Averroes

EPITOME OF THE DE ANIMA

©
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EXPLANATION (BAYÁN) OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

Abū Al-Walid b. Rushd, Jurist and Judge (May God be pleased with him) said:

The intention of this discourse is to establish, from the statements of the commentators on the science of the soul, what we think best corresponds to what has been proven in natural science, and is most compatible with the intention of Aristotle.

And before doing this, let us set forth, from what was proven in that science [of physics], what takes the place of the first principles (al-aṣl al-mawdūʿ), in order to make the substance of the soul understood. So we say:

That it has been shown in the first book of the Physics that all generable and corruptible bodies are composed from matter and form, and that neither one of these two [principles] is [itself] a body, even though it is through their combination (bi majmūʿ-humā) that body exists. And it was explained there that the prime matter which belongs to these bodies is not informed per se (laysat maṣūrah bi-al-dhāt), nor is it existent in actuality; and that the existence which is proper to it only belongs to it insofar as it is able to receive form, not in that potency is its substance, but rather, in that this follows upon its substance, and persists as something accompanying it; and that the rest of what is predicated of the actually existent bodies—that they are in potency (qawiyah) for something—is only said of them with respect to the matter (al-māddah), since it is not possible that any potentiality be found in them in the respect in which they are actually existent per se. And this is primarily because actuality and potentiality are mutually contradictory. And it was also explained there that it is not possible for this first matter to be denuded of form, because if it were denuded of it, then what is not existent in actuality would be existent in actuality.

And it was explained in addition to this in the De caelo et mundo that the bodies whose forms have their primary existence in prime matter, and from which matter cannot be stripped—and these are the simple bodies—four: fire, air, water, and earth.

And it was explained too in the De generatione et corruptione, concerning the nature of these simple [bodies], that they are the elements of the rest of the

1 The text used for the translation is Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Nafs, ed. F. Al-Ahwani. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1950. The Arabic title, which belongs properly to a middle commentary, is a misnomer. It should be either Jawāmiʿ Kitāb al-Nafs, or Mukhtaṣar Kitab al-Nafs.
homoemerous bodies, and that the generation of the latter from them only occurs by way of blending and mixture, and that the remote agent of this blending and mixture into a determinate order and cycle is the heavenly bodies.

And it was also explained in [Book] 4 of the Meteorology that the true blending and mixture in all homoemerous bodies exist in the water and on the earth only occurs through concoction; and concoction occurs by means of the heat proportioned to the thing concocted, namely, the natural heat (al-ḥarārah al-gharīzīyah, which is proper to each existent; and [it was explained] that the divisions of these homoemerous bodies are attributed only to the mixture alone, and that its proximate agent is the heat mixed with it, whereas the remote [agent] is the heavenly bodies. And in general it was explained there that in the elements and heavenly bodies, there is what is sufficient for the existence of the homoemerous bodies, and for the bestowal of what is established through [their existence]. And this is because all of their divisions are related to the four [primary] qualities, according to what was explained there.

And by means of all of this it was explained in the De animalibus that there are three species of composite things: (1) the first of them is the composition which is from the existence of the simple bodies in prime matter, [prime matter] not being informed (muṣawwarah per se; (2) the second is the composition which is made from these simples, namely, the homoemerous bodies; and (3) the third is the composition of instrumental organs, which are the most complete things which are existent in the perfect animals, such as the heart and the liver. And they may also exist, by way of analogy and comparison, in the imperfect animals and in plants, such as the roots and stamens. And it was also explained in this book that the proximate creator of these organic bodies is not the elemental heat, for activity of the elemental heat is only to solidify and to make dry, and [to perform] other [activities] among the things related to the homoemerous bodies. Rather, their creator is a power like the power of artistic vocation, as Aristotle said. And this too, along with heat, is suited to the creation, formation, and bestowal of shape (al-shakl=Gr. morphe). And that the bestower of this form is the heat, and its form is the mixture by which it acts in the breeding animals and breeding plants—that is, in the individual which is of this species, which is begotten by it, or by something analogous to it, insofar as it is an individual besouled through the mediation of the potency and the heat—that is, the heat existing in the seed and the semen. As for in those animals and plants which do not reproduce, their creator is the heavenly bodies. And it was also explained along with this that just as this heat, which is suitable for informing and creating, does not contain in itself what is sufficient for bestowing the shape and innate dispositions (al-khulqah), unless there is present there an

\[2\] Literally, “bodies whose parts are similar.”
informing power of the genus of the nutritive soul, just as there is no activity of nutrition in the body except through the nutritive faculty. And [it was explained] that the nutritive and sensitive faculties are produced in the animal from what is like them, and that their remotest agent is something separated, and is the thing called an “intellect,” even if that the most proximate [agent] is the power of the soul which is in the body, for these [bodies in-Q] instrumental organs only exist in what is besouled. For if they existed in what is not besouled, their existence would be a sort of equivocation, just as “hand” is predicated of the hand of both a dead person and a living person.

And it was also explained there along with this that the proximate subject of these souls in organic bodies is a heat related to the creative heat, since there is /8 no difference between them, except that this organ is preservative, and that organ is creative. And this is the heat observed through sensation in the perfect animal in the heart, or what is analogous to [the heart] in the imperfect animal. And this heat may be found in many of these species, like something dispersed in them, and this is on account of the proximity of their organs to the simple [bodies], like the condition of many animals and plants (these being the plants most suited for this). And for this reason, whenever we separate one of the branches of a plant and plant it, it is possible that it will live.

And it was also explained there that the powers of the soul are one in their proximate subject, which is the natural heat, [but] many in powers, like the condition of the apple. For it is possessed of many powers, such as colour and flavour and scent and shape, but it is one despite this. But the difference between the two is that these are accidents in the apple, whereas they are substance in the natural heat.

And these are the majority of the matters which, if we are mindful of them, then we will be able to reach knowledge of the substance of the soul, and what attaches to [the soul], in the most perfect and easiest ways. And they are matters which, even if Aristotle does not explain them in the beginning of his book, they are necessary starting points for it by the force of his custom of proceeding. And from these very matters it is possible to come to know what is the most sought after in this matter, namely, whether it is possible for [the soul] to be separated or not?

But it is necessary that one ask oneself before this investigation, in what respect it is possible that a form should exist separated from matter, if it does exist, and from what subjects and methods it is possible to come to know this, if

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3 Q=Cairo manuscript, which represents the original redaction of the Epitome. M=Madrid manuscript, which contains Averroes's later corrections.
it is? And we say that separation can only exist, in the case of things related to material things, insofar as they are related to them, not by the relation of form to matter, but rather, their conjunction to matter must be a conjunction that is not in their substance, as is said of the Agent Intellect, that it is in the semen and the seed; and that the Prime Mover is in the circumference of the universe. For the relation of form to matter is a relation of which it is not at all possible to conceive any separation in it, insofar as it is a material form. For this position is self-contradictory, because one of the things which the followers of this science posit as self-evident is that it is evident from the nature of this natural form that it is subsistent through matter, and for this reason it is originated (ḥādithah), and in its coming-to-be follows upon change and the nature of change. Moreover, when we grant the opposite of this (that is, that it is eternal—whether we suppose it to be transferred from place to place, or from non-place to place—and this is more supportive of this position—because, if it is eternal, why is it that it only exists in a subject?), many impossibilities follow from this. Among them, that what is existent would be generated from what is existent in actuality, because if matter is not originated, there would be no generation at all, nor would there be any need for the mover or the generator, but rather, there would be no agent at all. Moreover, if we grant that the form is existent before its existence in its designated matter (fi al-hayūlā al-mushār ‘ilā-hā), then there would be no need for its existence to change, or to follow upon change, or there would be no change at all for the form. But whenever we grant that form is not subject to change at all, nor does its existence in the matter designated for it follow upon change, and likewise its corruption, it follows that the thing is essentially one and the same before its generation, just like its state after its generation, and before its corruption is just like its state after its corruption, so that opposites are existent simultaneously in one subject, as if you said, the form of water and the form of fire. And all of this is contrary to what is intelligible.

And if we grant as well their coming-to-be through change, that is, that they are changed, when originated, from not-matter to matter, or from one matter to another, as the proponents of transmigration say, it follows necessarily that the form would be a body, and divisible, in accordance with what has been explained of the fact that everything changeable is divisible. And if this were the case, nothing would remain of its coming-to-be in matter, except insofar as their existence follows upon change, according to what is apparent from the nature of the generable and corruptible forms. For one of the things by which the form of air is perfected and produced in the matter of water, is only through the existence of the preceding transformation in the water through the coming-to-be of the

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4 Q—subject to subject.
5 Q—not being in a subject to being in a subject.
form of air. But this form is changes on account of its existence in what is changeable, not insofar as it is changeable per se, since it is neither a body nor divisible. And for this reason there is no motion in substance. And all of this has been shown in the *Physics*.

Moreover, were we to grant that this is an immaterial form its coming-to-be in the thing would not require the utmost preparation for the reception of another form, nor that some of the [forms] should be the perfection of others, and some of them the subjects for others, in the respect in which we say that the vegetative is a subject for the sensitive, and the sensitive its perfection. For the form, insofar as it is form, has nothing in it of preparation and potency, since the existence which is proper to it only belongs to it insofar as it is actuality, and actuality and potency are contradictories. And it is only possible for potency to exist in it through some sort of accident, this being something that belongs to its material generation.

And all of these arguments (*istiẓḥārāt*) are to be used with someone who denies their existence, not in the sense that they are demonstrations by which what is unknown is clarified through what is known. And one role of this type of discourse is that it may be used in the science of metaphysics, since this art is the art which guarantees the support of what the particular arts posit as [their] principles and subjects.

And since it has been posited by the followers of this science [of physics] that most forms are material, and that this is evident from their nature, that which the followers of this science inquire about is only the forms which are doubtful in their nature as to whether they are subsistent (*mutaqawwimah*) through matter, or not subsistent [through matter]. And the method from which it is possible to acquire the proper premises related to this speculation (*al-naẓar*) into this science is to enumerate all the predicates which attach to the material forms insofar as they are material, since their existence in matter is not of one mode, according to what was evident from what preceded—and we shall make this clear in this book—and then to consider all of them. For example, in the case of the rational soul (since it is that of which it is supposed that it is separable among the powers of the soul), but if we find it characterized by one of them, then it will be proven that it is not separable. Likewise the essential predicates which are proper to the forms insofar as they are forms, not insofar as they are material forms, will be examined; and if it is found that they have a proper predicate, it will be proven that they are separable, just as Aristotle said, that if there is found to belong to the soul or to one of its parts some activity which is proper to it, it will be possible that it is separable. For this is the way in which it is possible to acquire the premises proper to this speculation, that is, the way in which it is possible to study this. But let this be postponed until we reach the
place in which it is possible to investigate this problem (*maṭlūb*). For this investigation is only arranged according to each of the parts of the soul, following upon the knowledge of its substance, since the knowledge of anything’s essence is prior to [the knowledge] of its attributes (ʻalā lawḥiqi-hi).

/12 So let us begin from the beginning. And we say:

That it is clear from what has just been posited in the preceding discussion that the soul is the form of a natural organic body. And this is because, if every body is composed from matter and form, and what is in this relation in the animal is soul and body, and it is clear from the nature of the soul that it is not matter for the natural body, then it is clear that it is the form. And because natural forms are first perfections belonging to the bodies which are their forms, then the necessary element said in the definition of the soul is that it is a first perfection for a natural organic body. And “first” is only said as a precaution against the final perfections, which are found in activities and in affections. For the like of these final perfections follow upon the first perfections, since they proceed from them. But this definition, since it is concerned with what is evidently said equivocally of all the powers of the soul—and this is because our saying that the nutritive soul is a perfection is a different intention (*ma‘nā*) from our saying this of the sensitive and imaginative souls, or more appropriately, what is said equivocally in this case of the rational power, and likewise of the rest of the parts of the definition—is not sufficient to make known the substance of all the parts of this definition perfectly, so that it makes known what is the perfection existent in the nutritive soul, and in each one of them. And it is evident from sensation that the species of this soul are five: (1) the first of them /13 in temporal, that is, in material, priority is the vegetative soul; (2) then the sensitive soul; (3) then the imaginative; (4) then the rational, (4) and then the appetitive, which is like the concomitant (ka-al-lābiq) to these two powers, that is, the imaginative and the sensitive.6

And [it is clear] that the sensitive is five faculties: (1) the faculty of sight; (2) the faculty of hearing; (3) the faculty of smell; (4) the faculty of taste; (5) and the faculty of touch. And we shall make clear later that we have enumerated this number necessarily, and that it is not possible for another faculty of sensation than this to exist. And the differences between these faculties do not exist on the part of their activities alone, but rather, also because some of them may be separated from others in subject. And this is because the vegetative soul may be found in plants without the sensitive, and the sensitive without the imaginative in many animals, like the fly and others, even if it is not possible for the converse state of affairs to exist in them: that is, the sensitive soul exist without the

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6 Q adds “and the rational.”
nutritive, or the imaginative without the sensitive. And the reason for this is that what takes the place of matter among them for one of them cannot be separated from its matter in this one case, whereas it is possible for this faculty, which has the rank of matter for this last one, to be separated, but not insofar as it is matter for something, but rather, insofar as it is a perfection and fulfillment of the thing which has a fulfillment. And for this reason, it is not possible in the case of prime matter that it be separated, since there is no form actually in it by which it is prepared to receive another form, whereas this is possible in the composition which is in one respect matter, and in another respect form.

