

STUDIA ARTISTARUM

Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales

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L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle
Autour du « Guide de l'étudiant » du ms. Ripoll 109

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L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle Autour du « Guide de l'étudiant » du ms. Ripoll 109

*Actes du colloque international
édités, avec un complément d'études et de textes, par*

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BREPOLS

Traditions and Transformations in the Medieval Approach to Rhetoric and Related Linguistic Arts

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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the transmission to the Latin West of the full Aristotelian corpus along with Arabic commentaries on Aristotle had a profound and often turbulent impact on medieval thought and institutions during the course of the later Middle Ages. Although the most prominent effects were those pertaining to the physical and metaphysical teachings of Aristotle, the more neutral and traditional linguistic and logical sciences of the trivium – grammar, rhetoric, and logic – also demanded conceptual rethinking in the light of the new material. In particular, traditional conceptions of the interrelations amongst the individual arts of the trivium required adjustment or defense once confronted with Arabic views on the divisions of the sciences, in which rhetoric and poetics were subsumed **within** the scope of logic through the classification of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* as parts of the *Organon*.

In what follows it is my intention to investigate how and to what extent the literature associated with the arts faculties of medieval universities was able to reconcile more traditional conceptions of rhetoric with the new classification of rhetoric as a logical art¹. I have grouped the litera-

1. There are a number of articles that address texts and issues relevant to the relationship between logic and rhetoric in the medieval Latin tradition: K.M. FREDBERG, *The Scholastic Teaching of Rhetoric in the Latin Middle Ages*, in *CIMAGL* 55 (1987), pp. 85-105; P.O. LEWRY, *Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, 1220-1320*, in *The History of the University of Oxford*, vol. 1: *The Early Oxford Schools*, J.I. Catto (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 401-433; *Id.*, *Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford in the Mid-13th Century*, in *Rhetorica* 1 (1983), pp. 45-63; C. MARMO, *Suspicio: A Key Word in the Significance of Aristotle's Rhetoric in Thirteenth-Century Scholasticism*, in *CIMAGL* 60 (1990), pp. 145-198; W.A. WALLACE, *Thomas Aquinas on Dialectics and Rhetoric*, in *A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and*

ture surveyed into two broad categories: (1) texts from the university arts faculties dealing generally with the division of the sciences; and (2) commentaries on the *Organon*. Since I am concerned principally with the absorption of the Arabic classificatory schemes, I will confine myself to these more general works and ignore the scattered commentaries on the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* itself that begin to appear in the late 13th century.

Before I turn to the Latin tradition, it will be helpful to offer a brief account of what I believe are the principal philosophical reasons why the Arabic Aristotelians adopted the expanded *Organon*, and to consider the extent to which the Arabic logical texts available to the Latin West afforded the Latin tradition the ability to understand the purposes and implications of the Arabic views.

2. THE ARABIC BACKGROUND

The tradition of including the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* in the *Organon* first appears, as is generally well-known, among the sixth-century Greek commentators on Aristotle, although its exact origins remain obscure. But in the few extant Greek texts in which this taxonomy is upheld, there is little detailed discussion of its rationale. In the Arabic tradition, however, the claim that the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* embody a logical teaching is taken seriously, and incorporated into all levels of logical speculation. Three features can be isolated as central to the Arabic philosophers' adherence to the logical construal of rhetoric and poetics²:

1. The generally universal acceptance of the claim that all of the logical arts are formally syllogistic in some way, leading to a strong emphasis upon the place of the enthymeme and example in rhetoric, and to the assertion that there is a properly poetic form of syllogism.

2. The construction of a detailed epistemological and psychological account of the differences amongst the syllogistic arts and their interrelations, based upon the classification of the different degrees and strengths of assent (*taṣdiq*) that can arise in the human mind. Generally this theme was developed in terms of the material component of the syllogism, that is, the nature of its premises and their effect on the epistemic status of the conclusion. Within this framework, rhetoric was said to aim at persuasion

Culture. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, R. LINK-SALINGER, J. HACKETT, M.S. HYMAN, R.J. LONG, Ch.H. MANEKIN (ed.), Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1988, pp. 244-254; and R.F. WASHHELL, *Logic, Language, and Albert the Great*, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 34 (1973), pp. 445-450.

2. See my *Logic and Aristotle's «Rhetoric» and «Poetics» in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill, 1990, for a consideration of both the Greek background and the Arabic interpretation of the expanded *Organon*.

(*iqnā'*) or a weak form of opinion or supposition (*zann* = Gr. *doxa*) variously characterized as uncertain, unreflective, probable, and easily open to opposition. Rhetorical supposition was explicitly compared to and contrasted with dialectical supposition, which is proximate to certitude and tends strongly to one side of a contradiction. In the case of poetics, its premises and conclusions were identified by their appeal to the imaginative faculty rather than the intellect, that is, by their ability to evoke an image (*al-takhyīl*) rather than an act of intellectual assent.

3. The **application** of these doctrines to one of the most pressing problems in political philosophy in the medieval Islamic world, namely the relationship between philosophy and religion. In the tradition of Islamic political philosophy that begins with al-Fārābī, the expansion of logic to include rhetoric and poetics provides the underlying epistemological structure which supports the claim that religion's principal function is to communicate to the non-philosophical masses, in a manner consonant with their intellectual capacity, the practical and theoretical truths that have been attained via demonstrative methods within philosophy³.

While the Latin West had access to texts which would expose them in some degree to all three of these elements within the Islamic interpretation of rhetoric and poetics, by and large this exposure was superficial and sketchy. The available texts included al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-ʿulūm* (Catalogue of the Sciences) and his incomplete *Didascalía in Rhetoricam*; the initial chapters of the *Isagoge* of Avicenna's *Shifā'* and the summary of Avicenna's classification of premise-types and syllogisms presented in the logic portion of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah* (Intentions of the Philosophers); and Averroes's *Middle Commentary on the «Poetics»*. What these texts conveyed was the mere outline of the three points I have highlighted; none explained the meaning of the claim that rhetoric and poetics are fully syllogistic (this is found especially in the *Qiyās* [Syllogism] volume of the logic part of Avicenna's *Shifā'* [Healing]), and none conveyed the rich details of the epistemological theory that surrounded discussions of these two arts⁴. But perhaps most impor-

3. This is expressed most fully in Part II of FĀRĀBĪ'S *Kitāb al-ḥurūf* (Book of Letters), ed. Muhsin MAHDI, Beirut, Dar el-Mashreq, 1970, although it is best known via its legal application in AVERROES'S *Decisive Treatise (Fāṣl al-Maqāl)*, ed. G.F. HOURANI, Leiden, Brill, 1959.
4. The Latin versions of these texts can be found in the following editions: AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, ed. J. LANGHADE and M. GRIGNASCHI, Beyrouth, Dar el-Machreq, 1971 (Pensée arabe et musulmane, XLVIII); and *Catálogo de las ciencias*, ed. A. GONZALEZ PALENCIA, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1953 (2d ed.); AVICENNA, *Logyca*, in *Opera philosophica*, Venice, 1508; AL-GHAZĀLĪ, *Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text*, ed. C.H. LOHR, in *Traditio* 21 (1965), pp. 223-290; AVERROIS *Ex-*

tantly, none of the texts available in the West conveyed fully what would potentially be the most controversial aspect of this taxonomy for a Western audience, namely, the connection between the expanded *Organon* and the claim that it is religion that is philosophy's handmaiden, and not the converse.

