

# ***The transparency of experience: annotated bibliography***

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## **References**

- [1] William Alston. Back to the theory of appearing. In James Tomberlin, editor, *Epistemology*, volume 13 of *Philosophical Perspectives*, pages \*\*\*–\*\*\*. Blackwell, Oxford, 1999.

Scenes are “merely displayed”; theory of appearing follows.

- [2] William Alston. Perception and representation. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 70(2):253–289, 2005.

Brief discussion at top that adverbialism is false since it seems that in perception we confront qualities.

- [3] Torin Alter. Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? In Torin Alter and Sven Walter, editors, *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism*, pages 65–76. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Jackson puts transparency as a metaphysical thesis (character of experience inherited from character of its objects) rather than as an attentional thesis à la Tye. Representationalism doesn’t undermine the knowledge argument, since special phenomenal representation of red is what Mary doesn’t know.

- [4] David M. Armstrong. Qualia ain’t in the head. \*\*\*, \*\*\*.\*\*\*, \*\*\*.

This is a review of Tye. Armstrong agrees with diaphanousness but doesn’t think all philosophers do, hence it’s bad strategy for Tye to treat it as a datum to be explained.

- [5] David M. Armstrong. The causal theory of the mind. In *The Nature of Mind and Other Essays*, page \*\*\*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1981.

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\*Thanks to Chris Frey for providing many of these citations.

Purposes and intentions are transparent, visual states are not, involving a datum; more so for pains: so one might think. Hence the latter seem to involve qualities; apparent counterexample to functionalism. But no: intentionalism. Place the color and the visual extension out there, they're not mental, hence outside the domain of functionalism. [Lycan anthology 25]

- [6] Murat Aydede. Pain. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2005.

Transparency: in standard visual perception, we perceive externalia directly without first being aware of experience or its qualities. Sense-datum theory not so great here; perhaps better for pain. But is the pain the act or the object? If the latter where is it? Discussion of Tye on representation of tissue damage. Down a bit further, gustation and olfaction also seem transparent.

- [7] Katalin Balog. Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. MS, Yale University, in preparation.

The "quotational" theory of phenomenal concepts explains transparency.

- [8] Ned Block. Inverted earth. In James Tomberlin, editor, *Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind*, volume 4 of *Philosophical Perspectives*, pages 53–79. Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1990.

53-9: outlines a basic approach to mental features: long-arm functionalism for Russellian intentional, non-functional for qualitative (suggestion of Fregeanism), spectral inversion sets it up; 60-70: inverted earth shows that long-arm functionalism underdetermines qualia; to narrow functionalist, "good luck" specifying the narrow role; 73: transparency claims too hard to assess: should use simple intuitions about complex cases rather than other way round.

- [9] Ned Block. Mental paint and mental latex. In Enrique Villaneuva, editor, *Perception*, volume 7 of *Philosophical Issues*, pages 19–49. Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1996.

Sec 4: is Harman right about whether we can introspect nonintentional mental features? Paint and latex (vehicle of representation versus mere sensation); section 6–7 orgasm and phosphenes as challenges to diaphanousness and rep. "I say it isn't" transparent.

- [10] Ned Block. Mental paint. In Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg, editors, *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, pages 165–200. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

Very similar to Block 1996 at start. Additional stuff: does representationalism save functionalism; the knowledge argument; externalist memory and inverted earth; spectral shift.

- [11] Ned Block. Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. In Murat Aydede, editor, *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study*. Bradford Book/The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.

Pains are more like Shoemaker-colors than like colors. That's bad for Tye who needs them to be the other way round.

- [12] Charlie Dunbar Broad. *Scientific Thought*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1923.

Phenomenologically, vision is “prehensivive” of an objective reality. This is a problem since illusion seems to show otherwise.

- [13] Andrew Brook. Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, editors, *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, pages 89–110. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.

Kant believes in self-presenting representations. This undermines transparency.

- [14] Tyler Burge. Qualia and intentional content: Reply to block. In Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg, editors, *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, pages 405–415. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

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- [15] Myles Burnyeat. Conflicting appearances. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 65:69–111, 1979.

Explaining the allure of the tilted penny argument: we evidently assume that the perceptual experience is like a glassless window between the subject and the object, diaphanous like Moore's awareness of blue. (85, 95)

- [16] Alex Byrne. Intentionalism defended. *Philosophical Review*, 110(2):199–240, 2001.

We know how experiences are only by assessing how things look in them, that's representational; since phenomenal character is knowable, what phenomenal character is representational (sec. 3). Mental pain discussed in fn. 29 (nontransparency wouldn't undermine intentionalism since the states could be self-representing); on bodily sensations and funny perception: at worst we represent a sense-datum as being so and so (secs. 7 and 8).

- [17] Alex Byrne. Something about mary. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 63:123–40, 2002.

We're not aware of perceptual representations, unlike linguistic ones; accordingly it's not plausible that Black and White Mary finds out about the representation that means red for her.

- [18] Alex Byrne. Color and the mind-body problem. *Dialectica*, 60(3):223–244, 2006.

There is a color-body problem but no mind-body problem: this is a consequence of the transparency of experience. Very long fn. in sec. 5.2 on Martin's refinement of Peacocke on Berkeley.

- [19] Alex Byrne. Possibility and imagination. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21:\*\*\*, 2007.

There aren't any experiences considered as introspectable events: transparency shows that there is no phenomenological reason to believe in them.

- [20] Alex Byrne. Experience and content. to appear in *Philosophical Quarterly*, forthcoming.

Similar point to 'Possibility and imagination'.

- [21] Alex Byrne and Heather Logue. Either/or. In Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, editors, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Similar point to 'Possibility and imagination'.

- [22] John Campbell. A simple view of color. In John Haldane and Crispin Wright, editors, *Reality, Representation, and Projection*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.

Qualitative character of color experience is inherited from qualitative character of color. Depends on which color-tracking abilities are being used; so if same colors are tracked, qualities of experiences are the same. Hence no undetectable inversion. (A worry is spectral shift, which would seem to lead to a vast proliferation of colors per object.) (168)

- [23] Peter Carruthers. Natural theories of consciousness. \*\*\*, \*\*\*,\*\*\*, \*\*\*,

Similar point to Carruthers 2000. (44 in 2005 collection)

- [24] Peter Carruthers. *Phenomenal Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

Transparency is a prima facie problem for higher-order theories, since they say you're aware of consciousness but transparency denies this. Reply, it's not transparent since I can focus on how the color looks, not just on the color itself. This change of focus adds a dimension of subjectivity and brings experiences within phenomenal consciousness for the first time. (183)

- [25] Peter Carruthers and \*\*\* Botteril. *Philosophy of Psychology*. \*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*\*,

Similar point to Carruthers 2000. (secs. 3.3, 3.7)

- [26] Victor Caston. Aristotle on consciousness. *Mind*, 111:751–815, 2002.