And we shall only begin this discourse with what is most prior in time, namely, materially prior. And the faculty which is of this description is the nutritive soul. So let us begin the discourse concerning it.


DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE POWER OF SENSATION

And it is clear from the nature of this power that it is a passive power, since it exists by times in potency, and by times in actuality. And this potency includes what is proximate, and what is remote. The remote is like the potency that is in the fetus to sense, and the proximate is like the potency to sense of the person who is asleep, and that of someone whose eyes are closed.

And it is clear from what preceded that what is in potency, in the respect in which it is in potency, is related to matter, and that the emergence of the potency into act is a change, or a result of change, and that for everything which is altered, there is something which alters it, and a mover which imparts to the thing moved the likeness of what is in its [own] substance. And since this is the case, it is necessary that we should make known, from the nature of this power, what sort of existence is its existence, and what is its mover, and in what respect it receives motion.

So we say that as for the remote potency, it is that which is in the fetus. But it has been explained in the De animalibus what sort of existence is its existence. And the mover for it is necessarily other than the mover which belongs to the proximate potency, since there would be two potencies through this. And this has been explained in the De animalibus.

And as for the mover of the proximate potency, it is clear from its nature that it is the sensibles in actuality. And that which it is necessary for us to seek here is what sort of existence is its existence, and in what respect it receives motion from the sensibles. And we say that one of the things that is clear from what preceded is that potency is said in three ways. The first of these in priority and actuality is the potency related to prime matter, since prime matter only has existence with respect to what is a pure potency, and for this reason it is not possible, in the case of what is like this potency, to separate it through sensation from the form for which it is the first potency. Rather, whenever it is stripped of the form in which it is clothed by another form than its genus, it is like the state of water and fire, and in general the simple bodies. Then after this is the potency, existent in the form of these simple bodies, for the form of the homoemerous bodies.

And this power is posterior to the former, since it is possible in its case to separate the form of the thing which is the potency for it generically; moreover it is, at the time when it receives the perfection and actuality which does not
entirely denude it of its form, like the state of the power existent in the simple bodies. And for this reason we do not say that the form of the elements exists potentially in the homoemerous bodies, in the way that we say that water is potentially air or fire, but rather, in an intermediate way, as was explained in the *De generatione et corruptione*.

Just as this second potency resembles a kind of actuality, therefore the cause of its existence is the first potency conjoined to the simple form, not potency alone.

Then there follows this in rank the potency existent in some homoemerous bodies, such as the potency which is in the natural heat, for example, or what is related to it, which is the subject /22 in plants and animals of the nutritive soul. And this power is separated from the power which is in the forms of the elements of the homoemerous bodies, so that when this power receives what is in actuality, its subject is not destroyed by a kind of alteration, neither slight nor great, and for this reason the corruption of this is not into its opposite, but rather, into privation alone. Likewise, this power is more similar to actuality than the previous one. And for this reason it is said that the bestower of the mixed form whose role is for its subject to receive the principle of perfection is one of two things: either the soul in propagated creatures amongst those that are besouled, or the heat of the stars in those that are not propagated. But when this power is found in its perfection in plants, there is not found in it a readiness to receive other forms. As for when it is found in animals, there is found in it a readiness to receive another form, namely, the sensible form. And this only happens to it with respect to the difference in the preparation of their matters in plants and animals, not with respect to anything in the nutritive power. (And this preparation which is found in the nutritive power to receive the sensibles, which is the first perfection belonging to sensation, its proximate subject is nothing other than the nutritive soul. For it is not *per se* anything but the preparation existent in the nutritive soul.)\(^7\) And this power, and this preparation, is like something actual, except that it is not its final perfection. For we believe that the sleeping animal is possessed of the sensitive soul in actuality. And for this reason Aristotle compares this potency to the potency which is in the knower at the time when he is not using his knowledge. But it is not in potency in the [same] respect as it is in actuality. For what is potentially something is not actually something from the fact that it has the capacity for it, but rather, if it is something actually, it is not in the respect in which it is potential, since actuality and potentiality are mutually contradictory. But when the potency is not stripped of actuality, /23 it follows that it exists either as some imperfect actuality, or that it exists conjoined to another form which is different from the form which it is capable [of receiving],

\(^7\) Material in parentheses omitted in Q.
without its being anything in itself. And when the potency has a form, either it is the case that the form which is in the subject is opposed to the form that is arriving, and so the form of the subject is destroyed upon its arrival, be it a complete destruction, like the state of the forms of simple [bodies] at the time of the descent of the forms of the homoemerous bodies upon them; or if there is not anything opposed or differing between them, but rather, a perfect relation, the subject remains at the time of the perfection in the state it was in before the perfection. Rather, the existence of the perfection is not possible unless the subject remains in the state it was in before the perfection, like the state of the potency which is in the pupil for learning, for this is a potency whose imperfect actuality does not require in its existence that a form be existent, except accidentally, as is the state of the nutritive soul as well as the sensitive (which is the first perfection). And it is clear from this that this potency, that is the first potency of sensation, is different in rank form those potencies that precede it, since its subject is not a mixed form, but rather, some soul. And for this reason the reception of its final perfection by this potency from its mover is not of the genus of the reception of material potencies which we enumerated, whose perfections are from their movers. For the mover here only imparts to the matter a form like the form existent in it, and in the state in which it exists.

And an example of this is that when fire produces another fire and makes it come to be in actuality, it only imparts to this subject a form like its own form, and the state of its existence in matter is the very same as the state of the agent form in its matter.

And as for the power of sensation, its nature is not the same, for the existence of colour in this power is not the same as its existence outside the soul. For its existence in its matter external to the soul is the existence of an individual subject, divided by the division of matter. And as for the existence in the sensible power, it is not divided by any material division at all. And for this reason it is possible for it to be perfected by a very large and a very small body at one time, and in one subject, so that it is like the vitreous humour, which, in its smallness, receives the [form of] the hemisphere, which arrives in this power, just as it receives the form of a very small body. And if it were the case that this perfection were divided through some material division, this would not be possible for it. For we find this power is perfected through contraries simultaneously, and in the same subject, and we make judgments about them—for example, the visual power, which perceives black and white together. And for this reason there occurs to the sensibles, through this power, a more noble existence than what they have in their matters external to the soul. For the

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8 huviyah=ipseitas
9 Cf. Epitome of PN, E16.
intention (*ma'nā*) of this perfection is nothing other than the existence of the intention of the sensibles abstracted from their matter, but in a mode in which [the intention] possesses an individual relation to the matter by which it has become an individual intention; otherwise it would be an intellect, as we shall explain later in our discussion of the rational faculty.

And this is the first grade among the grades of the abstraction of the material forms. So this power, therefore, is the power whose role is for it to be perfected by the intentions of sensible things, that is, the sense power.

/25 And it is clear from what we have said that something like this sensible form is generable and corruptible, since it is found sometimes in potency, and sometimes in actuality, and whatever is potential, in the respect in which it is potential, is necessarily created (*ḥādīth*) since potency is most characteristic of the causes of creation (*ḥudūth*).

Moreover, if it were eternal, it would be as if this colour were existent before its existence. For the accidents are separable, and there would be no need for the sensibles in perception, so that the senses would be in the same state in their presence and in their absence. And all of this is impossible.

Moreover, in some respect they use corporeal organs, since their primary subject, that is, the nutritive soul, is a material form, and for this reason perfection attaches to it. And its actuality is only completed through determinate organs. For vision only takes place through the eye, and hearing through the ear.

And since we have said what the sensitive soul is in general, it is necessary that we begin the discussion of each of the individual powers. So we say:

That the most prior of these powers in temporal existence is touch. And for this reason it can exist stripped of the rest of the senses, as this [sense] exists in the seasponge, and other [animals] among those which are intermediate in existence between plant and animal; whereas the rest of the powers are not found stripped of it. And this is only this way because this power is most necessary for the existence of the animal among the rest of the powers of sensation. For if it were not so, then things which are external to it would destroy it, and especially during locomotion (‘*inda al-nuqlah*).

Then after this power is the power of taste. For it is also a sort of touch. Moreover, it is the power by which the animal distinguishes suitable from unsuitable food.

/26 Then the power of smell too, since the animal often uses this power for
detecting (*fi al-istidlāl*) food, as is the situation with the ant and the bee.

And in general, these three powers are the powers most necessary for the existence of the animal. As for the power of hearing and that of vision, their existence in the animal is for the sake of excellence, not for the sake of necessity. And for this reason the animal known as the mole does not have vision.

And it is necessary, before we commence upon the discussion of these senses, that we speak first concerning the nature of the sensibles, of that by which one arrives at the discourse concerning each one of these powers. For we only discern most of the things in this science, as has been said more than once, [by going] from what is most familiar to us to what is most familiar by nature. So we say:

*27* That sensible things include what is proximate and what is remote. And the proximate are numbered among what is essential, and the remote are numbered among what is accidental. And that which is essential includes those that are proper to a particular sense, and it includes those that are common to more than one sense. And the proper are like colours for vision, sounds for hearing, flavours for taste, odours for smell, and warmth and cold for touch.

As for those common to more than one sense, they are motion, rest, number, shape, and magnitude. As for motion and number, all of the five senses together perceive them; this is clear from their natures. As for shape and magnitude, they are common to sight and touch only.

Moreover, error only befalls the senses in the case of these common sensibles, as when someone imagines, when he is travelling on the river, that the shore is moving.

As for the incidental sensibles, such as that one senses that this is dead and that is alive, and that this is Zayd and that is ‘Umar, error [occurs] in these sensibles more than in the common sensibles. And for this reason, it is necessary, in discerning them, to use more than one sense, just as doctors use them in the case of someone with a paroxysm of the veins. For they may bleed him sometimes; and sometimes they may put a mirror up to his nose, so that the traces of his breathing are made visible in it for them.

*28* And since it has been explained what the proper and common sensibles are, let us now begin first to speak about the powers which are characteristic of each sensible object among the proper sensibles, and then we will begin after this to speak of the power whose sensibles are common, which is known as the common sense.
And this power is the power whose role is to receive the intentions of colours abstracted from matter, insofar as they are individual intentions. And this is clear from what preceded, since it perceives opposites simultaneously, as we said. And that which remains for us to explain concerning it is how this reception comes about, and by means of what thing it comes about, and in general all of the things by which this perception is established.

Since some of the sensibles make contact with the senses and are affected by them, such as the senses of touch and taste, and some of them are not affected and do not make contact, such as sight, hearing, and smell; and the sensibles are motive of the senses, and elicit them from potency to act; and the thing moving, as has been explained—if it is a proximate mover, it moves by contact with the thing moved, and if it is a remote mover, it only moves through the mediation of some other body, be it one, or more than one, and this latter, by moving it, is that which is contiguous to it, then another thing which is contiguous to it moves this, until the movement terminates at the last one. And I mean here by “movement” alteration in general, be it temporal or not, as is the case in this alteration. And the necessitating factor which requires these three senses to be mediated by it is their reception of the sensibles. And it is not through any condition which it happens that this medium is in, but rather, it follows necessarily that it is through a state by which it is enabled to receive the movement of the sensibles so that they are conveyed to the senses. And this state is nothing more than that it is in itself lacking in these intentions which it receives from the sensibles, so that it has neither colour nor smell. And its reception of them is with respect to a relation to the reception of the one sensing; that is, in order that its reception not be material, but rather, through some sort of middle state between the material and the spiritual—this also being one of the things which requires the existence of the medium. For nature only acts by degrees. And for this reason, these sensibles, when they are laid upon the sense organ, are not perceived. And this is the state of water and air, by whose mediation all of the sensibles are perceived.