3. TEXTS FROM THE ARTS FACULTIES

As one might expect, texts which deal generally with the division of the sciences and stem directly from the arts faculty curriculum show the least interest in explaining or absorbing the logical classification of rhetoric and poetics. Their principal purpose is to present the arts as they are taught within the university curriculum of the earlier part of the thirteenth century, not to raise new philosophical concerns. In most of these texts, then, the expanded *Organon* is either ignored entirely, in favour of the more traditional scheme of the liberal arts; or it is mentioned but with no effort made to assimilate what is simply an anomaly to which the student need only pay the briefest attention.

Amongst the introductory texts recently edited by Claude Lafleur, only the anonymous *Philosophica disciplina* and Arnulf of Provence's *Divisio scientiarum* show any interest in the new taxonomy, and that interest is largely negative⁵. Both authors rely principally upon Gundisalinus's appropriation of Fārābī's *Catalogue*, which is usually quoted as if it were Fārābī's own text⁶. The author of *Philosophica disciplina* identifies the entire trivium as a collection of *scientie sermocinales*, and he is content merely to present three alternative classifications of these sciences without adjudicating amongst them: the trivium itself; the trivium plus poetics as a separate science; and the trivium plus poetics and the *scientia linguae*, the latter loosely deriving from Fārābī's *'ilm al-lisān* (science of language), understood as the study of the imposition of meaning upon vocal sound. The last classification is presumably meant to take the expanded *Organon* into account, but the result distorts Fārābī

positio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno, seu Poetria Ibn Rosidin, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, Bruxelles-Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968, pp. 38-74 (Aristoteles Latinus, XXIII).

5. The *Accessus philosophorum* does have a section devoted to rhetoric, but it does not broach the question of rhetoric's relation to the other arts of the trivium and focuses solely on the *Ad Herennium*. For the editions of these texts, see Cl. LAFLEUR, *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIII^e siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique*, Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales/Paris: Vrin, 1988 (Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, XXIII).
6. With somewhat odd results – the anonymous author has Fārābī quoting Horace, and Arnulf has him quoting Boethius and Cicero!

considerably: he is portrayed as merely expanding the trivium, not as subsuming rhetoric and poetics into one of its traditional branches⁷. The science of language is treated as a prelude to the traditional liberal arts⁸, and poetics is inserted **between** rhetoric and logic. Moreover, the compiler's placement of logic **after** both rhetoric and poetics in Fārābī's name, on the grounds that assent (*fides*) is posterior to poetic delight and rhetorical persuasion, is clearly incompatible with Fārābī's own claim that the emotive effects of rhetoric and poetics themselves produce a form of logical assent, or at least an analogue to it⁹. And when the author actually comes to deal with the individual arts of the trivium, there is no mention of any link between rhetoric, poetics and the Aristotelian *Organon*, and both arts are dissociated entirely from syllogistic¹⁰.

In contrast to the anonymous author of *Philosophica disciplina*, Arnulf of Provence does make explicit allusion to the inclusion of rhetoric and poetics in the *Organon* in the course of his treatment of logic. But his own approach remains the traditional one. In the initial treatment the trivium is labelled as «rational philosophy», but Arnulf immediately adds that rational philosophy is «concerned with language» (*de sermone*), because the sensible expression and communication of the conceptions of reason in speech is more «ready to hand». Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are treated as coordinate sciences, each of which is concerned with some aspect of the attempt to communicate the conceptions of the mind to oth-

7. It should be noted that the notion of the liberal arts as a principle of dividing the subjects of study is not present in the Arabic world. On this point see M. FAKHRY, *The Liberal Arts in the Medieval Arabic Tradition from the Seventh to the Twelfth Centuries*, in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge*, Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales/Paris: Vrin, 1969, pp. 91-97 (Actes du quatrième Congrès de philosophie médiévale, Université de Montréal, 27 août-2 septembre, 1967); and G. MAKDISI, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1981, pp. 75-80.
8. In the original text, Fārābī introduces the *'ilm al-lisān* as a way of incorporating the traditional study of Arabic grammar into the philosophical division of the sciences.
9. This ordering of the parts of *scientia sermocinalis* seems to imply that logic presupposes the completion of the ends of grammar, poetics, and rhetoric: assent requires that speech be not only grammatically congruous and comprehensible, but also emotively effective and fittingly presented. By contrast, Fārābī's attitude is that the methods of poetics and rhetoric, as the instruments of religion, are posterior to demonstration and dialectic (the methods of philosophy proper). The philosopher does not need poetics and rhetoric for himself, but merely uses them to present his demonstrations to others. On this see BLACK, *Logic and Aristotle's «Rhetoric» and «Poetics»*, pp. 63-71.
10. For this discussion of the trivium as a whole, see ANON., *Philosophica disciplina*, ed. LAFLEUR, in *Quatre introductions*, pp. 274-275; for the discussion of rhetoric, see pp. 279-282; and for logic, see pp. 282-285.

ers¹¹. When Arnulf comes to treat of logic itself, the expanded *Organon* is mentioned with reference to Fārābī's definition of logic (although it is Gundissalinus who is quoted), as is the correlation of each of the eight parts of logic with a specific Aristotelian text. But poetics and rhetoric are mentioned only generically (presumably because of the unavailability of the texts themselves at the time), and Arnulf dismisses their inclusion in the *Organon* curtly, as both un-Aristotelian and as against «common custom». The Boethian division of the parts of logic, culminating in the inventive-judicative distinction, is then presented¹². As for Aristotle, Arnulf reads him as dividing logic according to the various ways in which the syllogism can be considered, «since all of logic is concerned either with the syllogism or with its parts». But no mention is made at all of the notion of rhetorical and poetical syllogisms, not even for the purpose of refutation¹³.

Turning now to the final text from the arts faculty, the «*Barcelona Compendium*»¹⁴, we find once again that the trivium as a whole is identified as both *philosophia rationalis* and *scientia sermocinalis*¹⁵, with the differences amongst the three arts explicated according to the various relations that can obtain between the *intellectus* and the *vox*¹⁶. The com-

