

**Albert the Great**  
**DE ANIMA**  
**Selections on the Internal Senses<sup>1</sup>**  
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**Book 2**

*Treatise 3, Chapter 4. A digression declaring the grade and mode of abstraction.*

[101b48] Before we speak of the sensibles individually, it is necessary for us to speak of the sensible in general terms, because, as we have said, objects are prior in reason to acts and acts to powers. And because speculation concerning common matters in physics is also prior with respect to us— inasmuch as in it common things are confused in singulars and prior with respect to us—we should first speak of the sensibles in common. But in order to understand more easily those things which we are about to say, let us compose a chapter briefly on the mode of apprehension of all the apprehensive powers; for this will be useful to facilitate the understanding (*notitia*) of everything that follows.

Therefore let us say that all apprehension is the reception of the form of what is apprehended, not according to the being (*secundum esse*) which it has in that which is apprehended, but according to its intention and species, under which some sensible or intellectual knowledge of what is apprehended will be had. But this apprehension, speaking universally, has four grades. The first of these and the lowest is that the form is abstracted and separated from matter, but not from its presence nor from its attachments. And the external (*de foris*) apprehending power, which is sensation (*sensus*) does this.

But the second grade is that the form is separated from matter and from the presence of matter, but not from the attachments of matter or the conditions of matter. And the imaginative power performs this apprehension, and it also retains the forms of sensible things when the singulars are not present, but it does not strip them of material attachments. By the attachments of matter I mean the conditions and properties which the subject of the form has according to which it is in this or that matter, as, for example, this position of members, or this color a face, or this time, or this shape of the head or this place of generation. For these are certain things individuating a form, which are thus in one individual of one species, but not in another. And by this apprehension we often imagine a curly-haired, white old man or youth with long or short fingers who is not present, none of which belong to him inasmuch as he is a human being. This, therefore, is the second type of apprehension.

But the third grade of apprehension is that by which we receive not only sensible things, but also certain intentions which are not imprinted on the senses, but which nonetheless are never known by us without the sensibles, [102a] such

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<sup>1</sup> From Albertus Magus, *De anima*, ed. Clemens Stroick, vol. 7.1 of *Opera omnia*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i. Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1968).

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as to be a companion, a friend, delightful company, and affable, and the contrary of these, which indeed we receive with the sensibles, but none of which are imprinted on the senses. And such is the case when we understand this to be the son of Dion and to be a lamb or a human, but that to be a wolf or a lion, inasmuch as substantial forms are apprehended by them with the senses mediating, and not as separate [from the senses]. And this is the grade nearest to cognition and it never occurs without estimation and collation.

But the fourth and final grade is that which apprehends the quiddities of things stripped of all material attachments, and which does not receive them with sensible intentions, but rather as simple and separate from them. And that apprehension is unique to the intellect, such as the understanding of human being through that which belongs to all humans, or the understanding of substance, and, as is commonly said, the understanding of the universal quiddity of every thing, inasmuch as it is its quiddity, and not inasmuch as it belongs to this thing and not to that one. For that which belongs to one thing and not to another is proper and singular, and it is something from the material and the individuating. But whatever things are common and thus belong in the same way to one thing as much as to another, are without a doubt universals, which the intellect alone receives. But according to these grades of abstraction or separation the inferior powers of apprehension are distinguished.

But further it must be noted that the form and the intention of the thing are different. For the form is properly that which, by informing, gives being in act to matter and to the composite of matter and form. But that through which a thing is signified individually or universally according to the diverse grades of abstraction is called an intention; and this does not give being to anything nor to the sense when it is in it, but rather, gives a sign and knowledge of the thing. And therefore the intention is not a part of the thing like the form, but rather it is the species of the whole knowledge of the thing; [102b]and therefore the intention, because it is abstracted from the whole and is the signification of the whole, is predicated of the thing; for the intention of the colored, which is in the eye, makes known the whole thing, just as the intention which is in the imagination makes known the particular which is not present. And this is what Aristotle says brilliantly in Book 2 of the *De anima*, that the senses are of particulars; he does not say that they are of some forms only, but of the whole particular, just as intellect too is of universals, not that it is the knowledge and species of the part, but of the whole. And therefore it gives knowledge of the whole. For knowledge of color alone is not received through sight, but of the colored, and its species in vision is the species of the colored, and it makes a judgment of the colored, inasmuch as it is colored. And so too is the case with the other intentions, in whatever grade of abstraction they are received. But in the same way, when it is said that abstraction is from matter, it is to be understood that matter is a certain particular which has its particularity from

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matter. For this [particular] is the first subject for form, and through it<sup>2</sup> the particular underlies both the common nature, which is abstracted universally by the intellect, and the individuating forms, whose intentions are abstracted by the other grades of apprehension. Just as it is said in the beginning of the *Physics*, that the common nature is sometimes received as confused in the particulars and not separated from them. And then such knowledge is of singulars and requires the singular just as sensation does, as we said in the previous chapter.