Interprets transparency in terms of “primary” and “secondary” awareness, argues that self-representationalism is not afoul of it. (secs. 8, 9)

- [27] David J. Chalmers. The representational character of experience. In Brian Leiter, editor, *The Future for Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

Defense of Fregean representationalism, sec. 8: “As I construe it, the central datum of transparency is that when we attempt to introspect the qualities of our experiences (e.g. phenomenal redness), we do so by attending to the qualities of external objects (e.g. redness). In effect, we look “through” the phenomenal property. But this is just one what one would expect where modes of presentation are involved. When one introspects the content of a belief such as *Hesperus is bright*, one does so by thinking about Hesperus; one looks right through the mode of presentation. But nevertheless the mode of presentation exists, and one can become introspectively aware of it.”

- [28] David J. Chalmers. Perception and the fall from eden. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*, pages 49–125. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Complaints about Fregean representationalism, sec. 5: (i) attend to phenomenal character by attending to the world; discern differences in phenomenal character by discerning differences in the world: so phenomenology seems Russellian; (ii) a few paragraphs down, Fregean contents require reference to experiences, and the phenomenology of perception

can seem to present the world directly, with no experiences involved. Edenic content solves.

- [29] Paul Coates. *The Metaphysics of Perception*. \*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*\*.

Endorses a “critical realist” view, on which perceptual experience are internally supervenient states caused by objects. How to square this with transparency? Response seems to be that there are two sorts of awareness, conceptual and perceptual.

- [30] Tim Crane. Introspection, intentionality, and the transparency of experience. *Philosophical Topics*, 28(2):49–67, 2000.

Intentionalism is compatible with nontransparency a la blurriness, by appeal to modes of representing.

- [31] Tim Crane. *Elements of Mind*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

Similar point to 2000 paper.

- [32] Tim Crane. The intentional structure of consciousness. In Quentin Smith and Alexander Jokic, editors, *Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.

Transparency-like phenomena against views that mix qualia in with intentionality. Argues for the “perceptual view” of bodily sensations, as involving the “intentional mode” as influential on consciousness, not just the content.

- [33] Tim Crane. Is there a perceptual relation? In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*, pages 126–146. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Transparency discussed in sec. 2: the thesis is twofold (i) we are aware of objects of experience; (ii) we aren’t aware of features of experience. On (i), false that we see right through to the real color: sometimes there’s illusion/hallucination. Tye says we’re aware of “aspects of the content of experience”, which are propositions. But now it’s not so phenomenologically obvious anymore. On (ii), why can’t we take the painterly stance? Some back and forth on blurry vision. Of course neither dialectic re-establishes qualia. But the second leads to the argument from illusion and the first to the argument from hallucination. The trenchancy of these problems shows that the real problem is the status of the naive view.

- [34] Tim Crane. Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann and Brian McLaughlin, editors, *Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Transparency = (i) reflection reveals only aspects of objects (ii) does not reveal aspects of experience. Pure intentionalism is rejected on grounds that seeing damage is distinct from feeling damage: the attitude makes a difference. What happens if we also reject (ii), due to blurriness? Hypotheses, blurriness is part of the intentional mode versus blurred representation results from the quale. Question, why is experience wholly intentional? A mere assertion of transparency doesn't answer that. Describing how things seem requires in part describing the object: Strawson, Byrne. A description of a point of view, and that's not blind: it's *on something*. Contained within idea of how things seem is idea of point of view on things.

- [35] Tim Crane. The problem of perception. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Spring 2005.

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- [36] Barry Dainton. *Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience*. Routledge, London, 2000.

“Precritical” phenomenology as world-presenting or transparent; post-critical proves it can't be this way because of hallucination. Transparency is interpreted as supporting direct realism (18). Brief discussion of Tye and transparency and unity (254).

- [37] Fred Dretske. *Naturalizing the Mind*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

Against qualia, pro Russellian representationalism.

- [38] Fred Dretske. How do you know you're not a zombie? In Brie Gertler, editor, *Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge*. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003.

Interesting paper to the effect that if consciousness is transparent, we face a difficulty in explaining how we know about it.

- [39] B. A. Farrell. Experience. *Mind*, 59:170–98, 1950.

Experiences are featureless, in the sense that they have no features one can discriminate (178). Much back and forth follows. Even calling it featureless is a mistake. It's not a thing. As it happens, though, it does have properties: they're just not ones which can be described; we can

only be acquainted with them. “Can’t” be described in the logical sense. Discussion prefigures Black and White Mary. Sometimes cited as an early paper on transparency, but not really relevant to the sense at issue: “featurelessness” turns out to be more about indescribability.

- [40] Christopher Frey. On the rational contribution of experiential transparency. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

Gupta says that there’s no categorical information in experience, and yet he makes appeal to phenomenological claims. One of these is transparency, so experience isn’t purely hypothetical.

- [41] Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne. Introduction: Perceptual experience. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*, pages 1–30. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Perceptual experience seems to be a sort of “direct contact”, as per transparency passages. Distinguishes the claim that we *can’t* attend to experience from that we *most naturally do so by attending outward*. Projectivism, it isn’t transparent but seems that way (2).

- [42] Rocco J. Gennaro. Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience. *Philosophical Studies*, 139:39–56, 2008.

Distinguishes focal and peripheral awareness, and advances a bunch of cases of crosscutting these with inner and outer objects. Denies that there is ever outer-focal, inner-peripheral awareness; this undermines a self-representational view.

- [43] Kathrin Glüer. Colors without circles. *Erkenntnis*, 66:107–131, 2007.

Mostly about the looks red iff is red biconditional. Builds sensations into the theory, hence some transparency stuff. Locus, sec. 4: “experience sees right through itself and gets in touch with material objects and their qualities. This is only a problem if colors are regarded as simple. This simplicity doctrine is ambiguous between syntax and semantics of color attributions, but fortunately phenomenology says nothing one way or the other.

- [44] Herbert Paul Grice. Some remarks about the senses. In R. J. Butler, editor, *Analytical Philosophy*, first series. Blackwell, Oxford, 1962.

Can we distinguish the senses by special characters of experiences? Not obviously: experiences are diaphanous. We don’t know what to do if asked to focus on seeing as opposed to what is seen. (\*\*p)



[45] Anil Gupta. *Empiricism and Experience*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Phenomenologically, experience is transparent, but skeptical scenarios shows that this phenomenology has *no* epistemic force [hmmmm] (146).