11. Three accounts of the relations among the sciences of the trivium are presented without adjudication. In the first account, grammar is said to deal with the simple intellectual origin of speech, logic with its expression of belief (*fides*), and rhetoric with its issuing in persuasion. The second account focuses on the orderly use of speech by the wise person to promote truth and right living among the *rudes*: grammar concerns itself with this ordering itself, logic with its truth, and rhetoric with its ornateness. In the last account, attributed to Isaac Israeli, grammar is associated with simple signification through speech, and both logic and rhetoric are associated with moving the audience, logic cognitively, and rhetoric appetitively (ARNULF OF PROVENCE, *Divisio scientiarum*, ed. LAFLEUR, in *Quatre introductions*, pp. 342-343).
12. ARNULF OF PROVENCE, *Divisio scientiarum*, ed. LAFLEUR, pp. 342-343.
13. ARNULF OF PROVENCE, *Divisio scientiarum*, ed. LAFLEUR, pp. 343-345.
14. All citations of the «*Barcelona Compendium*» refer to Cl. LAFLEUR, avec la collaboration de J. CARRIER, *Le «Guide de l'étudiant» d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIII^e siècle. Édition critique provisoire du ms. Barcelona. Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Ripoll 109, fol. 134ra-158va*, Québec, 1992 (Publications du Laboratoire de philosophie ancienne et médiévale de la Faculté de philosophie de l'Université Laval, I); the paragraph numbers will remain the same in the revised edition to be published in the *Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio mediaevalis* (Turnhout, Brepols).
15. Again, note the apparent desire to preserve the *sermocinalis* label while making the trivium essentially rational: «De tertia specie dicamus, que "rationalis" uocatur, uel alia ratione "sermocinalis", eo quod a sola ratione consistit» (ANON., «*Barcelona Compendium*», ed. LAFLEUR-CARRIER, § 134).
16. Grammar considers the asymmetrical relation (*comparatio*) of the intellect to the vocal sound insofar as the latter diversifies the former; this relation is what the *modi significandi* comprise. Logic considers only the relation or compatibility of one *intellectum* to another, in terms of identity and contradiction (*repugnantia*); this is the

piler openly admits that he is not much interested in rhetoric; he explains that he will treat it first (even though he has argued that it is posterior to both grammar and logic) because he has the least to say about it. But since this text contains a number of *dubitationes*, the author is forced to address more specific issues, including the relations between rhetoric and logic. But his treatment shows no inspiration at all from Arabic sources, even though a number of the issues he raises could afford an opportunity to adjudicate amongst the different classificatory schemes. The first question, for example, deals with the orator's use of enthymeme and example rather than syllogism and induction. The answer is framed with reference, first to the *Prior Analytics*' discussion of signs and probabilities, which the author associates with the example; and second to the need for brevity to effect persuasion, something accomplished by an abbreviated enthymeme better than by a syllogism. The author adds that the orator's concern with singulars rather than universals also explains his inability to use both syllogisms and inductions, since syllogisms are entirely on the level of universals, and while inductions may begin with singulars, they terminate in universals. The author avoids identifying the enthymeme and example as types of syllogism in this reply, and he seems undisturbed by the fact that his supporting authority here is a logical text of Aristotle's¹⁷.

In the long treatment of logic later in the text, the compiler once again shows some awareness of the formal affinities between logic and rhetoric, without allowing this to call into question their traditional places in the trivium. He identifies the syllogism as the subject-matter of logic, and like Arnulf, he divides logic according to the books of the Aristotelian *Organon*. But despite the fact that Fārābī is explicitly cited as an authority for his division of logic, rhetoric and poetics are not mentioned at all¹⁸. And when we reach the *dubitationes* on the *Prior Analytics*, we find another reference to Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme in a logical text. Here the objection is raised as to why this variety of «defective» syllogism is considered without a parallel treatment of the defective syllogisms

relation that produces truth and falsehood. And finally, rhetoric considers the asymmetrical relation of the *vox* to the intellect (the converse of grammar). According to the author, this relation obtains in rhetoric in virtue of its concern with speech as *ornatus* or *inornatus*, insofar as rhetorical *ornatus* is what disposes the vocal sound to be better understood by the intellect of the hearer. Each of these relations is in turn built upon the prior relation: ornateness presupposes truth, which presupposes congruous and intelligible composition (ANON., «*Barcelona Compendium*», ed. LAFLEUR-CARRIER, § 134).

17. ANON., «*Barcelona Compendium*», ed. LAFLEUR-CARRIER, § 148.
18. ANON., «*Barcelona Compendium*», ed. LAFLEUR-CARRIER, §§ 503-514. The five divisions of logic which occupy §§ 510-514 are illustrated by diagrams in Cl. LAFLEUR, *Logique et théorie de l'argumentation dans le «Guide de l'étudiant» (c. 1230-1240) du ms. Ripoll 109*, in *Dialogue* 29 (1990), pp. 336-340.

caused by the fallacies of *petitio principii* and *non causa ut causa*. The reply seems to treat the enthymeme as a sort of syllogism that violates the normal principles of syllogistic construction by relying upon propositions that remain in the mind alone. But it makes no explicit connection between rhetoric and the enthymeme, nor does this objection lead the author to address the claim that rhetoric ought to be subsumed under logic by virtue of logic's dominion over the enthymeme¹⁹.

It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the reasons for the overall reluctance to address the logical interpretation of rhetoric and poetics in university texts such as the ones just considered. The most obvious explanation for the lack of interest in the problem is that it reflects both the general neglect of rhetoric in the period and the absence of any central texts in the university curriculum that would explicate or even require acquaintance with the new taxonomy²⁰. Indeed the only explicit mention of rhetoric's inclusion in the scope of logic on the part of Arnulf of Provence supports this: on the level of the arts curriculum, the fact that the expanded *Organon* is «against common custom» and unnecessary for understanding either the standard texts of the *logica vetus* and *nova*, or the traditional Ciceronian and Boethian rhetorical texts, is sufficient to dismiss it. There are no deep doctrinal misgivings evident at all in his remarks.

4. COMMENTARIES ON THE *ORGANON*

Although the Latin commentators on the individual books of the Aristotelian *Organon* itself were no more interested in rhetoric for its own sake than were the compilers of general university texts, here we do find a more consistent effort to make sense of the logical interpretation of both rhetoric and poetics, although the effort nonetheless remains on the most general level. Usually the consideration of the logical classification of rhetoric arises in the course of introductory discussions of the nature of logic whose aim is to determine the place of the work being commented upon in the overall scope of the *Organon*.

The first two authors I wish to consider are Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great. Although Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum* is closer in intent to the university literature we have examined than to the Aristotelian commentaries, its approach to rhetoric, like Albert's, seems to represent a transitional stage in the interpretation of the expanded *Organon*.

19. ANON., «*Barcelona Compendium*», ed. LAFLEUR-CARRIER, §739.

20. On the general neglect of rhetoric by thirteenth-century philosophers, see the article by LEWRY, *Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford*, pp. 45-63.

Central to this approach is the explicit reliance upon the distinction between broad and narrow uses of the term «logic» as a means of accommodating the expanded scope of logic while preserving the traditional divisions amongst the liberal arts. In the broad sense, logic for Kilwardby is synonymous with *sermocinalis scientia* and coextensive with the trivium. But Kilwardby, like the arts faculty compilers, closely associates reasoning with language, and argues that all three «trivial» sciences teach one how to speak, write, and reason correctly; hence all three owe their historical origins and evolution to the desire of human beings to avoid error and arrive at certain truth²¹. And all three linguistic arts are said to study second intentions²².

In working out the specific relations amongst the three arts of the trivium, Kilwardby forges a very close link between logic and rhetoric, arguing that unlike grammar, which considers words as significative only of what is known, logic and rhetoric both share the property of being *inquisitivus* of what is unknown, implicitly invoking the famous Avicennian dictum that logic seeks knowledge of the unknown by way of the known, a dictum that becomes a veritable cliché in Latin logical commentaries²³. Indeed, argues Kilwardby, while all three arts of the trivium are rational in some way, only rhetoric and logic are *ratiocinativa* as well as *significativa* for this reason. In spelling out the differences between the two ratiocinative arts, Kilwardby relies heavily upon the Boethian distinction between theses and hypotheses to ground the claim that logic is concerned with the universal and rhetoric with the particular²⁴. In the

21. ROBERT KILWARDBY, *De ortu scientiarum*, cap. XLVI, §§419-423, ed. A.G. JUDY, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies/London: The British Academy, 1976, pp. 147-148 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, IV).