*Treatise 4, Chapter 7. A digression declaring what are the five interior powers of the sensible soul.*

[156b] Wishing now to investigate the interior powers of the sensible soul, in order to understand more easily we will first enumerate them, and afterwards we will follow up concerning them individually. Let us say, therefore, that in every nature which is common to many it is necessary for there to be one source from which that community arises. But sensible cognition is common to the five senses, and therefore it is necessary for there to be one source, from which every sense arises and to which every motion of the sensibles refers as to an ultimate end. And this source is called the common sense, which has certain [properties] insofar as it is a sense, and certain [properties] insofar as it is common. For insofar as it is a sense, it has the property of receiving the species of things without matter but while matter is present, which is proper to every sense. [157b] But inasmuch as it is common, it has two [properties], without which sensible cognition cannot be perfected. One of these is to make judgment about sensible operation, as we apprehend that we are seeing when we are seeing, and hearing when we are hearing, and thus of the other [senses]. For if this judgment were not in animals, it would not be enough to see, or hear, or apprehend through the other senses, something useful. But according as it compares the objects senses by the diverse senses through the fact that it finds them conjoined in or disjoined from one common sensed object. For nothing among the proper senses can do this, because the comparison is amongst many, and it is necessary for the one comparing many to have them together before itself. And therefore the common sense compares the sensed objects by saying that the yellow is sweet and the one is sweeter than the other through the fact that all the things sensed by the proper senses are referred to it. Therefore these things compel the positing of the common sense.

But we perceive there to be cognition of sensible forms in us even when the thing is not present; and this cognition is of a higher degree of abstraction than sensible cognition, just as we have determined above. But we know that the power which retains well is one thing, and the power which receives well is another, because what retains well is perfected by what is cold and dry, and what

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<sup>2</sup> *per ipsam*. Probably means *per formam*, but grammatically could mean *per materiam*.

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receives well is perfected by moisture; and since the sensible [power] receives well and does not retain the thing when absent, we know that the sensible power as a whole is not that which retains the images of things in us when the things themselves are not present.

But we experience in us a three genera of cognition concerning the sensible forms. One of them is that which is concerned with the forms received through sensation in the way in which they were sensed; but the other is that which is concerned with the intentions which were never in the sense, but nonetheless are not separated from sensible conditions, such as being suitable or unsuitable, and friendship or enmity, and being a son and not a son, a mother and not a mother. Just as the sheep knows her offspring and offers it her breast for taking milk, but not others, and she flees the wolf as an enemy and follows the dog as a guardian; and each of these cognitions is concerned with those things which are in us while not present. There is also a certain third type, which acts as much on sensed forms as on intentions by composing and dividing, which is a sort of common power to which sensed forms as much as the intentions extracted [from them], just as particular sensations [are referred] to the common sense.

Therefore let us take up again the two principles through which these powers are distinguished, by saying that the active, which is formal, is not perfected in the same way as the passive, which is recipient and retentive. Therefore, since [157b] there is a certain power which retains and receives the forms that were sensed before, it will be passive, perfected by the cold and dry in the complexion of the organ whose act it is. But since we experience that there is in us a cognition of the intentions extracted from the sensible forms, it is necessary for there to be something which extracts and produces (*agat*) those intentions; and it will be like an active power (*potentia activa*) producing those intentions from the sensible, whose perfection in the complexion of its organ will be a very spiritual and formal heat. Therefore the Peripatetics called the storehouse of the sensed forms “imagination”—and it pleases some to call it the formal power, in that it conserves the forms in us; but they called the active power that extracts the intentions “estimation.”

But because we also experience further that we retain those extracted intentions in us, just as the sensed forms are retained, and it does not belong to the same power to retain and to act, as has been said, nor does the same retentive [power] which retains the sensed form and the intentions extracted from them, inasmuch as the intention and the form are of different grades of abstraction, as we said above, therefore they were compelled to find a power of the soul which retains the intentions extracted by the estimative power; and they called this “memory.”