[46] Larry Hardin. Comments. *Dialectica*, 2006.

[47] Gilbert Harman. The intrinsic quality of experience. In James Tomberlin, editor, *Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind*, volume 4 of *Philosophical Perspectives*, pages 31–52. Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, 1990.

If you look at a tree, can you turn your attention to the intrinsic quality of experience? No! The only color for you to turn your attention to is the green of the tree. That's true of Eloise and it's true of you too! Hence the sense-datum theory does not receive support from phenomenological study.

[48] Gilbert Harman. Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions. In Enrique Villanueva, editor, *Perception*, volume 7 of *Philosophical Issues*, pages 1–18. Ridgeview, Atascadero, 96.

There are no color sensations, only visual sensations are tickles or pains in the eye. (sec. 4, 4.1)

[49] Gary Hatfield. The reality of qualia. *Erkenntnis*, 66:133–168, 2007.

Mostly about a dispositionalist theory of color, and most notions of “transparency” concern something more like “revelation” (believe that p iff p). Criticizes certain phenomenological claims made by Harman and the posse (fn. 5).

[50] Benj Hellie. Noise and perceptual indiscriminability. *Mind*, 114:481–508, 2005.

Discusses how to do the metaphysics of perceptual noise assuming transparency: either with a changing sense-datum the constant color is (vaguely) “seen in”, or with a changing region of color space in which the constant color is represented as being.

[51] Benj Hellie. Beyond phenomenal naivete. *The Philosophers' Imprint*, 6(2):1–24, 2006.

This paper argues for a Price-type view, seeing externalia in sense-data; these elements are assembled via an attentional shift into an introspective impression of direct realism. Defends the SD component from a “transparency” objection: the anti-SD prejudice is due to confusing it with various other plausible claims, or by an erroneous tendency to overlook internal qualities when introspecting or doing thought experiments (sec. 3.1).

- [52] Benj Hellie. Factive phenomenal characters. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21:259–306, 2007.

Transparency in the sense of we are only aware of either (i) qualities or (ii) some sort of awareness of qualities less plausible than that we are aware of acquaintance with qualities.

- [53] Benj Hellie. That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationalism. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 15(3):334–66, 2007.

Detailed interpretation of Moore’s ‘Refutation of idealism’, argues that the main point of the passages on transparency is that we can become aware of the relation of acquaintance if we try hard enough.

- [54] David R. Hilbert and Mark Eli Kalderon. Color and the inverted spectrum. In Steven Davis, editor, *Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.

Intentionalism explains transparency (sec. 1).

- [55] Christopher S. Hill. Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to the mind. In Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, editors, *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, pages 249–272. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.

Transparency undermines sense-datum theory.

- [56] Emmett L. Holman. Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism: Putting a new spin on the knowledge argument. *Philosophical Studies*, 128(2):229–256, 2006.

Transparency means the knowledge argument supports color primitivism, and, in turn, eliminativism.

- [57] Frank Jackson. Mind and illusion. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, editors, *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*, pages 421–442. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004.

Transparency can go in either the sense-datum way or the intentional way, the latter is better. This shows that what Mary finds out about isn’t a quale. (427ff)

- [58] Frank Jackson. Representation and experience. In Hugh Clapin, editor, *Representation in Mind*. Elsevier, Oxford, 2004.

Brief discussion: he likes representationalism because he always finds himself attending to ways things are represented as being. Link to Hume’s inability to find himself. (sec. 1.2)

- [59] Frank Jackson. Consciousness. In Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, editors, *Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

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- [60] Frank Jackson. The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism. In Torin Alter and Sven Walter, editors, *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*, pages 52–64. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Criticizes step 6 of Tye’s 10-step argument. Needs to assume falsity of sense-datum theory, and Tye’s “suggestion” that the best explanation of diaphaneity is representationalism is weak; also not plausible that can’t become directly aware of phenomenal character on certain readings of “direct aware”. Minimal representationalism: experience is essentially representational; strong representationalism: it’s exhaustively representational. Diaphaneity: properties of the object of experience determine without remainder the character of experience. If the object is an intentional object (as per minimal representationalism), contra sense-datum theory (and naive realism?), this gets us to strong representationalism. That wrecks the knowledge argument. (57)

- [61] William James. Does “consciousness” exist? \*\*\*, \*\*\*:\*\*\*, 1904.

Discusses Moore in the context of metaphysics of consciousness. Florid and bewildering.

- [62] Greg Janzen. The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 5(3–4):321–339, 2006.

Wishes to undermine transparency as used as a case for representationalism. Distinguishes a la Kind “it’s hard”/“it’s impossible”. But different from Kind: she thinks you can’t attend to your experience, and you can; he thinks you can’t discern intrinsic qualities of experience. Blurry vision and muffled hearing due to inner ear infection undermine strong transparency. Some back and forth on blur, he gives it up. Better: (sec. 2.1) implicit self-presence as on the Brentanian approach. Your experience “belongs” to you. That undermines transparency. Sec. 2.2, properties aren’t the primary objects of attention, objects are. Discussion of how to describe experience of seeing a bookcase full of books.

- [63] Greg Janzen. *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness*. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2008.

Similar points to the article.

[64] C. E. M. Joad. *Guide to Philosophy*. Dover, \*\*\*, 1957.

Moore, experience is diaphanous. Sensations are indescribable. Hence consciousness requires an object. (77–81);

[65] James John. Representationism, phenomenism, and the intuitive view. *Philosophical Topics*, 33:\*\*\*, 2005.

Defends the “intuitive” view of experience that qualitative characters are Russellian-representational properties, by appeal to Moorean (it’s awareness of something) and Harmanesque (that that thing is external) transparency claims.

[66] Mark Johnston. Is the external world invisible? In Enrique Villanueva, editor, *Perception*, volume 7 of *Philosophical Issues*, pages 185–98. Ridgeview, Atascadero, 96.

We long for what vision seems to provide, namely acquaintance with intrinsic natures of features of externalia (189–90). Overdetermination argument that it doesn’t provide this (190–91). Can get acquaintance with nature of color if it’s response-dependent, but this goes against the phenomenology (197–8).

[67] Mark Eli Kalderon. Color pluralism. *Philosophical Review*, 116:\*\*\*, 2007.

Remarks at the end on how the real X-body problem is when  $X = \text{color}$ .

[68] Matthew Kennedy. Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

Defends direct realism as better supported by transparency than intentionalism.

[69] Jaegwon Kim. *The Philosophy of Mind*. \*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*\*.