22. ROBERT KILWARDBY, *De ortu scientiarum*, cap. XLVII-XLVIII, especially §459, ed. JUDY, pp. 148-160 (p. 157).

23. Avicenna's account of the nature of logic is found especially in chapters two to four of the *Madkhal* or *Isagoge* of the logic of his *Shifā'*. See AVICENNA, *Al-Shifā'*, vol. I, *Al-Mantiq*, part 1, *Al-Madkhal*, ed. G. ANAWATI, M. EL-KHODEIRI, and F. AL-AHWANI, Cairo, Al-Matba'ah al-Amiriyah, 1952, pp. 15-24; for the Latin version see *Logyca*, ed. Venice 1508, pp. 1a-3b. The link between logic and second intentions is made in Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. See AVICENNA, *Al-Shifā': Al-Ilāhiyāt*, ed. M.Y. MOUSSA, S. DUNYA, and S. ZAYED, Le Caire, Organisme général des imprimeries gouvernementales, 1960, vol. II, pp. 10-11; medieval Latin translation, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, 2, in *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I-IV. Édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S. VAN RIET. Introduction doctrinale par G. VERBEKE, Louvain: Peeters/Leiden: Brill, 1977, vol. I, p. 10 (Avicenna Latinus, II, 1).

24. KILWARDBY, *De ortu scientiarum*, cap. XLIX, §§468-471, ed. JUDY, pp. 160-161. In §473, Kilwardby develops this point with special reference to the Ciceronian link between rhetoric and the civil realm. §§474-482 develop these same points in detail, with reference to a number of objections regarding the relationships among the individual linguistic sciences.

sections dedicated to logic and rhetoric respectively, this picture is modified somewhat. The generic use of «logic» to cover the whole trivium now becomes identified with *sermocinalis scientia* alone, whereas logic proper is labeled as *ratiocinativa*, and identified with the study of syllogistic²⁵. Given Kilwardby's remarks on the relations between logic and rhetoric on the more general level, this seems problematic, especially since he immediately proceeds to argue that the *Prior Analytics* teaches the proper form of reasoning for rhetoric as well as for dialectic and demonstration, since all three arts lead to belief (*fides*). Overall, however, the general thrust of Kilwardby's approach is to accommodate the logical interpretation of rhetoric on the broad, generic level, while restricting logic proper to the study of the syllogism insofar as the latter is aimed at universal conclusions and restricted to the books of the *logica nova* and *vetus*.

Albert the Great shares a general affinity to Kilwardby in dealing with these same sorts of questions, although he is more eclectic and makes explicit reference to Arabic sources, principally Avicenna, but also Fārābī and Ghazālī²⁶. The most extended treatments of the logical interpretation of rhetoric (and poetics) occur in the introductions to Albert's *Isagoge* and *Posterior Analytics* commentaries. In the first, the *De praedicabilibus*, Albert offers a general account of the nature of logic. Throughout this treatment, Albert employs the Avicennian characterization of logic as the method for acquiring knowledge of the unknown from the known, and he identifies logic as both rational and linguistic. In the course of his discussion, Albert makes numerous references to both rhetoric and poetics and cites approvingly their interpretation as logical arts on the part of his Arabic sources. Albert is especially fond of the Arabic theories that distinguish amongst the logical arts on the basis of epistemological criteria: logical reasoning proceeds either from signs to produce suspicion or presumption (rhetoric); from fictions so as to produce an estimation of delight or abomination (poetics); from common probable things to produce

25. KILWARDBY, *De ortu scientiarum*, cap. LIII-LVIII (on logic), especially §§492-495 and §523, ed. JUDY, pp. 167-201 (pp. 167-168 and p. 178). In the discussion of rhetoric (cap. LIX-LXI, pp. 202-212), the focus is almost entirely on rhetoric's connection to civil matters, although Kilwardby does make a concerted effort to link that connection to rhetoric's identification as rational (§§587-591, pp. 202-204).
26. For a discussion of Albert's relations to Kilwardby and the Arabic philosophers, see S. EBBESEN, *Albert (the Great?)'s Companion to the «Organon»*, in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung*, A. ZIMMERMANN and G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM (ed.), Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1981, pp. 89-103 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, XIV).

beliefs that are true *ut in pluribus* (dialectic); or from essential and proper causes to produce demonstrative certitude²⁷.

From these remarks, which occur in the first three chapters of Albert's *De praedicabilibus*, the initial impression is that Albert is following faithfully the Arabic tradition's expansion of the *Organon*, viewing rhetoric and poetics as simply and solely logical arts, where logic is understood not as coextensive with the trivium but as one of its three parts. But as Albert turns to the specific question of the subject-matter of logic in chapter 4, logic begins to take on a narrower meaning. Since logic aims at attaining knowledge of the unknown, its subject-matter, Albert argues, must be the instrument by which that goal is achieved, namely, argumentation, whose principal form is the syllogism. But «syllogism» is taken in its strictest sense, as it was by Kilwardby and the arts masters, to apply only to inferences which produce assent to a universal taken universally: the enthymeme, which is based upon topical relations that are not universal, is logical, but not syllogistic in the strict sense. Given this restricted view of the nature of the syllogism, Albert undertakes to refute those people who interpret any *scientia sermocinalis* as logical, making logic include not only rhetoric and poetics, but also grammar – that is, the trivium as a whole, with poetics separated out as a distinct art, just as it was in the university literature. Albert attempts to refute this view of logic by citing Avicenna's claims in his *Isagoge* and *Metaphysics* that speech is incidental to logic insofar as logic is concerned with second intentions²⁸. He agrees with Avicenna that language is of concern to the logician only for the sake of convenience and communication, and thus Albert implicitly rejects, in this context, the generic equation of logic with all the linguistic sciences. This is not to say that he goes so far as to deny the linguistic character of logic here; he simply uses the Avicennian polemic against the equation of logic and language as grounds for rejecting one possible way of reconciling the trivium with the expanded *Organon*. Ironically, however, this leads Albert to uphold the un-Avicennian exclusion of rhetoric and poetics from the scope of logic proper. For he proceeds to argue that only logic, in the restricted sense of the study of the universal syllogism, uses speech to produce assent (*fides*) to what was previously unknown. Rhetoric and poetics (along with grammar) are identified as studying speech in terms compatible with the expanded *Organon* – rhetoric to persuade, and poetics to delight or disgust the audi-

27. ALBERT THE GREAT, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tract. I, cap. 1, 2, and 3, in *B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, ed. A. BORGNET, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. I, pp. 1a-2a; 4ab; 5a-6a.
28. For the Avicennian texts, see note 23 above.

ence in order to provoke it to action – but the implication is that these ends are **not** achieved through any act of assent or belief²⁹.