Further, we experience ourselves to use forms as much as intentions when composing and dividing. For we invent (*facimus*) a two-headed man and something composed from multiple sensed forms and we compose these with the

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intentions which we have extracted in us. And it is necessary that what invents this be something common to which forms as much as intentions are referred as if to something common; and this they called “phantasy,” which is located between memory, in which are the intentions, and the imaginative [power], in which are the forms received through sensation, and which uses both by composing and dividing. And it does these things in sleep just as it does in waking. But phantasy is named from appearance, because it is the major cognition which the sensible soul possesses and the summit of its power, and this is colloquially [*a vulgo*] called “the cogitative [power]” in humans, although thinking [*cogitare*] properly belongs to reason.

But this phantasy refers many things to its memory which it has forgotten, inasmuch as it moves the intentions to forms and the forms to an intention; for through this it will come to something like what it had known before, and through that it comes to what it forgot, as we showed in our book *On Memory and Reminiscence*. For these are the things in which intellectual matters are similar to corporeal ones. For intellectual divisions of one into many resemble the division of a tree into many branches, just like what we do in a Porphyrian tree concerning the [158a] division of predicables, and the analysis which the intellect makes of the posterior into the prior resembles a scale, just like that which Pythagoras passed on concerning the golden scale.

But in accordance with what is suited to their operations, the Peripatetics assigned these powers a location (*situm*); for they all transmitted [the view] that they are organic, in that they are only concerned with particulars. For every particular form is something in matter, because a form received without any matter is a universal, upon which the intellect operates. Therefore they posited the common sense to be locally in the anterior part of the brain, where the sensitive nerves of the five senses converge as in a certain center, which marrowy part is also moist. After this place there is one of greater hardness coming from the coldness of the brain, and they assigned it the treasury of forms, in which the forms are retained and immobilized, which is called the imaginative or formal treasury. But in the first part of the middle cell of the brain, which is warm on account of the motion of the many spirits to it, they posited the estimative power, which is active and extractive with respect to the intentions. But its treasury which preserves the intentions, which is called memory, they posited in the posterior part of the brain, which place is dry on account of the motive nerves, which arise from it. A sign of this is that when that part is wounded, memory is lost or damaged in all animals. But phantasy, which directs itself as much to intentions as to forms, they posited in the middle of the medial cell as the center between the imaginative forms and the memory. And a sign of this is that when the middle cell is wounded, in some animals there will be no possession of an ordered regimen of life, since it is not possible for the sensed

forms and intentions to be used in accordance with need, and then the animals are made mad and rabid.

### **Book 3: Concerning the Interior Apprehensive Powers and the Motive Powers**

*Treatise 1: On the Apprehensive Sensible Powers of Soul. Chapter 1. A digression declaring the intention of this book and concerning imagination.*

[167a] But in this third book *On the Soul* we intend to make certain about the other remaining powers of the soul, the first division of which is into the apprehensive and the motive [powers], which differ through the notion of active and passive potency. We assigned the difference of these powers above, because the active power is always like itself in that it is actual and always complete for acting, and if at some time it does not act, this will be on account of a defect of that in which it acts, and not on account of the fact that it needs to acquire something through which it will be perfected for acting. But the passive power is dissimilar to itself, because sometimes it has form and sometimes it does not have it, but when it acquires it through alteration, then it can perform the action whose principle is the form which was acquired through the alteration in it. But this form is sometimes given to it from generation, as we said above concerning the sensitive potency, whereas other times it is acquired through alteration, as is the case with knowledge, which is the perfection of the intellect.

Therefore the apprehensive powers are generally passive nor do they have principles of acting except through the form which is acquired through apprehension; for this reason too they are called apprehensive. But all souls are not generally like this, but only the sensitive and intellective. And of these some are apprehensive of their agents existing externally (*de foris*), and others are apprehensive in such a way that their proximate agents are internal. And those which have their agents externally are the senses, which have already been treated inasmuch as they are powers of the soul; but let us now determine concerning those which are apprehensive internally (*intus*). For we will take together all of these, whether they be parts of the sensible soul or whether they be rational, because some of the ancients called all these a certain part of the intellect, as will be shown later. But in order to understand more easily the opinions of these ancients on this matter, we will speak of three powers which we enumerated above, namely, the imaginative, the estimative, and phantasy.

Therefore let us say that the imaginative is the apprehending power in which the images of the sensibles are preserved when the sensible things are absent. But this imagination abstracts more than sense, because the sense does not receive the form unless the thing is present, but it preserves it even when the thing is absent. For this reason too according to Avicenna and Algazel it is a different power than the common sense. But the excellence of this organic power is different from the excellence of the sense, because the excellence of the sense is in receiving, and the excellence of this power is in retaining and in representing purely. For this reason too we see that many who are subtle in discerning the sensibles (*in discretione sensibilium*) but not good at imaging.