Some introductory discussion of transparency, qualia, and intentionalism. (224)

[70] Amy Kind. What’s so transparent about transparency? *Philosophical Studies*, 115(3):225–244, 2003.

Is it impossible or just hard to attend “directly to our experience”? All we’re really entitled to is the latter, but it doesn’t have any very interesting consequences.

[71] Amy Kind. Restrictions on representationalism. *Philosophical Studies*, 134:405–427, 2007.

For nonperceptual experiences, transparency is unobvious, so unrestricted intentionalism is implausible; but restricted intentionalism isn't plausible; so no intentionalism is plausible.

- [72] Amy Kind. How to believe in qualia. In Edmond Wright, editor, *The Case for Qualia*, pages 285–298. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.

So it's said: Experience reveals no qualia since it's transparent: attention goes right through it to its objects. This doesn't show there aren't any qualia but if qualia are essentially introspectable it does. Exotic: Blurriness, phosphene, afterimage: they all cut against transparency. Tye tries to assimilate these within representationalism, but they still undermine transparency. Intermediate: sensations, eg orgasm. Not so much in bodily locations. Discriminates (1) experience represents (2) representationalism (3) attending to e involves attending to its ct (4) attending to e is just attending to its content. On ordinary, maybe (3) and not-(4) is true. Telegraphic discussion of the contrast between imagining and seeing: both involve focusing on green but there's a difference.

- [73] Uriah Kriegel. Phenomenal content. *Erkenntnis*, 57(2):175–198, 2002.

Transparency: introspection can only access representational content. If you shift attention from the sky to your experience, you're still looking at the sky. There is nothing else to experience that introspection registers. Tinkers with Shoemaker, advances an internalist view with the represented properties being dispositions to cause internal responses.

- [74] Uriah Kriegel. Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21:307–340, 2007.

We can't discriminate between a qualia inversion and an inversion of seen colors. This is transparency, and suggests that experience is just intentional. Also transparency is compatible with phenomenal intentionality, as distinguished from reductionism. Not clear that emotional experience is transparent, but the only relevant claim is that some experience is transparent, since the phenomenal intentionality thesis is that phenomenal intentionality exists, not that all phenomenality is intentional (fn. 46).

- [75] Uriah Kriegel. Self-representationalism and phenomenology. *Philosophical Studies*, pages 307–340, 2008.

Transparency is the view that the only introspectively accessible aspect of phenomenal experience is world-directed representational content. This is compatible with the sort of peripheral self-awareness predicted

by the self-representational model. An “attention shift” model of introspection.

- [76] Brendan Lalor. Intentionality and qualia. *Synthese*, 121(3):249–289, 1999.

A friend of broad intentionalism. Section 4.1 lays off Moorean diaphanousness against the view that “there is some component of experience residing wholly within us”. Criticizes Rey.

- [77] Charles Landesman. *The Eye and the Mind*. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993.

Descartes took the “subjective turn”, but that’s a bad idea: consciousness eludes introspection. But then why believe in it at all?

- [78] Harold Langsam. Strategy for dualists. *Metaphilosophy*, 32:395–418, 2001.

How in light of transparency the dualist should single out the subject-matter of consciousness talk and then of how consciousness has to be; points out (contra Chalmers 1996) that the taste of a bean salad isn’t something mental. (secs. V, VI)

- [79] Stephen Leeds. Perception, transparency, and the language of thought. *Nous*, 36(1):104–129, 2002.

(1) the properties we are aware of in perception are of objects perceived; (2) we are not aware of any other properties in introspection. But we need to explain this notion of ‘being aware of F in perception’: what’s the notion of perceptual representation? Even the sense-datum theorist can grant (1) in some sense. Assume perception is a module, and there’s a language of thought. The theory of perceptual reference involves causation of thoughts as well as perceptual tracking, which reduces a bit of underdetermination. Outline of picture (110): Perception presents sentences saying ‘things are so and so’, beliefs, to cognition; introspection is the fact that these beliefs are being presented. Acid test for transparency (111). Some criticism of Shoemaker and Tye.

- [80] Mark Leon. Character, content, and the ontology of experience. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 65:377–99, 1987.

Sensations are opaque, perceptions are diaphanous; a mixed, Peacockesque view emerges.

- [81] Joseph Levine. Color and color experience: Colors as ways of appearing. *Dialectica*, 60(3):269–282, 2006.

Starts with the phenomenology of immediate presentation. Tries to embed this apparent immediacy in the context of hallucination and an awareness of experience that is inseparable from the experience, whether attentively or not. The second sort of awareness is quotational, involving direct awareness of content. There's definitely cognitive immediacy of *something*, but it can't be the tomato, so why not the tomato-content.

- [82] Joseph Levine. Conscious awareness and (self-)representation. In Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, editors, *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, pages 173–198. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.

What happens to your theory of color if it tries to respect “transparency”: nothing to the phenomenology other than representing the tomato as having redness. Answer, colors exist merely as objects of perception.

- [83] Pierre Livet. What is transparency? *Psyche*, 11(5), 2005.

Metzinger's views discussed: transparency could be (T1) intentionality as being directed towards the object of the representation and not towards the representation (hereafter direct intentionality), (T2) directness, (T3) assumption of existence, (T4) assumption of plain access to content, (T5) insensitivity to the incompleteness of the content of our cognitive experience, (T6) insensitivity to the processed character of our conscious information, (T7) no attentional access to an earlier processing stage.

- [84] Brian Loar. Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. In Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg, editors, *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, pages 229–258. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

Intentionality isn't reference. Hence you can be an internalist about intentionality. Look to consciousness to do it. Transparency shows up in sec. 6, 'is there phenomenal paint'. There has to be, to make the position work. Sight-touch contrast exploited to show this. Blur. A contrast between the intentionality of pictures, their referent, and their paint [shades of Frege's three realms]. Sec. 7 on pictures. Sec. 8 on inversion. Secs. 9–11 on vats, recognitional concepts, general concepts. Sec. 12, 'paint that points'.

- [85] Brian Loar. Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Quentin Smith and Alexander Jokic, editors, *Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.

Qualia and transparency are compatible, since there's a way of attending in which they don't show up and another in which they do. Spectral

inversion isn't about qualia but is rather about ways objects look. Shoemaker abandons "phenomenological introspectability", hence qualia. Phosphenes don't undermine representationalism. But can representationalists handle phenomenally identical hallucination? Sadly, neither intentional objects nor property complexes nor appearances do the trick. Qualia are object-directed. Isolated brains. Three different perspectives: unreflective transparency, transparent reflection, oblique reflection = holding phenomenology constant while imaginatively shifting references, as in the isolated brain case (93). This latter makes qualia available.