In his most extended treatment of the scope and nature of logic, then, Albert uses the traditional view as his framework, incorporating elements from the expanded *Organon* and citing Arabic authorities; but he stops short of accepting the expanded *Organon* on its own terms. The same is true of Albert's approach in the text that on the surface seems to show the greatest influence of the expanded *Organon*, namely, Albert's introduction to his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*³⁰. The influence of the expanded *Organon* is felt here in Albert's extensive paraphrase of Ghazālī's enumeration of the various syllogistic arts based upon the epistemic status of their conclusions and the character of the premises from which they are constructed³¹. Since this classification of syllogisms and their premises explicitly refers to rhetorical and poetic propositions and modes of assent, Albert is forced to address the issue of the logical character of these two arts directly. Yet despite initial appearances to the contrary, Albert once again opts for a diluted version of the expanded *Organon* akin to that found in the *De praedicabilibus*, based upon isolating broad and narrow conceptions of logic. Once he has finished enumerating the thirteen varieties of propositions and begins to correlate each variety with its proper form of argumentation, Albert declares, «Arguments of diverse faculties are constructed from all such types of propositions, which are all included under logic **in general**, for even poetics, according to Aristotle, is contained under **general logic**» (my emphasis)³². A bit

29. ALBERT THE GREAT, *Liber de praedicabilibus*, tract. I, cap. 4, ed. BORGNET, pp. 6b-8b. This is also the position that Albert takes in the opening of his *De interpretatione* commentary, although in this case he simply equates *scientia rationalis* with *scientia sermocinalis*, opposing both to *scientia realis*. But in keeping with the Boethian reading of the term *interpretatio*, which implies the identification of the subject-matter of this text as *enunciatio* rather than *oratio*, Albert contrasts the orator and poet with the logician on the grounds that the latter alone is concerned with enunciative, truth-valued *orationes*, whereas the orator uses speech in order to charm, and the poet to urge delight or loathing or some other useful attitude in the imagination (*imaginabilis utilitas*). See ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Aristotelis Peri hermeneias*, I, tract. 1, cap. 1, in *B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, ed. A. BORGNET, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. I, pp. 373a-375b. In this case Albert has Aristotle's own remarks on non-indicative moods in chapter four of the *De interpretatione* to back up the dissociation of rhetoric from the text's logical concerns (17a1-8).
30. ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Posteriorum analyticorum Aristotelis*, I, tract. 1, cap. 1-2, in *B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, ed. A. BORGNET, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. II, pp. 1a-7b.
31. ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Posteriorum analyticorum*, I, tract. 1, cap. 2, ed. BORGNET, pp. 4a-7b.
32. ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Posteriorum analyticorum*, I, tract. 1, cap. 2, ed. BORGNET, p. 7a.

later, Albert again emphasizes that poetics and rhetoric belong to logic taken only in the **broad** sense. And he concludes his treatment by claiming that «it is clear from all this how far logic, understood in a general sense (*in genere accepta*), extends, and that the science which follows immediately upon the science of the syllogism absolutely is demonstrative science». And having made this remark, he proceeds to deal with the objection that the Arabic philosophers should not have interposed this treatment of non-demonstrative propositions as a prelude to their consideration of the *Posterior Analytics*, claiming that his Arabic sources intended to make clear «how far the science which is called by the common name of logic – which includes rhetoric and poetics – extends; and grammar, which Aristotle transmits along with logic, rhetoric, and poetics, precedes all of these [i.e., broadly logical, arts]»³³.

It seems clear, then, that despite his fondness for citing the Arabic texts available in Latin translation that convey the most about the expanded *Organon*, Albert himself remains far more tied to the liberal arts tradition, and like Kilwardby his principal tactic for dealing with the expanded *Organon* is simply to view it as the result of an extended use of the term «logic» which is coextensive with the trivium³⁴. It is not taken

33. ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Posteriorum analyticorum*, I, tract. 1, cap. 2, ed. BORGNET, p. 7ab. Albert is a bit more flexible in the next chapter, which considers the opening claim of the *Posterior Analytics* that all knowledge depends upon pre-existent knowledge, although he continues to treat rhetoric and poetics as distinct from logic proper and as coordinate with grammar. (See, for example, p. 8a, where Albert says that all arts and powers – grammar, rhetoric, poetics, and logic – use demonstration insofar as they are *docens*). The flexibility is forced upon Albert by Aristotle's own remarks on the enthymeme and example and their relation to the syllogism and induction. Albert is willing to reduce the enthymeme to the syllogism and the example to the induction, although once again he avoids treating the enthymeme as fully syllogistic, implicitly for the same reason he did in the *De praedicabilibus*: the rhetorical sciences persuade but they do not prove, because the middle terms and principles used in rhetoric fail to achieve the universality required by the conditions of *dici de omni* and *de nullo*; this is why they produce suspicion rather than certitude. Albert does say that enthymemes can become true syllogisms and that many examples can make an induction. (This seems to be part of his defense of the universal validity of the claim that all learning proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.) But in both cases something must be added to transform them: in the case of the example, one must add the claim that the property in question is similar in all things or in every single individual; in the case of the enthymeme, if one puts two enthymemes together, without any further additions, one generates a true syllogism. But such a concession is not the same as treating the enthymeme's own force as syllogistic, or recognizing its persuasive effects as forms of weaker though truly intellectual assent (see pp. 10b-11a).
34. Note should also be taken of another allusion to the broad sense of logic in Albert's commentary on the *Topics*. Here too Albert says that logic, taken generally, is a term for the entire trivium – or, allowing himself a bit of a pun, for the «quadrivium» if we wish to add poetics as a special science (as Aristotle did!). Logic in the narrow sense, by contrast, «is concerned with every syllogism», and the only three

to imply any radical reinterpretation of the syllogistic status of rhetoric and poetics, nor of the nature of their intended cognitive and appetitive ends³⁵.

Oddly enough, those authors who abandon references to the linguistic character of logic entirely seem to be the most likely to adopt the expanded *Organon* in its fullest form. In Thomas Aquinas's well-known presentation of the expanded *Organon* in the prooemium to his *Posterior Analytics* commentary³⁶, logic is identified solely as a rational science, the Avicennian theme of logic as a method of acquiring knowledge of the unknown reappears, and the traditional inventive-judicative distinction is incorporated into the framework of the expanded *Organon*. Aquinas elaborates more on the internal divisions within the discursive parts of logic than do many previous authors by calling upon the parallels between necessity and contingency in art and nature in order to explain the degrees of logical necessity. In this respect, he comes closest in spirit to the Arabic proponents of the expanded *Organon*, in particular Avicenna, who were especially concerned with the epistemological study of degrees of assent and their relation to and distinction from ontological degrees of necessity and possibility³⁷. Aquinas also elaborates further on the logical structure of the various acts of reason that fail to achieve certitude, again reflecting a prominent feature of the Arabic treatments of rhetoric and poetics. Reason may either achieve a certain and necessary judgement through demonstration; a belief or opinion, in which one side of a contradiction predominates (i.e., the believer leans more to *p* than to *not-p*) through dialectic; a mere suspicion of the conclusion, in which one in-

sylogisms enumerated are dialectical, demonstrative, and sophistical. See ALBERT THE GREAT, *In libros Aristotelis Topicorum*, I, tract. 4, cap. 2, in *B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, ed. A. BORGNET, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. II, pp. 278b-279a.

