Growing Apart?

America and Europe in the Twenty-First Century

Edited by

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Contents

Contributors
Acknowledgments  page ix
xiii

Introduction: Growing Apart? America and Europe in the
Twenty-First Century
Sven Steinmo and Jeffrey Kopstein  1

1 The Religious Divide: Why Religion Seems to Be Thriving
in the United States and Waning in Europe
Steven Pfaff  24

2 Value Change in Europe and North America: Convergence
or Something Else?
Christopher Cochrane, Neil Nevitte, and Stephen White  53

3 On Different Planets: News Media in the United States
and Europe
Donald Morrison  80

4 One Ring to Bind Them All: American Power and
Neoliberal Capitalism
Mark Blyth  109

5 Spreading the Word: The Diffusion of American
Conservatism in Europe and Beyond
Steven Teles and Daniel A. Kenney  136

6 Work, Welfare, and Wanderlust: Immigration and
Integration in Europe and North America
Randall Hansen  170

7 Lost in Translation: The Transatlantic Divide
over Diplomacy
Daniel W. Drezner  192
8  The Atlantic Divide in Historical Perspective: A View from Europe
   Laurent Cohen-Tanugi

Index
Value Change in Europe and North America

Convergence or Something Else?

Christopher Cochrane, Neil Nevitte, and Stephen White

Introduction

A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the basic values of mass publics in advanced industrial societies have changed over the last three decades. The same research also shows that there are significant and persistent crossnational differences in values. This chapter considers whether the trajectory and pace of value change in advanced industrial countries is leading to convergence or divergence in the values of publics in Europe and North America.

The question of value convergence or divergence can be conceptualized and addressed empirically in at least two ways. The most straightforward approach entails identifying common value domains among European and North American publics and then asking, Have these become more, or less, alike over the two decades for which we have data? A second approach, however, is to explore the internal dynamics of value change by examining how North American and European publics organize their core values. After outlining some different perspectives on value change and describing our data and methodological approach, we present the basic crossnational

and crosstime evidence of change on single-value dimensions for publics in Europe and North America. The focus then shifts to consider the matter of how publics on both continents bundle their basic value outlooks. Do the publics in North America and Europe organize their basic value outlooks in similar or different ways? And are there discernible patterns in the way in which these core values have changed over the same period?

On balance, the evidence suggests that Europeans and North Americans are moving in the same direction when it comes to their core value outlooks. But the evidence also shows that the publics in Europe and North America are moving in opposite directions when it comes to the dynamics of how these core values are bundled. Between 1981 and 2000, the American values divide tightened and it expanded across a greater range of value dimensions. Americans who disagreed on one issue became gradually more likely to disagree on other issues as well. The values divide in Europe, by contrast, increasingly fragmented over the same period.

Perspectives on Value Change

Understanding value change from a crossnational perspective is important for a number of reasons. First, such a vantage point facilitates a more precise understanding of the drivers of value change. Are the sources of value change rooted in the specific histories of advanced industrial societies, or are values being moved by something that these countries share in common? Second, and of more practical significance, the beliefs of mass publics can influence international decision making. As Robert Putnam has noted, national decision makers must always balance domestic and international political considerations in a two-level game; and there are reasons to believe that value compatibility between different publics makes it easier to achieve that balance.3

There are two broad schools of thought concerning crossnational shifts in basic values. One suggests that the social and political values of different societies follow similar developmental trajectories.4 The value composition of any particular mass public at any given moment depends on that country’s

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level of economic and technological advancement, but value change generally occurs in a comparable and even predictable fashion across Western nations. According to this line of reasoning, the expectation is that the basic value landscapes of these two sets of publics will be basically similar because Western European and North American publics experience similar levels of "postindustrialism." Different analysts emphasize different consequences of the processes of postindustrial value change. Some draw attention to the fact that these publics have become "emancipated from the forces previously dominating society." Others, such as Ronald Inglehart, contend that such goals as freedom, autonomy, and quality of life are increasingly valued as people become less preoccupied with such material goals as wealth and security. Yet others focus on changing authority patterns. To be sure, the underlying theoretical explanations for these broad shifts in values vary from scholar to scholar, but the common thread is that publics in advanced industrial states share the same syndrome of value change. From this perspective, the expectation is that the countries of Europe and North America are on broadly similar trajectories when it comes to basic values.

