Section 301. Basis of Liability for Offenses. 

(1) Conduct. A person commits an offense only if he engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession, in violation of a statute which provides that the conduct is an offense.

(2) Omissions. A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless he has a legal duty to perform the act.

(3) Publication Required. A person does not commit an offense if he engages in conduct in violation only of a statute or regulation thereunder that has not been published.

Section 302. Requirements of Culpability. 

(1) Kinds of Culpability. A person engages in conduct:
     (a) "intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his purpose to do so;
     (b) knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or has a firm belief unaccompanied by substantial doubt that he is doing so, whether or not it is his purpose to do so;
     (c) "recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly unjustifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, except that, as provided in section 502, awareness of the risk is not required where its absence is due to voluntary intoxication;
     (d) "negligently" if he engages in the conduct in unreasonable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct; and
     (e) "willfully" if he engages in the conduct intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.

(2) Where Culpability Not Specified. If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully. Except as otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, if a statute provides that conduct is an infraction without including a requirement of culpability, no culpability is required.

(3) Factors to Which Requirement of Culpability Applies.
     (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, where culpability is required, that kind of culpability is required with respect to every element of the conduct and to those attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the offense, except that where the required culpability is "intentionally," the culpability required as to an attendant circumstance is "knowingly."
     (b) Except as otherwise expressly provided, if conduct in an offense if it causes a particular result, the required kind of culpability is required with respect to the result.
     (c) Except as otherwise expressly provided, culpability is not required with respect to any fact which is solely a basis for federal jurisdiction or for grading.
     (d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, culpability is not required with respect to facts which establish that a defense does not exist, if the defense is defined in Part A of this Code or Chapter 10; otherwise the least kind of culpability required for the offense is required with respect to such facts,
     (e) A factor as to which it is expressly stated that it must "in fact" exist is a factor for which culpability is not required.

(4) Specified Culpability Requirement Satisfied by Higher Culpability. If conduct is an offense if a person engages in it negligently, the conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. If conduct is an offense if a person engages in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it intentionally or knowingly. If conduct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly, the conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it intentionally.

(5) No Requirement of Awareness that Conduct is Criminal. Culpability is not required as to the fact that conduct is an offense, except as otherwise expressly provided in a provision outside this Code.

Section 303.  Mistake of Fact in Affirmative Defenses. 

Except as otherwise expressly provided, a mistaken belief that the facts which constitute an affirmative defense exist is not a defense.

Section 304.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Culpability. 

A person does not commit an offense if when he engages in conduct he is ignorant or mistaken about a matter of fact or law and the ignorance or mistake negates the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.

Section 305.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result. 

Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the accused operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the accused clearly insufficient.

(2) Defenses Precluded. Except as otherwise provided, in any prosecution in which the liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person, it is no defense that:
     (a) the defendant does not belong to the class of persons who, because of their official status or other capacity or characteristic, are by definition of the offense the only persons capable of directly committing it; or
     (b) the person for whose conduct the defendant is being held liable has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense, or is immune from prosecution, or is otherwise not subject to justice.

Section 402.  Corporate Criminal Liability. 

(1) Liability Defined. A corporation may be convicted of:
     (a) any offense committed by an agent of the corporation within the scope of his employment on the basis of conduct authorized, requested or commanded, by any of the following or a combination of them:
     [(a) any offense committed in furtherance of its affairs on the basis of conduct done, authorized, requested, commanded, ratified or recklessly tolerated in violation of a duty to maintain effective supervision of corporate affairs, by any of the following or a combination of them:]
          (i) the board of directors;
          (ii) an executive officer or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees;
          (iii) any person, whether or not an officer of the corporation, who controls the corporation or is responsibly involved in forming its policy;
          (iv) any other person for whose act or omission the statute defining the offense provides corporate responsibility for offenses;
     (b) any offense consisting of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative conduct imposed on corporations bylaw;
     (c) any misdemeanor committed by an agent of the corporation within the scope of his employment; or
     (d) any offense for which an individual may be convicted without proof of culpability, committed by an agent of the corporation within the scope of his employment.

(2) Defense Precluded. It is no defense that an individual upon whose conduct liability of the corporation for an offense is based has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense, or is immune from prosecution, or is otherwise not subject to justice.

Section 403.  Individual Accountability for Conduct on Behalf of Organizations. 

(1) Conduct on Behalf of Organization. A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the name of an organization or in its behalf to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.

(2) Omission. Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever a duty to act is imposed upon an organization by a statute or regulation thereunder, any agent of the organization having primary responsibility for the subject matter of the duty is legally accountable for an omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed directly upon himself.

(3) Accomplice of Organization. When an individual is convicted of an offense as an accomplice of an organization, he is subject to the sentence authorized when a natural person is convicted of that offense.

(4) Default in Supervision. A person responsible for supervising relevant activities of an organization is guilty of an offense if he manifests his assent to the commission of an offense for which the organization may be convicted by his willful default in supervision within the range of that responsibility which contributes to the occurrence of that offense. Conviction under this subsection shall be of an offense of the same class as the offense for which the organization may be convicted, except that if the latter offense is a felony, conviction under this subsection shall be for a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 409.  General Provisions for Chapter 4. 

(1) Definitions. In this Chapter:
     (a) "organization" means any legal entity, whether or not organized as a corporation or unincorporated association, but does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
     (b) "agent" means any partner, director, officer, servant, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of an organization.

(2) Unincorporated Associations. Nothing in this Chapter shall limit or extend the criminal liability of an unincorporated association.
 
 

Section 502. Intoxication. 

(1) Defense Precluded. Except as provided in subsection (3), intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of section 503. Evidence of intoxication is admissible whenever it is relevant to negate or to establish an element of the offense charged.

(2) Recklessness. A person is reckless with respect to an element of an offense even though his disregard thereof is not conscious, if his not being conscious thereof is due to self-induced intoxication.

(3) When a Defense. Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced, or (b) if self-induced, is grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible, is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

(4) Definitions. In this section:
     (a) "intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of alcohol, drugs or other substances into the body;
     (b) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would otherwise afford a defense to a charge of crime.

Section 609. Mistake of Law. 

Except as otherwise expressly provided, a person's good faith belief that conduct does not constitute a crime is an affirmative defense if he acted in reasonable reliance upon a statement of the law contained in:

     (a) a statute or other enactment;
     (b) a judicial decision, opinion, order or judgment;
     (c) an administrative order or grant of permission; or
     (d) an official interpretation of the public servant or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the crime.

Section 610. Duress. 

(1) Affirmative Defense. In a prosecution for any offense it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. In a prosecution for an offense which does not constitute a felony, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by force or threat of force. Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if the force, threat or circumstances are such as would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure.

(2) Defense Precluded. The defense defined in this section is not available to a person who, by voluntarily entering into a criminal enterprise, or otherwise, willfully placed himself in a situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.