- [86] Eric Lormand. The explanatory stopgap. *The Philosophical Review*, 113:303–58, 2004.

Brief discussion of the "transparency and image illusions" of the 2006 paper to ward off objections against inner sense (sec. 6).

- [87] Eric Lormand. Phenomenal impressions. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*, pages 316–353. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Imagery and transparency are illusions, stemming from an attentional or binding confusion.

- [88] Arthur O. Lovejoy. *The Revolt Against Dualism*. Open Court, \*\*\*, 1930.

Moore discovered that there's nothing to consciousness more than a mere "being-aware" (7–9).

- [89] Jonathan Lowe. Against disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, editors, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Pressing a qualia view. The main claim is that experiences have intrinsic character, not that we must be aware of it. Transparency just amounts to denying the latter. Still, it's clear that we can shift attention away from the properties of things, to how things look, as when we take the painterly stance. That refutes transparency. (108ff)

- [90] William G. Lycan. *Consciousness and Experience*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996.

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- [91] William G. Lycan. The case for phenomenal externalism. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15, 2001.



Brief discussion of Harman supporting representationalism (19–20); discusses allegedly nontransparent sensational states (28).

- [92] William G. Lycan. Representational theories of consciousness. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2006.

Transparency: perception is of externalia. Everyone thinks this anyway. But does this defend *reductive* representationalism? Some summary of a bit of back and forth (Tye-Dretske/Block-Loar) over transparency; representationalism doesn't require it. Stuff on Byrne's argument as allegedly equivocating on 'seem'. A bit of discussion of nontransparent pains as antirepresentationalist features.

- [93] Douglas Cylde Macintosh. *The Problem of Knowledge*. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1915.

Some discussion of Moore in the context of discussion of outlining the "English neo-realist" conception of consciousness adumbrated by Shadworth Hodgson in the inaugural PAS, namely that there's a subject and an object and a relation of knowing. Hard to see how Moore can think something can be transparent and exist without altering the object; accordingly people tend to think there's more to psychology than this bland element.

- [94] Fiona Macpherson. Novel colours and the content of experience. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 84:127–52, 2003.

Moore: when you introspect and pay attention to the nature of your experience, you just seem to be paying attention to the objects and properties that seem to be in your environment. Don't encounter experience or something that exists in yourself (44). Thus, it is argued, what an experience is like can be explained by what it is that it represents. Crane and Piantanida on "reddish green" as input to the supersaturated red objection.

- [95] Michael G. F. Martin. On being alienated. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 06.

Very brief discussion: transparency alone doesn't get you direct realism, you need more phenomenology to get that, eg the argument in 2002 (fn. 7).

- [96] Michael G. F. Martin. Setting things before the mind. In Anthony O'Hear, editor, *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, pages 157–179. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

Dennett and Dretske in an equivocation on ‘qualia’ between features of the experience and its object. How then are qualia related to properties objects appear to have? Diaphanousness: Price thought that differences between states of consciousness just are differences between their objects: hence we come to know what experiences are like by attending to objects given in them. Ducasse, contrastingly, thought that experiences are effects in us by the environment; we can categorize them by their effects. Can turn attention out or in. For price, qualities are part constituted by appearances; for Ducasse, appearances are properties qualia cause us to believe objects have. Attention to experiences with any level of complexity shows that the adverbialist conception of knowledge of experience is unintelligible. Baxandall on shadows. Phenomenology of reading. The 2x2 matrix (are the objects inner or outer, actual or intentional).

- [97] Michael G. F. Martin. Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem. In Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson, editors, *History of the Mind-Body Problem*. Routledge, London, 2000.

Sec. 5: Transparency = “the character of experience involves or is directed upon or of mind-independent objects and their features”. Distinguished from Actualism = the objects exist. 2x2 matrix. Some phenomenological stuff at bottom of MS 28, support Transparency + Actualism. (Sartre on perception/imagination, fn. 46)

- [98] Michael G. F. Martin. The transparency of experience. *Mind and Language*, 17:376–425, 2002.

Introspection of experience reveals only mind-independent objects and features one learns about in perception (378). Sec. 1, intentionalist brings transparency against sense-data and qualia (386). Stative representation required for distinctive phenomenology (378): presence, immediacy; seeing pig food is unlike imagining it. Semantic representation alone not enough (391). “Explain the phenomenological datum” (392) that experience is of mind-independent objects with intentionalism. Thus does not need to be introspectively evident that experience has representational properties. Sec. 2: Disjunctivism blocks this reasoning from transparency to intentionalism (esp 395) by saving direct realism. Contrasting different explanations of “immediacy” between intentionalism and disjunctivism; ends inconclusively before segueing into sec. 3 on imagination (399). Argument: sec. 3, to imagine a scene is to imagine experiencing it; sec. 4, in imagining there is a sort of analogue of transparency, we don’t doubt that things really are that way. Because of

the phenomenology of imagination stuff, no way to square up all the phenomenological data.

- [99] Michael G. F. Martin. The limits of self-awareness: Disjunctivism and indiscriminability. *Philosophical Studies*, 120:37–89, 2004.

Very brief mention of transparency: sometimes intentionalists appeal to it, “experience presents one with a mind-independent realm, not just mind-dependent entities or qualities” (39).

- [100] Barry Maund. *Perception*. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2003.

Tye’s argument from transparency. Naive realism does better at explaining it than does representationalism (ch. on representationalism). Adverbial theory is blitzed by transparency (ch. on adverbialism).

- [101] Barry Maund. A defense of qualia in the strong sense. In Edmond Wright, editor, *The Case for Qualia*, pages 269–284. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.

Intentionalism needs that colors are externalia, but need qualia to explain structure of color space.

- [102] Gregory McCulloch. On the very idea of the phenomenological. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 93:39–57, 1993.

Pro-intentionalism, anti the idea that bodily sensations are nonintentional because nontransparent. Content is nontransparent, which is not to engage with introspection in a special way. Serially criticizes as phenomenologically inadequate various ways of being an anti-intentionalist.

- [103] Thomas Metzinger. Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 2(4):353–393, 2003.

Moore: first pass, only “content” not “vehicle” properties of phenomenal states are introspectively accessible. Better: transparency goes up as attentional availability of earlier processing stages goes down (357). Some complex stuff defending and developing this notion of transparency (up to 365). A bunch of different notions of introspection (around 367). This apparatus is deployed to explain ‘I’-thoughts.

- [104] George Edward Moore. The refutation of idealism. *Mind*, 12:433–53, 1903.

