L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle

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Traditions and Transformations in the Medieval Approach to Rhetoric and Related Linguistic Arts

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1. General Introduction

It is well known that the transmission to the Latin West of the full Aristotelian corpus along with Arabic commentaries on Aristotle had a profound and often turbulent impact on medieval thought and institutions during the course of the later Middle Ages. Although the most prominent effects were those pertaining to the physical and metaphysical teachings of Aristotle, the more neutral and traditional linguistic and logical sciences of the trivium – grammar, rhetoric, and logic – also demanded conceptual rethinking in the light of the new material. In particular, traditional conceptions of the interrelations amongst the individual arts of the trivium required adjustment or defense once confronted with Arabic views on the divisions of the sciences, in which rhetoric and poetics were subsumed within the scope of logic through the classification of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics as parts of the Organon.

In what follows it is my intention to investigate how and to what extent the literature associated with the arts faculties of medieval universities was able to reconcile more traditional conceptions of rhetoric with the new classification of rhetoric as a logical art. I have grouped the litera-

ture surveyed into two broad categories: (1) texts from the university arts faculties dealing generally with the division of the sciences; and (2) commentaries on the Organon. Since I am concerned principally with the absorption of the Arabic classificatory schemes, I will confine myself to these more general works and ignore the scattered commentaries on the Aristotelian Rhetoric itself that begin to appear in the late 13th century.

Before I turn to the Latin tradition, it will be helpful to offer a brief account of what I believe are the principal philosophical reasons why the Arabic Aristotelians adopted the expanded Organon, and to consider the extent to which the Arabic logical texts available to the Latin West afforded the Latin tradition the ability to understand the purposes and implications of the Arabic views.

2. THE ARABIC BACKGROUND

The tradition of including the Rhetoric and Poetics in the Organon first appears, as is generally well-known, among the sixth-century Greek commentators on Aristotle, although its exact origins remain obscure. But in the few extant Greek texts in which this taxonomy is upheld, there is little detailed discussion of its rationale. In the Arabic tradition, however, the claim that the Rhetoric and Poetics embody a logical teaching is taken seriously, and incorporated into all levels of epistemological speculation. Three features can be isolated as central to the Arabic philosophers' adherence to the logical construal of rhetoric and poetics:

1. The generally universal acceptance of the claim that all of the logical arts are formally syllogistic in some way, leading to a strong emphasis upon the place of the enthymeme and example in rhetoric, and to the assertion that there is a properly poetic form of syllogism.

2. The construction of a detailed epistemological and psychological account of the differences among the syllogistic arts and their interrelations, based upon the classification of the different degrees and strengths of asseveration (tanzīl) that can arise in the human mind. Generally this theme was developed in terms of the material component of the syllogism, that is, the nature of its premises and their effect on the epistemic status of the conclusion. Within this framework, rhetoric was said to aim at persuasion (iqna') or a weak form of opinion or supposition (qam = Gr. doxa) variously characterized as uncertain, unreflective, probable, and easily open to opposition. Rhetorical supposition was explicitly compared to and contrasted with dialectical supposition, which is proximate to certitude and tends strongly to one side of a contradiction. In the case of poetics, its premises and conclusions were identified by their appeal to the imaginative faculty rather than the intellect, that is, by their ability to evoke an image (al-tahrîyīl) rather than an act of intellectual assent.

3. The application of these doctrines to one of the most pressing problems in political philosophy in the medieval Islamic world, namely the relationship between philosophy and religion. In the tradition of Islamic political philosophy that begins with al-Fârâbî, the expansion of logic to include rhetoric and poetics provides the underlying epistemological structure which supports the claim that religion's principal function is to communicate to the non-philosophical masses, in a manner consonant with their intellectual capacity, the practical and theoretical truths that have been attained via demonstrative methods within philosophy.

While the Latin West had access to texts which would expose them in some degree to all three of these elements within the Islamic interpretation of rhetoric and poetics, by and large this exposure was superficial and sketchy. The available texts included al-Fârâbî's Ikhtîṣâs al-ilmâm (Catalogue of the Sciences) and his incomplete Didascalia in Rhetoricam; the initial chapters of the Isagoge of Avicenna's Shifa' and the summary of Avicenna's classification of premise-types and syllogisms presented in the logic portion of al-Ghazâlî's Maqāṣid al-falāṣīfī (Intentions of the Philosophers); and Avrozzo's Middle Commentary on the Poetics. What these texts conveyed was the mere outline of the three points I have highlighted; none explained the meaning of the claim that rhetoric and poetics are fully syllogistic (this is found especially in the Qiyas [Syllogism] volume of the logic part of Avicenna's Shifa' [Healing]), and none conveyed the rich details of the epistemological theory that surrounded discussions of these two arts. But perhaps most impor-

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2. See my Logic and Aristotle's «Rhetoric» and «Poetics» in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 1990, for a consideration of both the Greek background and the Arabic interpretation of the expanded Organon.

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4. The Latin versions of these texts can be found in the following editions: Al-Fârâbî, Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique, ed. J. Langhade and M. Grignarbi, Beyrouth, Dar el-Machreq, 1971 (Pensee arabe et musulmane, XLVIII); and Catálogo de las ciencias, ed. A. González Palencia, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1953 (2nd ed.); AVICENNA, Logica, in Opera philosophica, Venice, 1508; AL-GHAZALI, Logica Alghazelis: Introduction and Critical Text, ed. C.H. Lohr, in Traditio 21 (1965), pp. 223-290; AVERROES Ex-
tantly, none of the texts available in the West conveyed fully what would potentially be the most controversial aspect of this taxonomy for a Western audience, namely, the connection between the expanded Organon and the claim that it is religion that is philosophy's handmaiden, and not the converse.