35. This approach also appears in John of Dacia's *Divisio scientie*. He treats the entire trivium as *rationalis*, citing Avicenna's identification of the subject-matter of logic as second intentions and the method of acquiring knowledge of the unknown from the known. He then adds that «Avicenna includes under logic the other rational sciences». But Avicenna includes rhetoric and poetics under rational science because he considers them to be parts of logic; and his remarks regarding the rational character of logic are meant to contrast it with grammar, not to encompass grammar within logic. See JOHN OF DACIA, *Divisio scientie*, in *Johannis Daci Opera*, ed. A. OTTO, Copenhagen, Gad, 1955, vol. I, part. 1, pp. 34-35 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, I, 1).
36. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Expositio libri Posteriorum; Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, t. I*, 2, *Expositio libri Posteriorum, Editio altera retractata, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum* (= ed. R.A. GAUTHIER), Roma: Commissio Leonina/Paris: Vrin, 1989, pp. 3a-7a.
37. On this point see BLACK, *Logic and Aristotle's «Rhetoric» and «Poetics»*, pp. 86-102.

clines somewhat more to one side of the contradictory pair, although without total adherence to it, through rhetoric; or an estimation of the conclusion, based on an imaginative representation, through poetics³⁸. At the end of the introduction, Aquinas reiterates the claim that all these logical arts are inferential, and therefore all pertain to rational philosophy; the one thing missing from his account is an explicit mention of the attendant claim that rhetoric and poetics are indeed truly syllogistic arts³⁹.

Aquinas also seems to be more amenable to a logical interpretation of rhetoric and poetics when commenting Aristotle's allusions to these arts at the end of *De interpretatione* chapter 4⁴⁰. Aquinas does accept as a partial explanation of Aristotle's remark that the *De interpretatione* is directly aimed at the study of demonstrative science. While this reading of the text can easily be taken as grounds for likewise restricting the scope of logic in general, Aquinas does not draw this inference. Rather, he focuses on the fact that demonstration is restricted to producing knowledge of things through their **proper** causes, in such a way that all extraneous grounds of assent are irrelevant to it. Non-enunciative modes of discourse are thus not treated as excluding entirely an appeal to the conception of the intellect: truth and falsehood may be implied in some way in these other types of *oratio*, but there is no **absolute** signification of concepts, nor of true or false judgements. Aquinas provides a theoretical justification for this claim by observing that the human soul has functions which go beyond the simple apprehension of truth and falsehood, namely, appetitive functions. But these appetitive functions are built upon cognitive ones, and they do in fact induce **assent**, although for what we would call subjective rather than objective reasons:

38. The theme of the degree of the knower's inclination to the opposite of the conclusion was an extremely important and often problematic aspect of the Arabic version of the expanded *Organon*, in particular its treatment of rhetoric. The only text available in Latin to address this characterization of the logical arts was Fārābī's *Didascalīa*, so I presume it was Aquinas's source. See AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Didascalīa in rhetoricam*, ed. LANGHADE and GRIGNASCHI, in *Deux ouvrages inédits*, p. 155.
39. This is noteworthy, given that Thomas's division of the text immediately mentions the demonstrative **sylogism** as Aristotle's topic. It seems that Thomas, like his predecessors, was not entirely comfortable with the claim that rhetoric and poetics are fully syllogistic, even though he seems to view them as truly logical. In commenting on 71a9, Aquinas too **contrasts** enthymemes and syllogisms, examples and inductions, on the grounds that syllogisms and inductions must be universal. But he is willing to call an enthymeme an abridged syllogism, and an example an incomplete induction (p. 9ab).
40. ARISTOTLE, *De interpretatione*, chap. 4, 17a6-8: «The present investigation deals with the statement-making (ὁ ... ἀποφαντικός) sentence; the others we can dismiss, since consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric and poetry» (Aristotle's «Categories» and «De interpretatione», Translated with Notes by J.L. ACKRILL, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 46).

«Therefore the demonstrator uses nothing but enunciative statements signifying the things insofar as their truth is in the soul in order to achieve his end; but the orator and poet induce assent to what they intend **not only** through what is proper to the thing, but also through the audience's disposition. Thus orators and poets usually try to move the hearers by provoking them to feel certain passions, as Aristotle says in the *Rhetoric*. Therefore, the consideration of the aforementioned types of speech, which are concerned with directing the hearer towards something, fall under the consideration of rhetoric or poetics, by reason of what is signified by them» (my emphasis)⁴¹.

By suggesting that rhetoric and poetics do have a cognitive end (in aiming at assent), that they **may** use what is proper to their subjects, but that they add to this emotive appeals, Aquinas once again links these arts more closely to the realm of logic construed as a rational science. Moreover, Aquinas goes on to distinguish the grammarian's study of the different types of speech in terms of the rules of congruous construction from the rhetorical and poetical use of non-enunciative discourse to direct belief and action. In this remark too he seems concerned to ensure that rhetoric and poetics are not being treated as adjuncts to grammar, but as extensions of logical study, in sharp contrast to the traditional adherents of the trivium.

The approaches to the expanded *Organon* in texts from the late 13th and early 14th centuries do not show much variation from the patterns established up to the time of Aquinas. In two of his commentaries on the *Organon*, Simon of Faversham presents a position similar to that of Aquinas, in which the expanded *Organon* is accepted even under a narrow interpretation of the scope of logic. More importantly, however, Simon explicitly upholds the syllogistic status of both rhetoric and poetics. In the prooemium to his questions on the *Isagoge*, poetics and rhetoric are both treated as truly discursive, syllogistic sciences: rhetoric is said to be discursive insofar as it moves from signs that produce suspicion or presumption. Aristotle's *Organon* is explicitly identified as consisting of seven parts, including rhetoric and poetics; and all seven parts (and the books corresponding to them) are said to be *de necessitate logice*. And while Simon does claim that rhetoric and poetics preserve the form and *ratio* of the syllogism less fully than demonstration and dialectic, he

41. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Expositio libri Peryrmenias; Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, t. I*, 1, *Expositio libri Peryrmenias, Editio altera retractata, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum* (= ed. R.A. GAUTHIER), Roma: Commissio Leonina/Paris: Vrin, 1989, pp. 37b-38b.

nonetheless implies that rhetoric and poetics are as truly syllogistic arts as is dialectic⁴².

In his *Questiones veterae* on the *Sophistical Refutations*⁴³, Simon adds to this perspective an explicit contrast between grammar and logic, arguing that grammar is founded upon language and offers direction in writing, whereas logic is founded upon the acts of the intellect and provides direction in reasoning (*ratiocinatio*). The liberal arts tradition is not neglected, but it is interpreted in terms of the expanded *Organon*, rather than the converse. Thus, the third act of reasoning, which is fully discursive, is identified with the whole *logica nova*, and it is said to be concerned with the syllogism. The Boethian division of logic into a *pars inventiva* and a *pars iudicativa* is used to bifurcate the new logic: but under the inventive part of logic, rhetoric and poetics are included, along with sophistry. (Simon omits to mention dialectic here.) The *Questiones novae* omit the contrast with grammar, but they develop in more detail the divisions of the inventive and judicative parts of logic; again, Simon follows the tradition of distinguishing the two parts according to whether or not certain knowledge is attained, but he fully incorporates rhetoric and poetics into the inventive part, identifying them as syllogistic and as producing some act of uncertain assent: «The inventive part of logic is concerned with that act of reason through which certain knowledge is not acquired, but rather, some other [kind of knowledge], whether it be belief and opinion, or suspicion, or some estimation of the conclusion. And in accordance with this the inventive part of logic has three parts: dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics [...]. Rhetoric is concerned with the syllogism through which suspicion is acquired, and poetics with the syllogism through which some estimation is acquired»⁴⁴.