A second school of thought suggests that shifts in basic values are rooted in the specific historical circumstances of societies. The timing and sequence of such events as massive immigration flows, economic development, and the establishment of political institutions, they contend, can have a profound and lasting impact on the evolution of the values of mass publics. This historical perspective features prominently in most explanations for the cultural and political exceptionalism of the United States. The postindustrial and historical propositions stand as the major alternative accounts of value change in late-industrial states. But it is also important to acknowledge an emerging middle ground. Recent empirical scholarship suggests that the trajectories of change in Europe may be more complex than proponents of the postindustrialism thesis allow.

6 See Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization.
7 Nevitte, Decline of Deference.
9 See, for example, JohnKingdon, America the Unusual (New York: St. Martin's/Worth, 1995); Seymour Martin Lipset, America Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).
10 Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough, eds., The Impact of Values (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
find that “country specific characteristics and historic roots... appear to be the most important characteristics in understanding country differences in value orientations.” The expectation that flows from this perspective is that value change in different societies across Europe and North America does not conform to a single discernible pattern. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the values of publics in different countries may diverge with the passage of time. Fundamental value changes may move in different directions, and at different rates, in different societies.

Data and Methodology

Measuring value change presents a number of empirical challenges. First, the conventional wisdom is that changes in values take place slowly; they are incremental because under normal conditions they are geared primarily by socialization and population replacement. Consequently, tracking value change directly and reliably calls for directly comparable data that are gathered at regular intervals over a long time span. One possible approach is to cast the widest possible net and to gather data from multiple countries over the longest time span possible. But that approach confronts a variety of potential problems. Different surveys use different strategies for collecting data; survey items may have different metrics, and even questions tapping similar values are rarely asked in exactly the same way. With these kinds of data, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether any apparent crosstime changes in the data reflect genuine shifts in values or whether these changes are simply the result of differences in the question wording of the survey items, response set variations, administration effects, or some combination of instrument effects.

To respond to these challenges, we adopt a more cautious approach and rely on data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS contains data from nationally representative samples of publics from twenty-one countries in 1981–3 (N = 28,764), forty-three countries in 1990–3 (N = 59,169), forty-five countries in 1995–7 (N = 78,574), and sixty-seven countries in

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1999–2002 (N = 96,296). The WVS is explicitly designed to maximize the crossnational and crosstime reliability of the data. Many of the survey items from the 1981 wave of the survey are asked in precisely the same way in each of the successive waves and in each of the participating countries. To maximize crossnational and crosstime reliability, this analysis focuses only on those countries for which we have data from at least three time-points beginning in 1981. After screening the questionnaires used in each of these countries, we isolated those variables that met two important criteria for inclusion: identical question wording and response set across countries and time-points. That screening disqualifies four country datasets from consideration: Argentina, Japan, Korea, and Mexico. Nonetheless, that screening process leaves us with sixty-three variables for analysis across two decades in fifteen countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany (see Appendix A).

The next step involves determining how respondents in all countries organize their core values. To identify these underlying structures in the responses to the sixty-three survey items that met our criteria for inclusion, the pooled data from each of the fifteen countries and four time-points are subjected to exploratory factor analysis (principal components). The initial results reveal eleven components with an Eigenvalue greater than one (Appendix B). Six of these components measure an underlying construct well enough to meet or exceed the minimum threshold of scale reliability, and of these six components, four turn out to be statistically reliable in all countries and at each and every time-point: religiosity (component 1), work motivations (component 2), political protest (component 3), and moral permissiveness (component 6).

Each of the value dimensions emerging from these screening procedures has attracted significant attention from analysts of culture and cultural change: religiosity and moral values, work motivations, and political protest. This analysis focuses initially on two of the most important value dimensions: religiosity and moral values. The second part of the investigation then turns to explore how Europeans and North Americans told these core values into their conceptualizations of “left” and “right,” conceptualizations

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13 We used a Cronbach’s Alpha of .700 as the minimum threshold of scale reliability.


that are part of the everyday political discourse among publics in all of these states.

A substantial body of empirical evidence indicates that publics in advanced industrial states clearly can and do employ and respond to “left” and “right” labels. The left–right dimension, however, is not content-specific; it has taken on different meanings for different publics at different historical moments. Left–right considerations become substantively important precisely because they allow us to probe the question of convergence or divergence from a slightly different vantage point: Is the value content that Europeans and North Americans pour into their notions of “left” and “right” the same? Or has it changed? And if so, to what extent has the content of these left–right ideological vessels become more similar or more different with the passage of time?