Introspection tells us that the sensation of blue is a relation to something blue, but doesn’t tell us whether it is blue. (Don’t believe the haters who say we can’t be aware of the relation: try it and you’ll see.) Accordingly it’s conceivable that the thing which is blue is not an experience, hence possible. That’s what the idealist denies.

- [105] Martine Nida-Rümelin. A puzzle about colors. *Dialectica*, 2006.
- [106] Martine Nida-Rümelin. Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21:429–55, 2007.
- Lots of readings of transparency theses. None are (a) plausible and (b) can be used to show that phenomenality isn't intrinsic, or that we can't focus attention on them. If it seemed that way it's because advocates were assuming opponents had to regard introspection as perceptual.
- [107] Martine Nida-Rümelin. Phenomenal character and the transparency of experience. In Edmond Wright, editor, *The Case for Qualia*, pages 309–324. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.
- Argument from transparency to intentionalism succeeds for colors but trivially so since colors exist only as experienced; fails for shapes since can know what it is to be an experience that represents circularity without knowing what it's like to represent circularity. Biggest problem with reductive intentionalism is that reducing consciousness isn't the same as giving individuation conditions for phenomenal types, since there's something omnipresent in all experiences which hasn't yet been reduced, namely the subject of experience.
- [108] Alva Noë. *Action in Perception*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004.
- (i) Transparency makes it unclear how phenomenology can do anything (72); (ii) Grice, hence no qualia (106); (iii) depicting how things look = depicting them (ch. 5.5).
- [109] Casey O'Callaghan. *Sounds*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
- In discussion of echoes, a proposal on which we only perceive the spatial beginnings and ends of echoes but perceive the temporal beginnings and ends of experiences is dismissed with the grounds that experience is transparent, so that any perception of the latter sort would have to amount to perception of the temporal beginnings and ends of the echoes. (122)
- [110] John O'Dea. Transparency and the unity of experience. In Edmond Wright, editor, *The Case for Qualia*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.
- Distinguishing the senses is incompatible with the strength of transparency needed for Tye's view.
- [111] Michael Pace. Blurred vision and the transparency of experience. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 88:328–54, 2007.

Blurriness isn't merely loss of info, since the periphery is info-poor but not blurry. Blurriness isn't misrepresentation as blurred, since we aren't tempted to believe it's blurred. If blurriness is a sui generis mode of representing, this undermines transparency; also can't explain phenomenal similarity to representation as blurred. A two-layer view, with "primary content" as externalia and "secondary content" as sense-data.

- [112] David Papineau. Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In Torin Alter and Sven Walter, editors, *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*, pages 111–144. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Quotationalism explains transparency (124) since a phenomenal concept involves thinking about an experience and a perceptual concept involves thinking with it. Hence there's no phenomenal difference between focusing on the bird and focusing on seeing the bird.

- [113] Adam Pautz. Intentionalism and perceptual presence. In *Philosophy of Mind*, volume 21 of *Philosophical Perspectives*, pages 495–541. 2007.

"Item-awareness" = we're always acquainted with something. That's false since Meinong and inconsistent sense-data are bad. Transparency theses sometimes presuppose item-awareness, hence are false; other times need technical formulation and are unattractive.

- [114] Christopher Peacocke. Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to reject. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, \*\*:\*:\*\*\*, 2007.

The transparency intuition is false, since it's elicited by instructions to focus on how things look. Then you're already focused outward. But you can focus on the bullet train's fast objective speed and slow speed across the visual field. Hence no conflict between transparency and sensational properties.

- [115] Roy W. Perrett. Intentionality and self-awareness. *Ratio*, 16:222–35, 2003.

Claim: if you're aware of o, you're aware of being aware of o. Case for this: "memory argument" that if you remember blue also remember seeing blue. Diaphaneity is a worry. But Moore didn't really say perception was diaphanous, and what's more no one said memory was diaphanous.

- [116] Ullin T. Place. Is consciousness a brain process? *British Journal of Psychology*, 47:44–50, 1956.

Blocking an objection that consciousness can't be a brain process, it's argued that we describe consciousness experience in terms of externalia which ordinarily (though perhaps not in the present instance) give rise to it.

[117] Simon Prosser. The two-dimensional content of consciousness. *Philosophical Studies*, 136:319–349, 2007.

Some want to be representationalists due to diaphaneity (can't focus on experience without focusing on the tomato). Better to treat representationalism as a hypothesis, to be rejected only if false. Some related discussion of indirect realism in sec. 8.

[118] Georges Rey. A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience. *Philosophical Perspectives*.

[119] William S. Robinson. Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving harman's critique. *Erkenntnis*, 47(3):285–309, 1998.

Discussion of Harman's Eloise (297). Main (unnoticed) move is ignoring primitive-attitude representationalism (291, D5).

[120] William S. Robinson. *Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004.

Criticizes a transparency case for representationalism along the lines that transparency is a spatial thesis (ch. 5). In general a defense of qualia.

[121] David M. Rosenthal. A theory of consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere, editors, *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.

“Consciousness of mental states is transparent” (744): higher-order thought theory explains this.

[122] Mark Rowlands. *Externalism*. \*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*\*.

Some discussion of Sartre's ideas on intentionality of consciousness in *Psychology of Imagination* as a mere emptiness or container. Consciousness can't involve representations, since if it did these could clash with or occlude one another, like when a painting sits on another one. This would then violate phenomenological transparency. The argument is unconvincing since it seems to require a “representor to whom the representations are presented”. Transparency implies that it is only the world (including bodies), never experiences, that can feel a certain way (fn. 15 on 234).

[123] Mark Rowlands. *The Nature of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

[\*\*\*]

- [124] Mark Rowlands. Two dogmas of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, \*\*\*:158–80, 2002.

What it is like to undergo an experience is not an object of consciousness but something that exists in the directing of consciousness towards (non-phenomenal) objects. What it is like to undergo an experience is not something of which we are aware, but something in virtue of which we are aware. And there is little reason for supposing that the directing of consciousness towards its objects is something that occurs exclusively inside the skins of experiencing subjects. On the contrary, directing of consciousness towards its objects is often extended, involving acts of worldly probing and exploration.

- [125] Robert Schroer. The reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 85(3):393–414, 2007.

Visual phenomenal character (a) doesn't say whether seen objects are mental or not (b) doesn't specify representationality status but (c) transparency should be understood as saying that features inhabit a space.

- [126] Sydney Shoemaker. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 50(Supplement):109–131, 1990.