Other logical texts from the late 13th century show the same unhesitating adherence to the expanded *Organon*; but they add a new element to the absorption of this taxonomy insofar as they forge a special link between rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, a link that is, once again, prominent in Arabic logical texts. Excerpts from Jacob of Douai's exposition of the *Posterior Analytics* cited in the notes to Gauthier's edition of Aquinas's commentary on the same text openly acknowledge the logical status

42. SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, *Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, in *Magistri Simonis Anglici sive de Faverisham Opera omnia, volumen primum: Opera logica, t. 1^{or}*, ed. P. MAZZARELLA, Padova, CEDAM, 1957, pp. 13-15.

43. SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, *Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum*, ed. S. EBBESEN, Th. IZBICKI, J. LONGEWAY, Fr. DEL PUNTA, E. SERENE, E. STUMP, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984, p. 28 (Studies and Texts, LX).

44. SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, *Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum*, ed. S. EBBESEN *et al.*, pp. 102-103.

of both rhetoric and poetics⁴⁵. But Jacob adds, as do many of the later commentators, an explicit defense of this position: he cites the *Rhetoric's* opening claim that rhetoric is a counterpart (*assecutiva*) of dialectic as evidence that Aristotle himself upheld the taxonomy first encountered via the Arabic philosophers. As a result of this new concern with direct Aristotelian testimony, moreover, Jacob makes more specific the association of rhetoric and poetics with dialectic. Rather than treating all three as coordinate species of the inventive part of logic, they are treated specifically as parts of dialectic. The cognitive acts aimed at by dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics do not change at all – they are identified as opinion, suspicion, and estimation, and they are ordered according to their decreasing strengths⁴⁶. But all three are characterized as acts of reason towards which **dialectic**, as a generic mode of argumentation, is ordained.

A recently edited anonymous prologue to Porphyry also upholds the syllogistic status of rhetoric and poetics by virtue of their close association with dialectic⁴⁷. Logic is again identified as purely a rational art: there is, however, an interesting variation in this text upon the rationale behind the subdivisions of logic which is, perhaps coincidentally, much closer to the underlying theory behind the Arabic views of the divisions of the *Organon*. The syllogistic arts and the theory of predication (as

45. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, ed. GAUTHIER, p. 7, editor's notes.
46. Jacob's characterization of poetics here is also the standard one. Jacob says that it proceeds *per similitudines*, and he repeats the Avicennian example of comparing something to disgusting food in order to repulse the hearer. See AVICENNA, *Madkhal*, pp. 18-19 (= *Logyca*, ed. Venice 1508, p. 2ab).
47. See C. MARMO, *Anonymi Philosophia «Sicut dicitur ab Aristotile»*. A Parisian Prologue to Porphyry, in *CIMAGL* 61 (1991), pp. 140-146, especially p. 145. The commentary on the *Prior Analytics* edited by MARMO in the same volume of *CIMAGL* (see ANONYMOUS CORDUBENSIS, *Questiones super primum librum Posteriorum*. A Partial Edition, in *CIMAGL* 61 [1991], pp. 107-139), also addresses the expanded *Organon*. The author takes the Avicennian position on the nature of logic: it is a *scientia rationalis* which concerns itself with second intentions, not a *scientia sermocinalis*, since it is only accidentally concerned with language. Rhetoric and poetics are both explicitly identified as possessing their own varieties of syllogism, since all the arts of logic that pertain to the process of composition and division – both judicative and inventive – concern themselves with truth and falsehood. The syllogistic status of both arts is further confirmed in one manuscript's account of question 4, which asks whether the syllogism is the subject of logic: here an affirmative reply is provided, partially on the grounds that demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics all treat of the subjective parts of the syllogism. The author even notes that poetic *estimatio* is a type of *cognitio*. Like Jacob, he finds Aristotelian authority for the inclusion of both rhetoric and poetics under the scope of logic: he too cites the *Rhetoric's* association of dialectic and rhetoric, and adds to this remarks in Hermann the German's version of Averroes's *Middle Commentary on the «Poetics»*, citing both, as was often customary, as if they were evidence of Aristotle's own views (pp. 122-124; p. 132, note b).

outlined in the *De interpretatione*) are both treated as simply compositive, the former composing subject with predicate, the latter composite statement with composite statement. The syllogism, in turn, can either be studied absolutely (*simpliciter*), that is, in terms of its formal composition, or materially, that is, insofar as it achieves a particular degree of necessity or probability. Rhetoric and poetics are, according to this scheme, once again grouped as parts of the *Topics*, since all three, in contrast to demonstration, attain only a probable, not a necessary, end⁴⁸.

Finally, there is one further approach that can be identified in the attempts of later authors to accommodate the expanded *Organon*, an approach that appears to be linked to the development of a more direct interest in the arts of rhetoric and poetics themselves. Within this approach, we find that the logical classification of rhetoric and poetics continues to be upheld, and there are vestiges of the close association of rhetoric and poetics with dialectic. But there is less interest in the syllogistic interpretation of either art, and the focus shifts from defending the internal logical character of the arts to explaining their instrumental character as tools for practical reasoning. An example of this approach is found in two works of Bartholomew of Bruges, the first a sophism on logic, the other an exposition of Averroes's *Middle Commentary on the «Poetics»*. In the sophism, Bartholomew repeats the familiar association between rhetoric and suspicion, poetics and estimation⁴⁹. Aristotle is cited as approving of the logical classification of rhetoric, once again through his remarks on rhetoric as dialectic's counterpart, and Hermann the German, al-Fārābī, and even Albert the Great are cited as upholding the logical status of poetics. For his own part, Bartholomew opts to rely upon logic's instrumental character and the traditional association of rhetoric with the ethical realm: rhetoric is in some sense the application of dialectic to the ethical realm. In the exposition of the *Poetics*, this is made even more explicit: logic has two branches, one applied to the discernment of truth from falsehood in the theoretical realm, the other applied to the discernment of good from evil in the practical⁵⁰. Rhetoric and poetics together comprise this logic of ethical reasoning. Given the context, little is said about the

48. Rhetoric is associated with *suspectio*, poetics with *estimatio*, as was customary; these are viewed as descending levels of *notitia*. The author also links his points to the status of the various known *libri logicales*: these six books are the principal books of logic; the other common university texts, such as Boethius's works and the *Liber sex principiorum*, are relegated to secondary status.
49. S. EBBESEN and J. PINBORG, *Bartholomew of Bruges and His Sophisma on the Nature of Logic*, in *CIMAGL* 39 (1981), pp. 64-65.
50. This text is edited by G. DAHAN, *Notes et textes sur la poétique au Moyen Âge*, in *AHDLMA* 47 (1980), pp. 171-239; the section that concerns us is found on pp. 223-224.

formal logical character of the two arts; but while Bartholomew does not call either syllogistic, he does claim that the *Prior Analytics* treats the general science that applies to both theoretical and practical methods⁵¹.

