CANADIAN PARTIES IN TRANSITION

edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay

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CHAPTER 12

Value Change and the Dynamics of the Canadian Partisan Landscape

Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the links between values—people’s deep-seated dispositions about the world (Rokeach 1968; Feldman 1988)—and Canada’s partisan landscape. The focus is on two questions: Have there been detectable shifts in Canadian values over the last two decades? And, if so, to what extent have these value shifts been reflected in the partisan landscape?

On the first question there are strong reasons to believe that Canada, like publics in most other advanced industrial states, has indeed experienced significant value changes (Inglehart 1977; Nevitte 1996; Dalton 2000). Analysts differ somewhat in the precise language they use to describe these shifts (Bel 1976; Touraine 1985; Offe 1985; Abramson and Inglehart 1992; Inglehart 1997), but they do agree on some fundamental points. Most agree that the value shifts are intimately related to transformations in the structure of society and the economy (Huntington 1974; Nevitte 1996; Inglehart 1977, 1997; Dalton 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003). The patterns and trajectories of these structural changes are strikingly similar from one advanced industrial state to the next. All have enjoyed massive increases in wealth and significant expansions of the middle class (Huntington 1974). All have experienced shifts in their sources of wealth from industrial economic sectors and towards the service, technology, and knowledge sectors. A growing knowledge economy has placed a premium on knowledge workers and triggered a corresponding expansion of access to post-secondary education. In Canada, as elsewhere, these transformations in economic structures have also been accompanied by a host of social changes, including rising levels of geographic and occupational mobility, gradual declines in birth rates, a striking increase in the number of women in the paid workforce, changing family

These structural transformations, which began in the 1960s, have continued into the current century. Women now make up nearly one-half of the Canadian paid workforce. In the 1990s alone, women accounted for 75 per cent of the growth in the labour force; the number of women in the business, finance, and technology sectors of the economy doubled (Statistics Canada 2003a). In 1981, 55 per cent of all Canadian families conformed to the traditional pattern of a man, woman, and children living together in the same household. That proportion fell to 44 per cent by 2002 (Statistics Canada 2002). That same year, Canada’s birth rate dropped to its lowest level in recorded history. And over the same period church attendance rates continued to decline. In effect, the kinds of workplace and primary social structures that shaped the lives of Canadians by 2000 were vastly different from those experienced by Canadians just 25 years before. It would be remarkable indeed if Canadians had escaped the kinds of value changes that have taken place in other states experiencing the same kinds of structural change.

Most analysts also agree that the combination of structural and value changes experienced in the advanced industrial world have had a significant impact on the partisan landscape (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984) for two reasons. First, social and institutional changes have reshaped the political arenas within which all political parties compete. And second, value change within populations—shifts in what people take to be important in life—mean that the kinds of preferences people have and the demands they make on the political system will also be different (Huntington 1974; Kitschelt 1994, 1995). To the extent that political parties are vote-seeking institutions, they have strong incentives to respond to these shifting demands.

Sustained prosperity and the rapid expansion of the middle classes has realigned traditional old left-old right partisan landscapes. In some settings the emergence of new left and new right parties has modified and re-polarized conventional lines of electoral competition (Betz and Immerfall 1998).

Canadians have also experienced an unprecedented period of electoral volatility over the last two decades or so. In 1984, the Progressive Conservative Party (PCs) won the largest victory in any federal election in Canadian history. A mere nine years later the same party experienced the worst electoral defeat for a governing party in the history of the country. And by 2004, the PCs had completely disappeared. Over the same period three new political parties appeared. The Reform Party emerged in 1987, and the Bloc Québécois (the Bloc) was formed in 1990. The Reform Party morphed into the Canadian Alliance to compete “on the right” against the PCs in the 2000
federal election. And then the “rights” came back together as the Conservative Party of Canada to compete in the 2004 federal election. These changes in the Canadian partisan landscape over the last two decades may be attributable to a variety of factors, including the constitutional struggles of the 1980s and 1990s (Carty, Cross, and Young 2000; Bernard 1996). It is also possible that, like many European countries, some of the volatility may also be attributable to the kinds of value shifts that have swept across most advanced industrial states.

DIMENSIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF VALUE CHANGE

The connections between values and partisan behaviour can be explored in a variety of ways. One approach is to examine closely the election platforms that Canada’s major political parties have used in federal campaigns over the years. From those we could try to discern what kinds of values they reflect and to see whether and how these might have changed over the years. The problem with that approach is that we would have to assume that voters are familiar with the party platforms and then further assume that people voted for the parties because of the particular values that the platforms projected.

An alternative approach, and the one followed in this chapter, is to examine the values of citizens directly and to ask: Have these values changed? And are there systematic differences between the values of voters supporting different political parties? This kind of analysis requires direct survey evidence and there are two sources of data to consider. First are the Canadian Election Studies (CES), which have used surveys to study Canadian voting behaviour in all but one federal election since 1965. From these we know that even among citizens with little interest or knowledge about politics, values do help voters make judgements about the political world (Feldman 1988; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Moreover, evidence from the most recent CES confirms that general finding; values are meaningfully related to Canadian patterns of partisan support (Nevitte et al. 2000; Blais et al. 2002). Even so, the CES may not be ideal for our purposes: the early surveys asked hardly any questions about voters’ values. The CES began to ask more questions about values in 1988, but the question wordings of some of these survey items have varied somewhat.

If value change is rooted in structural change and structural changes take place slowly, then the best way to track value change is to take the long view. For that reason data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) are the most useful. These data have several advantages. First, they are deliberately designed to measure Canadian values and have been repeatedly conducted over a 20-year period (1981, n=1254; 1990, n=1730; 2000, n=1951), longer than any other comparable data set. Second, many of the same value questions have
been repeatedly asked in exactly the same way. The same random sample
designs and data collection methods—face-to-face interviewing—are used
for each wave of the survey. These features increase our confidence that the
data are reliable and comparable. Fortunately, each of these surveys also asks
respondents about their vote intentions. Consequently, it is possible to exam-
ine not only how Canadians’ values have changed across the two decades but
also to see whether there are any systematic differences between the value
outlooks of people who support different political parties. The strategy we
follow is to rely primarily on the WVS data and, where possible, to use the
CES data to check and elaborate our findings.

Making judgements about values and value change depends on which
particular values are under consideration. The first step in our analysis
entails turning to the WVS data to identify empirically what are the dimen-
sions around which respondents organize their core value outlooks. Factor
analysis is a conventional and useful method for identifying how people’s
responses to multiple questionnaire survey items cluster together. The results
of a factor analysis of the WVS data show that Canadians organize their
value outlooks along at least three distinct dimensions (see Appendix 12.1
for the full results). On each of the dimensions, responses to one item are
systematically related to responses to other items in the same dimension. The
first dimension is moral traditionalism; it encompasses beliefs about abortion,
prostitution, divorce, homosexuality, euthanasia, and suicide. The sec-
ond, family values, shows that beliefs about whether children need a home
with both a mother and a father, perspectives on single parenting, and
outlooks towards women and children cluster together. The third is reminis-
cent of the classic economic left/right dimension; it captures views about free mar-
kets. Here, respondents’ views about private versus public ownership and
about market competition cluster together.

