Penal Code Comparer & Analyzer

New York Penal Law

Part 1 (General Part)



Part One--General Provisions
Title A--General Provisions, Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 1--General Purposes

Section 1.00 Short title

 This chapter shall be known as the "Penal Law."
 

Section 1.05 General purposes

 The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are:

 1. To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;

 2. To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;

 3. To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state which constitute each offense;

 4. To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor;

 5. To provide for an appropriate public response to particular offenses, including consideration of the consequences of the offense for the victim, including the victim's family, and the community;  and

 6. To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.

Article 5--General Rules of Construction and Application

Section 5.00 Penal law not strictly construed

 The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.
 

Section 5.05 Application of chapter to offenses committed before and after enactment

 1. The provisions of this chapter shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in this chapter and committed after the effective date hereof, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.

 2. Unless otherwise expressly provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this chapter shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside of this chapter and committed after the effective date thereof, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.

 3. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to or govern the construction of and punishment for any offense committed prior to the effective date of this chapter, or the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.  Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this chapter had not been enacted.
 

Section 5.10 Other limitations on applicability of this chapter

 1. Except as otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of offenders and offenses is not regulated by this chapter but by the criminal procedure law.

 2. This chapter does not affect any power conferred by law upon any court-martial or other military authority or officer to prosecute and punish conduct and offenders violating military codes or laws.

 3. This chapter does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved in such civil action constitutes an offense defined in this chapter.

 4. Sections 120.45, 120.50, 120.55 and 120.60, section 240.25 and sections 240.70 and 240.71 of this chapter (a) do not apply to conduct which is otherwise lawful under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, the National Railway Labor Act as amended, or the Federal Employment Labor Management Act as amended, and (b) do not bar any conduct, including, but not limited to, peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration, protected from legal prohibition by the federal and state constitutions.

Article 10--Definitions

Section 10.00 Definitions of terms of general use in this chapter

 Except where different meanings are expressly specified in subsequent provisions of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:

 1. "Offense" means conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of this state or by any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, or by any order, rule or regulation of any governmental instrumentality authorized by law to adopt the same.

 2. "Traffic infraction" means any offense defined as "traffic infraction" by section one hundred fifty-five of the vehicle and traffic law.

 3. "Violation" means an offense, other than a "traffic infraction," for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed.

 4. "Misdemeanor" means an offense, other than a "traffic infraction," for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days may be imposed, but for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year cannot be imposed.

 5. "Felony" means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year may be imposed.

 6. "Crime" means a misdemeanor or a felony.

 7. "Person" means a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.

 8. "Possess" means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.

 9. "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.

 10. "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

 11. "Deadly physical force" means physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.

 12. "Deadly weapon" means any loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle knife, dagger, billy, blackjack, or metal knuckles.

 13. "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, article or substance, including a "vehicle" as that term is defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.

 14. "Vehicle" means a "motor vehicle", "trailer" or "semi-trailer," as defined in the vehicle and traffic law, any snowmobile as defined in the parks and recreation law, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail.

 15. "Public servant" means (a) any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any governmental instrumentality within the state, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee.  The term public servant includes a person who has been elected or designated to become a public servant.

 16. "Juror" means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court in this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury.  The term juror also includes a person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror.

 17. "Benefit" means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.

 18. "Juvenile offender" means (1) a person thirteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 of this chapter;  and (2) a person fourteen or fifteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 (murder in the second degree) and in subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible;  section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree);  125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree);  130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse);  140.30 (burglary in the first degree);  subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree);  160.15 (robbery in the first degree);  or subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter;   subdivision four of section 265.02 of this chapter, where such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter;  or section 265.03 of this chapter, where such machine gun or such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter;  or defined in this chapter as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.

Title B--Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15--Culpability

Section 15.00 Culpability;  definitions of terms

 The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:

 1. "Act" means a bodily movement.

 2. "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.

 3. "Omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law.

 4. "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

 5. "To act" means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

 6. "Culpable mental state" means "intentionally" or "knowingly" or "recklessly" or with "criminal negligence," as these terms are defined in section 15.05.
 