3. TEXTS FROM THE ARTS FACULTIES

As one might expect, texts which deal generally with the division of the sciences and stem directly from the arts faculty curriculum show the least interest in explaining or absorbing the logical classification of rhetoric and poetics. Their principal purpose is to present the arts as they are taught within the university curriculum of the earlier part of the thirteenth century, not to raise new philosophical concerns. In most of these texts, then, the expanded Organon is either ignored entirely, in favour of the more traditional scheme of the liberal arts; or it is mentioned but with no effort made to assimilate what is simply an anomaly to which the student need only pay the briefest attention.

Amongst the introductory texts recently edited by Claude Lafleur, only the anonymous Philosophica disciplina and Arnulf of Provence's Divisio scientiarum show any interest in the new taxonomy, and that interest is largely negative.6 Both authors rely principally upon Gundissalinus's appropriation of Fârâbî's Catalogue, which is usually quoted as if it were Fârâbî's own text. The author of Philosophica disciplina identifies the entire trivium as a collection of scientia sermocinale, and he is content merely to present three alternative classifications of these sciences without adjudicating amongst them: the trivium itself; the trivium plus poetics as a separate science; and the trivium plus poetics and the scientia linguae, the latter loosely deriving from Fârâbî's *ilm al-lisān (science of language), understood as the study of the imposition of meaning upon vocal sound. The last classification is presumably meant to take the expanded Organon into account, but the result distorts Fârâbî considerably: he is portrayed as merely expanding the trivium, not as subsuming rhetoric and poetics into one of its traditional branches.7 The science of language is treated as a prelude to the traditional liberal arts, and poetics is inserted between rhetoric and logic. Moreover, the compiler's placement of logic after both rhetoric and poetics in Fârâbî’s name, on the grounds that assent (fides) is posterior to poetic delight and rhetorical persuasion, is clearly incompatible with Fârâbî’s own claim that the emotive effects of rhetoric and poetics themselves produce a form of logical assent, or at least an analogue to it.8 And when the author actually comes to deal with the individual arts of the trivium, there is no mention of any link between rhetoric, poetics and the Aristotelian Organon, and both arts are dissociated entirely from syllogistic.9

In contrast to the anonymous author of Philosophica disciplina, Arnulf of Provence does make explicit allusion to the inclusion of rhetoric and poetics in the Organon in the course of his treatment of logic. But his own approach remains the traditional one. In the initial treatment the trivium is labelled as «rational philosophy», but Arnulf immediately adds that rational philosophy is «concerned with language» (de sermone), because the sensible expression and communication of the conceptions of reason in speech is more «ready to hand». Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are treated as coordinate sciences, each of which is concerned with some aspect of the attempt to communicate the conceptions of the mind to oth-

7. It should be noted that the notion of the liberal arts as a principle of dividing the subjects of study is not present in the Arabic world. On this point see M. FAKHY, The Liberal Arts in the Medieval Arabic Tradition from the Seventh to the Twelfth Centuries, in Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge, Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales/Pas: Vrin, 1969, pp. 91-97 (Actes du quatrième Congrès de philosophe médiévales, Université de Montréal, 27 août-2 septembre, 1967); and G. MAKRIS, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1981, pp. 75-80.

8. In the original text, Fârâbî introduces the *ilm al-lisān as a way of incorporating the traditional study of Arabic grammar into the philosophical division of the sciences.

9. This ordering of the parts of scientia sermocinale seems to imply that logic presupposes the completion of the other parts of the trivium and focuses solely on the Ad Herennium. For the editions of these texts, see CL. LAFLEUR, Quatre introductions à la philosophie au xiiie siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique, Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales/Paris: Vrin, 1988 (Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, XXIII).

10. For this discussion of the trivium as a whole, see ANON., Philosophica disciplina, ed. LAFLEUR, in Quatre introductions, pp. 274-275; for the discussion of rhetoric, see pp. 279-282; and for logic, see pp. 285-288.  

5. The *Accessus philosophorum* does have a section devoted to rhetoric, but it does not broach the question of rhetoric’s relation to the other arts of the trivium and focuses solely on the *Ad Herennium*. For the editions of these texts, see CL. LAFLEUR, Quatre introductions à la philosophie au xiiie siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique, Montréal: Institut d'études médiévales/Paris: Vrin, 1988 (Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, XXIII).

6. With somewhat odd results — the anonymous author has Fârâbî quoting Horace, and Arnulf has him quoting Boethius and Cicero!
When Arnulf comes to treat of logic itself, the expanded *Organon* is mentioned with reference to Fārābī’s definition of logic (although it is Gundissalinus who is quoted), as is the correlation of each of the eight parts of logic with a specific Aristotelian text. But poetics and rhetoric are mentioned only generically (presumably because of the unavailability of the texts themselves at the time), and Arnulf dismisses their inclusion in the *Organon* curtly, as both un-Aristotelian and as against «common custom». The Boethian division of the parts of logic, culminating in the inventive-judicative distinction, is then presented. As for Aristotle, Arnulf reads him as dividing logic according to the various ways in which the syllogism can be considered, «since all of logic is concerned either with the syllogism or with its parts». But no mention is made of all of the notion of rhetorical and poetical syllogisms, not even for the purpose of refutation.