Because responses to these items cluster into distinct and systematic
dimensions, we can create a scale for each dimension, and with these scales we
can see how Canadians’ values have shifted since 1981. Figure 12.1 summarizes
the direction of the value shifts. The aggregate trend lines clearly show that
Canadians became progressively less traditional in their moral outlooks over
the course of the two decades. In 1981, about three-quarters of all Canadians
held traditional moral values. By 2000, barely half did so. It turns out that
growing acceptance of homosexuality was the single largest shift among all
of the items measured in the WVS. That trend certainly seems to correspond
with the historical record. Recall that in the mid-1980s, gays and lesbians
still struggled to have Gay Pride parades recognized in major Canadian
cities. A mere 15 years later, same-sex marriage became institutionalized and
it now holds the same legal standing as the union of traditional couples.
A similar general pattern is also evident when it comes to changes in family values, although in this case the cross-time shifts are somewhat less even. Between 1981 and 2000, Canadians became less inclined to believe that a woman having a child needs to have a stable relationship with a man or to believe that having children is necessary for women's self-fulfillment. Not surprisingly, this pattern of value change mirrors the kinds of shifts that took place in the family structure over the same period.

What about the third value dimension, free markets? By cross-national standards, Canadians are more committed to the principles of free enterprise than are publics in nearly all other advanced industrial states (Nevitte 1996). Even so, the WVS data show that Canadians' enthusiasm for free markets dwindled somewhat between 1990 and 2000. By 2000, Canadians became more open to the idea of increased government ownership of business and industry, and they became less inclined to think of economic competition as an unvarnished virtue.

THE VALUE SPACE OF PARTY SUPPORTERS
Recent CES have found that value orientations do go some distance towards
explaining Canadians’ vote choices (Nevitte et al. 2000; Blais et al. 2002). It seems reasonable to suppose that people’s values will be a particularly important touchstone for vote choice when campaign issues engage those beliefs or when political parties prime core values during the course of an election campaign. Certainly, there is some indication that political parties have indeed made direct appeals to values during recent federal election campaigns. During the 2000 federal election, for example, part of the Liberal Party’s campaign was to draw attention to the conservative religious and moral values of Canadian Alliance leader Stockwell Day (Marzolini 2001). Liberal leader Paul Martin kickstarted the 2004 federal election campaign with an appeal for people to consult their values. “...You cannot have a health care system like Canada’s, you can’t have social programs like Canada’s,” Martin said, “with taxation levels like those of the United States. That’s why this election is so important. It’s about the values we bring with us in this new century” (Liberal Party of Canada 2004: 1). With appeals like these, it is certainly plausible that meaningful differences in value outlooks might help to draw voters to support some political parties. But values cut two ways. They have the potential both to draw people to some parties and to drive them away from others.

Figure 12.2 summarizes the average positions of the parties’ supporters on each of these core value dimensions and tracks the value positions of party supporters across the two decades for which we have data. In some respects, these findings are quite consistent with conventional interpretations of partisan variations in Canada: the moral, family, and economic values of NDP and Bloc supporters cluster at one end of these value dimensions while the values of Reform-Alliance supporters tend to fall towards the opposite end. Liberal and PC supporters occupy the middle ground.

The data in Figure 12.2 also shed some light on partisan value dynamics. Notice that with the passage of time, supporters of all political parties became less traditional in their moral outlooks and family values and more skeptical about free markets. Despite these shifts, the relative positions of party supporters remained approximately the same. That said, there are some nuances to observe. The first concerns NDP supporters. Their moral and family values are consistently different from the values of those supporting other mainstream political parties. Intriguingly, the stability of market values among NDP supporters meant that, by 2000, they were more distinctive in their moral and family values than in their views about free markets.

Second, there is evidence of both stability and change in the partisan distributions of free market values. Brodie and Jenson (1980, 1996) noted some 25 years ago that there was a basic consensus between Liberals and PCs when it comes to economic values. According to the WVS evidence, that
Figure 12.2: Value Change and Partisan Space, Average Positions of Party Supporters (1981–2000)\(^1\)

**Moral Traditionalism**
- 1981: Liberal = 7.8 (7.4-8.1) PC = 7.3 (6.9-7.7) NDP = 6.5 (5.7-7.3) Canada = 7.2 (7.1-7.3)
- 1990: Liberal = 6.5 (6.4-6.7) PC = 6.5 (6.2-6.7) NDP = 5.8 (5.5-6.0) Reform = 5.9 (5.4-6.4)
- 2000: Liberal = 5.9 (5.7-6.0) PC = 6.2 (5.8-6.6) NDP = 5.4 (5.0-5.8) Alliance = 6.2 (5.8-6.5) BQ = 5.2 (4.8-5.5) Canada = 5.9 (5.8-6.0)