I. Galileo and Locke on the colors; sweep quality into the dustbin of the mind. Harman “quines qualia”, bans spectral inversion. Not obvious we confront qualia in experience: “diaphanous” (113). II. I like drinking cabernet not because the experience has an intentional content but because of what it's like; that's the quale. Not just what is represented as being the case, but also the sense; that's the quale. III. Subjective similarity and difference of colors is not intrinsic to them but in us. Could do inversion without illusion. IV. Innate quality space requires qualia. V. Against projectivism and Eden. Maybe Eden is required, maybe straight-up qualia, but straight-ahead Russellian content isn't enough.

- [127] Sydney Shoemaker. Qualia and consciousness. *Mind*, 100:507–24, 1991.

IV. Experience is said to be diaphanous but there are relations of similarity of which we are aware; this similarity requires nonintentional features of which we are aware, the qualia. A theoretical argument for step 2 (516–17). In a sense we're consciousness of qualia, in a sense not (521). We don't ordinarily token introspective content concerning qualia; but judgements are conditioned by qualia. To get awareness of qualia one must reconceptualize what one was aware of all along.

- [128] Sydney Shoemaker. Phenomenal character. *Nous*, 28:21–38, 1994.

Problem of phenomenal character concerning features of externalia, not of mind (23). Big paragraph on 26–7 concerns how we focus on phenomenal character.

- [129] Sydney Shoemaker. Introspection and phenomenal character. *Philosophical Topics*, 28(2):247–273, 2001.

Similar to 1994 and 1996 papers.

- [130] Sydney Shoemaker. Reply to leads. *Nous*, 36(1):130–136, 2002.

Similar to 1994, 1996, 2001 papers.

- [131] Sydney Shoemaker. Content, character, and color. In Enrique Villanueva, editor, *Philosophy of Mind*, volume 13 of *Philosophical Issues*, pages 253–78. Blackwell, Oxford, 2003.

We used to kick the explanatory gap into the mind, now due to transparency it's been kicked back out (255). People press representationalism. Spectral inversion takes out Tye and is the bomb. Tinkering with consequences spectral inversion. End result, both the '94 view and a modes of presentation view are good.

- [132] Sydney Shoemaker. On the ways things appear. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, *Perceptual Experience*, pages 461–480. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Reject the “ways = properties” principle. The new account is that phenomenal character is determined by the ways colors appear. This preserves transparency in that to learn phenomenal character, one must attend to ways things appear.

- [133] Sydney Shoemaker. Color, subjective reactions, and qualia. In Enrique Villanueva, editor, *Perception*, volume 7 of *Philosophical Issues*, page \*\*\*. Ridgeview, Atascadero, 96.

Not introspectively aware of any mental paint (55–6). Qualia as functionally realized quality spaces determining similarity/difference judgments, unique hue, etc.; can grant Harman's phenomenological point without rejecting qualia; awareness consists in going by quality space rather than in direct awareness of mental paint (61–4).

- [134] F. N. Sibley. Analysing seeing i. In F. N. Sibley, editor, *Perception: A Philosophical Symposium*. Methuen, London, 1971.



In favor of a belief-acquisition analysis of visual experience: “seeing and other forms of visual experience or awareness” are diaphanous, so that it helps to have something nondiaphanous like a belief acquisition to take its place in analysis (119).

- [135] Charles Siewert. Is experience transparent? *Philosophical Studies*, 117:15–41, 2004.

Attention “passes through” experience straight to the object I am conscious of, the object I experience. Alleged consequences: (1) reductive representationalism (2) displaced perception account of self-knowledge: we are not aware of and cannot attend to phenomenal character, hence know that an experience has this or that phenomenal character by means of attention to externalia. But rather, introspection makes (1) and (2) harder to defend. Analyze Tye: content isn’t a feature of experience; reductive representationalism says phenomenal character = content; we notice that we can’t attend to features of experience but can attend to externalia; reductive representationalism explains what we notice. As for displaced perception, introspection confirms its starting point, that we are aware of externalia and aren’t aware of phenomenal character. T1: can’t attend to phenomenal character T2: can’t be aware of phenomenal character. Either false or unhelpfully true. Can attend to how things look, also to feature of their looking that way (19). Those are phenomenal features. Seems to require attn to experience. We don’t just attend to c’s being bigger than d: illusion, not there to attend to; rather, to c’s *looking bigger*. Not introspectively evident that we can attend to *being bigger than*. Sense-data or Meinong give a way out but they are bad. Down with T1 (22). Down with T2 (24): displaced perception provides no way of describing “means whereby” one is aware of experience, hence in trouble even if inner sense theory is rejected. Sec. 3, *reductiveness* has a hard time appealing to first-person evidence. In 1P reflection we conceive of objective features only via looks, which are phenomenal features, hence we essentially make a “phenomenal appeal” which can’t support a reductive view (29). We can’t isolate pure representational content even if we can’t isolate pure sensational qualities. Tilted penny, Necker cube. Sec. 4, another reading of transparency: can’t turn attn *away* from externalia and *to* internalia. Maybe, but so what.

- [136] John Jamieson Carswell Smart. Sensations and brain processes. *The Philosophical Review*, 68:141–56, 1959.

Objection 3, what about qualities of afterimages? The famous analysis: something is going on in me like what is going on when I see an orange thing: this quantified analysis explains the “singular elusiveness” of raw

feels, no one can pin any qualities on them since they are as colorless as “someone”. (150)

- [137] A. D. Smith. *The Problem of Perception*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002.

Moore says the act of awareness derives all its character from that of its object (55–6).

- [138] A. D. Smith. Translucent experiences. *Philosophical Studies*, 140:197–212, 2008.

Tye’s stuff on blurry vision as indeterminacy defends representationalism but not transparency (key manoeuvres start at 207–8: to focus on what is *not* represented is not to focus on a represented property).

- [139] Paul Snowdon. The objects of perception. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume(64):121–151, 2008.

Case against the causal theory of vision: (a) it requires that, conceptually, there are inner experiences; but (b) this can’t be, because (i) inner experiences are transparent, so that we can’t focus attention on anything other than the book (137); also appeals to the Evans-model of introspection by looking outward, and (ii) if so, it’s not so plausible that these are a conceptual requirement for anything. Strawson rebuts (i): we are manifested to by the experience by enjoying it, not by observing it. Still, unclear how this manifestation is supposed to work, hence unclear that it exists. Ends the dialectic a bit inconclusively (not obviously false). What then is the concept of seeing? A natural kind concept with ties to “visualness” and “grounding demonstrative thought”.

- [140] Michael Sollberger. Representationalism and tactile vision. In \*\*\*, editor, \*\*\**Heil festschrift*. \*\*\*, 2004.