Our analytical approach to investigating change on these value dimensions begins by taking each survey as the first (1981), second (1990), second plus one-half (1995), and third (2000) time-point and then to plot lines of best fit through the values for those countries. Because the samples are nationally representative, the trend lines for Europe and North America are weighted to take into account population differences between the countries within each region. The second stage in the analysis process probes these data more deeply by separately examining three salient value dimensions: religiosity, moral permissiveness, and left–right self-placement.

Findings: The Rate and Direction of Changing North American and European Values: Growing Together or Growing Apart?

Nine survey items load heavily on the single dimension that we label “religiosity.” These items include questions about the importance of God and religion in the lives of respondents, whether respondents get comfort and strength from religion, beliefs in God, heaven, an afterlife and hell, rates of

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18 The slope of the line of best fit represents the trend: \( \Delta \text{Values} = \beta_1 \times \text{(year)} \), in the equation \( \text{Values} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{(year)} + \epsilon \).

19 The weighting formula is simply:

\[
\Sigma \frac{\text{Population of } X_{1,a}}{\text{(a Population of Selected European + North American Countries) \times Y_{1,a}})} \]

This weighting procedure ensures that the countries within Europe and North America affect the aggregate means on each value dimension in a way that is proportionate to their relative share of the population.
church attendance, and confidence in the churches (see Appendix C for question wording and variable coding). Together, these items constitute a highly reliable and broad scale of religiosity. 20 Figure 2.1 summarizes the trends in religiosity among publics in each country and highlights the weighted aggregate trend lines for Europe and North America. Clearly, the aggregate trends for Europe and North America are relatively stable; there has been a marginal decline in levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000. In effect, Europeans and North Americans were almost as religious in 2000 as they were in 1981.

A more detailed probing of these data, however, shows that this aggregate stability masks significant within-country variations, particularly in Europe. Levels of religiosity declined in seven European countries, were stable in two countries, and increased in four others (substantially so in three of them). The trajectories in Canada and the United States are stable and identical. Substantial variation between European countries has been documented elsewhere, 21 but it is the stability of aggregate levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000 that is noteworthy.

The simple intuition is that levels of religiosity among publics might well be responsible for shaping orientations toward other such value dimensions as “moral outlooks.” The empirical implication of that line of speculation is that national changes in moral outlooks might mirror the changing levels of religiosity in each country. The data summarized in Figure 2.2, however, provide no support for this hypothesis. Rather, the publics in all but one of the countries included in the analysis became more permissive in their moral outlooks between 1981 and 2000. 22 The weighted trends for moral permissiveness show that European and North American publics have converged during the course of the two decades for which we have data. There is also evidence of the emergence of two distinctive clusters of countries: Britain, the United States, and West Germany, on the one hand, and Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, and Norway, on the other. Taken together, the data reported in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 appear to present a paradox: If levels

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20 It would be possible, of course, to dichotomize our scale of religiosity into separate institutional and spiritual components. But factor analysis and reliability checks for the data for each country show that there is no statistical justification for introducing such a dichotomy; the scale measures a single component and is highly reliable in all national contexts and at each time point.


22 Denmark is the only exception. We include Denmark even though we only have Danish data on moral permissiveness for 1981 and 2000.
of religiosity are relatively stable over the two decades and there is substantial variability between countries, then what accounts for the seemingly uniform and substantial rise in levels of moral permissiveness? That question will be revisited later in the analysis.

The initial WVS results do indeed point toward common syndromes of value change among North American and European publics: Among both, levels of religiosity are declining slightly and moral permissiveness is increasing. These patterns seem to signify what might conventionally be thought of as a “shift to the left.” On all of these value dimensions, as well as on such other value dimensions as political protest, economic egalitarianism, and even political protest potential, publics in Europe and North America appeared more “left-wing” in their value outlooks in 2000 than twenty years earlier.

The WVS has always contained a question asking respondents to place themselves on a standard left–right scale, and so the question of whether these publics have shifted “to the right” or “to the left” can be answered directly. As the data in Figure 2.3 show, the North American and European patterns are in the same direction. Both Canadians and Americans moved significantly “to the left” between 1981 and 2000. This same pattern is evident in eight European countries, including Spain, Germany, and especially Britain. Italy was the only large country to experience a “shift to the right” over the same period, joining Iceland and Denmark as the only European publics to move in the opposite direction. The Dutch and French publics remained in relatively stable ideological space during the course of these two decades. The net results of these national patterns are aggregate continental trends indicating convergence. On balance, North Americans and Europeans moved in the same direction.