But those who imagine well are disposed to two things, one of which is mathematics (*mathesis*), because such people describe figures well. The reason

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for this is that although all sensible things are described in the organ of imagination, nonetheless all sensibles are described in it inasmuch as they are united in its subject; and therefore sound is not imaginable except inasmuch as it is the act of something sounding, and color inasmuch as it is the quality of color, and so too of the other [senses], and therefore that which is principally described in it is quantity and figure. For this reason those having a pure and well composed [167a] organ of this power, are rendered excellent in imagination and when they are of subtle intellect in addition to this, then from the conjoining of the excellence of the intellect with the excellence of imagination, they excel greatly in mathematical learning.

But if people of this kind are withdrawn (*abstrahantur*) from the motions of the senses and are often isolated and withdrawn from the care of the flesh and the delight of the body, they are made prophets. For the motion of many sensibles, by its tumult impedes the effects of the heavens from being manifest in it. But likewise the care of the flesh and the delights and cares and acts of many mundane matters occupy the soul in such a way that it cannot perceive the impressions of heavenly things, because the soul, on account of the union of its powers in its substance, has such a binding (*colligatio*) of its powers that when its operation is directed towards any single power whatsoever (*intenditur operatio eius secundum unam quamcumque potentiam*), then it will be distracted (*abstrahitur*) from directing itself towards another. A sign of this is that when someone is thinking intently about something, he does not notice those things which he has before his eyes. And likewise it happens that when the soul is occupied with external things it does not notice the motions and impressions of the heavens which take place in his body. But when he is withdrawn (*abstracta*) from these he senses such [heavenly] things and images appear to him because it is connatural to him to know whatever he knows under corporeal images, and those dreams which signify something about the future are rooted in such impressions of heavenly things. But how the impressions of such heavenly motions as much as of the intelligences, which are the movers [of the heavens], come to the souls of animals will be demonstrated in First Philosophy. But what is sufficient here is that the organ of imagination does not need to be in every way the same as the organ of the common sense, but rather they differ in being although perhaps they may be the same in substance. And this will be shown more fully below.

*Chapter 2. A digression declaring those things which belong to the estimative [faculty].*

But that power which is called the estimative differs from imagination in the very species that it apprehends, because, as was determined in what was held before, it extracts the intentions which are not described in sense. Nor can it be



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said that this is the function (*officium*) of sense according to what we determined of the accidental sensible above, because it never happens that there is knowledge that “this is the son of Dion” unless one has knowledge of the [property of] “being-a-son” according to which it is in “this.” Nor would the wolf ever have pity over its offspring unless it had knowledge both of this individual and of the fact that this individual [167b] is its offspring. Therefore it is necessary for there to be a power of the soul which extracts intentions of this kind, for it cannot be imagination nor can it be entirely separate from it. For that it is not imagination is clear because the motion or affect of mercy or sadness or fleeing or staying (*insecutio*) do not follow upon the image of the thing alone, but any one of these things follows immediately upon estimation. But it cannot be totally separated from it [i.e., imagination], because intentions of this kind are not received according to common and universal notions, but rather in this or that imagination, inferring nothing in common. Therefore it is necessary to say that just as the practical intellect is related to the speculative so too the estimative is related to imagination; and therefore this power is not entirely apprehending, but it is also motive in that it determines that towards which the animal must move and from which it must flee. For this reason some of the philosophers said this is opinion, which is not appropriate, because opinion is a habit of the rational soul, but estimation belongs to everything which has sensation, as has already been shown. For we said above that that all things which have sensation have a motion of dilation and constriction at least, and since those are moved by some type of motion to food, it is necessary for there to be an imagination of food in them; but imagination alone does not move, as has already been said; therefore it is necessary for all such [animals] to have an estimation by which they are moved.

Therefore every animal which has one or more of the external senses has these three internal senses, namely the common sense, the imagination, and estimation. For this reason we said above that everything which has sensation has the desire for food, which is hunger, and everything having desire has imagination and estimation, which differs from imagination in being but not in substance, as we said above. But estimation is more active than the imaginative [power], because to extract intentions is to make something and it is more perfect than to consider images alone (*speculari imagines solas*), as if we were to say that a besouled mirror were to consider the images impressed upon it.

But all the powers of the soul are active in some way, in that they all perform some vital operation (*opus vitae*), as we showed above, when we spoke of the definition of the soul according to its substance. But although the estimative power has more of action than the imaginative, nonetheless it has the property of a passive power inasmuch as it does not act through itself but through an intention which it extracts from the acquired form.