Heil thinks there are qualia but transparency is a problem for this.

- [141] Jeffrey Speaks. Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

Transparency entails intentionalism via a Byrne-type argument; thence to Russellianism; stuff about the broad and the narrow.

- [142] Daniel Stoljar. *Ignorance and Imagination*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, \*\*\*.

A brief discussion to set transparency aside (23); on the “grain” problem, a smooth experience is one which represents something as smooth (114); responding to a “structure and dynamics” argument, experiences have external properties as constituents (150).

- [143] Daniel Stoljar. Two conceptions of the physical. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62:253–81, 2001.

Diaphanousness against qualia and the “grain problem” for physicalism.

- [144] Daniel Stoljar. The argument from diaphanousness. In Maite Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton, and Chris Viger, editors, *New Essays in Philosophy of Language*, volume 30 of *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement*, pages 341–90. University of Alberta Press, Calgary, 2004.

Qualia are intrinsic features that are directly introspectable. Diaphanousness is the thesis that one cannot be directly aware of intrinsic features. The latter does not entail the nonexistence of qualia, though, since the form of “direct awareness” that is unavailable may be distinct from that required by qualia. Or relatedly, one can turn direct cognitive attention on qualia, even if one cannot turn direct perceptual attention on them.

- [145] Peter F. Strawson. Perception and its objects. In Graham Macdonald, editor, *Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with His Replies*. Macmillan, London, 1979.

The most natural way to describe experiences is in terms of seeing externalia.

- [146] Leopold Stubenberg. *Consciousness and Qualia*. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1998.

A friend of qualia. Cites W. Robinson against “Moore” to the effect that we know what consciousness is every time we have a sensation. Need both a quale and a having-of-it to have consciousness. Moore attempts to isolate the having-relation and call it consciousness; that’s a mistake, and of course you get diaphanousness then (161). Attempts to undermine the transparency intuition (sec. 7.4.2).

- [147] Scott Sturgeon. Visual experience. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 98:179–200, 1998.

Discusses “scene-immediacy” as one of several criteria of adequacy on a theory of experience. This is best explained by a fusion of sense-datum and intentional views: acquaintance with a case of intentional directedness.

- [148] Scott Sturgeon. *Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature*. Routledge, London, 2000.

Similar to 1998 paper.

- [149] Michael Thau. *Consciousness and Cognition*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.

Moore, can't focus on anything but the tomato, against qualia = sense-data (34). Hence intentionalism is true.

- [150] Brad Thompson. Colour constancy and russellian representationalism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 84(1):75–94, 2006.

Russellian representationalism undermined by colored light and constancy. Argument could be rejected by “holistic” Russellianism, but the only reason to be a Russellian is transparency and transparency is not plausibly holistic.

- [151] Brad Thompson. Shoemaker on phenomenal content. *Philosophical Studies*, 135(3):307–334, 2007.

There's no way to make Shoemaker's views work. You need an indexical element in the content, so you have to be a Fregean.

- [152] Brad Thompson. Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. *Synthese*, 160:307–334, 2008.

Transparency says that “it's a priori by introspection that e attributes p to the object of perception”. But if so, you can't say inversion without illusion is conceivable but impossible.

- [153] Evan Thompson. Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery. *Synthese*, 160(2):203–213, 2008.

Imagination undermines both internalist and externalist representationalism. Transparency comes in early on to undermine the idea that vision involves an internal image.

- [154] Michael Tye. Visual qualia and visual content. In Tim Crane, editor, *The Contents of Experience*, pages 158–176. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992.

When I stare at the ocean entranced by blueness, I don't experience the blueness as a property of my experience, but rather as a property of the ocean. Hence qualia theory is false and representationalism is true.

- [155] Michael Tye. Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. *Nous*, 27:159–83, 1993.

Discusses Moore and transparency (162). Remainder of paper a finicky discussion of ‘looks’ sentences and of inverted earth.

- [156] Michael Tye. *Ten Problems of Consciousness*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue. Intuitively, you are directly aware of blueness and squareness as out there in the world away from you, as features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze inward and try to become aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. *Try* to focus your attention on some Intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, something other than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one's awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness, as instantiated together in an external object. In turning one's mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or properties. (30)

- [157] Michael Tye. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000.

Contains an abridgement of the 2002 paper.

- [158] Michael Tye. Representationalism and the transparency of experience. *Nous*, 36:137–51, 2002.

I. The 10-stage argument from transparency to representationalism; II. displaced perception and recognitional concepts; III. blurry vision

- [159] Michael Tye. *Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

Brief discussion of displaced perception in the context of stuff on unity of consciousness.

- [160] Michael Tye. Qualia. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Fall 2007.

They're transparent.

- [161] Jerome J. Valberg. *The Puzzle of Experience*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.

When we are “open” to experience we conclude its object is an externalion (ch. 2: contra the reasoning of ch. 1 in which he proved it had to be an internalion). Fn. 9 on 150–51 on transparency in Moore: More is prompted by the “horizontal” conception of experience, but is also conceiving of experience as a “phenomenon” with a character of its own: a transparent character. Not that experience is a phenomenon

whose character is unavailable to the subject (as the process of filming is unavailable to cinecamera), but a phenomenon with a funny see-through character. But how could what is transparent make it *look* as if a book is present?

- [162] Robert Van Gulick. Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness. In Christopher Hill, editor, *Introspection*. University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, AR, 2001.

Discusses the bearing of transparency on the higher order perception v thought debate (sec. 11).

- [163] Robert Van Gulick. Consciousness. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Fall 2004.

Perception is sometimes said to be transparent but not everyone agrees.

- [164] Max Velmans. Reflexive monism. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 15(2):5–50, 2008.

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- [165] Adam Vinuesa. Sensations and the language of thought. *Philosophical Psychology*, 13:373–392, 2000.

Discusses diaphanousness as a case for broad intentionalism in sec. 3.3.

- [166] Josh Weisberg. Consciousness constrained: A commentary on being no one. *Psyche*, 12:\*\*\*, 2006.

On Metzinger's views.

- [167] Kenneth Williford. Moore, diaphanousness of consciousness, and physicalism. *Metaphysica*, 5(2):133–155, 2004.

Diaphaneity = not phenomenologically revealing nature. Couple this with a revelation thesis and you get antiphysicalism.

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Blithely assuming that we're in Eden chickens out on the project of describing how we construct an image of reality, and is thus ethically suspect.

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Brief discussion of diaphaneity (try to focus on experience, always focus on what it's of) as a motivation for intentionalism (308).