Turning now to the final text from the arts faculty, the «Barcelona Compendium»14, we find once again that the trivium as a whole is identified as both *philosophia rationalis* and *scientia sermocinalis*15, with the differences amongst the three arts explicated according to the various relations that can obtain between the *intellectus* and the *vox*16. The compiler openly admits that he is not much interested in rhetoric; he explains that he will treat it first (even though he has argued that it is posterior to both grammar and logic) because he has the least to say about it. But since this text contains a number of *dubitaciones*, the author is forced to address more specific issues, including the relations between rhetoric and logic. But his treatment shows no inspiration at all from Arabic sources, even though a number of the issues he raises could afford an opportunity to adjudicate amongst the different classificatory schemes. The first question, for example, deals with the orator’s use of enthymeme and example rather than syllogism and induction. The answer is framed with reference, first to the Prior Analytics’ discussion of signs and probabilities, which the author associates with the example; and second to the need for brevity to effect persuasion, something accomplished by an abbreviated enthymeme better than by a syllogism. The author adds that the orator’s concern with singulars rather than universals also explains his inability to use both syllogisms and inductions, since syllogisms are entirely on the level of universals, and while inductions may begin with singulars, they terminate in universals. The author avoids identifying the enthymeme and example as types of syllogism in this reply, and he seems undisturbed by the fact that his supporting authority here is a logical text of Aristotle’s17.

In the long treatment of logic later in the text, the compiler once again shows some awareness of the formal affinities between logic and rhetoric, without allowing this to call into question their traditional places in the trivium. He identifies the syllogism as the subject-matter of logic, and like Arnulf, he divides logic according to the books of the Aristotelian Organon. But despite the fact that Fārābī is explicitly cited as an authority for his division of logic, rhetoric and poetics are not mentioned at all18. And when we reach the *dubitaciones* of the Prior Analytics, we find another reference to Aristotle’s treatment of the enthymeme in a logical text. Here the objection is raised as to why this variety of «defective» syllogism is considered without a parallel treatment of the defective syllogisms

relation that produces truth and falsehood. And finally, rhetoric considers the asymmetrical relation of the *vox* to the *intellectus* (the converse of grammar). According to the author, this relation obtains in rhetoric in virtue of its concern with speech as *ornatus* or *inornatus*, insofar as rhetorical *ornatus* is what disposposes the vocal sound to be better understood by the intellect of the hearer. Each of these relations is in turn built upon the prior relation: *ornatus* presumes truth, which presupposes congruous and intelligible composition (Anon., «Barcelona Compendium», ed. Lafleur-Carrier, §134).

caused by the fallacies of *petitio principii* and *non causa ut causa*. The reply seems to treat the enthymeme as a sort of syllogism that violates the normal principles of syllogistic construction by relying upon propositions that remain in the mind alone. But it makes no explicit connection between rhetoric and the enthymeme, nor does this objection lead the author to address the claim that rhetoric ought to be subsumed under logic by virtue of logic's dominion over the enthymeme.  

It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the reasons for the overall reluctance to address the logical interpretation of rhetoric and poetics in university texts such as the ones just considered. The most obvious explanation for the lack of interest in the problem is that it reflects both the general neglect of rhetoric in the period and the absence of any central texts in the university curriculum that would explicate or even require acquaintance with the new taxonomy. Indeed the only explicit mention of rhetoric's inclusion in the scope of logic on the part of Arnulf of Provence supports this: on the level of the arts curriculum, the fact that the expanded *Organon* is «against common custom» and unnecessary for understanding either the standard texts of the *logica vetus* and *nova*, or the traditional Ciceroonian and Boethian rhetorical texts, is sufficient to dismiss it. There are no deep doctrinal misgivings evident at all in his remarks.

4. COMMENTARIES ON THE *ORGANON*

Although the Latin commentators on the individual books of the Aristotelian *Organon* itself were no more interested in rhetoric for its own sake than were the compilers of general university texts, here we do find a more consistent effort to make sense of the logical interpretation of both rhetoric and poetics, although the effort nonetheless remains on the most general level. Usually the consideration of the logical classification of rhetoric arises in the course of introductory discussions of the nature of logic whose aim is to determine the place of the work being commented upon in the overall scope of the *Organon*.

The first two authors I wish to consider are Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great. Although Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum* is closer in intent to the university literature we have examined than to the Aristotelian commentaries, its approach to rhetoric, like Albert's, seems to represent a transitional stage in the interpretation of the expanded *Organon*.


Central to this approach is the explicit reliance upon the distinction between broad and narrow uses of the term «logic» as a means of accommodating the expanded scope of logic while preserving the traditional divisions amongst the liberal arts. In the broad sense, logic for Kilwardby is synonymous with *sermo/nalis scientia* and coextensive with the trivium. But Kilwardby, like the arts faculty compilers, closely associates reasoning with language, and argues that all three «trivial» sciences teach one how to speak, write, and reason correctly; hence all three owe their historical origins and evolution to the desire of human beings to avoid error and arrive at certain truth. And all three linguistic arts are said to study second intentions.  