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[168a] But it must be noted further that in humans this power of the soul, and others too, is sometimes conjoined to reason, and then it is helped by reason and persuaded to imitate or to flee what it estimates. And because of its similitude to opinion in humans, some philosophers, like Plato, asserted it to be a sort of opinion and not to differ in humans and in brute animals except that it is more obscured in brutes and less in humans. But what they say is that false, because opinion is concerned with what is common insofar as it is in many, but estimation, inasmuch as it is like this, does not recede from this individual, inasmuch as it is a this, and therefore in humans aided by reason, it is not aided unless inasmuch as it is concerned with this or that, and then it is properly called by the name of estimation. But if a similar conception of many particulars is received according to one intention found in them, this does not now belong to estimation, but to experimental knowledge, which belongs to reason, but nonetheless sense and estimation are subservient to it in this [type of knowledge]. But because that power is conjoined to imagination, therefore its organ is also the same as the organ of imagination, or one is near to the other, being the same substantially and differing according to the being of the disposition, as we said above.

*Chapter 3. A digression making clear the nature of phantasy.*

Determining of phantasy next, let us say that it is the power composing images with intentions and intentions with images and images with images and intentions with images, for a twofold end, which is concerned with particulars. One end is greater knowledge (*cognitio*) of particulars, which can be had in the sensible soul, and the end of that is an opinion concerning this [thing], that it is that, and concerning something else, that it is some other thing; and thus concerning everything about which an opinion is proffered by way of affirmation and negation. But the second end is the operation (*opus*) which is intended from particulars of this kind, just as the operation in things having reason is the end of art. And because such cognition in many animals is clearly evident, in such a way that we see them choose some things and in a way refute some others, but for choice and refutation opinion and decision are prerequisite, and therefore many say that phantasy is something of reason. But our intention is not for there to be true choice in the sensible soul, although we clearly do see something like choice in some brute animals, and in one more, and in another less; but we also [168b] see them to building shelter (*facere casas*) by way of art and providing for food over a long time, for which type of operation it is necessary for there to be as a principle some power of the sensible soul. But this cannot be anything else but that power which composes and divides images and intentions in the aforementioned way. For we do not see this operation in all things in which there is imagination and estimation, but in those which are more perfect. For although

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all those are passive powers of the soul and are affected by the individual forms which are the principles of sensible cognition, which seem to be the very same forms, the mode of affection is not, however, the same, but rather is in accordance with a different grade of abstraction. For this reason the powers themselves are not entirely the same, but just as we said above concerning the common sense, it seems that the entire formality of the sensible power is in phantasy. And it has this difference materially, inasmuch as it begins from the organ of one of its motions or from the organ of another. And in this way all these powers of the sensible seem to be internal in one common essence and substance, but they differ according to material being in the diverse parts of the brain, in which these powers are organized, all of which are organic. And this is the reason why Aristotle in many places treats these powers as if they were the same, and posits a name of one equivocally for the name of another, but if, they are, however, subtly distinguished, as they are distinct here, they must in this way be distinguished.

But it is necessary not to fail to notice that when these powers are conjoined with reason as they are in human beings, they receive an order of acting and operating and their guidance from reason; and because reason is diversified according to the diversity of those things concerning which argumentation (*ratiocinatio*) is made, therefore the operations of phantasy are also greatly multiplied. But when they are not accompanied by reason, then they guide the instinct of nature alone, and because nature occurs in one way in those things having one species, therefore the works of phantasy in all things having one species in irrational things occur in one way, and therefore every swallow builds a nest in one way, and therefore every ant looks for food in one way, and so too of all other [animals] operating in accordance with the appearances of phantasy and the instinct of nature. But a human being does not work in this way on account of diverse principles of operation, concerning which it inquires through reason.

And this is what some of the philosophers who excelled greatly in natural philosophy said, that those powers in brute animals act more strongly from nature than they act in a human being, but they do what they do more strongly [169a] because in the case of humanity, [nature] only serves them instrumentally, whereas in the case of brute animals it moves them more strongly according to something which is moved by them. But that power is one which impedes the intellect very much inasmuch as it excessively occupies the soul with the composition and division of imaginations and intentions, of which there is a great abundance in it, because it can not only compose and divide what is received from the senses, but also depict what is similar to it. And because the conceptions of the intellect frequently are not similar to the images and fictions of phantasy, therefore when it dresses the concepts in images and intentions, it often generates deception and error, but especially when something concerning

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the heavenly and divine is imprinted on the intellect. But this is the reason why dreams, which are prophecies of the future, when mostly applied to images, become illusions and deceptions. But when it applies fitting images and intentions to the conceptions of the intellect, then the conceptions of images and intentions still require interpretation, in that the images and intentions of the sensibles do not agree with the divine and celestial conceptions except metaphorically. But we will speak of these in the science concerning sleeping and waking.