Value Dynamics in Europe and North America

To this point, the primary focus has been on the national-level “big pictures” for each of the fifteen countries in the analysis. Exclusive attention to nation-level data, however, sheds no light on the dynamics of value change within each country. Knowing how many people in any national setting hold what particular values is a useful starting point. But it is at least as important to know who holds which values, and how some sets of values are bundled with others.

There are two basic strategies available for examining the value dynamics within countries. One is to focus on the extent to which publics within a country disagree or agree on any given value dimension. Knowing how
publics are distributed along and across core values is certainly consequential because it is harder to reach consensus on value questions when the country is polarized.\textsuperscript{33}

The second approach works from the premise that most people hold more than one value simultaneously. People hold core economic values while also holding moral values, religious values, and work values. Following Philip Converse, the second approach draws attention to why or whether these different values are connected to each other.\textsuperscript{34} Do moral values run with economic ones? Are workplace motivations connected to religious outlooks? And are these connections, these values packages, changing or stable?

The second approach is more promising for a combination of empirical and theoretical reasons. First, it turns out that the extent to which publics agree, or disagree, about these basic value outlooks is essentially the same from one population to the next (although these results are not shown here). Moreover, the average distance of each individual from the overall average, the standard deviation, is partly an artifact of the scale construction. “Floor” and “ceiling” effects, for instance, will shrink the standard deviation where the national average is concentrated toward one end of the scale, regardless of whether the national distribution is clustered around the mean or polarized between groups who are far but equidistant from the average. Scales can capture values only up to a certain extreme point. Anything beyond that extreme will get lumped into the highest or the lowest available category on the scale, thus positioning the respondent artificially close to the average position because there was no available category to capture their actual opinion. Since our scales are designed to measure values from a very broad segment of the world’s population, “floor” and “ceiling” effects will thus inevitably affect analyses of how values are distributed.

More important, though, the bundling of values is especially germane to an investigation into the extent of the values divide within societies. If people’s attitudes on one value dimension tend to be strongly connected to their attitudes on another value dimension, then, ipso facto, there are overlapping disagreements within society. If people who disagree in their religious outlooks also turn out to disagree in their moral outlooks, work motivations, economic attitudes, and protest potential, then the values divide has a greater capacity to sort and possibly mobilize people than would be the case under those circumstances where value orientations are more randomly


bundled. Aggregate distributions and across-time trajectories on separate value dimensions reveal one aspect of the value change story in Europe and North America. What they do not reveal, however, is the extent to which value disagreements overlap to divide each society into separate camps.

Value Bundling

Research drawing on the insights of Max Weber suggests that values in advanced industrial countries are becoming increasingly “individualized” and “fragmented.” According to Weber, “with the multiplication of life chances and opportunities the individual becomes less and less content with being bound to rigid and undifferentiated forms of life prescribed by the group. Increasingly he desires to shape his life as an individual and to enjoy the fruits of his own abilities and labor as he himself wishes.” Empirical research in Europe by Halman and de Moor provides evidence of a contemporary variant of this argument. Halman and de Moor show that “… values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors are increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions.” As values become increasingly detached from such social structures as the family, church, or even class, individual values become more and more fragmented as the range of possible combinations of values expands considerably. As the values that individuals hold on one value dimension become progressively disconnected from their positions on other value dimensions, religiosity loses its hold on moral outlooks, and the language of “left” and “right” fails to constrain moral or economic outlooks. This conceptualization of individualization predicts increasing levels of value fragmentation.

Weber provides convincing reasons to suppose that the deepening and widening of advanced industrialism will be accompanied by accelerating trends toward individualization in these societies. And this theory can be tested empirically by developing some operational definitions of individualization and exploring crossnational and crosstime data on value change in postindustrial Western countries. Following Halman and de Moor, the focus here is primarily on the linkages between religious and moral outlooks. Religion clearly qualifies as a traditional social institution that historically has provided guidance for the life choices and worldviews of individuals.


