

# CONTENTS

[Page references marked 'H' indicate the pagination of the later German editions, as shown in the outer margins of the text.]

*Translators' Preface* 13

*Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition* 17

## *Introduction*

Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being H. 2 21

### I. THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

1. The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being H. 2 21
2. The formal structure of the question of Being H. 2 21
3. The ontological priority of the question of Being H. 5 24
4. The ontical priority of the question of Being H. 8 28
4. The ontical priority of the question of Being H. 11 32

### II. THE TWOFOLD TASK IN WORKING OUT THE QUESTION OF BEING. METHOD AND DESIGN OF OUR INVESTIGATION H. 15 36

5. The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general H. 15 36
6. The task of Destroying the history of ontology H. 19 41
7. The phenomenological method of investigation H. 17 49
  - A. *The concept of phenomenon* H. 27 51
  - B. *The concept of the logos* H. 32 55
  - C. *The preliminary conception of phenomenology* H. 34 58
8. Design of the treatise H. 39 63

## *Part One*

The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being

### *DIVISION ONE: PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN*

- I. EXPOSITION OF THE TASK OF A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN H. 41 67
  9. The theme of the analytic of Dasein H. 41 67

10. How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology  
 11. The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. The difficulties of achieving a 'natural conception of the world'

H. 45 71

H. 50 76

## II. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD IN GENERAL AS THE BASIC STATE OF DASEIN

12. A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms of an orientation towards Being-in as such  
 13. A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world

H. 52 78

H. 52 78

H. 59 86

## III. THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD

14. The idea of the worldhood of the world in general  
 A. *Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general*  
 15. The Being of the entities encountered in the environment  
 16. How the worldly character of the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world  
 17. Reference and signs  
 18. Involvement and significance: the worldhood of the world

H. 63 91

H. 63 91

H. 66 95

H. 66 95

H. 72 102

H. 76 107

H. 83 114

H. 89 122

H. 89 123

H. 92 125

H. 95 128

H. 101 134

H. 102 135

H. 104 138

H. 110 145

## IV. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE'S-SELF. THE 'THEY'

25. An approach to the existential question of the "who" of Dasein  
 26. The Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with  
 27. Everyday Being-one's-Self and the "they"

H. 113 149

H. 114 150

H. 117 153

H. 126 163

## V. BEING-IN AS SUCH

28. The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in  
 A. *The existential Constitution of the "there"*  
 29. Being-there as state-of-mind  
 30. Fear as a mode of state-of-mind  
 31. Being-there as understanding  
 32. Understanding and interpretation  
 33. Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation  
 34. Being-there and discourse. Language  
 B. *The everyday Being of the "there", and the falling of Dasein*  
 35. Idle talk  
 36. Curiosity  
 37. Ambiguity  
 38. Falling and thrownness

H. 130 169

H. 134 172

H. 134 172

H. 140 179

H. 142 182

H. 148 188

H. 153 195

H. 160 203

H. 166 210

H. 167 211

H. 170 214

H. 173 217

H. 175 219

## VI. CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN

39. The question of the primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole  
 40. The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed  
 41. Dasein's Being as care  
 42. Confirmation of the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological way of interpreting itself  
 43. Dasein, worldhood, and Reality  
 (a) Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the 'external world' can be proved  
 (b) Reality as an ontological problem  
 (c) Reality and care  
 44. Dasein, disclosedness, and truth  
 (a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations  
 (b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth  
 (c) The kind of Being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth

H. 180 225

H. 180 225

H. 184 228

H. 191 235

H. 196 241

H. 200 244

H. 202 246

H. 209 252

H. 211 254

H. 212 256

H. 214 257

H. 219 262

H. 226 269

## DIVISION TWO: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY

45. The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the task of a primordial existential Interpretation of this entity

## I. DASEIN'S POSSIBILITY OF BEING-A-WHOLE, AND BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH

46. The seeming impossibility of getting Dasein's Being-a-whole into our grasp ontologically and determining its character

47. The possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp

48. That which is still outstanding; the end; totality

49. How the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this phenomenon

50. Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death

51. Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein

52. Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full existential conception of death

53. Existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death

## II. DASEIN'S ATTESTATION OF AN AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, AND RESOLUTENESS

54. The problem of how an authentic existential possibility is attested

55. The existential-ontological foundations of conscience

56. The character of conscience as a call

57. Conscience as the call of care

58. Understanding the appeal, and guilt

59. The existential Interpretation of the conscience, and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted

60. The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience

## III. DASEIN'S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING-A-WHOLE, AND TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE

61. A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole to the laying-bare of temporality as a phenomenon

62. Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity

63. The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care; and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general

64. Care and selfhood

65. Temporality as the ontological meaning of care

66. Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the existential analysis in a more primordial manner

## IV. TEMPORALITY AND EVERYDAYNESS

67. The basic content of Dasein's existential constitution, and a preliminary sketch of the temporal Interpretation of it

68. The temporality of disclosedness in general

(a) The temporality of understanding

(b) The temporality of state-of-mind

(c) The temporality of falling

(d) The temporality of discourse

69. The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world

(a) The temporality of circumspective concern

(b) The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world

(c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world

70. The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein

71. The temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness

H. 301 349

H. 301 349

H. 305 352

H. 310 358

H. 316 364

H. 323 370

H. 331 380

H. 334 383

H. 334 383

H. 335 384

H. 336 385

H. 339 389

H. 346 396

H. 349 400

H. 350 401

H. 352 403

H. 356 408

H. 364 415

H. 367 418

H. 370 421

*Being and Time*

12

V. TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICALITY

72. Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history H. 372 424

73. The ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historicizing H. 372 424

74. The basic constitution of historicity H. 378 429

75. Dasein's historicity, and world-history H. 382 434

76. The existential source of historiology in Dasein's historicity H. 387 439

77. The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicity with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck H. 392 444

H. 397 449

VI. TEMPORALITY AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS AS THE SOURCE OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION OF TIME

78. The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein H. 404 456

79. Dasein's temporality, and our concern with time H. 404 456

80. The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness H. 406 458

81. Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time H. 411 464

82. A comparison of the existential-ontological connection of temporality, Dasein, and world-time, with Hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit H. 420 472

(a) Hegel's conception of time H. 428 480

(b) Hegel's Interpretation of the connection between time and spirit H. 428 480

83. The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general H. 433 484

H. 436 486

489

503

524

*Author's Notes*  
*Glossary of German Terms*  
*Index*

INTRODUCTION

EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING

I

THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

¶ 1. *The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being*

THIS question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to 'metaphysics' again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled *γυναικαλία περί τῆς οὐσίας*. Yet the question we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a *theme for actual investigation*.<sup>1</sup> What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become trivialized.

Not only that. On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect. It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it. In this way, that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method.

At the beginning of our investigation it is not possible to give a detailed

<sup>1</sup> '... als thematische Frage wirklicher Untersuchung'. When Heidegger speaks of a question as 'thematisch', he thinks of it as one which is taken seriously and studied in a systematic manner. While we shall often translate this adjective by its cognate, 'thematic', we may sometimes find it convenient to choose more flexible expressions involving the word 'theme'. (Heidegger gives a fuller discussion on H. 363.)