Section 2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act;  Omission as Basis of Liability;  Possession as an Act.

 (1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.

 (2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:

  (a) a reflex or convulsion;

  (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;

  (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion;

  (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.

 (3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:

  (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense;  or

  (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.

 (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.
 
 

Section 2.02. General Requirements of Culpability.

 (1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability.  Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

 (2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

 (a) Purposely.

 A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:

  (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result;  and

  (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.

 (b) Knowingly.

 A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:

  (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist;  and

  (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

 (c) Recklessly.

 A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.

 (d) Negligently.

 A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

 (3) Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided.  When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.

 (4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements.  When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

 (5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge.  When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly.  When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly.  When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.

 (6) Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is Conditional.  When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

 (7) Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability.  When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.

 (8) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly.  A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.

 (9) Culpability as to Illegality of Conduct.  Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides.

 (10) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense.  When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.
 
 

Section 2.03. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result;  Divergence Between Result Designed or Contemplated and Actual Result or Between Probable and Actual Result.

 (1) Conduct is the cause of a result when:

  (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred;  and

  (b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense.

 (2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless:

  (a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused;  or

  (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.

 (3) When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware unless:

  (a) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused;  or

  (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.

 (4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
 
 

Section 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake.

 (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:

  (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense;  or

  (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

 (2) Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed.  In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.

 (3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:

  (a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged;  or

  (b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment;  (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment;  (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission;  or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense.

 (4) The defendant must prove a defense arising under Subsection (3) of this Section by a preponderance of evidence.
 
 

Section 2.05. When Culpability Requirements Are Inapplicable to Violations and to Offenses Defined by Other Statutes;  Effect of Absolute Liability in Reducing Grade of Offense to Violation.

 (1) The requirements of culpability prescribed by Sections 2.01 and 2.02 do not apply to:

  (a) offenses which constitute violations, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the Court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense;  or

  (b) offenses defined by statutes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.

 (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides:

    (a) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation;  and

    (b) although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the material elements of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient culpability and the classification of the offense and the sentence that may be imposed therefor upon conviction are determined by Section 1.04 and Article 6 of the Code.
 
 

Section 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another;  Complicity.

  (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

  (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

    (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;  or

    (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense;  or

    (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.

  (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

    (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he

      (i) solicits such other person to commit it;  or

      (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it;  or

      (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do;  or

    (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

 (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

  (5) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

  (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:

    (a) he is a victim of that offense;  or

    (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission;  or

    (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and

      (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense;  or

      (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.

  (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
 
 

Section 2.07. Liability of Corporations, Unincorporated Associations and Persons Acting, or Under a Duty to Act, in Their Behalf.

 (1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:

    (a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;  or

    (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law;  or

    (c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.

  (2) When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.

  (3) An unincorporated association may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:

    (a) the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code which expressly provides for the liability of such an association and the conduct is performed by an agent of the association acting in behalf of the association within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the association is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;  or

    (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on associations by law.

  (4) As used in this Section:

    (a) "corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;

    (b) "agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association;

    (c) "high managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.

  (5) In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the commission of an offense included within the terms of Subsection (1)(a) or Subsection (3)(a) of this Section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.  This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.

  (6)(a) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the name of the corporation or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in his own name or behalf.

    (b) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or association having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.

   (c) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation or an unincorporated association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the grade and the degree involved.
 
 

Section 2.08. Intoxication.

  (1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.

  (2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.

  (3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of Section 4.01.

  (4) Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

  (5) Definitions.  In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is required:

    (a) "intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;

    (b) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;

    (c) "pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
 
 

Section 2.09. Duress.

  (1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

  (2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress.  The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.

  (3) It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this Section.  [The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.]

  (4) When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude such defense.
 
 

Section 2.10. Military Orders.

  It is an affirmative defense that the actor, in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than execute an order of his superior in the armed services which he does not know to be unlawful.
 
 

Section 2.11. Consent.

  (1) In General.  The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

  (2) Consent to Bodily Harm.  When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:

   (a) the bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious;  or

   (b) the conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport;  or

    (c) the consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code.

  (3) Ineffective Consent.  Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

    (a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense;  or

    (b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense;  or

    (c) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense;  or

    (d) it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
 
 

Section 2.12. De Minimis Infractions.

  The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:

  (1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negatived by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;  or

  (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction;  or

  (3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.

  The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3) of this Section without filing a written statement of its reasons.
 
 

Section 2.13. Entrapment.

  (1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:

    (a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited;  or

    (b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.

  (2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.  The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.

  (3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.