An it is clear from this discourse that these three senses necessarily require a medium, and of what description it is necessary that it be in general, and that it is not possible that acts of seeing, nor any one of these perceptions, should occur in the void, as many of those who preceded among the ancients believed.

And it is necessary that we return to what is characteristic of sight; so we say:
That the body whose role is to receive colour insofar as it is not [itself] possessed of colour is the transparent body, insofar as it is transparent. And this reception is of two kinds: either a material reception, as is the state of colours in their matters; or a reception intermediate between material and spiritual, as is the case in the impression of the colours in air and water. And this species of reception is the way in which these two elements serve sight alone. And for this reason essentially, water and air are predominant in the parts of that which is the organ of this perception, namely the eye. But it is clear from the nature of these transparent bodies that they only receive colours when they are transparent in actuality, that is, when they are illuminated; and for this reason it is not possible to see in the dark. And they are only transparent in actuality when something luminous is present. Therefore sight only happens through these two elements and through light.

But as for the mode by which these two elements serve this power, it has already been explained. And as for in what respect this light is in act, it is necessary to explain this after we first comment upon how many are the luminous bodies, what is light, and what is the illuminated. So we say:

As for the luminous bodies first of all, they are of two species: the divine bodies and fire, except that this essentially belongs to the divine body, and accidentally to fire, and for this reason nothing luminous exists in its location.

And the luminous is also predicated secondarily of everything in whose nature it is to receive light from something else, and then is illuminated in itself.

And the most suitable of that of which luminous is predicated among these is that which is insofar as it makes something else to be seen; and its light has no contrary, as is the state of the moon. . . .
DISCOURSE ON THE COMMON SENSE

And it is clear from their natures that these five powers which we enumerated possess a single, common power. And this is because they possess on the one hand sensible objects in common, and therefore they possess on the other hand a common power whereby they perceive the common sensibles, be they common to all of them, such as motion and number, or to two of them only, such as shape and magnitude, which are perceived by means of the sense of sight and the sense of touch.

Moreover, since we perceive through sensation the difference between the sensibles proper to each sense, so that we judge (naqdi), for example, of this apple, that it possesses colour, scent, flavour, and shape, and that these sensibles are differentiated in it, it is necessary that this perception occur by means of a single power. And this is because the power that judges that these two sensibles are different is necessarily one power. For to say that the power by which we perceive the difference between two sensible things is not one power is analogous to saying that I perceive the difference between the sensible which I am sensing and the sensible which you are sensing but I am not sensing. And this is self-evident.

And one may also make the existence of this power known from another activity here which we cannot ascribe to one of these proper senses. And this is that we find that each of these senses perceives its sensibles, and perceives along with this that it perceives. For it senses /55 sensation (al-ilâh), as if the sensation itself were the subject for this perception, since its relation to this power is the same as the relation of the sensibles to some sense. And for this reason we are not able to relate this activity to one of the five senses. Otherwise, it would follow that the sensibles themselves are the sensations themselves. And this is because the subject, for example, of the visual power, is only colour, whereas the subject of this power [i.e. the common sense] is the perception of colour itself. For if this activity did belong to the visual power, colour would be the perception of itself, and this is impossible. Therefore what follows necessarily from all of these things is the existence of a power common to all of the senses, which is in one respect one, and in another respect many. As to its multiplicity, it is in the respect in which it perceives the different sensibles through diverse organs, and is moved by them in diverse motions. And as for its being one, this is because it perceives the difference between the various perceptions. And because of its being one, it perceives colours through the eye, and sounds through the ears, and smells through the nose, and flavours through the tongue, and tangibles through flesh, and it perceives all of these essentially
and judges (tahkumu) of them. And likewise it perceives all of the common sensibles through each one of these organs; for it perceives number, for example, through the tongue, the ears, the eye, the flesh, and the nose. And these in general are one in subject, but many in definition (al-qawil=logos ‘speech,’ ‘discourse’), and one in quiddity (bi-al-māhiyyah), but many through the organs.

And the state of the conception (fi al-taṣawwur) of this faculty is one in some respect, but many in another respect, just as is the state of a line which goes from the centre of a circle to its circumference. For this line is many through the termini which end at the circumference, one through the point which joins these termini to itself, namely, the centre. And likewise these motions which come from these sensibles are many with respect to the sensibles and the organs, whereas in the respect in which they terminate in a single power, they are one. And by using this image (al-mithāl) the custom of the dialectical theologians (‘ādhah al-mutakallimin) is being followed in the case of the soul by Aristotle, and by anyone else apart from him among the commentators [who uses this image], to facilitate comprehending the existence of this power. And even if it is one of the types of instruction in which there is found, in making the substance of the thing understood, a substitute for the thing [itself]—this being either a likeness, as is the case here, or something else (and this is poetic instruction)—there is no harm in this, if it is preliminary, and makes known the substance of this power, and if the respect in which the imitation between the two things occurs is known. And this method of instruction is only introduced into demonstrative instruction in the case of things which are difficult for the mind (al-dhihn) to conceive by themselves at first. So these things are taken at first in place of the substance of the thing, to make the thing understood by way of introduction, until the mind is transferred from the imitation of the thing to the thing itself. Because what is intended from this is the conception of the thing through what merely imitates it, just as this same thing is intended in poetic instruction. As for the substance of this power, and what it is, and what sort of existence is its existence, this is clear from what we have said concerning sense in general (bi-iṭlāq). And this is because we made known there the rank of this power among the other material powers, and we made known that its reception of the sensibles is not a material reception. And from this it holds true (ṣalḥa) of it that it perceives contraries simultaneously, and by means of a power that is undivided (ghayr mungasimatin).

And this is the discourse concerning what is proper to each one of the sensible objects of these five senses, and how it is proper to them, and concerning what is common, and how it is common.

And as for the fact that it is not possible to find a sixth sense, this is clear in other ways. One of them is that if there were another sense here than these five,
it would have another /57 sensible object. And it is clear from careful study that the proper sensibles are only these five. And this is because the sensibles are necessarily either colours, sounds, flavours, smells, tangible qualities, or what follows upon these and is perceived by means of them, namely, the common sensibles. And since this is self-evident, and there is no other sensible object here, there is no other sense power here. Moreover, if there were another sense power here, there would be another organ in this case, and other media if we assume that this sense is not in contact with its sensible objects.

And this is because it is clear through careful investigation that there does not remain in these media any way by which they might serve other sensibles than the aforementioned ways, and that it is not possible to perceive diverse sensibles through one organ. For there is one organ—as we have said—for one sensible. And if this is the case, it follows that if there were another sense, then either another organ alone would exist, if we assume it to be in contact with its sensible object; or another organ and another medium, if we assume it is not in contact with its sensible object. And since it is also clear through reflection that the existence of another organ or another medium is not feasible here, it is evident that it is not possible that another sense exist here. As for from where [the proof comes] that it is clear that it is not possible that another organ could be found here, [it comes] from what preceded. And this is because another medium than water and air does not exist; and this [in turn] is because it is not possible for earth to be a medium on account of its opacity; 10 and it is not possible for an animal to exist in fire, let alone for it to be a medium. Likewise it is also not possible that /58 another organ should exist. And this is because every organ is either composed from water, as is the eye, or air, as is the state of the ear, or is a mixture of the utmost proportion of the four elements, such as what belongs to touch. For the organ in some respect must be related to the medium.

And this is also clear from the fact that if another sense were found here, another animal than human being would exist, and then there would exist in the less perfect what does not exist in the more perfect. And for this reason the senses exist primarily for the sake of the powers which are their perfections, and especially reason (al-nuṭq), as we shall show from its nature (min amrī-hi).

And in the De animalibus the nature of the relation of the organs which are found in the animal—without their existing in exactly the same way in the human being—to the organs which take their place in the human being, has been explained; and that the existence of the like of these organs in the human being is in a more noble way, such as the elephant’s trunk, and the bird’s wing. For the hand of a human being is more perfect in its activity than these, and more noble.

10 The reading is doubtful. Ar. li-ḥasāwati-hi.
And there may exist, following upon this power, that is, the power of sensation in the perfect animal, another power. And it is that which moves towards the sensible after its absence from it, or moves towards it before its presence. And it is called by the name of imagination (*al-takhayyul*). And it is necessary that we speak of it.
This power requires that we investigate here [a number] of things concerning its nature (amr-hi): the first of them its existence. For one group supposes that it is the sensitive power itself; and another group supposes that it is the power of opinion (zann=Gr. doxa); and another group believes that it is composed from these two.

Then [we should investigate] whether it is among the powers which exist sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in actuality. And if its nature is of this kind, then it will necessarily have matter. Thus, what is this matter? And what rank is its rank? And what is the subject of this disposition and power? Also, what is its mover, and what elicits it from potency to actuality? So we say:

As for the fact that these powers are different from the sensitive power, this will be clear shortly. And this is because the two [powers], even if they agree in that they perceive what is sensible, they differ in that this faculty judges the sensibles after their absence. And for this reason, it is more perfect in its activity when the activity of the senses is at rest, as is the case in sleep. And as for the case when one is perceiving (jī hāl al-ihsās), the existence of this power is barely evident, and if it is evident, it is distinguished from sensation with some difficulty. And in this way it is supposed that this power does not exist in many animals, such as worms, flies, and mollusks. And this is because we see that these types of animals do not move except through the appearance (zuhūr) of sensibles. And it is likely that imagination does not exist at all in these types of animals, or that it does exist in them, but undistinguished from the sensibles. And the investigation of this is part of the speculation concerning the locomotive power of animals.

And this power may also be distinguished from the power of sensation, since we often judge falsely (nakdhibu) through this power, whereas we judge truly (nasdīqu) through the power of sensation, especially in the case of the proper sensibles. And for this reason we call false sensibles “imagination” (takhayyulan).

Moreover, we are also able through this power to compose things which we have not yet sensed, but rather, which we have only sensed singly, such as our conception of goat-stag of and ghoul, and of what is like these among the things which have no existence outside the soul, and which this power merely fabricates (tafʿalū). And it is likely that this is one of the activities of this power which is proper (khāṣṣah) to human beings. And we will explain in the De sensu et sensato the things which separate humans from the other animals in these powers, and one animal from another, and the things which they share in
Moreover, we sense things which are necessary for us (darūriyah la-nā), whereas this is not the case with imagination. Rather, it is up to us (la-nā) to imagine the thing, or not to imagine it. And this is one of the things by which this power is distinguished from the power of opinion. And this is because we opine something which is necessary for us.

And we may also distinguish it in that opinion always occurs only when accompanied by assent (ma’a taṣdiq), whereas there may be imagination without assent, such as our imagining things whose truth or falsehood we do not yet know.

And since this power is neither one of these two powers, that is, the power of sensation or of opinion, it is not possible for it to be composed of the two of them, as some people thought, because that which is composed from something, if it is not composed by way of mixture, must necessarily preserve what is characteristic of that from which it is composed.

Likewise, here it will shortly be made clear that this power is not an intellect, since we only make true judgements through the intelligibles in most cases, whereas we make false judgements through this power. And the difference between rational conception and imaginative conception—even if both of them have in common that we do not assent to them or falsify them—is that we only conceive of things that are imagined insofar as they are individual and material. And for this reason, it is not possible for us to imagine colour at all except along with magnitude, although it will be made clear from its nature that there are four grades of individual intention.

And as for intellectual conception, it is the abstraction of the universal intention from the matter, not insofar as it has an individual, material relation in its substance, but rather, if it necessarily has [such a relation], then [it abstracts it] insofar as this attachment is one of the universal attachments, that is, that it is multiplied by the multiplication of individuals, and has a material relation. And we shall make this fully clear in our discourse on the rational power.

And as for the fact that this power exists sometimes actuality, and sometimes in potentiality, this is clear from its nature. And this is because for its activity, it has need of being preceded by sensation, as we shall explain later, and of acts of sensation, as has been explained, before coming-to-be (ḥādithah). And since this

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11 This remark indicates that Averroes wrote the original Epitome of the De anima prior to his Epitome of the PN.
is the case, this power is therefore material in some respect, and generable (hādithah).