And the empirical implication of individualization theory is that religion will progressively lose its hold on the moral outlooks of citizens in Western countries. At issue is not just the question of whether religion itself is becoming less important in modern societies (secularization). Rather, the question is whether individuals are becoming less likely to take their cues from religious outlooks when making decisions about important moral questions. The paradox raised at the beginning of this analysis was this: If religious values are relatively stable over the two decades for which we have data, then what explains the relatively sharp increases in moral permissiveness? One potential answer to that question comes from the dynamics of individualization.

Figure 2.4 graphically displays the connectedness (Pearson’s R) between religiosity and moral traditionalism for publics in every country across the two decades. Two striking findings emerge from the data. First, there is convincing evidence for supporting the individualization hypothesis in Europe. The connection between religiosity and moral outlooks has weakened in every single European country over these two decades. In effect, religious and moral outlooks have become increasingly decoupled. Not only are Europeans more secular, but by 2000 there was a greater consensus in moral outlooks between religious and secular Europeans than was the case in 1981.

The second finding concerns clear evidence indicating that the correlation between religiosity and moral traditionalism operates in the opposite direction; it increased only in two countries – the United States and Canada. The pattern is particularly striking within the United States. Between 1981 and 2000, the moral outlooks of secular Americans became far more permissive and they did so quite quickly. The moral outlooks of religious Americans, by contrast, changed rather slowly. The net effect of these changes stands in sharp contrast to the European pattern; the gap between the moral outlooks of religious and secular Americans widened substantially.

Taken together, these data are consistent with the argument that the religious cleavage has become more salient in the United States and less salient in Europe. The significant point to emphasize, however, is that the increased salience of the religious cleavage in the United States is not attributable to a rise in levels of religiosity or a decline in moral permissiveness (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

The declining connection between religiosity and moral outlooks is only one element of individualization. If values are moving away from such social structures as religion, then it is also plausible that other value bundles are also experiencing fragmentation. Perhaps individuals are choosing their own value outlooks with little regard for such structuring influences as class,
religion, or the compartments of “left” and “right.” With the WVS data, it becomes possible to explore directly the extent to which individuals organize their value outlooks along the lines of left and right by tracking cross-national and crosstime trends in the ways that left–right self-identification is connected to a variety of different core values.

One possibility to consider is that the categories of “left” and “right” mean different things to Europeans and North Americans – that Europeans and North Americans pour a different value content into their conceptions of left and right. The data provide no support for this line of speculation. According to the WVS data, “right-wing” self-identification is associated with moral traditionalism, and “left-wing” identification connotes moral permissiveness in every single country. When the analysis is expanded to encompass attitudes toward economic egalitarianism in 1990 and 2000, the same basic patterns persist: In every country, publics who see themselves as “left-wing” consistently favor greater income equality. And those who see themselves as “right-wing” are consistently more supportive of income incentives for individual effort. When it comes to the connection of left–right self-identification to both moral and economic values, however, the findings are somewhat less straightforward. If value bundles are falling apart, the expectation is that “left” and “right” are less useful categories for organizing these value outlooks.

Figure 2.5 plots the correlations between moral traditionalism and left–right self-identification. As these data show, the categories of “left” and “right” have taken on increasingly moral connotations in five countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United States. In nine countries, the opposite pattern emerges. Left–right self-identification grew apart from moral values in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Intriguingly, the North American and European trajectories are nearly identical to the trajectory of the correlations between religious and moral outlooks. For North Americans, that connection became closer between 1981 and 2000, whereas for Europeans that connection weakened. Do “left” and “right” serve more as compartments of moral values in North America and of economic values in Europe?

The WVS findings concerning the links between economic egalitarianism and left–right self-placement are graphically summarized in Figure 2.6. Note that the WVS measures of economic egalitarianism were first introduced in

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28 The distributive justice questions were not asked in 1981. We therefore have data for these measures for 1990, 1995, and 2000 only.
and so the three time-points concerned here are 1990, 1995, and 2000 only.  

The striking finding once again is clear evidence of divergence between the patterns in Europe and North America. In Canada and the United States, left–right self-identification became progressively more tightly bundled with attitudes toward distributive justice. With the single exception of the Netherlands, in each European country for which we have data, the opposite patterns persisted. In short, the salience of “left” and “right” as bundles of economic and moral values has increased in North America while it has decreased in Europe.