**Traditional Family Values**
- 1981: Liberal = 5.5 (4.9-6.2) PC = 5.4 (4.8-6.0) NDP = 4.1 (3.0-5.1) Canada = 5.0 (4.8-5.2)
- 1990: Liberal = 5.4 (5.1-5.6) PC = 5.1 (4.7-5.5) NDP = 4.4 (4.0-4.8) Reform = 5.4 (4.7-6.1) Canada = 4.7 (5.0-5.3)
- 2000: Liberal = 4.5 (4.2-4.8) PC = 4.2 (3.7-4.7) NDP = 3.5 (3.0-4.0) Alliance = 4.8 (4.4-5.2) BQ = 6.0 (5.6-6.5) Canada = 4.6 (4.3-4.8)

**Free Market Support**
- 1990: Liberal = 7.5 (7.3-7.7) PC = 7.8 (7.5-8.0) NDP = 6.8 (6.6-7.1) Reform = 8.4 (8.0-8.8) Canada = 7 (7.4-7.6)
- 2000: Liberal = 6.9 (6.8-7.1) PC = 7.6 (7.3-7.8) NDP = 6.9 (6.5-7.2) Alliance = 7.8 (7.5-8.0) BQ = 5.6 (5.3-5.9) Canada = 7.0 (6.9-7.1)

**Legend**
- "CAN" = National Average  "LIB" = Liberal Party Average  "PC" = PC Party Average
- "REF" = Reform Party Average  "ALL" = Alliance Party Average  "BQ" = Bloc Québécois Average

\(^*\) See Appendix 12.3 for question wording and scale construction.

\(^*\) Items in the Free Market Scale were not asked in the 1981 wave of the WVS.


\(^1\) The precise figures (95 per cent confidence intervals) are as follows:
consensus was still intact some two decades later. Notice, however, that NDP supporters’ views about free markets remained virtually unchanged between 1990 and 2000. What did change was the economic values of Liberal and PC supporters. By 2000, the consensus on these economic outcomes included not just Liberals and PCs, but also NDP supporters. And that broader consensus emerged not because of the changing outlooks of these NDP supporters, but rather because the economic outlooks of Liberals and PCs in effect “converged” on those of the NDP between 1990 and 2000.

Bloc supporters represent, perhaps, the most intriguing combination of positions across these values dimensions. Moral and family values are strongly related to each other for Canadians living outside of Quebec. Bloc supporters, by contrast, turn out to be both the least traditional on our measure of moral values and the most traditional on our measure of family values. They are the most likely to think that a woman needs a child in order to be fulfilled (30 per cent) and that a child needs both a mother and a father to grow up happily (87 per cent). At the same time, they are also the least likely to approve of a single woman having a child without a stable relationship with a man (38 per cent).4

VALUES ARE A MIXED BAG: MARKETS AND MORALS
The focus so far has been on identifying core value dimensions, on showing that value changes have indeed taken place among the Canadian public, and on examining where supporters of different political parties stand on each of those value dimensions at different points in time. That approach is a useful starting point because it allows us to identify the key dimensions and directions of value change. However, it also works from a simplifying assumption that needs careful consideration: individual preferences are not driven by a single core value. Rather, people hold multiple values at the same time, and they do so in different combinations. That complication is less problematical if the assumption that people combine their bundled values in coherent ways is justified. For example, if the political world is viewed through the prism of “left” and “right,” or “liberal” and “conservative,” the simple intuition is that people who hold “right-wing” values about the economy will also hold “right-wing” values when it comes to moral outlooks. Or, for those who have “left” values, the intuition is that if they are “left” on the economy they will also hold “left” values about morality and the family. That simplifying assumption might be useful under some circumstances. It turns out, however, that according to WVS data, it is not entirely justified.