But there are many animals which do not have this potency. The reason for this is a defect or diminution of the brain in such animals. For the whole brain of such animals differs somewhat from the fluid marrowy nature, in which the sense is and the delicate (*tenuis*) imagination, and therefore the spirit of these things is not purified, and their brain is not fortified for complete animal operations of this kind.

*Chapter 4. A digression declaring that all the powers of the sensible soul are organic and act through the mediation of the body.*

But all the aforementioned powers of the sensible soul are organic and their operations are perfected through corporeal instruments. And indeed this is not difficult to show concerning the senses, which apprehend externally; because it has already been established that they; only apprehend through the presence of the sensible thing; but the sensibles are bodies, and a body cannot be present except to a body; for presence in accordance with position and place is not needed for an incorporeal power, nor is anything done in it by local propinquity or remoteness, as is clear in the case of the intellect and intelligibles. Therefore in this way it is established the sensible powers are also in a body, before which the thing is also sensibly and presently set forth in position and in place.

[169b] But concerning the internal powers, namely, imagination, estimation, and phantasy, the same thing is established, because in all these things there is an apprehension of the singular form in accordance with the place of part of it, and the line and quantity whose description and picture can only be through a corporeal instrument. This is proven in this way: Let us imagine a square ABCD and let us adjoin to it two other squares equal to it in every way and like it in every way, one of which is EFGH, adjoined to it at angle A, which is the right-hand angle of the first imagined square, and the other it IKLM, adjoined to the first square at angle B, which is the left-hand angle, and let us establish those three squares in our imagination, as you see them to be depicted here:

Therefore I ask how one of these is apprehended to be on the right and the other on the left and the third in the middle, to which the two are adjoined. For either this is from the subject, in which they are described, or from the squares themselves, or from the comparison of the squares to something external. But it cannot be said that it is from the comparison of the squares to something

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external, because we often imagine that which is not compared to something external, like the chimaera, the *fligalax*, and the *tragelaf*, and the many other monsters, which we depict by imagining. But if it is said to be from the squares themselves, this will either be from the essence and figures of the squares or from some other accident. but it cannot be from the squares themselves, because they have one formula (*sunt unius rationis*) and are equal and similar in every way, in such a way that no diversity can fall between them inasmuch as they are such. But if it is said that it is from some accident which befalls them, then this will either be an inseparable or a separable accident. But it cannot be an inseparable accident, because an inseparable accident is caused by what is essential to its subject, and those things of which the essentials are the same, the inseparable accidents are the same; but the essential of the three squares are the same in all respects, and thus the aforementioned imagined diversity of the squares cannot be on account of an inseparable accidents. But if it be said that this is a separable accident, then that is understood not to belong [to them]; and since that is the cause of the aforesaid diversity in the imagination, then one will not now be imagined to be right and the other left; which is false in every way, because the imagination still remains as prior so long as the aforementioned squares are posited to be conjoined. Therefore it remains that it is for that reason that they are described in such a way in the organ of imagination, which is the brain. But whatever the form is depicted in under a different place, is a body, and therefore the organ of imagination is a body.

But if perhaps someone should say that this diversity of position into right-hand, left-hand, and middle comes from the intellect attributing to them the notion of right-hand and left-hand and middle, this is agreed to be false, because the understanding of right-hand and left-hand is universal and is not attributed to this or that except through a particular position, through which that one is right-handed and that one is left-handed and the third is the middle; and then the same question will return, from what is this sort of position will be caused.

Therefore it is necessary that it be caused in the imagination, as if in the continuum in which the three squares are described in the aforementioned way, because in the continuum one is not made right-hand, the other left-hand, and the third middle, except through the fact that one is described in the right-hand part of space, the other in the left-hand part, and the third in the middle [part]. Therefore it is in the imagination in such a way that one is in one part of the organ and another is in another part and the third in the third part; but the power of imagination considers it so described and because it is thus described in the organ; therefore it operates in an organ and is organic.

Moreover let us further imagine a figure and image of the same man, one larger and one smaller. This cannot be caused by the thing, because it exists in [only] one way; nor is it caused by the form, because the form does not produce its [170b] diversity through being greater or smaller; therefore this come about

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from the subject in which it is describe and in which it is extended more and less. But it is only described as more and less in a body; therefore the organ of the imaginative [power] is a body, and it is an organic power which operates in such a body.