As for the subject of this power, in which the disposition [for it] exists, it is the common sense. As a sign of this, imagination is always found only along with the power of sensation, whereas sensation may be found without imagination.

62 And in general it is clear from the nature of the sensitive power that it is prior in nature (bi-al-tab’r) to this power, and that its relation to it is the same as the relation of the nutritive power to the sensitive. And we mean by this the relation of the first perfection which is in the imaginative power to the first perfection which is in the sensitive power. And in fact the subject of these two dispositions, that is, the disposition for receiving the sensibles and the disposition for receiving the images (al-muthakhyyalah), is the nutritive soul, since it is, as has been explained, of the nature of this power that from the beginning it has only insofar as it is actual. And dispositions, insofar as they are dispositions, are only found conjoined with what is in actuality. And some of them are subjects for others only metaphorically, in the sense that the existence of some of them in the subject precedes the existence of others.

And in this way it is necessary that the nature of the imaginative disposition be understood together with the sensitive disposition. And we are not able to say that actual sensations are the subjects for this disposition in the way that we say that the nutritive soul is the subject of the sensitive soul, since it has been explained that the sensations are the movers of this power, by which it is perfected. But in every case it is clear that this power and disposition is more spiritual than the sensitive disposition, since its arising is of the second grade, and subsequent to the arising of the sensitive dispositions. And it is as if it were only related to matter through the mediation of the sensitive power.

Moreover, the affection (infi‘āl-hā) of this power does not come from the sensibles actually [existent] outside the soul, but rather, from the traces arising from the sensibles in the sensitive power, as we shall explain later. And to the extent that this is its nature, it is more spiritual.

And the existence of this power, and what matter is its matter, 63 and what is its rank, have been shown through this discourse. And since what is in potency—as is said in another place—only comes into actuality through a mover which elicits it from potency into act, what is this mover—would that I knew—for this power?

As for the mover for the power of sensation, the situation is clear in this
case, namely, it is the sensibles in actuality.

As for this power, since its perfection too only occurs by means of the sensibles in some manner, this being after their absence, and [since] it is also clear from their nature that for them to exist in their final perfection, they are in need of the sensibles, and that this is because we are only able to imagine the thing itself, and to its utmost, after we have sensed it, then it is inevitable that its mover is one of two things:

[1] Either the sensibles in actuality external to the soul. For this power is in some respect a sort of sense. And this is because there is no difference between it and the power of sensation, except that the power of sensation perceives the sensibles while they are present, whereas they persist in this power only after their absence. [2] Or the mover of this power is not the sensibles which are external to the soul, but rather, the traces remaining from them in the common sense. For it is evident that some traces of the sensibles remain in the common sense after their absence, especially [the traces of] strong sensibles. And for this reason, whenever we turn our attention quickly from them to something less strong than them (dīna-ha) among the sensibles, we cannot sense [the latter].

And in general, there is in the common sense the power to retain the traces of the sensibles and preserve them. But whenever we posit that the imagination itself is only concerned with the existence of these traces remaining in the common sense after the passage of the sensibles—not by these traces being the mover of the imagination—so that they have in the matter of the imagination an existence more spiritual than they have in the common sense, it follows that we will imagine simultaneously many things, the extent of their number being the same as the extent of the number of things which we have sensed.

Moreover, it is not possible for us to imagine whenever we wish, but rather, we are in a state of continual imagination (fi takhayyulin dāʿimin). And in general, the imagination is one of the necessary things for us (min al-umūr al-ḍarūriyyah), as is the case with the sensibles. And if this is the case, then there is no cause, therefore, for our imagining one time after another time, except that whenever we wish to, we consider by means of this power the traces remaining in the common sense. And for this reason the activity of this power is improved with rest. And we also imagine in the presence of the sensibles, and this is because whenever the sensibles are present in actuality to the common sense, most of these movements come from them alone. But when they are absent from it, it withdraws, and this power is moved by the remaining traces of the sensibles in it. And for this reason the activity of this power during sleep is greater.

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12 Reading inṣaraññā with Q.
Therefore the sensibles move the common sense, and the traces arising from them in the common sense move this power, that is the power of imagination, in the way that some things move other things. But composition and division of these traces belong also to this power, and for this reason it is active in one respect, but passive in another.

And from this it is evident that this power—as we have said—is more spiritual than the common sense, but despite this it is of the genus of sensation, since its mover is individual. And the recipient only receives the likeness of what the mover bestows, and the mover only bestows the likeness of what is in its substance. As for the mover from which the universal is produced is of a loftier rank than this power, since its movement is infinite, as we will show later.

As for the fact that this power is one of the generable and corruptible powers of the soul, this is clear from the fact that it first exists in potency, then in actuality. And potency, as we have said more than once, is the most proper cause of coming to be, and what comes to be, as we said, is necessarily corruptible.

Moreover, its perfection is only through the traces remaining in the common sense from the sensibles, and these traces necessarily come to be from the sensibles; therefore, they are generable.

Moreover, the first disposition of this power is what is existent—as we said—in the nutritive soul through the mediation of the first perfection of sensation, and both of them are generable. So therefore the first perfection of this power is generable.

So the existence of this power has been explained through this discourse, and what sort of matter is its matter, and what is its rank, and what is its mover. And it has also been explained from its nature that it is generable and corruptible.

As for why this power exists in the animal, this is because of the desire which arises from it whenever locomotion is conjoined to this power. And this is because by means of the power of imagination, in connection with this desire, the animal moves to seek what is pleasant, and to shun what is harmful. And we shall speak of this in detail in our discourse on the motive power of the animal.

And since we have finished the discourse on this power, let us now speak of the rational power, since it is that from whose nature it is evident that it is above this power in rank. And this is because it is not possible for there to exist in the animal a power higher than this power, that is, the imaginative, except in the case of humans. And this [higher] power is the rational power.
Since perfect knowledge of anything is only attained—as is said in another place—if it is preceded by prior knowledge, then if the existence of the thing is not self-evident, [its existence] comes to be known [first], and then the understanding of its substance and its quiddity is sought from the things through which it subsists, and then after this knowledge of the things which subsist through this thing, these being its essential attributes and accidents (al-lawâhiq al-dhâtiyyah la-hu), is sought. Thus it is necessary that we investigate these very things concerning this power [i.e., the rational faculty], so let us begin first by calling attention to the way in which certitude concerning the existence of this power and its difference from the other preceding powers [of the soul] arises. After that we shall investigate its nature, whether it is potential at one time and actual at another, or whether it is always actual as many people think, and its activities only inactive in infancy, because it is obscured by moisture; or [whether] some part of it is a potency, and some part an actuality. For this is the most important thing which we will investigate about its nature, and it is an idea (al-ma’nā) about which the ancients disagreed much. From this can be known the thing that is most desired about its nature, that is, whether it is eternal or generated and corruptible or composed from something eternal and something generated. For if it is sometimes potential and sometimes actual, then it is necessarily material, and thus [the question arises], what is this matter, what is its status, and what is the subject for this preparation and potency, for potency is one of the things that is not separable [from matter]. And is this [power] a body, a soul, or an intellect? Moreover, what is the mover of this power, and what elicits it into actuality, and at what stage of motion does the activity of this mover in us terminate in itself? For through these things we will learn of its final perfection. /67 For it is evident that this power is not in the community of people from the beginning in its final perfection, and that it is always increasing, but that it is not possible that this process (al-amr fi-hi) should proceed to infinity, for nature abhors this.

So these are all of the questions which it is necessary to investigate concerning the nature of this power, for by coming to know them, perfect knowledge of it will arise in us.

And the matters which we take as premises in proving these things are either of two things: either the conclusions of syllogisms which we have proven in what preceded of this science [of physics], or things certain in themselves here; or the arguments used in this science may be composed of these two varieties of premises. We will call attention to which one of these varieties [is at issue] when
Thus we say that one of the things that is clear—from what has been said in many places—is that apprehended ideas are of two types: either universal, or particular, and that these two types of ideas are ultimately different. This is because the universal is the perception of the general idea abstracted from matter, whereas the individual perception is the perception of the idea in matter. And since this is the case, the powers which perceive these two ideas are necessarily distinct.

It has been shown in what preceded that sensation and imagination only perceive ideas in matter, even if they do not receive them by a material reception, according to what was said before. For this reason we cannot imagine colour separated from magnitude and shape, let alone sense them [as separated]. And in general we cannot imagine sensibles abstracted from matter, for we only perceive them in matter, this being the way in which they are individuated.

But the apprehension of the universal idea and quiddity is different from this, for we abstract it from matter by a certain abstraction. This is especially clear in things remote from matter, such as the line and the point. Therefore this power [i.e., the intellect] is necessarily a power different from the powers which preceded, since one of its functions is to perceive the idea abstracted from matter.

And it is clear that the activity of this power is not to perceive the idea abstracted from matter alone, but rather, it composes some [ideas] with others and judges that some things belong to others. This is because a composition is necessarily made up of the actuality of simple things that have been perceived. Thus the first activity among the activities of this power is called concept formation (al-taṣawwur) and the second is called assent (al-taṣdiq).

It is clear therefore that the powers of the soul are necessarily divided in same way that the ideas which it apprehends are divided and that it is not the case that another power which is not one of these powers might be found to belong to the animal and to be useful for its existence. This is because when [the animal] is healthy it is only moved by the sensibles or to the sensibles; but the sensibles are either present or absent; thus necessarily what is made for it are the powers of sensation and imagination alone, since there is no aspect of the sensibles which the animal needs to perceive other than these two ideas [of presence and absence]. For this reason, there is no other power which perceives the sensible idea other than these two powers or what serves them. But since there is also some animal, namely a human being, in whose existence is not possible by these two powers alone, but by his having as well a power by which
he perceives ideas abstracted from matter and composes some of them with others and discovers some of them through others, so that he constructs many arts and vocations from them which are useful in his existence, either with respect to some need he has or for the sake of excellence, therefore the need for this power, that is, the power of reason, arises in human being.

69 And nature is not restricted to this alone, that is, that it bestow to [a human being] the principles of reflection (mabādī‘ al-fikrah) which are determined toward what is practical (al-‘aml), but rather it is also clear that it bestows to him other principles which are not intended for practice at all, nor are they useful for any necessity of his sensible existence, but rather they are only for the sake of excellence These are the principles of the speculative sciences. And since this is the case, this power [of reason] is only found for the sake of excellence absolutely, and not for excellence in his sensible existence.

From this it is clear that this [rational] power is first divided into two divisions: one of them is called the practical intellect, and the other the speculative. And this division happens to it necessarily through the division of its objects of apprehension. This is because the activity and perfection of one of the two powers only occurs by way of possible, artistic ideas (bi-ma‘āni šinā‘iyah mumkinah), whereas that of the second is by way of necessary ideas whose existence is not related to our choice.

Since it has been explained that the existence of this power is different from that of the other powers which we have enumerated, and since it has also been explained in addition to this that it is divided into two divisions, it is necessary that we consider next the problematic matters (al-umūr al-mašlahah) which we have enumerated concerning each of them, even if most of them are common to both. We shall first begin by speaking of the practical power, for its nature is easier [to grasp] and there is not any great controversy over it. Moreover, this power is a power common to all people who are not lacking in humanity, and people are only distinguished in it by [possessing] less or more [of it]. As for the second power, [the speculative intellect], it is clear from its nature that it is very divine and that it is only found in some people, who are [the ones] primarily intended by [God’s] Providence over this [human] species.

So we say: as for these practical intelligibles, they are intelligibles of either generated powers or occupations and existent in us at first in potency, and then in actuality. This is evident from their nature. For it is clear upon reflection that all of the intelligibles among them which arise in us only arise through experience, and experience only arises first through sensation and then imagination. Since this is so, these intelligibles therefore require sensation and imagination in their existence, for they are necessarily generated through their
generation and corrupted through the corruption of the imagination.

As for whether the images have the rank of the subject of this power, or the rank of mover, according to what is in it of the traces which are in the common sense from the sensibles, along with the imaginative power, it is clear that its rank is not the rank of the subject. This is because the imaginative intention\textsuperscript{13} is the intelligible intention in itself. So it is the mover, although it is not sufficient for this, because the universal is different in existence from the imagination. And if the images were the sole movers of it, then it would necessarily be of the same species as them, as is the case with the sensibles and the imagination. And we will explain this more full when we speak of the speculative intellect. For there we shall speak concerning the existence of this mover and what it is. And since the images are not the sole movers for this power, and are one of the things by which the apprehension of the universal is perfected, they are in some respect like the subject for the universal, since they exist as the universal disposition and power, and it is dependent upon them.\textsuperscript{14} And through this disposition the imaginative soul of humans differs from the imaginative soul of animals, just as the nutritive soul of animals differs from the nutritive soul of plants, through the disposition which is in the animal nutritive soul for receiving the sensibles. And this disposition is nothing but the preparedness for the reception of the intelligibles, in contrast to the nature which is in the sense power.