The data summarized in Figure 12.3 capture the essential point: they schematically show that some values—that is, moral traditionalism and family values—are indeed related at the aggregate level. Indeed, these two partic-
ular sets of core values are related quite strongly at every time point. In effect, knowing that a person has traditional family values means that you can predict reasonably accurately that he or she will also hold quite traditional moral outlooks, and vice versa. By contrast, it is also clear that, at the aggregate level, there is virtually no overlap between what people’s views are about free markets and their family or moral values. Canadians who are skeptical of the free market are no more likely to hold traditional family or moral values than are people who are supportive of free markets.

**Figure 12.3: Overlap in Moral, Economic, and Family Values, 1981-2000**

![Diagram showing overlap of values]


The implications of these particular sets of value configurations come into clearer view when non-centrist positions on two sets of values, outlooks towards free markets and moral traditionalism, are considered together. According to the WVS data, fewer than one in four Canadians qualify as being “on the left” on both of these dimensions; just 23 per cent are both skeptical about free markets and relatively permissive in their positions on the moral traditionalism scale. Similarly, about one in four respondents
simultaneously hold “right-wing” views about both free markets (express strong support for free markets) and moral outlooks (traditional). Even among those Canadians who hold clear positions on moral and market values, half do not adhere to a combination of value outlooks that fit comfortably into conventionally used left-right value space. Put more starkly, about half of these Canadians hold bundles of values that are a mix of “left” and “right”; they are “right” on one value dimension but “left” on the other.

What, then, are the implications of these different combinations of values for partisan support? Do different parties attract sets of voters that systematically bundle their values in different ways? The short answer to that question is: “yes.”

As it turns out, more Canadians hold a mixed bundle of values than hold “consistent” left/left or right/right value outlooks. Indeed, the only party with a majority of “consistent” left/left or right/right values is the Bloc. In fact, fully three in five PC supporters in 2000 held values similar to those of NDP supporters on one dimension and to Alliance supporters on the other. As Figure 12.4 shows, respondents with mixed values occupy four times as much of the PC support base (61 per cent) as the Bloc support base (15 per cent). This finding is intriguing but not entirely unexpected. PC supporters seem to reflect the kind of value mix that is reminiscent of the “Red Tory” segment of the population: they hold traditional moral values, but they are not enthusiastic about free market principles (Horowitz 1966; Grant 1965; Campbell 1974). This configuration of market and moral values is significantly different from the way that Alliance and especially NDP and Bloc supporters bundle these values together.

Voters with a “mixed” bundle of values face something of a dilemma when they consider their electoral options. One possibility is that voters sort through their electoral options by placing greater emphasis on those core values that are most salient to them (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). So, for instance, a voter who supports greater economic intervention by the government may nonetheless have voted for the Alliance because she likes the party’s position on abortion and her convictions about abortion are stronger than her support for government intervention. Another possibility, of course, is that these voters can opt to support a party that occupies the middle ground on both the moral and market dimensions. Repelled by NDP positions on moral issues and by Alliance positions on economic ones, a voter might chose to support the Liberal Party. In effect, this is a “least worst” option. Notice also that the number of Canadians who are “consistent” in the sense that they couple high free market support with high levels of moral traditionalism is relatively small. Consequently, parties who want to attract voters holding this combination of values face a serious limit to their growth.
Canada’s parties of the “left” between 1981 and 2000. But the data also clearly show that the trajectory of value change over the past few decades is decidedly “leftward”: Canadians are becoming less traditional in their moral and family values and somewhat less supportive of free market principles. In that sense, the value space occupied by the NDP and the Bloc has gradually expanded, while the value space embraced by supporters of the Alliance and PC parties (now the Conservative Party) has gradually narrowed.