But the same thing is the case concerning the estimative [faculty] and phantasy, because their intentions are not separate from apprehended images; therefore all the aforementioned powers are organic and require a body for their operations. And in this way we understand the difference between the intellect and these powers, because it is in every way incorporeal.

*Chapter 5. On disproving the error of the ancients which said that understanding and sensation are the same [omitted].*

*Chapter 6. That imagination or phantasy is neither sense nor opinion nor estimation. [171b71]*

But in the same way *imagination* understood broadly so as to embrace imagination and phantasy, which use images, *is different from sensation and from intellect*; for *this* imagination indeed *never comes about without sensation*, that is it only comes about in what has sensation, *and without imagination* neither estimation nor *opinion* either *come about without imagination*, because although opinion is a certain acceptance of reason through probabilities, but because it is uncertain, it is necessary that it be mixed with phantasy. For the simple conceptions of the intellect are not uncertain, but always true. *But that intelligence and opinion are not the same as imagination*, about which we have spoken, *it is clear* from those things which will now be said. *For to imagine is a certain passion*, which is *in our power when we will*; for we can *depict an image (idolum)* in ourselves in such a way that it is *before our eyes* whenever we will, just like those things which *are posited* in the operation of *recollection* do. For from that which was deposited in the soul they [172a] come to something which was earlier before the eyes, and they refer the image (*idolum*) to something received in the past. And likewise we can depict an image not referring to the thing and then we will imagine it. *But it is not up to us to opine* or to understand, because it is necessary to have a reason which produces belief, and this is necessary for us to accept from the thing and not up to us. But the same is the case with estimation, because in these three things *it is necessary to declare* and discern something *true or false*, as if from belief (*sententia*); and this is not up to us, but rather from the thing of which the belief or truth or falsehood is proffered.

*But further when we have an opinion or an estimation of something difficult and terrible, a feeling (compassion) of fear or sadness follows immediately in*

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the affection; and this is the case because opinion and estimation are in accordance with the intentions of the things or certain beliefs concerning the things. *But the same thing happens if* we have an opinion or an estimation concerning something which *must be believed* as if of something fitting; for joy or hope follow immediately in the affection upon an opinion or estimation of this kind. *But* when we depict something *terrible* or something which *must be believed according to phantasy* or imagination, no passion follows in the affection, but *we are related* to such images (*idola*) *in the same way as we are* to those things which are not necessarily real (*in re*), but in such a way as if *as if we were seeing painted* things which are not real on a wall, and in that case no one would fear a painted lion or a painted wolf. But in imagination and phantasy there is even less of the truth of the thing than in the wall, as a fiction has less of the truth of a thing than something painted (*depictum*).

*But science, opinion, and prudence* and other intellectual virtues, moreover, like estimation in the case of the sensibles, *are types (partes) of acceptance*; but that which is not accepted as true is not accepted; but imagination and phantasy depicting an image accept nothing as true, therefore it is not a type of acceptance; therefore imagination and phantasy are not opinion or estimation.

But *concerning* the intellectual virtues which are types of acceptance and *to which* one consents as true, it belongs to another discourse to discuss (*dissere est altera ratio*); for this pertains to Book 6 of the *Ethics*, in which one has to determine the intellectual virtues. Therefore through these [arguments] it is established that imagination, and phantasy using images, is neither opinion or estimation.

*Chapter 7. That imagination and phantasy is neither sensation nor opinion nor opinion with sensation.*

[173b54] ... But let us begin this disputation in this way: for because we have already *determined* certain things *concerning phantasy*, in which we showed that it is neither opinion or estimation, it is now *necessary* for us *to speak of something else* which they say, namely whether *phantasy is* a type of understanding. And let us now take phantasy generally for imagination and phantasy, calling that entire power of the soul “phantasy,” *according to which a phantasm* or an image (*idola*) of a thing that is not present *comes about in us*. For phantasy is taken properly in this way when it is *not said metaphorically*; for intellect, which is accompanied by a phantasm, is sometimes called phantasy metaphorically.

Therefore according to those [philosophers] those who say that phantasy is a sort of understanding, it is necessary that phantasy *be a habitual power, according to which* it happens *that we speak truly* of the thing itself. But although there are many such powers, nonetheless four suffice at present, namely, *the common sense, opinion, science, and intellect*. For art and prudence,

which are also intellectual virtues, but also wisdom as well, according to which it happens that something is said to be true, have no similitude to phantasy, because wisdom is of the highest, first, and divine, which have no images, whereas art is a productive (*factivum*) principle accompanied by reason directing production and making, whereas prudence is an active principle accompanied by reason, and it is directive of things to be done by us; but imagination directs nothing in anyway, but rather it impedes every direct, as we showed above. But likewise we will prove that it is not some habit among those virtues which we have enumerated. For if it is [173] sensation or some part of it which is understanding, as they say, then it is necessary that it be a habit or habitual potency according to which we discern by sensing or according to which we say that something is true or false by affirming or denying; and then it will be some one of the habits named above.