In working out the specific relations amongst the three arts of the trivium, Kilwardby forges a very close link between logic and rhetoric, arguing that unlike grammar, which considers words as significative only of what is known, logic and rhetoric both share the property of being *inquisitivus* of what is unknown, implicitly invoking the famous Avicennian dictum that logic seeks knowledge of the unknown by way of the known, a dictum that becomes a veritable cliché in Latin logical commentaries. Indeed, argues Kilwardby, while all three arts of the trivium are rational in some way, only rhetoric and logic are *ratio/cinativa* as well as *significativa* for this reason. In spelling out the differences between the two ratiocinative arts, Kilwardby relies heavily upon the Boethian distinction between theses and hypotheses to ground the claim that which is concerned with the universal and rhetoric with the particular.
sections dedicated to logic and rhetoric respectively, this picture is modified somewhat. The generic use of «logic» to cover the whole trivium now becomes identified with sermoconfirmis scientia alone, whereas logic proper is labeled as ratiocinativa, and identified with the study of syllogistic. Given Kilwardby’s remarks on the relations between logic and rhetoric on the more general level, this seems problematic, especially since he immediately proceeds to argue that the Prior Analytics teaches the proper form of reasoning for rhetoric as well as for dialectic and demonstration, since all three arts lead to belief (fides). Overall, however, the general thrust of Kilwardby’s approach is to accommodate the logical interpretation of rhetoric on the broad, generic level, while restricting logic proper to the study of the syllogism insofar as the latter is aimed at universal conclusions and restricted to the books of the logica nova and vetus.

Albert the Great shares a general affinity to Kilwardby in dealing with these same sorts of questions, although he is more eclectic and makes explicit reference to Arabic sources, principally Avicenna, but also Fārābī and Ghazāli. The most extended treatments of the logical interpretation of rhetoric (and poetics) occur in the introductions to Albert’s Isagoge and Posterior Analytics commentaries. In the first, the De praedicabilibus, Albert offers a general account of the nature of logic. Throughout this treatment, Albert employs the Avicennian characterization of logic as the method for acquiring knowledge of the unknown from the known, and he identifies logic as both rational and linguistic. In the course of his discussion, Albert makes numerous references to both rhetoric and poetics and cites approvingly their interpretation as logical arts on the part of his Arabic sources. Albert is especially fond of the Arabic theories that distinguish amongst the logical arts on the basis of epistemological criteria: logical reasoning proceeds either from signs to produce suspicion or presumption (rhetoric); from fictions so as to produce an estimation of delight or abomination (poetics); from common probable things to produce beliefs that are true ut in pluribus (dialectic); or from essential and proper causes to produce demonstrative certitude.

From these remarks, which occur in the first three chapters of Albert’s De praedicabilibus, the initial impression is that Albert is following faithfully the Arabic tradition’s expansion of the Organon, viewing rhetoric and poetics as simply and solely logical arts, where logic is understood not as coextensive with the trivium but as one of its three parts. But as Albert turns to the specific question of the subject-matter of logic in chapter 4, logic begins to take on a narrower meaning. Since logic aims at attaining knowledge of the unknown, its subject-matter, Albert argues, must be the instrument by which that goal is achieved, namely, argumentation, whose principal form is the syllogism. But «syllogism» is taken in its strictest sense, as it was by Kilwardby and the arts masters, to apply only to inferences which produce assent to a universal taken universally: the enthymeme, which is based upon topical relations that are not universal, is logical, but not syllogistic in the strict sense. Given this restricted view of the nature of the syllogism, Albert undertakes to refute those people who interpret any scientia sermoconfirmis as logical, making logic include not only rhetoric and poetics, but also grammar—that is, the trivium as a whole, with poetics separated out as a distinct art just as it was in the university literature. Albert attempts to refute this view of logic by citing Avicenna’s claims in his Isagoge and Metaphysics that speech is incidental to logic insofar as logic is concerned with second intentions. He agrees with Avicenna that language is of concern to the logician for the sake of convenience and communication, and thus Albert implicitly rejects, in this context, the generic equation of logic with all the linguistic sciences. This is not to say that he goes so far as to deny the linguistic character of logic here; he simply uses the Avicennian polemic against the equation of logic and language as grounds for rejecting one possible way of reconciling the trivium with the expanded Organon. Ironically, however, this leads Albert to uphold the un-Avicennian exclusion of rhetoric and poetics from the scope of logic proper. For he proceeds to argue that only logic, in the restricted sense of the study of the universal syllogism, uses speech to produce assent (fides) to what was previously unknown. Rhetoric and poetics (along with grammar) are identified as studying speech in terms compatible with the expanded Organon—rhetoric to persuade, and poetics to delight or disgust the audi-

25. KILWARDBY, De orbe scientiarum, cap. LIII-LVIII (on logic), especially §§492-495 and §523, ed. JUDY, pp. 167-201 (pp. 167-168 and p. 178). In the discussion of rhetoric (cap. LIX-LXI, pp. 202-212), the focus is almost entirely on rhetoric’s connection to civil matters, although Kilwardby does make a concerted effort to link that connection to rhetoric’s identification as rational (§§587-591, pp. 202-204).


27. ALBERT THE GREAT, Liber de praedicabilibus, tract. 1, cap. 1, 2, and 3, in B. Alberti Magni, Rationesensis episopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia, ed. A. BORGNET, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. I, pp. 1a-2a; 4ab; 5a-6a.