Behind these value shifts lies another trend with potential implications for the political right in Canada. In 2000, morally traditional Canadians were more polarized on their market values than were their morally permissive counterparts. Empirically, for every one point increase on the 10-point scale of moral traditionalism there is a 1 per cent increase in polarization (p = .01): .5 per cent to the “right” and .5 per cent to the “left.” Canadians on the moral “right,” as it were, are more divided in their market values than those on the moral “left.” Intriguingly, this divergence of “right-wing” values corresponds to the fragmentation that Canada’s right-wing parties experienced over the last two decades.

This fragmentation of right-wing moral and market values may well help to explain the preponderance of Canadians with “mixed values” among the PC supporters—the pattern among PC supporters—and it is unique to PC supporters—does not correspond to the value landscape implied by the simplifying language of “left” and “right.” In fact, the conventional application of “left/right” discourse actually obscures the value bundles they held. Those with the least traditional moral outlooks were the most supportive of the free market (r = .19, p = .02), and those with the least support for the free market were the most traditional in their moral outlooks (r = .16, p = .05). These value conservatism of PC supporters in 2000 were quite different from the conservative value bundles of Reform and Alliance supporters.8

On this point, these WVS findings are confirmed by data from the CES, which show that the Reform and Alliance parties were not the second choice of most PC voters (Blais et al. 2002). Similarly, the WVS data show that PC supporters preferred the Liberals and even the NDP over the Alliance by margins of 7 to 1 and 4 to 1, respectively.

The WVS data concerning voters’ second choices also corroborate some other intriguing findings from the CES. After the 2000 federal election, the CES surveys asked respondents whether they thought there was one political party “that is just too extreme?” The Alliance was the most frequently labelled as “just too extreme” by Liberal voters (34 per cent) and PCs (37 per cent), as well as by NDP supporters (62 per cent) and Bloc supporters (35 per cent). Alliance voters mostly thought that the NDP (25 per cent) was “just too extreme.” That finding, of course, begs a key interpretive question: just
what did respondents have in mind when they were labelling a party as “too extreme”?

It turns out that these views were powerfully influenced both by respondents’ market values ($r = .22, p < .000$) and by their moral values ($r = .21, p < .000$). Morally permissive Canadians were significantly more likely to view the Alliance as “just too extreme,” as were Canadians who were skeptical of free market principles. Voters who were the most enthusiastic about free market values were repelled by the Alliance’s moral outlooks ($r = -.21, p = .02$). Morally traditional Canadians, by contrast, were driven away from the Alliance, it seems, by their market outlooks ($r = -.16, p = .03$).

These value dynamics carried implications for the electoral prospects of the Alliance in particular, but the lessons apply equally to any party that becomes identified with clear polar positions on any salient value dimension. Political parties do not simply gain supporters from among those whom they attract, but they also stand to lose support from among those whom they repel. Viewing the dynamics of party support from both of these perspectives suggests a different set of strategic costs and benefits for political parties that adopt distinctive positions on those issues that engage the values of the electorate. In terms of market and moral values, for instance, these parties risk alienating supporters who occupy the “right” or “left” on one dimension but not on the other.

One core finding that clearly emerges from this analysis of the WVS data is that for most Canadians their positions on core value dimensions do not “run together” in any straightforward way. Thus, if party strategists work from the assumption that they do “run together,” then vote-seeking parties run the risk of alienating more Canadians than they attract. In effect, the empirical tradeoffs look something like this: on the one hand, parties of the right repel three fiscal conservatives for every two moral conservatives that they attract. For those on the “left,” on the other hand, the same dilemma operates in the opposite direction: these parties lose market skeptics by appealing to the morally permissive, but they lose morally permissive Canadians by appealing to market skeptics.