Since all of this is as we have said, it is clear from the nature of these intelligibles that they are generated and corruptible, and this is one of the things about which none of the Peripatetics disagrees. This is because it is clear that these images are not subjects for this power in any respect\textsuperscript{[Q missing]}, but rather they are the perfection of this power and its actuality, for it is perfected only insofar as it produces imaginative forms through reflection and investigation, from which the existence of artistic things follows. If these intelligibles were to exist without the imaginative soul, their existence would be dreary and vain. This species of imaginative forms may [also] be found in many animals, such as the hive which is produced by the bee and the web which is produced by the spider. But the difference between them is that in humans they arise from cogitation (\textit{‘an al-fikri}) and investigation, but in animals they arise from nature, and for this reason [animals] have no control (\textit{taşarrufân}) over them, but each animal only perceives of them certain determinate forms which are necessary for its survival. For this reason people suppose that animals have understanding.

\textsuperscript{13}Q: “the universal intention.”
\textsuperscript{14}Q: “for they are in some respect like the subject, since they exist through the universal power and disposition.”
And by means of this power human beings love and hate and associate with others and make friends. And in general the moral virtues are produced from it. This is because these virtues are nothing more than the existence of the images from which we are moved to these activities for the right end. [Moral virtue] is, for example, to be brave in the situation in which it is necessary, in the measure by which it is necessary, and at the time when it is necessary. But whatever is found of these virtues in animals, such as courage in the lion and temperance in the rooster, is predicated equivocally of them in some way in relation to human virtues. This is because these [virtues] are natural to the animal, for which reason they often perform them when it is not required. And the intellect /72 which Aristotle mentions in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is also related to this power in some respect. This is what we have to say about the practical intellect.

As for the discussion of the speculative [intellect], it calls for more proof, for the Peripatetics disagreed on it with Plato etc. We have investigated this matter in proportion to our abilities and in proportion to the help which is shed on this matter from our predecessors. So we say:

That the first thing which it is necessary to consider of the nature of these speculative intelligibles is whether they are eternally in actuality. Or are they existent first in potency, then secondly in actuality? So are they in some respect material? For to say that some of them are found always in actuality, and some of them potentially, is a statement which is clearly self-contradictory. For forms are not divided essentially, nor are some of them subjects for others. For this only belongs to the forms in virtue of matter, that is, what is individual. And this is clear for anyone who has practiced [even] the least amount in this science [of physics]. And the way to this—as we said from the beginning of this book—is to consider whether their conjunction with us is a conjunction like the conjunction of separate things with matters, as it is said of the Agent Intellect, that it is conjoined to us at the time of its use, so that there is no distinction between the existence of these intelligibles in us /73 when we are children, and when we are mature, in their being existent in actuality, except that in childhood they are obscured by moisture.

So generally it is necessary for us to say that they are in us while we are hindered from perceiving them; but when the subject receiving them achieves its final disposition, these intelligibles appear in it and it perceives them. And in order for the intelligibles to arise for us, it is not necessary that their mover be of their genus, that is, that it be an intellect. But rather, if this is the case, and it certainly is, then it is accidental, just as what causes red to disappear from the mirror is in some respect a cause for the impression of that form in it.
Nor, moreover, is our saying that it is existent in us potentially when we are children, according to the meaning of material powers, but rather, in a metaphorical sense which is similar to the meaning of the term “potency” which the followers of Alcmaeon stipulate. Or we say that the conjunction of the intelligibles with us is a material conjunction, namely, the conjunction of form with matter. And this is made known in this way, by enumerating the things essential to material forms, insofar as they are material. Then it will be considered whether some of these intelligibles can be so described or not. So we say:

That it has been proven in what preceded that what is material belongs to forms by degrees. And powers too, and dispositions, are arranged according to their ordering. For the first of the species of material forms is the simple forms whose subjects are prime matter, and these are heaviness and lightness. Then, after this, the forms of homoemerous bodies, and then the nutritive soul, and then the sensitive, and then the imaginative. And each one of these forms, when it is considered, is found to possess things which are common, and in which they all share, insofar as they are material without qualification, as well as things which are proper to each one of them, or to more than one, insofar as they are a certain kind of matter.

/74 And one of the things which is proper to the simple forms is that matter is not divested in them of one of two contrary forms, such as cold and heat, and moisture and dryness. And one of the things which is common to the simple forms and the homoemerous forms is that they are divided through the division of their subjects, and their arising in them is a true alteration. And the nutritive forms share these two determinations with them, even if they are different in their existence itself. And owing to the proximity of this soul to the mixed form, it is supposed of it that it is a mixture. And it is proper to the sensible form that it is not divided by the division of matter through the intention by which the mixed forms are divided, and for this reason it is enabled to receive two contraries simultaneously, both small and large, in the same state. And it shares with the nutritive soul that it uses an organic, (corporeal) instrument. And it is proper to the imaginative soul that it does not need any organic instrument in its activity. And these material forms have two things in common in their rank and division, insofar as they are absolutely material: one of them is that their existence is only consequent upon an alteration essentially, and this is either proximate or remote, as is the situation in the mixed forms and in the psychic forms whose mention preceded; and the second is that they are numbered.

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15 The apparatus notes that the Cairo ms. has “not” (ghayr), which is clearly the correct reading, given Averroes’s emphasis elsewhere on the spiritual nature of sensible reception, as evidenced by the possibility of being actualized by contraries.
essentially through the enumeration of the subject, and multiplied through its multiplication. For through these two characteristics, the notion of coming-to-be holds true of them both, for otherwise there would be no generation at all. And we have surveyed this in the beginning of this book.

And this notion of the enumeration of the souls through the enumeration of their subjects is what escaped the notice of those who speak of transmigration.

And there is a third thing belonging to the material forms insofar as they are material, namely, that they are composed of something which plays the role of form, and something which plays the role of matter. And the material forms have in common a fourth thing, namely, that their intelligible is non-existent.

75 Let us now enumerate the things proper to these intelligibles and consider whether or not any one of them is something which is proper to what is separate [from matter], and if it is not proper, then whether or not it belongs to what is separate as well as to those things which are common to material forms insofar as they are material.

So we say that it is evident from the nature of the existence of the forms of intelligibles in humans that they are in them in a different way from the existence of the rest of the psychological forms in them, since the existence of these forms in their ostensible subjects is different from their intelligible existence, because [their existence] is one insofar as it is intelligible, and many insofar as it is individual and existent in matter.

And as for the forms of the intelligibles, it has been supposed that their intelligible existence is the existence itself of the ostensible thing, even if what is intelligible is not existent in it, but in a way which is other than 76 the way in which we say of the rest of the forms that what is existent among them is not intelligible. But if what is intelligible in it is not existent, in whatever way it may be, then it is generable and corruptible, whereas if what is intelligible of it is existent, then it is necessarily separate, or something in it is separate. But it does not follow, from our positing that the intelligible is different from the existent thing in a way different from the way which the intelligible is different from the rest of the forms existent among them, that it is separate, since it has not be proven from this statement that it has no special relation to matter, but rather, it has only been proven from this that if it has a relation, then it is not the relation which belongs to these forms.

And perhaps this relation is characteristic of some of the material forms.16

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16 This last sentence is added in the Madrid manuscript.
And one of the ways in which these intelligibles differ from the rest of the psychological forms is that the apprehension of them is infinite, according to what we have shown of the nature of the universal, whereas the apprehension of the rest of the powers is finite. Now it may also be supposed from this that they are not material at all, but this is not sufficient for their being entirely separate as well, since concept formation belongs to the rational power apart from judgment and assent, since they are two distinct activities. And this is because concept formation in actuality is nothing but the abstraction of the forms from matter, for whenever the forms are abstracted from matter, there is eliminated from them individual multiplicity. But from the elimination of individual material multiplicity, the elimination of multiplicity from it entirely does not follow, for perhaps it is possible that there remain here a multiplicity in some respect, but in a respect in which it abstracts the forms from determinate multiplicity but forms a judgment of an infinite multiplicity. So it is necessary that this activity belong to an immaterial power; because if it is necessary that the apprehension of the separate forms belongs to something infinite, then it is necessary that the apprehension of material forms belong to something finite, and that their judgment belong to a finite power. And since the judgment of material forms is finite, then whatever the judgment of the infinite is, it is necessarily immaterial, since the judgment of the thing is the apprehension of it, or in proportion to the nature of the apprehension of it. So from this it is clear—upon my life—that this power which is in us is immaterial. However, it is not yet clear that this judgment belongs to the universal intelligibles, for it may perhaps belong to another power which is given the rank of form from these intelligibles.

Another thing that is also proper to this intellectual apprehension is that the apprehension in it is [the same as] the thing perceived. For this reason it is said that the intellect is the very thing understood itself. The reason for this is that whenever the intellect abstracts the forms of intelligible things from their matter and receives them through a non-material reception, it happens that it also understands itself, since the production of the intelligibles in its essence does not occur insofar as it is understanding them in a manner different from their being the intelligibles of things external to the soul. The situation is not the same in sensation, even if [sensation] is assimilated to the sensibles. For it is not possible for something to sense itself to such an extent that the sense is the sensible, since its apprehension of the idea of the sensible only takes place insofar as the sense receives it into matter. For this reason the idea abstracted by the sense power comes to have an existence different from its existence in the sensible thing, and opposed to it insofar as it belongs to the nature of sensation to have things existent in it which are contradictory in the category of the relative. Clearly this can only happen to it insofar as the reception of the sensible is not a material, individual reception. But if the intellect is the intelligible itself in every respect, in accordance with the model which is supposed [to apply] to the nature of
separate things, so that it has no relation to matter in any respect which would allow it to be thought that the intellect is not the intelligible in some way, then it would necessarily be always in act. But it is clear that this cannot yet be explained from what has been here posited of its difference from sensation.

But another things which is also proper to these intelligibles is that their perception does not take place by means of being [physically] affected [by the object], as is the case in sensation. This is why whenever we see strong sensibles, and then turn away from them, we are not able at that time to see what is less visible. But the intelligibles are the opposite of this. The cause of this is that since some of the impressions which are similar to the material forms remain in sensation from the forms of the sensibles in it after the sensible objects have departed, it is not possible in the case of sensation for another form to be received, until these [residual] forms have been effaced and departed from it. And this also only happens to it on account of a material relation. Another one of these [differences] is the fact that the intellect increases with old age, and the rest of the soul’s powers are the opposite of this.

Now when most of these conditions proper to the intelligibles are considered, it is evident that the cause of their existence is that the generation of intelligibles lacks the material relation which is found in the rest of the powers of the soul, for in their case what intelligible in them is indeed ultimately different from what is existent in the nature of the individual forms belonging to the existent.

And therefore whenever we use these characteristics as proofs, they do not lead us to much of what is known of [the intelligibles]. And as for whenever we wish to use them as proofs for the existence of these intelligibles in pure and eternal actuality, we may, in this problem, make use of posterior things from whose existence the existence of what is prior does not follow, which are on the same level as someone saying that the stars are afire because they are shining. And this is because everything which is always actual is necessarily lacking in the individual relation which is found in the other powers of the soul. And this is not convertible, so that it follows that whatever lacks this connection is always existent in actuality. And this is clear to anyone who has studied the art of logic. And therefore, that which deceives the person who argues for the separation of these intelligibles is the topic of the consequent.

Since this is the case, it is clear that there is not, in these things which are proper to the intelligibles, anything by which it is proven that they are existent always in actuality. So let us consider whether the things proper to material forms generally apply to them or not. We have said that there are two such things: one of them is that the existence of [material] forms follows
essentially upon alteration, and for this reason they are generated; the second is that they are multiplied through the multiplication of their subjects, by an essential and not an accidental multiplication, as those who uphold the transmigration [of souls] suppose, whatever the nature of the multiplication happens to be.