...[173a24] *But* further, *if* sensation and phantasy said in any way *were the same actually* and essentially, then phantasy said in any way *would belong* to whatever sensation belongs. But sensation belongs to *every beast* according to some species and difference; therefore phantasy understood in any sense and according to any of its operations would belong to every animal. And this is *not* true, because we see *worms*, which crawl along (*sunt lumbrici\**) the earth, and flies, *cinifes*, *pediculos*, and incomplete animals of this sort perform no operation in relation to phantasy, in the way that we determined the operations of phantasy above. However, there is in such animals some imagination and estimation; for this was proven above. However, Aristotle *seems* to say that *ants and bees* do not have phantasy, which is entirely false, since such animals build dwellings by way of art, provide for their futures, and work as a group. But I think this is not due to any failing of the Philosopher, but rather it is because of the poor quality of the translation, because the translator did not know the names of the animals which Aristotle said did not have phantasy, and in place of them he translated ants and bees, corrupting the truth by a bad translation.

... [174a4] *Therefore it remains to be seen if it is opinion*, inasmuch as opinion is a sort of understanding, as the ancients said; and *opinion is sometimes true and sometimes false, but belief (fides) in the conclusion is intrinsic to opinion, for it cannot be the case that the one opining does not have a belief concerning those things of which he has an opinion*. For since doubt is an indeterminate motion of reason to either part of a contradiction, whereas ambiguity embraces each part of an argument through equally strong reasons, opinion stands in one part and believes in it on account of reasons which it has for it but not the other part, although it still fears the other part of the contradiction [might be true] because the reasons which it has for the one part are not demonstrative but probable. From this it is clear that everyone holding an opinion, which belongs to understanding and to reason, has a belief in that of which he has an opinion, *but such belief does not belong to any beast*, although *many* beasts have



*phantasy*. For although beasts acquiesce to their estimations, nonetheless they do not have belief nor credence, because just as science is the effect of demonstration, so too belief and credence is the effect of a probable syllogism.

Moreover, *if belief follows every opinion*—for whoever has an opinion has a belief, *but in this way belief follows upon being persuaded*, in such a way that no one is persuaded unless through reason, *but phantasy can belong to some of the animals*, as we showed above, although it does not belong to all of them, *but reason belongs to no animal*—therefore phantasy is *not* reason, nor consequently, opinion.

But from these things it is finally *evident that imagination is also neither opinion or estimation*<sup>3</sup> *conjoined with sensation*, as some said, *nor is it an opinion which is formed through a sensation conjoined to it, nor is it the completion and composition of opinion and sensation or of estimation and sensation*, because if *phantasy were opinion with sensation*, then there would not be any phantasy unless of those things of which there is actual or potential sensation; but we have shown this to be false above. ...

*Chapter 8. What phantasy is in truth, insofar as it is commonly said of imagination and phantasy.*

But if we wish to know in truth what phantasy is, inasmuch as it is commonly taken for the imagination in which images are described and for [175a] phantasy which uses them according to the mode determined above, [then it must be said] that in all things which are so constituted that *something is moved* to the form of the prime mover, just as actual sensation is made to be moved to the sensible form, necessarily that thing also moves something following it and proportioned to it according to the community of the mover and the moved. Therefore it is necessary that sensation made actual and having a sensible form moves the interior apprehensive powers close to it the sensible species which it has. ...<sup>4</sup>

*Chapter 9. On the reason for the name “phantasy” and on its utility.*

... [176b60] Therefore in this way just as there are five external senses—vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—so too are the five internal senses—the common sense, imagination, the estimative sense, phantasy, and memory; and

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<sup>3</sup> The text places *aestimatio* in italics as if it were a lemma from the *De anima*, but it is not found in the Latin text as given by the editors, and throughout this seems to be an additional point made by Albert himself.

<sup>4</sup> The chapter concludes with a discussion of the degrees of error among the three types of sensibles (proper, common, and incidental). It is noteworthy that Albert does not mention estimation explicitly in his account of the perception of the incidental sensibles or their propensity to error.

phantasy as commonly used includes within it imagination and phantasy properly so called. *Therefore concerning phantasy and the other internal senses, what it is and on account of what it is, has been declared by us in such a way.*