CONCLUSION: THE TIE GOES TO THE CENTRE
Values did not occupy a very prominent place in early analyses of Canadian electoral behaviour. Indeed, from the 1960s and throughout the 1980s the surveys used by scholars studying Canadian elections paid little attention to voters’ values. The focus of these early studies, rather, was on determining what impact such short-term factors as leader evaluations and issue positions had on Canadians’ vote choices (Meisel 1972; Clarke et al. 1984). By the 1990s that changed. It has become increasingly clear that values do matter to
citizens' vote choices. Even among citizens with little interest in or knowledge about politics, values help voters make judgements about their political world (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Feldman 1988). Evidence from the most recent CES confirms that general finding; values are indeed meaningfully related to Canadians' patterns of partisan support (Nevitte et al. 1997; Blais et al. 2002).

The evidence from the WVS supports this line of interpretation. There are meaningful differences in the family, moral, and market values of the supporters of Canada's different political parties. Although Canadians do not give much priority to politics (Nevitte 1996), the changes in the underlying social and economic structures of the country do have implications for people's values towards morality, family, and the economy.

These reverberations, however, turn out to be less straightforward than the simplifying language of "left" and "right" implies. For most Canadians, "right-wing" outlooks on the free market are not associated with "right-wing" outlooks on morality, and vice versa. Canadians hold bundles of values, and most Canadians may simultaneously be attracted to a political party on one value dimension and yet repelled by that same political party on another. This finding has especially pronounced implications for those political parties in Canada that seek to stake out distinctive value space at either end of the political spectrum. As the bounds of these parties' platforms are extended to encompass more than a single value dimension, the number of Canadians that they may repel grows at least as fast as the number of Canadians that they will potentially attract.

The trajectory of value change in Canada is decidedly "leftward" across all of the value dimensions considered here. Even so, so-called "right-wing" or "conservative" political parties do have the potential to enjoy significant levels of support from the Canadian public. That potential, however, is limited by two factors: first, the direction of value change is in the opposite direction of the value positions usually associated with "the right." Second, the deep divisions between the moral and economic "right" also hinder the electoral prospects of these parties. Unless they move to the centre in their positions on moral and/or economic issues, value change may continue to work against the electoral prospects of right-wing political parties in Canada.
Appendix 12.1: Factor Dimensions, 2000*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Moral Traditionalism</th>
<th>Free Market Support</th>
<th>Traditional Family Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abortion</td>
<td>.806</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Prostitution</td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Divorce</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Euthanasia</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Homosexuality</td>
<td>.670</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Suicide</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Competition</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.807</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Privatization</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.803</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Two Parents</td>
<td>-.133</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Women and Children</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Single Mothers</td>
<td>-.300</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigenvalues: 3.461 | 1.366 | 1.172
Proportion: 31% | 12% | 11%
Cronbach's Alpha: .81 | .47 | .48

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Orthogonal Rotation (3)
Missing Values: Listwise Deletion

*Reported factor analysis is of the 2000 data. Competition and Privatization are not available in 1981. The same three components emerge on factor analysis of both the 1990 and 2000 data. After excluding questions that are not asked in precisely the same way for both 1990 and 2000, we dropped all questions that did not load on distinct dimensions (Eigenvalue < 1) for both of these time points. After repeating this process, factor analyzing the remaining variables produced the above dimensions that are stable across both time points. Although our free market measures are not available in the 1981 data, factor analysis of that year's data breaks the remaining variables into two components: moral values and family values. One exception in the 1981 data is that the question about single mothers runs about as well with the moral traditionalism dimension as it does with the traditional family values dimension. This same pattern emerges in factor analysis of the 1990 data only if our measures of free market values are not included. This does not occur in the 2000 data regardless of whether the measures of free market values are included in the factor analysis. Overall, attitudes toward single mothers fit best with the family values dimension, but our analysis suggests that it was indeed a morality question for many respondents in 1981 and 1990.
Appendix 12.2: Distributions of Market and Moral Values, 2000

Pearson's $R = .025$

Appendix 12.3: Question Wording and Scale Construction

Moral Traditionalism (0-10)
Please tell for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.*