This line of analysis could be extended to other value dimensions as well. Our data suggest that Europe and North America are diverging when it comes to the ways that value outlooks are organized. In Europe, individualization and value fragmentation appear to be occurring across a number of important value dimensions: moral values are less constrained by religious outlooks, and left–right self-identification serves less effectively than it once did as compartments in which economic and moral values are organized. In North America, however, the connection between religious and moral outlooks has increased substantially, as has the extent to which the terms “left” and “right” are filled in with economic and moral values.

Conclusion: Convergence, Divergence, or Something Else?

This chapter began with a question: Does value change among publics in Europe and North America produce convergence or something else? The answer to that question, of course, depends on which values and which countries are under consideration. The approach followed here relies on direct individual level values data from the WVS from 1981 to 2000. The advantage of these data is that a large core of identically worded questions has been repeatedly asked of publics in multiple countries over the course of two decades. From these data we identified eleven core value dimensions and then focused on the very clear value dimensions for which we have reliable scales for each country at each time-point. The approach is conservative but robust. The aggregate answer to the research question is that the patterns of value change do not qualify as “convergence” but rather something else.

When it comes to the distributions of values across countries, North Americans and Europeans are moving in the same direction. Moral outlooks have become more permissive; publics are more tolerant about some behaviors

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29 We include for analysis all countries for which we have data for at least 1990 and 2000. For the sake of comparing these trends with those presented in the other figures, we plot the lines of best fit and extend these lines to 1981 and 2010.
that were once considered highly controversial or utterly unacceptable. Similarly, both North Americans and Europeans moved more “to the left” in their political outlooks between 1981 and 2000. The end result of the shared trajectories in both moral outlooks and political self-identification is that Americans and Europeans are moving closer together; their paths converged on these value dimensions.

The trend in religious outlooks, however, is less consistent. In some countries levels of religiosity declined, in others it increased, and in yet others it remained stable. On balance, aggregate levels of religiosity declined very modestly on both continents. But they declined at different rates, and consequently the gap between Europe and North America over the two decades widened slightly. Certainly, publics on both continents became more secular in their religious outlooks in 2000 than they were in 1981, but the pace of secularization was so incremental that it is hardly plausible to identify secularization as a central theme of value change from 1980 to 2000.

The analysis of within-country dynamics, however, reveals that there is quite another dimension to this story. In the United States, value differences became progressively more reinforcing; religious differences are strongly connected with moral differences, as well as with opposing opinions about distributive justice. In effect, if you knew where an American stood on moral values, you could predict with increasing accuracy where he or she stood on economic justice, left-right location, or levels of religiosity. The same applies, but to a lesser extent, to Canadian respondents. Indeed, the United States is the only country in our analysis where moral outlooks predict attitudes toward economic egalitarianism more effectively than income. Poor Americans may not support widespread wealth redistribution, but secular and morally permissive Americans are far more egalitarian in their economic outlooks than their religious and morally traditional co-nationals. In Europe, value disagreements overlap as well, but they do not do so nearly as tightly or as widely. Different moral outlooks overlap with differences in religiosity, but the overlap has weakened with the passage of time and moral outlooks do not run with economic viewpoints.  

These data suggest that Americans over the last two decades have settled into two separate but clear value camps. European values, by contrast, are becoming more individualized and fragmented. In America, people who disagree in their religious outlooks are more likely than Europeans who disagree

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30 The only two exceptions to this trend are Britain and Italy, where moral outlooks run with economic viewpoints in precisely the opposite direction as the language of left and right would lead us to predict. In both of these countries, “right-wing” economic outlooks are associated with “left-wing” moral outlooks, and “left-wing” economic outlooks are associated with “right-wing” moral outlooks.
in their religious outlooks to share different opinions about moral issues and economic egalitarianism. Americans with right-wing moral values are the same people who also hold right-wing economic values. The same applies to Americans on the left. Europeans think of left and right in the same way as Americans. The significant difference is that Europeans with left-wing moral outlooks are less likely to also hold left-wing economic viewpoints, or vice versa. In Europe, many people hold right-wing economic outlooks and many others hold right-wing moral outlooks. Unlike North Americans, however, comparatively few Europeans hold both at the same time.

The publics in Europe and North America are diverging when it comes to how they bundle their core values together. The American values divide, in effect, amounts to a fault line that is spreading across value dimensions, not widening between them. Americans are no more divided in their religious outlooks than they once were, but religious differences are now more likely to be connected to differing views about distributive justice, morality, and even left-right self-identification. By comparison, the values divide in Europe hardly qualifies as a crack. In the end, the trajectories on individual value dimensions are the same on both continents, but the common ground between people is more navigable in Europe than in America. Whereas Europeans seem to be growing together, North Americans seem to be growing apart.