So we say that whenever one considers how the intelligibles arise in us, and especially the intelligibles from which empirical premises are composed, it is clear that in order for them to arise in us we must first sense and then imagine [the object], after which we will be able to grasp the universal. For this reason anyone who is lacking in one of the types of sensibles is lacking in some intelligible. For the person born blind does not perceive the intelligible of color at all, nor is it possible for him to perceive it. The same is the situation for us concerning the [intelligible of] “elephant.”17 And this is not all, but rather it is also necessary to have the power of memory as well as these two powers and to repeat these sensations time after time until the universal has been illumined for us. For this reason these intelligibles only come to arise in us with time.

Likewise it is likely that this is the state of the other genera of intelligibles of which we are not aware when they arise nor how they arise. But since their individuals are apprehended by us from the beginning, we do not remember when this state of theirs, which takes hold of us through experience, took hold of us. This is self-evident, for these intelligibles are not another genus of intelligibles different from the empirical ones, and for this reason it is necessary that the way they come about in us should in some way be the same. In general, then, it is clear that the existence of these intelligibles follows upon the change that takes place in sensation and imagination by an essential consequence, in the way that material, changeable forms follow upon those [forms] prior to them. Otherwise it would be possible for us to understand many things without our having sensed them, and so learning would be recollection, as Plato said. This would be the case if we posited these intelligibles to be always actually existent and ourselves to be in the final perfection of the disposition to receive them. If this were so—for what should we think, would that I knew!—then would we not always have concepts the way we doe when we are mature, and would not everything be known through primary knowledge? The upshot of our saying [that learning is recollection] would be that whenever we forget some intelligible and then recollect it, such recollection of it would be perception, rather than the arising of knowledge which was not actually in us before; therefore the teaching of wisdom would be futile. And all of this is clearly self-refuting.

17 The elephant is a common example among the Andalusian philosophers of an object which cannot be experienced (since there are no elephants indigenous to Spain).
But since the existence of these intelligibles is essentially consequent upon alteration, they are necessarily material, and they are existent first in potency, then in actuality, and they are generated and corrupted, since everything generated is corrupted according to what was shown in the end of the first book of *On the Heavens*. It is also evident that they are multiplied through the multiplication of their subjects and enumerated through their enumeration. This is the second thing that is characteristic of the material forms inasmuch as they are material, namely, that these intelligibles only have existence insofar as they are dependent upon their subjects outside the soul. For this reason what is true among them has a subject external to the soul upon which it relies entirely through its imaginative form. For that which has no subject, like the goat-stag and the phoenix, is false, since its imaginative form is false. In general it is clear in a primary way that between these universals and the images of their particular individuals there is some relation by which the universals come to be existent, since the universal only has existence insofar as it is a universal through that which is a particular, just as the father is only a father in actuality so long as he has a son. For it happens to both [correlates], as a consequence of their being correlates, that each of their names signifies both of them inasmuch as they are related. And one of the things proper to two correlates, as is said in another place, is that they exist in potency and in actuality mutually, so that whenever one of them exists the other exists, and whenever one of them is destroyed the other is destroyed. This is clear upon reflection, because the father is only a father in actuality so long as he has a son existent in actuality; and likewise the son is only a son so long as he has a father. So it would only be possible for these universals not to depend upon their subjects if it were the case that [universals] were existent outside the soul, as Plato thought. But it is evident that these universals do not have existence outside the soul, as we have said, and that what is existent outside the soul only includes the individuals [belonging to these universals] alone. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle has enumerated the impossibilities following from this position. And through the dependence of these universals on the images of their individuals, they come to be multiplied through their multiplication. For the intelligible of “human being” in me, for example, comes to be other than its intelligible in Aristotle, for its intelligible in me only depends on individual images that are other than the individuals whose images its intelligible depends upon in Aristotle. And because of the essential conjunction of these intelligibles with imaginative forms, we forget them when their imaginative forms pass away, and when we reflect upon them [our grasp of them] becomes weakened, and the person whose imagination is corrupted is deceived in his apprehension [of them].

And in general, it is in this respect that things are attached to the intelligibles by which we think that they are material, not [because of the] mixtures which Themistius and others among those who said that its existence is eternally actual alleged. For the only function of this statement is to cause some sort of
conceptualization by giving the cause of these attachments, in the same degree as poetic speeches make [such concepts] known. Moreover, if we were to set down that these universals are not multiplied by the multiplication of the images of their sensible individuals, then there would follow from this repugnant things: one of them is that all the intelligibles arising in me would arise in you so that whenever I learn something, you too would learn it, and whenever I forget it, you too would forget it. But rather, there would be no learning here at all, nor any forgetting. And all of the things that Aristotle knows would be actually existent for anyone who had not read his books. And all of this is self-evident, whereas the interpretation of it is difficult.

So it has been show from this discussion that these intelligibles are consequent upon change, and they are multiplied by the multiplication of their subjects, but in another way than that by which individual forms are multiplied. And it is clear that they are possessed of matter, and that they are generable and corruptible.

But insofar as they are material and ostensible, it follows necessarily that they are composed from something that takes the place in them of matter, and something that takes the place of form. And as for the thing which takes the place of form, upon reflection it is evident that it is not generated nor corruptible. And this is shown from the [following] premises: one of them is that every intelligible form is either material or immaterial. The second is that every intelligible form is either actual when it is thought, otherwise, it is an intelligible in potency. And the third is that every immaterial intelligible form is an intellect, whether it is thought or not thought. And the fourth and fifth are the converse of these premises, namely that for every form which is an intelligible, if it is thought, then it is material; and for every form which is an intellect in itself, even if it is not thought, it is immaterial. And since these premises have been established by us—for they are straightforward—from the nature of the intellect and the intelligible, we say that these forms, which are the forms of speculative intelligibles, are necessarily immaterial, because they are intellect in themselves, whether we understand them or not, since they are forms belonging to something which is in itself an intellect. And if we were to posit them to be intelligible in actuality in one way, and potential in another way, then it would follow that in this case there would be another intellect which is generated and corruptible, and it would be the thing by which the intelligibles come to be in actuality after they had been in potency. So the question would arise again concerning this intellect, whether it is actual in any respect, or potential in any respect. And if we posit it to be thus, it follows that there would be a third intellect here, and the question would come up again concerning this third intellect. And for this reason what is necessary is that the intelligible of the intellect which is in actuality be existent in it per se, not non-existent, as is the case in the material forms which
are potentially intelligible. Otherwise, infinite human intellects would exist. As for the fact that their conception is possible, this shall be explained from what we have said afterwards. So from this it is clear that the intelligibles are partly transitory, and partly enduring. And for this reason the speculation of the speculator is required. And since it has been shown that the intelligibles are partly enduring and partly generable and corruptible, and that everything generable and corruptible has matter, let us examine what is the substance of this matter, and what rank is its rank. And so we say that whoever posits these intelligibles to be existent in actuality always and eternally, [on his view] they will have no matter except by way of comparison and metaphorically, since matter is most characteristic of the causes of generation. And this is because the meaning of matter according to this view is nothing but the generable disposition by which it is possible for us to conceive of these intelligibles and apprehend them, not that this preparation is one of the things by which these intelligibles are constituted when we receive them, as is the case in true material disposition. And for this reason it is possible to conceive of this disposition as generated, and the intelligibles which it receives as eternal in some respect, namely, the respect in which everyone who posits these intelligibles to be eternally existent must claim of them, and [conceive of the disposition] as conjoined to them.

As for Themistius, and others among the ancient commentators, they posited this power which we call the material intellect to be eternal, and they posited the intelligibles existent in it to be generated and corruptible, owing to their being conjoined to the imaginative forms. And as for others among those who followed this path, such as Avicenna and the rest, they contradicted themselves in what they posited, and were not aware that they were inconsistent. And this is because along with their positing that these intelligibles are existent eternally, they also posited that they are generated, and that they are possessed of eternal matter as well. And this is because they held that these intelligibles are existent at one time as potential, and so they made them in this respect material. And since, as they claimed, material affections do not attach to them, and yet they found that the rest of the characteristics which we enumerated do belong to them, they judged on the basis of this that they were eternal matter, and that these intelligibles were eternal. And I do not understand what I should say concerning these contradictions—for what is in potency, and then is found in actuality, is necessarily generated—except, by God, that by potency here they intend the meaning which we assigned to it in what preceded, namely, that the being of the intelligibles is obscured by moisture in us, and this hinders us from perceiving them, not that they themselves admit of any privation at all. But our saying that they are possessed of matter is according to a metaphorical meaning. But we find that they think that the conditions of real matter follow upon them, and especially Themistius. This is because he says: “And since everything which is in potency is something that necessarily has in itself nothing of the actuality
for which it is a potential, as is the case with colors and vision. For were sight to be possessed of color, it would not be possible for it to be clung to by colors, and to receive them, since the color would impede them from being present in it. And for this reason it is alleged that it follows that none of the forms which are found in it after it is in actuality are in the material intellect.” Whereas I say, would that I knew of this [sort of] matter which is existent in it, this disposition for receiving the intelligibles, whether they claim that it is something existent in actuality or not. And there is no way out of this for them. For generable possibility and disposition are among the things which necessarily require a subject, as was explained in the first book of the De caelo. And since this is something, it is necessarily actual, since the subject in which is found nothing at all actual is prime matter. And it is not possible for prime matter to be posited as the thing receiving these intelligibles. And if it is something in actuality, then it is necessarily either a body, a soul, or an intellect, since as we shall show later, there is no fourth type of existence here.

And it is impossible that it be a body, [as is clear] from what preceded in the discourse concerning the nature of these intelligibles. And if we posited it to be a soul, it would necessarily be generated and corruptible. And if it were corruptible, then the disposition which is in it would be more open to corruption. And if it were a soul, but not a body, it would necessarily be an intellect. And this is what is clear from what they said.

But if it is an intellect, then it is in actuality an existent from one of the species of what is a potential for it, and this is impossible. For potency and actuality are contraries. And it is not a way out of this consequence for us to posit some of this matter to be a potency, and some of it an actuality, for forms are not divided by existence in matter, except accidentally. Or someone might posit that substantial change belongs to the category of change in quantity, but this is impossible. And for this reason, what follows for those who posit these intelligibles to be eternal is that they do not posit any matter for them, except by way of metaphor, since they posit them to be eternal. And it is not necessary here to bring in an eternal mover as well, for it belongs to a species of the movable that is different from this.

Moreover, this error only happened to them because they wished to harmonize the doctrine of Plato with the doctrine of Aristotle. And this is because they found that Aristotle posited that there are three species of intellects here, one of them the material intellect, the second the habitual, this being the perfection of the material, and the third that which elicits it from potency into actuality, namely, the Agent Intellect, after the manner of what belongs to the nature of other physical things. And they believed, along with this, that these intelligibles are eternal. And they wanted to consider what Aristotle said,
whereas they perverted it to these contradictions. And this is why Alexander preserved his words. It is clear that he thought him to be opposed in this matter to their opinions. So let us set this down for anyone who will devote himself to investigating the teaching of Aristotle on this matter.

So let us return to where we were. And we say that since it has been shown that these intelligibles are generated, therefore it is necessary that a disposition precede them. And since a disposition is something which is not separate, it follows that it is found in a subject. And it is not possible that this subject be a body, inasmuch as it has been shown that these intelligibles are not material in the way that corporeal forms are material. And it is also not possible that it be an intellect, since what is in potency is some thing, but which does not have in itself anything in actuality of that for which it is a potency. And since this is the case, the subject for this disposition is necessarily a soul. And there nothing closer to being a subject for these intelligibles which is here evident among the powers of the soul, other than the imaginative forms, since it has been shown that [the intelligibles] are only found conjoined to them, and that they exist through their existence and are destroyed through their destruction. Therefore, the disposition which is in the imaginative forms for receiving the intelligibles is the first material intellect.18

But there follows from this that something would receive itself, since the imaginative intentions are themselves the intelligible intentions. And for this reason, what is clear is that it is necessary that the intellect which is in potency be something else. But what is this thing?—would that I knew! Perhaps—as Aristotle said—it is a substance in potency to all the intelligibles, which is not anything in itself. Because if it were something in itself, it would not understand all things, because the intellect is a reception, and nothing receives itself. And for this reason what is evident from the nature of the intelligibles is that they are conjoined to two subjects: an eternal one, which is that whose relation to it is the relation of prime matter to the sensible forms; and the second is as if corruptible, and is the imaginative forms, these being in some respect a subject, and in some respect a mover.