28. For the Avicennian texts, see note 23 above.
ence in order to provoke it to action – but the implication is that these ends are not achieved through any act of assent or belief. In his most extended treatment of the scope and nature of logic, then, Albert uses the traditional view as his framework, incorporating elements from the expanded Organon and citing Arabic authorities; but he stops short of accepting the expanded Organon on its own terms. The same is true of Albert’s approach in the text that on the surface seems to show the greatest influence of the expanded Organon, namely, Albert’s introduction to his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. The influence of the expanded Organon is felt here in Albert’s extensive paraphrase of Ghazālī’s enumeration of the various syllogistic arts based upon the epistemic status of their conclusions and the character of the premises from which they are constructed. Since this classification of syllogisms and their premises explicitly refers to rhetorical and poetic propositions and modes of assent, Albert is forced to address the issue of the logical character of these two arts directly. Yet despite initial appearances to the contrary, Albert once again opts for a diluted version of the expanded Organon akin to that found in the De praedicabilibus, based upon isolating broad and narrow conceptions of logic. Once he has finished enumerating the thirteen varieties of propositions and begins to correlate each variety with its proper form of argumentation, Albert declares, “Arguments of diverse faculties are constructed from all such types of propositions, which are all included under logic in general, for even poetics, according to Aristotle, is contained under general logic” (my emphasis). A bit later, Albert again emphasizes that poetics and rhetoric belong to logic taken only in the broad sense. And he concludes his treatment by claiming that “it is clear from all this how far logic, understood in a general sense (in genere accepta), extends, and that the science which follows immediately upon the science of the syllogism absolutely is demonstrative science.” And having made this remark, he proceeds to deal with the objection that the Arabic philosophers should not have interposed this treatment of non-demonstrative propositions as a prelude to their consideration of the Posterior Analytics, claiming that his Arabic sources intended to make clear how far the science which is called by the common name of logic – which includes rhetoric and poetics – extends; and grammar, which Aristotle transmits along with logic, rhetoric, and poetics, precedes all of these (i.e., broadly logical, arts)33.

It seems clear, then, that despite his fondness for citing the Arabic texts available in Latin translation that convey the most about the expanded Organon, Albert himself remains far more tied to the liberal arts tradition, and like Kilwardby his principal tactic for dealing with the expanded Organon is simply to view it as the result of an extended use of the term “logic” which is coextensive with the trivium. It is not taken

29. ALBERT THE GREAT, Liber de praedicabilibus, tract. I, cap. 4, ed. Borgia, pp. 69-88. This is also the position that Albert takes in the opening of his De interpretatio commentary, although in this case he simply equates scientia ratiocinis with scientia sermoneis, postponing both to scientia realis. But in keeping with the Boethian reading of the term interpretatio, which implies the identification of the subject-matter of this text as enunciatio rather than oratio, Albert contrasts the orator and poet with the logician on the grounds that the latter alone is concerned with enunciativa, truth-valued orationes, whereas the orator uses speech in order to charm, and the poet to urge delight or loathing or some other useful attitude in the imagination (imaginabilia utilitas). See ALBERT THE GREAT, In libros Aristotelis Peri hirmeneias, I, tract. I, cap. I, in B. Alberti Magni, Rhetoricon episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia, ed. A. Borgia, Paris, Vivès, 1890, vol. I, pp. 373a-375b.

In this case Albert has Aristotle’s own remarks on non-inductive moods in chapter four of the De interpretatio to back up the dissociation of rhetoric from the text’s logical concerns (17a 1-8).


34. Note should also be taken of another allusion to the broad sense of logic in Albert’s commentary on the Topics. Here too Albert says that logic, taken generally, is a term for the entire trivium – or, allowing himself a bit of a pun, for the “quadrivium” if we wish to add poetics as a special science (as Aristotle did!). Logic in the narrow sense, by contrast, is concerned with every syllogism, and the only three
to imply any radical reinterpretation of the syllogistic status of rhetoric and poetics, nor of the nature of their intended cognitive and appetitive ends.

Oddly enough, those authors who abandon references to the linguistic character of logic entirely seem to be the most likely to adopt the expanded Organon in its fullest form. In Thomas Aquinas's well-known presentation of the expanded Organon in the proemium to his Posterior Analytics commentary, logic is identified solely as a rational science, the Avicennian theme of logic as a method of acquiring knowledge of the unknown reappears, and the traditional inventive-judicative distinction is incorporated into the framework of the expanded Organon. Aquinas elaborates more on the internal divisions within the discursive parts of logic than do many previous authors by calling upon the parallels between necessity and contingency in art and nature in order to explain the degrees of logical necessity. In this respect, he comes closest in spirit to the Arabic proponents of the expanded Organon, in particular Avicenna, who were especially concerned with the epistemological study of degrees of assent and their relation to and distinction from ontological degrees of necessity and possibility. Aquinas also elaborates further on the logical structure of the various arts of reason that fail to achieve certitude, again reflecting a prominent feature of the Arabic treatments of rhetoric and poetics. Reason may either achieve a certain and necessary judgement through demonstration; a belief or opinion, in which one side of a contradiction predominates (i.e., the believer leans more to p than to not-p) through dialectic; a mere suspicion of the conclusion, in which one in


35. This approach also appears in John of Dacia's Divisi scientiae. He treats the entire trivium as rationalis, citing Avicenna's identification of the subject-matter of logic as second intentions and the method of acquiring knowledge of the unknown from the known. He then adds that «Avicenna includes under logic the other rational sciences». But Avicenna includes rhetoric and poetics under rational science because he considers them to be parts of logic; and his remarks regarding the rational character of logic are meant to contrast it with grammar, not to encompass grammar within logic. See JOHN OF DACIA, Divisi scientiae, in Johannis Daci Opera, ed. A. LANGHAE AND GROENASCHI, in Deux ouvrages inédits, p. 155.

36. THOMAS AQUINAS, Expositio libri Posteriorum; Sancti Theom de Aquina Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t 1°, 2°, Expositio libri Posteriorum, Edito altera retractata, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum ( = ed. R.A. GAUTHERET), Roma: Comitati Leoniniae Parisi. Vrida, 1989, pp. 5a-7a.


