006, 2006 is now
 - Hence 2006 is now (Transparency, fundamentality)
 - Hence 2006 is not past (Tense Exclusion, monadicity)
- From the perspective of 2007, 2006 is past
 - Hence 2006 is past
 - Hence 2006 is not now
- Eeek!

Color Exclusion

- If redness is monadic, if something is red, it is not green (or . . .)
- If greenness is monadic, if something is green, it is not red (or . . .)
- Etc.
 - These are not so obvious if colors are polyadic: the stop sign is red (wrt me) and green (wrt Invert)

McTaggart against common sense color

- From the perspective of me, the stop sign is red
 - Hence the stop sign is red (Transparency, fundamentality)
 - Hence the stop sign is not green (Color Exclusion, monadicity)
- From the perspective of Invert, the stop sign is green
 - Hence the stop sign is green
 - Hence the stop sign is not red
- Argh!

Where to go?

- The treatment of inversion is admirable.
- Revelation seems a priori.
- Color Exclusion seems a priori.
- So we'll have to put pressure on Transparency.

Transparency (propositional restriction)

- For all fundamental *nonperspectival* propositions p , for all perspectives X , p iff from X 's perspective, p .
- Let propositions attributing tense and color be perspectival.
- Problem solved.

Color realism

- Is anything red?
- Simpliciter, that is -- not just from your or my perspective.
- Surely the stop sign is.
- So we need *some perspective X such that the 'from X's perspective' operator is transparent even for perspectival fundamental propositions: a fully transparent perspective.*

Analogously, is anything now?

- Once again, simpliciter.
- Surely this talk is.
- Another reason for a fully transparent perspective.

The fully transparent perspective:

- My present perspective.
- Hence the stop sign is red (simpliciter) and this talk is now (simpliciter).
- Letting anyone else (or any other time) drive the train would be too deferential.

How do you like *me now*?

- Privileging *the present* seems easy. Here it is! *The past is gone, the future has not yet arrived. (That doesn't mean we need to be presentists: just that the present is somehow privileged.)*
- Privileging *me* is a bit harder. (A trick due to Caspar Hare.) *When I pinch myself, my experience manifestly is terrible in a special way, but when you pinch yourself, big deal.*
- *(When you endorse the previous sentence in your own case, it will seem obvious to you.)*
- *(This is the fairly heterodox metaphysical view.)*

Ontology of color (speculative)

- Dualism about monadic colors (since fundamental)
- Contingent upward laws (surface prop, subject prop) \dashrightarrow color
- From X 's perspective, o is red iff law: (prop of o , prop of X) \dashrightarrow red
- Problem: how are these laws sensitive to presentness?

Semi-conclusion

- We have preserved:
 - Inversion without illusion
 - Standard russellianism
 - The common sense view of colors
 - Color realism
- If we have accepted:
 - The truth--correctness distinction
 - Fundamental facts which privilege a perspective
- Or if we don't . . .

5. Way out

- . . . there's still an option open:
- *Fragmentalism (Fine):*
 - *No privileged perspective*
 - *Correctness = truth*
- *The bad news: we end up with true contradictions*
- *The good news: they have no effect on us, because each perspective is consistent, and rationality precludes nonhypothetical deliberation from another perspective.*