5. CONCLUSION

It is clear that throughout the course of the thirteenth century, Latin authors gradually came to appreciate more and more clearly the nature of the Arabic philosophers' logical interpretation of rhetoric and poetics and its essential incompatibility with any traditional approach to the trivium. Latin authors who were principally concerned with expounding Aristotelian logical texts rather than with defending the traditional liberal arts division of the sciences, and who assumed that the Arabic authors were transmitting Aristotle's own views on the logical character of his texts, became more and more comfortable with the idea of the expanded *Organon* until it became a commonplace of the introductory literature on logic. If there is any overall tendency to be seen in these texts, it is that of a move from the interpretation of the expanded *Organon* as a variation on the liberal arts to the interpretation of the liberal arts as an inchoate version of the expanded scope of logic.

There is no evidence at all, however, that this move represented any deeper commitment to, or interest in, the logical character of rhetoric and poetics on the part of Latin philosophers. Throughout the thirteenth century the taxonomy remains by and large a cliché, and it has little effect on

51. The idea that rhetoric and poetics comprise the part of logic that provides a tool for practical reasoning is repeated in an anonymous question on poetry also edited by DAHAN in *Notes et textes sur la poétique*, pp. 214-223. In this text logic as a whole is identified as rational. Insofar as logic is concerned with reason as discursive, it can be divided according to whether or not it directs reason in contingent or necessary matters. In the theoretical realm, this distinction differentiates dialectic from demonstration; in the practical realm, which is only concerned with contingent matters, a different principle of distinction must be sought. Thus, rhetoric and poetics, the methods of practical reasoning, differ in terms of their orientation: rhetoric directs one's practical reasoning as it applies to one's relations to others – given the legal orientation of rhetorical persuasion; whereas poetics, because of its focus on the peculiarities of each person's imagination, directs one's practical reasoning on a purely personal level. Despite the ethical focus, however, the author of this question maintains a central feature of the expanded *Organon*: both poetics and rhetoric are assigned their own forms of syllogism. This approach is similar to that taken by ROGER BACON in the *Moralis philosophia*, ed. E. MASSA, Zurich, Thesaurus Mundi, 1953, pp. 247-263. But Bacon's peculiar mix of themes from Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* with superficial references to Arabic sources makes his overall approach quite distinct from that of the authors we have considered in this study. For a consideration of Bacon's views on rhetoric, see J. HACKETT, *Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric in Roger Bacon*, in *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987), pp. 18-40.

the overall approach to the study of logic or language amongst Latin philosophers. In the most obvious place where one might expect the expanded *Organon* to have an effect – the interpretation of logic as linguistic or as rational – there are no discernible repercussions. Both linguistic and rational construals of the nature of logic in particular, or of the liberal arts as a whole, occur in the remarks of adherents and non-adherents of this taxonomy. If anything, the apparently more sympathetic view of logic as a broadly linguistic science provides a convenient escape for those authors who are eager to incorporate the newly available Arabic materials but ultimately uncomfortable with a strongly logical construal of rhetoric and poetics.

By the same token, the overall features of the logical theories of both adherents and non-adherents of the expanded *Organon* do not vary: their identification of the subject-matter of logic, its quest for knowledge of the unknown, the identification of the epistemic goals of rhetoric and poetics, and the use of traditional logical concepts, like the judicative-inventive distinction, remain constant in most of these authors. And many of those who adopt the strongest interpretation of the expanded *Organon* will still stop short of attributing full syllogistic force to rhetoric and poetics, often because of their adherence to the link between true syllogistic reasoning and a concern with the universal as universal.

But almost all of these features which produce hesitation in the Latin authors are in fact fully incorporated into the Arabic philosophers' insistence on the logical status of rhetoric and poetics. What, then, explains the differences in interest in this doctrine between the Arabic and Latin traditions? At bottom, I believe that the explanation lies in the predominantly instrumental view of logic in both traditions, and the absence of any real outlet in the Latin West for **applying** the notion of rhetoric and poetics as logical to important philosophical problems. While the traditional link between rhetoric and poetics and the ethico-political realm was recognized in the Latin West, that link was upheld in purely practical and legal terms: rhetoric was principally for persuading a judge in legal matters, and most logical commentators were not much interested in such an application. But in the Arabic world, the political and practical applications of rhetoric and poetics were construed much more broadly – they provided the logical and theoretical framework for working out the relations between philosophy and religion, relations that were a major preoccupation within Islamic philosophy. Without a fuller understanding of why the Arabic tradition took such a keen interest in the logical status of rhetoric and poetics, Latin authors could not be expected to pay more than lipservice to the doctrine. Neither its epistemological merits, nor the

implicit dangers that its political side posed to the hegemony of religion over philosophy, could be properly assessed, absorbed, or refuted.

La grammaire dans le « *Guide de l'étudiant* »

Irène Rosier

La section sur la grammaire du « *Guide de l'étudiant* » est importante puisque sur 99 colonnes, elle en couvre 24. L'étude de son organisation et de son contenu donne des indications, parfois difficiles à interpréter cependant, sur le milieu où il a pu être élaboré.

1. LES SOURCES

Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, je voudrais soulever une question d'ordre méthodologique. Comment procéder pour « expertiser » une section du « *Guide* » ? J'ai d'une part étudié les statuts et les classifications des sciences, qui donnent d'ailleurs, nous le verrons bientôt, des informations qui ne se recoupent que partiellement. D'autre part, l'enquête s'est poursuivie par l'étude de la production grammaticale artienne. Or, ici, la difficulté tient au fait que nous ne disposons de presque aucun texte édité pour la première période universitaire, et que la majeure partie de cette production est anonyme et sans date. Un point fixe dans cet ensemble flou est Robert Kilwardby, dont l'enseignement des Arts s'est déroulé pendant les années 1237-1245¹. Sur sa production grammaticale de nombreuses incertitudes subsistent, puisque si son commentaire sur le *Priscien Mineur* est très certainement authentique, il n'en va pas de même pour les autres œuvres qui lui sont attribuées, le commentaire sur le *Barbarismus* de Donat et sur le *De accentu* du Pseudo-Priscien, tous deux édités², et les sophismes grammaticaux, en cours d'édition. Quant au

¹ Voir les travaux de P.O. LEWRY, et notamment sa thèse: *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the « Logica vetus » Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method*, Oxford, 1978; on se reportera, pour une présentation synthétique, à l'article *Robert Kilwardby (circa 1215-1279)*, rédigé par le même auteur, dans *Medieval Philosophers*, J. HACKETT (éd.), Detroit-London, Gale Research, 1992, pp. 257-262 (Dictionary of Literary Biography, CXV).

² ROBERTUS KILWARDBY O.P., *In Donati Artem maiorem III*, éd. L. SCHMÜCKER, H. Brixen, Weger, 1984; *Id.*, *Notulae libri De accentibus*, éd. P.O. LEWRY, *Thirteenth-*