Appendix A: Countries, Waves, and Sample Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. France</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Britain</td>
<td>1,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Germany (West)</td>
<td>1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Italy</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Netherlands</td>
<td>1,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Denmark</td>
<td>1,182</td>
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<td>7. Belgium</td>
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<td>14. Iceland</td>
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<td>15. Finland</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
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</table>
Appendix B: Rotated Factor Analysis (Principal Components Factor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Job Traits: Fulfillment</th>
<th>Political Protest</th>
<th>Institutional Confidence</th>
<th>Civil Permissiveness</th>
<th>Moral Permissiveness</th>
<th>Subjective Well-Being</th>
<th>Neighbors: Minorities</th>
<th>Job Traits: Economic</th>
<th>Military Nationalism</th>
<th>Family Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. V106: Importance of God</td>
<td>-1.468</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.809</td>
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Appendix C: Question Wording, Variable Coding, and Scale Construction

1. Religiosity (Scale) = \([v_{196}/9] + v_{197} + v_{191} + v_{195} + [v_{186}/4] + [v_{185}/6] + v_{192} + [v_{147}/3] + v_{194}/9\)

2. V196 HOW IMPORTANT IS GOD IN YOUR LIFE
   How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.
   
   1 (0)\(^{31}\) Not at all
   2 (1)
   3 (2)
   4 (3)
   5 (4)
   6 (5)
   7 (6)
   8 (7)
   9 (8)
   10 (9) Very

3. V197 COMFORT AND STRENGTH FROM RELIGION
   Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?
   
   0 No
   1 Yes

4. V191 BELIEVE IN GOD
   Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in God.
   
   0 No
   1 Yes

5. V195 BELIEVE IN HEAVEN
   Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in heaven.
   
   0 No
   1 Yes

6. V186 RELIGION IMPORTANT
   For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life: religion.
   
   1 (3) Very important
   2 (2) Rather important
   3 (1) Not very important
   4 (0) Not at all important

\(^{31}\) Values in parentheses represent variable recoding where different from the original.
6. V185 HOW OFTEN DO YOU ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
1. (6) More than once a week
2. (5) Once a week
3. (4) Once month
4. (3) Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days
5. (2) Other specific holy days
6. (1) Once a year
7. (0) Less often
8. (0) Never, practically never

7. V192 BELIEVE IN LIFE AFTER DEATH
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in life after death.
0. No
1. Yes

8. V147 CONFIDENCE: CHURCHES
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The churches.
1. (6) A great deal
2. (5) Quite a lot
3. (4) Not very much
4. (3) None at all

9. V194 BELIEVE IN HELL
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in hell.
0. No
1. Yes

II. Work Motivations (Scale):
A. Fulfillment = (V91+V94+V93+V96+V95+V89)
B. Comfort = (V90+V92+V87+V86+V88)

Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job.
Mentioned 1 | Not Mentioned 2 (0)

Personal Fulfillment:

10. V91 An opportunity to use initiative
11. V94 A responsible job
12. V93 A job in which you feel you achieve something
13. V96 A job that meets one's abilities
14. V95 A job that is interesting
15. V89 A job respected by people in general

Economic Comfort:
39. V90 Good hours
40. V92 Generous holidays
41. V87 Not too much pressure
42. V86 Good pay
43. V88 Good job security

III. Protest Potential (Scale) = (V136+V137+V135+V138+V134)/5
Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never under any circumstances do it:

Have Done 1 | Might Do 2(1) | Would Never 3(0)

16. V136 Attending lawful demonstrations
17. V137 Joining unofficial strikes
18. V135 Joining in boycotts
19. V138 Occupying buildings or factories
20. V134 Signing a petition

IV. Moral Permissiveness (Scale) = (V211+V210+V212+V208+V213)/5
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:

Never 1(0) 2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8) 10(9)
Justifiable Always Justifiable
29. V211 Divorce
30. V210 Abortion
31. V212 Euthanasia
32. V208 Homosexuality
33. V213 Suicide

V. Single Items:
A. Left-Right Self-Identification
V139 In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

1(0) 2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8) 10(9)
Left Right

B. Economic Egalitarianism
V141 How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

Incomes should be made more equal
We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

(0) 2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8) 10(9)