1. Abortion  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 10  Never Justifiable
2. Prostitution  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Never Justifiable
3. Divorce  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Never Justifiable
4. Homosexuality  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Never Justifiable
5. Suicide  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Never Justifiable
6. Euthanasia  Always Justifiable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Never Justifiable

*Original variable coding reversed for ease of interpretation.
Scale = ||(Abortion + Prostitution + Divorce + Homosexuality + Suicide + Euthanasia) / 6-1||/9*10

Traditional Family Values (0-10):

5. Two Parents:
If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?
Tend to agree (10) Traditional
Tend to disagree (0) Non-Traditional
6. Women and Children
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?
   Needs children (10) Traditional
   Not necessary (0) Non-Traditional

7. Single Mothers
If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn’t want a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?
   Approve (0) Non-Traditional
   Disapprove (10) Traditional
   Depends (if volunteered) (.5)

Scale = (Two Parents + Women and Children + Single Mothers) / 3

Free Market Support (0-10)
Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

9. Privatization
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased.
   10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.

10. Competition
Competition is good.
   It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.
   10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.

Scale = (Privatization + Competition) / 2 | 1/9 | 10

Party Preference
<#220> If there were a federal election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? If don’t know [1990 and 2000 only] which party appeals to you most?

• Liberal
• Progressive Conservative
• NDP
• Reform (1990), Alliance (2000)
• Bloc Québécois (2000)
Notes

1. Two of the three dimensions—moral values and market values—are very similar to those found in the CES.

2. Additive scales are created for each value dimension by combining the responses to those questions that load on a single component in the factor analysis presented in Appendix 12.1. So, for instance, a respondent's score on the moral traditionalism scale is the average of their answers to the questions about abortion, prostitution, divorce, homosexuality, euthanasia, and suicide. The additional calculations in Appendix 12.1 are done simply to standardize our scales so that they run between 0 and 10.

3. Reform Party supporters score lower on the moral traditionalism scale than the national average, even lower than the supporters of either the PC or Liberal parties. This finding is inconsistent with conventional wisdom. With such a small number of Reform supporters in 1990 (N=89), we checked this finding with data from the CES. The 1993 CES contains two items that overlap with our measure of moral traditionalism, namely, questions about abortion and homosexuality. There are notable differences in question wording in terms of abortion. The CES asks about access to abortion, and the WVS asks about its justifiability. Both measures show that Reform supporters are quite close to the national average in their position on abortion, even though Reform Party supporters in the WVS are slightly more permissive than average whereas those in the CES are slightly to the traditional side. In terms of homosexuality, however, Reform supporters in the WVS were less permissive than their counterparts in the CES. We use 1 to 4 and 1 to 10 as comparable cut points on the 10 and 100 point scales in the WVS and CES, respectively.

4. This is intriguing given that the CES finds that Bloc supporters are the most likely to disagree that only “legally married people should be having children” (90 per cent). At first glance, this appears contradictory, but the differences may be attributable to variations in question wording: the WVS asks about a “stable relationship with a man,” whereas the CES asks about “legal” marriage. When the analysis is expanded to cover variables that are only available in the 2000 wave of the WVS, we find that Bloc supporters are more than twice as likely as other Canadians to strongly agree with the statement that “being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay” (61 per cent) and that “a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children” (56 per cent). Bloc supporters in the WVS are also more than twice as likely as other Canadians to agree that “marriage is an outdated institution” (42 per cent). The connection between two-parent families and child-rearing is strongest among Bloc supporters, even though they tend more than others to think that these relationships can exist outside of the context of “legal” marriage. Note that the rate of common-law marriage in Quebec (30 per cent) is more than double the Canadian average (14 per cent) (Statistics Canada 2002).
5. That is, those who do not fall into the middle tertile on either of the 10-point scales. See Appendix 12.2 for the distributions.

6. For more on the different types of conservatism, see Horowitz 1966 and Campbell 1974.

References