38. The theme of the degree of the knower's inclination to the opposite of the conclusion was an extremely important and often problematic aspect of the Arabic version of the expanded Organon, in particular its treatment of rhetoric. The only text available in Latin to address this characterization of the logical arts was Fārābī's Dīdascalia, so I presume it was Aquinas's source. See AL-FARĀBĪ, Dīdascalia in rhetorice, ed. LANGHAE AND GROENASCHI, in Deux ouvrages inédits, p. 155.

39. This is noteworthy, given that Thomas's division of the text immediately mentions the demonstrative syllogism as Aristotle's topic. It seems that Thomas, like his predecessors, was not entirely comfortable with the claim that rhetoric and poetics are fully syllogistic, even though he seems to view them as truly logical. In commenting on 71a9, Aquinas too contrasts enthymemes and syllogisms, examples and inductions, on the grounds that syllogisms and inductions must be universal. But he is willing to call an enthymeme an abridged syllogism, and an example an incompleted induction (p. 94b).

40. ARISTOTLE, De interpretatione, chap. 4, 1746-8: "The present investigation deals with the statement-making (ο....δρομακεύοντος) sentence; the others we can dismiss, since consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric and poetry" (Aristotle's Categories) and "De interpretatione", Translated with Notes by J.L. ACKRILL, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 46).
«Therefore the demonstrator uses nothing but enunciativestatementssignifyingthe things as insofar as their truth is in the soul in order to achieve his end; but the orator and poet induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing, but also through the audience’s disposition. Thus orators and poets usually try to move the hearers by provoking them to feel certain passions, as Aristotle says in the *Rhetoric*. Therefore, the consideration of the aforementioned types of speech, which are concerned with directing the hearer towards something, fall under the consideration of rhetoric or poetics, by reason of what is signified by them.» (my emphasis)\textsuperscript{41}

By suggesting that rhetoric and poetics do have a cognitive end (in aiming at assent), that they may use what is proper to their subjects, but that they add to this emotive appeals, Aquinas once again links these arts more closely to the realm of logic construed as a rational science. Moreover, Aquinas goes on to distinguish the grammarians’ study of the different types of speech in terms of the rules of congruous construction from the rhetorical and poetical use of non-enunciative discourse to direct belief and action. In this remark too he seems concerned to ensure that rhetoric and poetics are not being treated as adjuncts to grammar, but as extensions of logical study, in sharp contrast to the traditional adherents of the trivium.

The approaches to the expanded *Organon* in texts from the late 13th and early 14th centuries do not show much variation from the patterns established up to the time of Aquinas. In two of his commentaries on the *Organon*, Simon of Faversham presents a position similar to that of Aquinas, in which the expanded *Organon* is accepted even under a narrow interpretation of the scope of logic. More importantly, however, Simon explicitly upholds the syllogistic status of both rhetoric and poetics. In the proemium to his questions on the *Isagoge*, poetics and rhetoric are both treated as truly discursive, syllogistic sciences: rhetoric is said to be discursive insofar as it moves from signs that produce suspicion or presumption. Aristotle’s *Organon* is explicitly identified as consisting of seven parts, including rhetoric and poetics; and all seven parts (and the books corresponding to them) are said to be *de necessitate logice*. And while Simon does claim that rhetoric and poetics preserve the form and ratio of the syllogism less fully than demonstration and dialectic, he nonetheless implies that rhetoric and poetics are as truly syllogistic arts as is dialectic\textsuperscript{42}.

In his *Questiones veterae* on the *Sophistical Refutations*\textsuperscript{43}, Simon adds to this perspective an explicit contrast between grammar and logic, arguing that grammar is founded upon language and offers direction in writing, whereas logic is founded upon the acts of the intellect and provides direction in reasoning (*ratio*). The liberal arts tradition is not neglected, but it is interpreted in terms of the expanded *Organon*, rather than the converse. Thus, the third act of reasoning, which is fully discursive, is identified with the whole *logica nova*, and it is said to be concerned with the syllogism. The Boethian division of logic into a *pars inventiva* and a *pars judicativa* is used to bifurcate the new logic: but under the inventive part of logic, rhetoric and poetics are included, along with sophistry. (Simon omits to mention dialectic here.) The *Questiones novae* omit the contrast with grammar, but they develop in more detail the divisions of the inventive and judicative parts of logic; again, Simon follows the tradition of distinguishing the two parts according to whether or not certain knowledge is attained, but he fully incorporates rhetoric and poetics into the inventive part, identifying them as syllogistic and as producing some act of uncertain assent: «The inventive part of logic is concerned with that act of reason through which certain knowledge is not acquired, but rather, some other [kind of knowledge], whether it be belief and opinion, or suspicion, or some estimation of the conclusion. And in accordance with this the inventive part of logic has three parts: dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics [...]. Rhetoric is concerned with the syllogism through which suspicion is acquired, and poetics with the syllogism through which some estimation is acquired.»\textsuperscript{44}

Other logical texts from the late 13th century show the same unhesitating adherence to the expanded *Organon*; but they add a new element to the absorption of this taxonomy insofar as they forge a special link between rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, a link that is, once again, prominent in Arabic logical texts. Excerpts from Jacob of Douai’s exposition of the *Posterior Analytics* cited in the notes to Gauthier’s edition of Aquinas’s commentary on the same text openly acknowledge the logical status


\textsuperscript{44} SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, *Questiones super libro Elianorum*, ed. S. EBBESEN et al., pp. 102-103.
of both rhetoric and poeticas\textsuperscript{45}. But Jacob adds, as do many of the later commentators, an explicit defense of this position: he cites the \textit{Rhetoric's} opening claim that rhetoric is a counterpart (\textit{assecutiva}) of dialectic as evidence that Aristotle himself upheld the taxonomy first encountered via the Arabic philosophers. As a result of this new concern with direct Aristotelian testimony, moreover, Jacob makes more specific the association of rhetoric and poetics with dialectic. Rather than treating all three as coordinate species of the inventive part of logic, they are treated specifically as parts of dialectic. The cognitive acts aimed at by dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics do not change at all—they are identified as opinion, suspicion, and estimation, and they are ordered according to their decreasing strengths\textsuperscript{46}. But all three are characterized as acts of reason towards which dialectic, as a generic mode of argumentation, is ordained.