And the habitual intellect is the intelligibles emerging into actuality in it, since they come to be insofar as a human being conceives of them whenever he wishes, as is the state of the teacher when he is not exercising his knowledge. For he only emerges into actuality in his final perfection. And through this state

18 The indented paragraph is an interpolation relating to Averroes's revised views. It seems to be the only interpolation that is found in the Cairo ms. as well as the Madrid one, although Davidson notes that it is missing from the Hyderabad edition and the Chester Beatty ms.
the speculative sciences arise, and this is because human beings have something which, by means of this state, the four perfections, which were numbered among the perfections of the arts in the Posterior Analytics, [come about] in all the speculative arts.

And through this disposition which is found in a human being in the imaginative forms, his imaginative soul differs from the imaginative soul in animals, just as the nutritive soul in plants differs from the nutritive soul in animals through the disposition which there is in it for receiving the sensibles.19

But the difference between them is that the disposition which is in the imaginative forms for the reception of the intelligibles is a reception not blended with the imaginative forms, because if it were blended, then it would not enable it to understand the imaginative forms. In the same way, if the thing sensing were itself color, it would not be able to receive color. And this is the meaning of their saying that if the material intellect had a proper form, it would not receive the forms; rather, the imaginative forms are more suitable to be movers of it than to be receivers. So it is for this reason that [when] Alexander said that the material intellect is a disposition alone, abstracted of forms, he intended that one of the forms is not a condition for its receiving intelligibles and it is only a condition of its existence, not its reception. And because of the obscurity of this meaning to the commentators, they made the material intellect an eternal substance, of the nature of intellect, whose existence is an existence in potency, so that its relation to the intelligibles is the relation of matter to form. But what is this nature it has? For its nature is not to be perfected in the generation of a corruptible body, nor for what is perfected by it to be an intellect through it, i.e., since a human being is generable and corruptible. But this was something introduced by Alexander, in his granting that a human being is ultimately perfected in his existence through what is separate. And for this reason adjudicating between the two schools calls for a more extensive statement than this, which this epitome does not permit. So let us return to where we were.20

/88 And this is the reason why Aristotle compares this disposition for receiving the intelligibles, which is in the imaginative power, to the joining of the tablet to the writing, and the soul, which is the subject for this disposition, to the rank of the tablet. And we say that since this disposition is not anything in actuality, nor is it existent in a body, it follows that there does not attach to it, at the time of the production of the forms in it, any affection at all.

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19 The indented passage is a later interpolation found in the Madrid ms.
20 The next paragraph is found only in the Cairo ms.
So we say that it has been shown from this discourse that there is a material part in these intelligibles, and an immaterial part. And it has been shown along with this what this matter is, and what is its form, and that it is the utmost rank which exists. And let us now consider what is the mover of this power. So we say:

That since these intelligibles, as we have shown from their nature, are found first in potency, and then in actuality, and [since] all those things whose function belongs to what subsists by nature have a mover which educes them from potency into act, it follows necessarily that this is the case concerning these intelligibles. For in the case of potency, it is not possible that it come into actuality through itself, since it is merely a privation of actuality in the way it was explained before. And since, moreover, the mover only imparts to the thing moved a likeness of what is in its substance, it follows too that this mover is an intellect, and that it is, along with this, not material at all. And this is because the material intellect, insofar as it is material, necessarily requires in its existence that an intellect existent in actuality always be here, and that it not be material. And this is clear from what preceded among the principles of physics. Moreover, everything which does not require matter in its proper activity is not material at all. For this is clear from the fact that this agent only bestows the nature of the intelligible form insofar as it is an intelligible form. And from this it is clear that this intellect, the Agent intellect, is more noble than the material, and that it is existent per se as an intellect in actuality always, whether we understand it or we do not understand it; and that the intelligible is in the intellect in every respect. And it has been shown already that this intellect is form, and it has been shown there that it is agent. And for this reason it is supposed that the understanding of it is possible for us ultimately, that is, insofar as it is a form for us, and may become for us an eternal, intelligible form, since it is in itself an intellect, whether we understand it or not, not that its existence as an intellect is from our activity, as is the case in the material intelligibles. And this state is that which is known as union (al-ittihād) and conjunction (al-ittiṣāl). And Alexander thinks that what Aristotle means by the acquired intellect is the agent intellect in the respect in which it has this conjunction with us, and for this reason it is called ‘acquired,’ that is, that we acquire it. And we have considered whether this conjunction is possible for human beings or not.

And the last thing which the master of this science [i.e. Aristotle] reached is the investigation of the final perfections existent in physical matter insofar as they are physical and changeable, such as what he concluded through the investigation of their ultimate cause in motion and being moved, namely the ultimate agent, and prime matter. So we say:

That in this matter people have recourse to (lit. ‘depend upon’) the
speculative intellect, since the abstraction (intizā’ī) of the forms from their underlying subjects is part of its nature, for it has abstracted the unseparated form, which is not an intellect in itself. So it is more fitting that it abstract this separate form [i.e. the Agent Intellect], which is an intellect in itself. That is, whenever it has considered these generable intelligibles insofar as they are intelligibles, this being whenever it has become an intellect in actuality in its final perfection, that is the material [intellect], and this is so long as it has not come to its final perfection, then it is a created intellect. And the activity of what comes into being, insofar as it comes into being, is imperfect. And whenever this has been established, then this conception is the final perfection for the human being, and the intended end. And here ends the discourse concerning the rational soul.

[Appendix]21

I say that what I have related concerning the material intellect is something which was clear to me before, whereas when I studied Aristotle’s words, it was clear to me that in no way can the substance receiving the power in which the material intellect is be anything actual, that is, one of the forms, because if this were the case, it would not receive all forms. As for the imaginative forms, they are those whose relations to the material intellect are the relation of the sensible to sensation, that is, of the visible to sight, not the relation of the eye to vision, that is, the subject, as was previously the case in what we said in what we had written. And the only previous person who said this was Abū Bakr al-Sā’igh [b. Bājjah], and he misled us. And all of this I have shown in my Long commentary on Aristotle’s “De anima.” So whoever wants to know my true view on this question, he has this book. And by God it is superior in correctness.

And I have not removed these things that were written here for two reasons: one of them is that a group of scholars had [already] copied it; and the second is that it has the rank of a discourse raising doubts concerning the view of Aristotle. For Aristotle stipulates that the material intellect is eternal.

And as for the method which Abū Bakr wished to follow in the aforementioned work to prove this problem, it is, upon my life, true. And the exposition of it is that people are of two types, the blessed and the masses. As for the masses, it is not possible that two intelligibles of theirs be one in number, because many impossibilities follow from this, among them that a human being would be existent before his existence, and that knowledge would be recollection, and that there is no learning according to the natural course

21 Found only in the Madrid ms. The remainder of the appendix deals with conjunction with the Agent Intellect, and does not seem to be directly related to the evolution in Averroes’s views.
which bestows a quality rather than a quantity, so that all intelligibles would be existent in actuality in Aristotle, for example, as they are in every one of the masses.

And in general, it has been shown from what preceded that the multiplication of the intelligible which is one in number for this variety of people necessarily depends upon the spiritual forms enumerated according to the enumeration of each individual.

And as for the blessed, they are those who, in their final perfection, the matter is the opposite for them. That is, that it is not possible for what is happy to be found of people two in number insofar as they are two in their final perfection, and this is because if we posited that happiness is only the occurrence of the intellect which is actual and habitual to its final perfection, and it had been shown that this intellect is enumerated by the enumeration of individuals, and we stipulated two happy people of this description, it would follow necessarily that this intellect and that intellect would have a single intelligible for each one of them. And this is because everything two in number has a single intelligible. For if the intelligible of this for one of the two who are happy is not the intelligible for the other, it follows too that there would be for these two intelligibles an intelligible for each one of them. For if we posit that this intelligible does not belong to them, there follows of it what followed of the first, and the thing would proceed to infinity. Or the conception of happiness would terminate necessarily in a conception one in number in every respect, there being no multiplicity in it at all. And the proceeding of this to infinity is impossible. Because it follows that the final perfection is not existent. And this is because the nature of the final perfection is to be pure actuality, and there is no potency in it at all, neither first nor final. So it is clear that the potency to conceive of this intellect and the conception which is habitual, are equivocal.

And for Abū Bakr b. Sā’igh, there was another method than this, and we have explained this in another place, and this method, upon my life is demonstrative. As for how a person travels to this perfection, it is said of this that the intelligibles are of different ranks, and one of them is the rank of the masses, namely the practical intelligibles, and this is clear from the fact that they are generated and corruptible, since they are tied up with imaginative forms, as was said before.

And the second rank is the speculative intelligibles, and these too are of different degrees. Among them are the intelligibles of mathematical things, these being the imperfect intelligibles, since they are not conceived of according to what belongs to them 92 in their existence. And they are only dependent upon the images/symbols of their individuals. And for this reason their intelligibles
almost seem to be as if invented.

And among them is physical science, which is nobler than this, since its intelligibles are more perfect in existence, and more proximate to individual things. And these all have in common, as we said, that their intelligibles rely upon the images of their individuals, as is the case in the practical intelligibles, except that the difference between them is that the masses consider the practical intelligibles, only for the sake of their sensibly perceptible individuals. Whereas in speculative science, the matter is the converse of this, that is, they consider the individuals only for the sake of the intelligibles.

And the intelligibles of physical science differ too through the difference of the subjects upon which they rely, for among them are things whose subjects are pure matter, such as the intelligible of weight and lightness and the mixed forms. And among them are those whose subjects are spiritual, such as the intelligible of the imaginative power, and the rest of the powers of the soul. But all of this has in common that its intelligibles are the intelligibles of individual matters, which have no existence in themselves, except through our intellection of them.

He said: When the master of physical science rises to another higher level, and considers the intelligibles which are not [physically?] existent, namely the separate forms, he will understand in this time intelligibles which are not at all corruptible, since what is understood of these is not dependent upon subjects, nor does it have any subjects.

So this is the way which Abū Bakr followed concerning the possibility of the existence of this conjunction with the Agent Intellect, and the nature of its existence.

And we shall consider what remains of this, and we say:

As for when the master of physical science ascents, and considers the intelligibles which are not intelligibles of material things, this being only, without a doubt, in the science of metaphysics, then, I know not whether the intelligibles arising in this science are eternal, for some sciences are not generable nor existent first in potency, then next in actuality. And in general we have enumerated the impossibilities following on the part of /93 whenever we grant that the intelligibles of this science are eternal. And for this reason we think that it remains to us from this genus of speculative intelligibles the question of whether it is always existent in actuality, or sometimes in potency, sometimes in actuality. For one of the things by which it has been shown that these intelligibles are generable is from the fact that they rely upon imaginative forms, and the case is not thus in these [intelligibles.]
And in general, it is clear from the nature of these intelligibles arising in the science of metaphysics that they are different from those: for they are the intelligibles of thins which are existent in themselves. And for this reason, perhaps the scientific discourses which we have stated concerning the generation of the speculative intelligibles are not sufficient for making these known. So this is the first thing for us to consider concerning them apart from the rest, since it is clear from their nature that they are different in rank from those. So we say:

That it is clear to anyone who considers this science, that is the science of metaphysics, that these separate intelligibles are only conceived by the relation which there is between them and these material intelligibles, and by the analogy between them, and the negation of the attachments and conditions, which we think only adhere to these intelligibles insofar as they are material, form these separate [intelligibles]. An example is what we say, that the intellect and the intelligible of these things is one in every respect. And these intelligibles which are belong [properly] to us [e.g. material forms], even if the intellect in us is the intelligible, there would attach to them some difference which is denied of the former. And this is only the case because the premises by which we consider the quiddity of these only arise in us from these material intelligibles. And for this reason is the fact that knowledge of the soul is necessary to precede knowledge of this science. And for this reason it is said: Know this, and you will know your Creator.

And in general, that which arises in us of the knowledge of metaphysics from the conception of these separate matters is only such that it is existent in a nobler way than the existence of this intelligibles, in the way in which the cause is nobler than the effect in many things. And likewise too, what is understood of the nobility of some things over others is by analogy, for example, what is said: that the first intellect is simpler than all the intellects, and that it is not in any way caused, and does not conceive of anything outside its own essence, and the rest of the things which are known of it from this science.

/94 And since this is the case, we only conceive of the separate forms by the relation and analogy that they have to material forms. And analogy is only a certain relation. And whenever one of two relata exists, necessarily the other exists, and whenever it is missing, the other is missing. Therefore the concepts arising in this science are not existent in actuality always, but rather they are generated in us, since they are not the substance of these things, but are very close to their substance.