A recently edited anonymous prologue to Porphyry also upholds the syllogistic status of rhetoric and poetics by virtue of their close association with dialectic\textsuperscript{47}. Logic is again identified as purely a rational art: there is, however, an interesting variation in this text upon the rationale behind the subdivisions of logic which is, perhaps coincidentally, much closer to the underlying theory behind the Arabic views of the divisions of the \textit{Organon}. The syllogistic arts and the theory of predication (as outlined in the \textit{De interpretatione}) are both treated as simply compositive, the former composing subject with predicate, the latter compositive statement with composite statement. The syllogism, in turn, can either be studied absolutely (\textit{simpliciter}), that is, in terms of its formal composition, or materially, that is, insofar as it achieves a particular degree of necessity or probability. Rhetoric and poetics are, according to this scheme, once again grouped as parts of the \textit{Topics}, since all three, in contrast to demonstration, attain only a probable, not a necessary, end\textsuperscript{48}.

Finally, there is one further approach that can be identified in the attempts of later authors to accomodate the expanded \textit{Organon}, an approach that appears to be linked to the development of a more direct interest in the arts of rhetoric and poetics themselves. Within this approach, we find that the logical classification of rhetoric and poetics continues to be upheld, and there are vestiges of the close association of rhetoric and poetics with dialectic. But there is less interest in the syllogistic interpretation of either art, and the focus shifts from defending the internal logical character of the arts to explaining their instrumental character as tools for practical reasoning. An example of this approach is found in two works of Bartholomew of Bruges, the first a sophism on logic, the other an exposition of Averroes's \textit{Middle Commentary on the \textit{Poetics}}. In the sophism, Bartholomew repeats the familiar association between rhetoric and suspicion, poetics and estimation\textsuperscript{49}. Aristotle is cited as approving of the logical classification of rhetoric, once again through his remarks on rhetoric as dialectic's counterpart, and Hermann the German, al-Fārābī, and even Albert the Great are cited as upholding the logical status of poetics. For his own part, Bartholomew opts to rely upon logic's instrumental character and the traditional association of rhetoric with the ethical realm: rhetoric is in some sense the application of dialectic to the ethical realm. In the exposition of the \textit{Poetics}, this is made even more explicit: logic has two branches, one applied to the discernment of truth from falsehood in the theoretical realm, the other applied to the discernment of good from evil in the practical\textsuperscript{50}. Rhetoric and poetics together comprise this logic of ethical reasoning. Given the context, little is said about the


\textsuperscript{46} Jacob's characterization of poetics here is also the standard one. Jacob says that it proceeds \textit{per similitudines}, and he repeats the Avicennian example of comparing something to disgusting food in order to repulse the hearer. See Avicenna, \textit{Makhdal}, pp. 18-19 (= Logica, ed. Vanice 1508, p. 2ab).

\textsuperscript{47} See C. Marmo, \textit{Anonymi Philosophiae \textit{Sicut dictur ab Aristotile.}} A Parisian Prologue to Porphyry, in CIMALG\textsuperscript{6} (1991), pp. 140-146, especially p. 145. The commentary on the \textit{Prior Analytics} is edited by Marmo in the same volume of CIMALG (see Anonymous Cordubensis, \textit{Questiones super primum librum Posteriorum. A Partial Edition}, in CIMALG\textsuperscript{6} (1991), pp. 107-139), also addresses the expanded \textit{Organon}. The author takes the Avicennian position on the nature of logic: it is a \textit{scientia rationalis} which concerns itself with second intentions, not a \textit{scientia sermocinalis}, since it is only accidentally concerned with language. Rhetoric and poetics are both explicitly identified as possessing their own varieties of syllogism, since all the arts of logic that pertain to the process of composition and division—their respective substantive parts—concern themselves with truth and falsehood. The syllogistic status of both arts is further confirmed in one manuscript's account of question 4, which asks whether the syllogism is the subject of logic: here an affirmative reply is provided, partially on the grounds that demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics all treat of the subjective parts of the syllogism. The author even notes that poetic \textit{estimatio} is a type of \textit{cognitio}. Like Jacob, he finds Aristotelian authority for the inclusion of both rhetoric and poetics under the scope of logic: he too cites the \textit{Rhetoric's} association of dialectic and rhetoric, and adds to this remark in Hermann the German's version of Averroes's \textit{Middle Commentary on the \textit{Poetics}}, citing both, as was often customary, as if they were evidence of Aristotle's own views (pp. 122-124; p. 132, note b).

\textsuperscript{48} Rhetoric is associated with \textit{suspectio}, poetics with \textit{estimatio}, as was customary; these are viewed as descending levels of \textit{nositia}. The author also links his points to the status of the various known \textit{libri logicae}; these six books are the principal books of logic; the other common university texts, such as Boethius's works and the \textit{Liber sex principiorum}, are relegated to secondary status.

\textsuperscript{49} S. Eshbion and J. Pinborg, \textit{Bartholomew of Bruges and His Sophisma on the Nature of Logic}, in CIMALG\textsuperscript{9} (1981), pp. 64-65.

\textsuperscript{50} This text is edited by G. Dahan, \textit{Notes et textes sur la poétique au Moyen Âge}, in AHDLMA\textsuperscript{47} (1980), pp. 171-239; the section that concerns us is found on pp. 223-224.
formal logical character of the two arts; but while Bartholomew does not call either syllogistic, he does claim that the Prior Analytics treats the general science that applies to both theoretical and practical methods.  

5. CONCLUSION

It is clear that throughout the course of the thirteenth century, Latin authors gradually came to appreciate more and more clearly the nature of the Arabic philosophers’ logical interpretation of rhetoric and poetics and its essential incompatibility with any traditional approach to the trivium. Latin authors who were principally concerned with expounding Aristotelian logical texts rather than with defending the traditional liberal arts division of the sciences, and who assumed that the Arabic authors were transmitting Aristotle’s own views on the logical character of his texts, became more and more comfortable with the idea of the expanded Organon until it became a commonplace of the introductory literature on logic. If there is any overall tendency to be seen in these texts, it is that of a move from the interpretation of the expanded Organon as a variation on the liberal arts to the interpretation of the liberal arts as an incluative version of the expanded scope of logic.

There is no evidence at all, however, that this move represented any deeper commitment to, or interest in, the logical character of rhetoric and poetics on the part of Latin philosophers. Throughout the thirteenth century the taxonomy remains by and large a clichéd, and it has little effect on the overall approach to the study of logic or language amongst Latin philosophers. In the most obvious place where one might expect the expanded Organon to have an effect – the interpretation of logic as linguistic or as rational – there are no discernible repercussions. Both linguistic and rational construals of the nature of logic in particular, or of the liberal arts as a whole, occur in the remarks of adherents and non-adherents of this taxonomy. If anything, the apparently more sympathetic view of logic as a broadly linguistic science provides a convenient escape for those authors who are eager to incorporate the newly available Arabic materials but ultimately uncomfortable with a strongly logical construal of rhetoric and poetics.

By the same token, the overall features of the logical theories of both adherents and non-adherents of the expanded Organon do not vary: their identification of the subject-matter of logic, its quest for knowledge of the unknown, the identification of the epistemic goals of rhetoric and poetics, and the use of traditional logical concepts, like the judicative-inventive distinction, remain constant in most of these authors. And many of those who adopt the strongest interpretation of the expanded Organon will still stop short of attributing full syllogistic force to rhetoric and poetics, often because of their adherence to the link between true syllogistic reasoning and a concern with the universal as universal.

But almost all of these features which produce hesitation in the Latin authors are in fact fully incorporated into the Arabic philosophers’ insistence on the logical status of rhetoric and poetics. What, then, explains the differences in interest in this doctrine between the Arabic and Latin traditions? At bottom, I believe that the explanation lies in the predominately instrumental view of logic in both traditions, and the absence of any real outlet in the Latin West for applying the notion of rhetoric and poetics as logical to important philosophical problems. While the traditional link between rhetoric and poetics and the ethico-political realm was recognized in the Latin West, that link was upheld in purely practical and legal terms: rhetoric was principally for persuading a judge in legal matters, and most logical commentators were not much interested in such an application. But in the Arabic world, the political and practical applications of rhetoric and poetics were construed much more broadly – they provided the logical and theoretical framework for working out the relations between philosophy and religion, relations that were a major preoccupation within Islamic philosophy. Without a fuller understanding of why the Arabic tradition took such a keen interest in the logical status of rhetoric and poetics, Latin authors could not be expected to pay more than lip service to the doctrine. Neither its epistemological merits, nor the
La grammaire dans le « Guide de l'étudiant »

Irène Rosier

La section sur la grammaire du « Guide de l'étudiant » est importante puisque sur 99 colonnes, elle en couvre 24. L'étude de son organisation et de son contenu donne des indications, parfois difficiles à interpréter cependant, sur le milieu où il a pu être élaboré.

1. LES SOURCES

Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, je voudrais soulever une question d'ordre méthodologique. Comment procéder pour « expertiser » une section du « Guide » ? J'ai d'une part étudié les statuts et les classifications des sciences, qui donnent d'ailleurs, nous le verrons bientôt, des informations qui ne se recoupent que partiellement. D'autre part, l'enquête s'est poursuivie par l'étude de la production grammaticale artisienne. Or, ici, la difficulté tient au fait que nous ne disposons de presque aucun texte édité pour la première période universitaire, et que la majeure partie de cette production est anonyme et sans date. Un point fixe dans cet ensemble flou est Robert Kilwardby, dont l'enseignement des Arts s'est déroulé pendant les années 1237-1245. Sur sa production grammaticale de nombreuses incertitudes subsistent, puisque si son commentaire sur le Priscien Mineur est très certainement authentique, il n'en va pas de même pour les autres œuvres qui lui sont attribuées, le commentaire sur le Barbarismus de Donat et sur le De accentu du Pseudo-Priscien, tous deux édités, et les sophismes grammaticaux, en cours d'édition. Quant au

2. ROBERTUS KILWARDBY O.P., In Donati Artem maiorem III, éd. L. Schmucker, Bruxelles, Weige, 1984; Id., Nundae libri De accentibus, éd. P.O. Lewry, Thirteenth-