22 idāfah—“relation” thus far has translated munāsabah.
And the condition concerning them is of the level of someone who conceives the thing through its attachments which are consequent upon its substance, whenever it is not possible to conceive of the thing in itself. And this is another rank of intelligibles, in their highest degree. And this thing has been shown through argument (bi-al-qawl) to be the ultimate end, and it may be attained by us through the careful study of the grades of human beings and their stages in this meaning of which there is supposed to be a likeness to what induction bestows. And this is because we think that when we consider carefully that these intelligibles will be abstracted from matter gradually, and that they are in this rank, and that they are in this rank. So it is probable that this final rank occurs through a preceding judgement, in accordance with that whose nature is to understand the induction in which all of the parts are not complete.

And that which it is necessary to rely upon in the existence of this conjunction is the preceding demonstration. So let us posit this condition to be existent, according to what alleges this from those witnessing it according to what has been shown by discourse. Then we will consider of it whether it is through a natural perfection, or not through a natural perfection. And if it is an unnatural perfection, as people say, but rather, a divine perfection difference in genus from this, then in what respect is it possible that an unnatural perfection be found belonging to a natural existent? And this is one of the things that is evident proximately [to certitude], that this state, namely conception, is not through a natural perfection, because if it were a natural perfection, then the rest of the powers of the soul and the material intelligibles would have some entry into the existence of this perfection, according to what is of its nature that things which are antecedent to its end should enter into the existence of the end. So the perfection would be material, and exist through its existence, and this is impossible; or nature would produce something vain, by preparing things towards some end, while the nature of this end is such that it can exist without these things.

And since this is the case, and it has been shown that this conjunction is not a natural perfection, it remains to us that it is a perfection in the way in which it is said that the separate forms are a perfection to the spherical bodies. And the nature of this relation has been explained in the science of metaphysics. And it is in general a perfection different from the natural perfection which is its matter.

And when the nature of the state of a human being in this conjunction is considered, it is clear that it is one of the wonders of nature, and that it happens to him that he is like rank of what is both eternal and corruptible, in the way in which things intermediate between related general exist, such as what is intermediate between plants and animals, and animals and humans. And this
existence is different from the existence which is characteristic of a human being insofar as she is human. And it produces, in the rest of the powers of the soul, in this state, something of amazement and perplexity, and in general, of the paralysis of the natural activities which occur, so that it is said that it has crippled their spirits. And it is, in general, a divine gift.

And this is state of union is that which the Sufis desire. And it is clear that they do not reach it alone, since one of the things necessary for reasoning it is knowledge of the separate sciences. And they only apprehend of them things that are similar to this apprehension, and this is like the conjoining/combination of the three powers, and other things among the things whose causes we gave in the *De sensu et sensato*, and the mode of their similarity to them is that in which one is overwhelmed from the suspension of the senses and their withdrawal from the rest of the powers of the soul. And for this reason these two powers are predicated equivocally of them, that is, the powers of physical and divine perfection. For the power of the final divine perfection has nothing in it of the intention/meaning of the material power, nor the individual enumeration. And this intention of the existence of this power is that which the earlier thinkers supposed is existent in man from the beginning of his life, at one time. And for this reason they said that they were obscured by moisture. And the difference between the two powers is that the physical power, when it is found in actuality, there is found something which is not yet existent. And that power, when it exists in actuality, the perfection here is only in the relation (fi al-idāfa). And through this relation (al-nisbah), the agent intellect is acquired.

And we have spoken on all of the problems which we promised to investigate in the beginning of this discourse. And there remains to us, among the powers of the soul, the discourse concerning the locomotion of animals, namely, the desiderative power.
DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE APPETITIVE FACULTY

It is clear from its nature that this faculty is none of faculties which preceded, and that it is distinct in being (bi-wujdī-hā) from them. This is because we have not been able to say that it is the sensitive or the imaginative faculty, because each of these two faculties may exist without this faculty. And this is because we may sense and imagine without desiring. And since this is the case, it is not possible for us to desire without these two faculties, that is, imagination and sensation. And it is for this reason that we think that these two faculties are prior to this one, that is the appetitive, by a natural priority. And for this same reason, the plant is lacking in this faculty, owing to the fact that it lacks sensation and imagination. And these two faculties alone are not prior to this faculty, that is, to the appetitive faculty, but rather, the rational faculty may exist prior to it as well in the case of speculative knowledge. For it is inevitable that we desire that conceptualization which is through the intellect, and that we may also desire the imaginative forms which occur through cogitation and reflection. And this is something intelligible.

And since this is the case, and these two faculties, that is, the faculty of sensation and that of imagination, are prior to this faculty, then it is necessary that its nature be one of two things: (1) Either that these two faculties are subjects for this faculty, that is, for the appetitive faculty, in the way that matter is the subject for form; or (2) that it is one subject for them, but the existence of the faculty of appetition in this subject follows upon the existence of the imaginative and sensitive faculty in the way that concomitant accidents follow upon the things which possess the concomitant accidents. And this is the case if appetition exists apart from imagination, but instead [arises] from /97 sensation alone, as it is supposed is the case in animals without imagination, like the fly and the worm. As for if appetition does not exist apart from some sort of imagination, then the only thing prior to this faculty in nature would be the imaginative faculty alone. And the investigation in this case only concerns the relation of this faculty to the faculty of imagination, and whether this is the relation of a concomitant [accident] or the relation of perfection.

And if the nature (kayf) of its relation to the imagination is explained, then necessarily its relation to the rational soul is explained. And it is for this reason that it is necessary to investigate, first, concerning the nature of this faculty, this idea, that is, whether the appetitive faculty exists apart from the imaginative. And if not, in what condition is it related to this [faculty of] imagination? Then afterwards, we will investigate, concerning its nature, whether it is one or many, and in what respect the animal is found to move on account of it in a generated
motion; and whether it is in the sense of its being a remote mover to it in this motion, or whether it is a mover of the animal in one respect, but the thing moved in another, in the way in which intermediate movers exist.

And in general, we will investigate the things from which this motion is composed. And the investigation of this motion only occurs in this place, because we think that the most proper of the causes of this motion is this faculty, that is, the appetitive faculty. For even if it only moves the animal with the aid of other faculties, it is the most proper cause of its movement.

So when we have learned all of this from its nature, we may acquire perfect knowledge of its substance. So we say:

That this faculty is the faculty by which the animal seeks what is suitable [for it], and flees from what is harmful. And this is self-evident from its nature. And if this appetition is towards what is pleasant, it is called desire. And if it is for revenge, it is called anger. And if it comes from deliberation (rawiyah) and cogitation (fikr), it is called choice and will (ikhtiyār; irādah).

As for the fact that imagination is prior in its existence to this faculty in the animal endowed with imagination (for here there is appetite), this is something about which there is no doubt. As for whether this faculty exists through sensation in isolation, apart from imagination, this being in those animals which we suppose are non-imaginative, there is room for speculation on this point. This is because we suppose that animals without imagination are only moved by sensation alone, since they are not found to move except in the presence of sensation. But whenever we grant this, that is, that some animals are not moved except in the presence of sensation, it does not follow that motion is found without imagination, because animals are only moved in the presence of sensation to imagine an intention which is potentially sensible, in order to give rise to an actual sensible. And if its motion were from the sensible insofar as it is sensible in actuality, its motion would be frivolous and in vain.

And since this is the case, it is inevitable that the animal’s motion toward this intention be existent in potency, in the respect in which it is imagining it, for its motion is that of an animal (hayawanīyah). Otherwise, its motion towards this intention would not be insofar as it imagined it, for then its motion would be a natural one, not that of an animal. And this is impossible. So it is necessarily the case that there is another division, that is, that it is only moved by some imagination, but that it is an indefinite imagination, which is not distinguished

\[\text{23} \quad \text{shawq, i.e. the concupiscible appetite.}\]

\[\text{24} \quad \text{ghaḍab, i.e. the irascible appetite.}\]
from sensation. And from this it is clear that it is not possible to find an animal that moves which is lacking entirely in imagination. And since this is the case; and [since] it has been explained that this faculty is always found only in the company of imagination or reason; and since it has been shown from the nature of these two faculties that they are prior to the [corresponding appetites] in nature; and since it is also self-evident that the faculty of imagination is not related to this faculty as a subject, since the imagination is an apprehending faculty, whereas appetite is something which follows upon apprehension (idrāk), in the same way that fleece /98 follows upon cutting; and this is even more fitting for the rational faculty—then it is evident that [the appetitive faculty] follows upon these two in the way in which concomitant [accidents] follow upon the things with which they are concomitant. And the subject for this faculty is necessarily the natural heat; and what happens to the appetitive faculty from bodily affections bears witness to this, e.g. when someone who is angry turns red, and when someone who is fearful turns yellow. And owing to this faculty’s being consequent upon more than one of the faculties of the soul, we think that it is multiplied through the multiplication of the faculties upon which it is consequent. And appetite in its entirety is said to be a type of intermediate between the equivocal and the univocal, i.e. the ambiguous, especially when we consider what our predicating appetite of an animal signifies, or our predicating appetite of speculative objects of inquiry. And as for artistic objects of desire, it is predicated in a way intermediate between these two. And because of there being this difference between these species of appetite, human beings may be found to be moved by them in opposite motions. For the cogitative appetite is oftentimes opposed to the animal appetite. And this is evident from our own experience.26

And since it has been shown from the nature of this faculty how it is related to the faculty of imagination, and in addition to this it has been shown in what respect multiplicity is found in it, it is necessary for us to say in what respect animal motion comes from it, and with how many things this local motion is combined. So we say:

That everything which is moved—as has been shown in popular discourses—has a mover. And of the movers, the first is that which is not moved at all whenever it moves [something else]; also among them is that which moves by being moved. And this is the case in all motions which are composed from more than one mover. And it is clear that animal locomotion is one of the motions which is composed from more than one mover, and that it contains these two kinds of movers, that is, the mover which is not moved at all except

25 Literally, “things sharing names.”
26 Literally, “from what we find in us.”
accidentally, and the mover which is moved, and that the two movers in this motion, by which its existence is composed, include bodies and the psychological faculties. As for bodies, they are the things from which this motion is composed; but they have been investigated in the De motu animalium.

As for the faculties, the investigation of them is proper to this context. And it is evident that these motions are only generated in the animal by two faculties of the soul, namely, the imaginative faculty and the appetitive faculty. And this is because it is something evident in a way approximating necessity that these two faculties are prior to this motion. But we may imagine something, and desire it, without being moved. And for this reason, there is required necessarily, in the case of this motion, the existence of some relation between the two faculties, by which the animal is moved necessarily. And this is nothing more than the existence of the imaginative form moving the appetitive soul, and the appetitive soul being moved by it, and receiving it. For whenever the imaginative form moves the soul, the appetitive power moves the natural heat, so that it moves the rest of the organs of motion. And for this reason, whenever the imaginative soul is averted from desiring to move, or this agreement between them is not found, then motion is averted. And this is because the appetite is nothing more than the desire for the presence of the sensible form in the respect in which we imagine it. For whenever this agreement between the two faculties arises from activity and reception, the animal necessarily moves towards attaining this imaginative form as a sensible in actuality. Therefore, the imaginative faculty is the remote mover of in this motion, and the appetitive faculty is moved by it by way of apprehension, and it is the first mover in respect to place. And for this reason this motion is ascribed to it apart from the apprehending soul, which is the cause of the appetition. And the state which moves the natural heat when it arises in the appetitive soul, and the natural heat’s moving the limbs, are both called the conjoining of the movers by the commentators. And this relation which is found between them, of activity and passivity, is that which the commentators call the conjoining.

And whenever this imaginative form and the appetite are found without this connection, there is no advantage in the movement of this animal for them, since the existence of the imaginative form is only for the sake of the motion. And the privation of the appetitive soul’s reception of the motion from the imaginative forms is called listlessness, and the slowness of their reception is called sluggishness, just as their opposites are called vigour.

So we have spoken about what this motion joins together, and how it is brought together, and when it is brought together. And we have also spoken of the existence of the appetitive soul, and its quiddity.
Here ends the discourse concerning the universal statements which belong to the science of the soul, according to the custom followed by the Peripatetics.

As for the discourse concerning the rest of the particular faculties, such as the retentive, the memorative, and the recollective, and what follows from them in the way of perceptions, and in general the remainder of the psychological perceptions, these things are discussed in the *De sensu et sensato.*