Section 15.05 Culpability;  definitions of culpable mental states

 The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:

 1. "Intentionally."  A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.

 2. "Knowingly."  A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.

 3. "Recklessly."  A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.  A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.

 4. "Criminal negligence."  A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
 

Section 15.10 Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and mental culpability

 The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission  to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing.  If such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of "strict liability."  If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to every material element of an offense, such offense is one of "mental culpability."
 

 Section 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements

 1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly" or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge.  When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

 2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state.  A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability.  This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and outside this chapter.
 

Section 15.20 Effect of ignorance or mistake upon liability

 1. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:

  (a) Such factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the commission of an offense;  or

  (b) The statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption;  or

  (c) Such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification as defined in article thirty-five of this chapter.

 2. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute or other enactment, or (b) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (c) a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or (d) an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.

 3. Notwithstanding the use of the term "knowingly" in any provision of this chapter defining an offense in which the age of a child is an element thereof, knowledge by the defendant of the age of such child is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did not know the age of the child or believed such age to be the same as or greater than that specified in the statute.

 4. Notwithstanding the use of the term "knowingly" in any provision of this chapter defining an offense in which the aggregate weight of a controlled substance or marihuana is an element, knowledge by the defendant of the aggregate weight of such controlled substance or marihuana is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did not know the aggregate weight of the controlled substance or marihuana.
 

Section 15.25 Effect of intoxication upon liability

 Intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge;  but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged.

Article 20--Parties to Offenses and Liability Through Accessorial Conduct

Section 20.00 Criminal liability for conduct of another

 When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.
 

Section 20.05 Criminal liability for conduct of another;  no defense

 In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is no defense that:

 1. Such other person is not guilty of the offense in question owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense in question;  or

 2. Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question, or has previously been acquitted thereof, or has legal immunity from prosecution therefor;  or

 3. The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
 

Section 20.10 Criminal liability for conduct of another;  exemption

 Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 20.00 and 20.05, a person is not criminally liable for conduct of another person constituting an offense when his own conduct, though causing or aiding the commission of such offense, is of a kind that is necessarily incidental thereto.  If such conduct constitutes a related but separate offense upon the part of the actor, he is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or offense committed by the other person.
 

Section 20.15 Convictions for different degrees of offense

 Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, when, pursuant to section 20.00, two or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of such degree as is compatible with his own culpable mental state and with his own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
 

Section 20.20 Criminal liability of corporations

 1. As used in this section:

  (a) "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.

  (b) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.

 2. A corporation is guilty of an offense when:

  (a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law;  or

  (b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation;  or

  (c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation, and the offense is (i) a misdemeanor or a violation, (ii) one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation, or (iii) any offense set forth in title twenty-seven of article seventy-one of the environmental conservation law.
 

Section 20.25 Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct

  A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.

Title C--Defenses
Article 25--Defenses in General

Section 25.00 Defenses;  burden of proof

 1. When a "defense," other than an "affirmative defense," defined by statute is raised at a trial, the people have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

 2. When a defense declared by statute to be an "affirmative defense" is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Article 30--Defense of infancy

Section 30.00 Infancy

 1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than sixteen years old is not criminally responsible for conduct.

 2. A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 and in subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible;  and a person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree);  150.20 (arson in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree);  125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree);  subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree);  130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse);  140.30 (burglary in the first degree);  subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree);  150.15 (arson in the second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree) or subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter;   subdivision four of section 265.02 of this chapter, where such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter, or section 265.03 of this chapter, where such machine gun or such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter;  or defined in this chapter as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.

 3. In any prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility by reason of infancy, as defined in this section, is a defense.

Article 35--Defense of Justification

Section 35.00 Justification;  a defense

 In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense.
 

Section 35.05 Justification;  generally

 Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:

 1. Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions;  or

 2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.  The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder.  Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.
 

Section 35.10 Justification;  use of physical force generally

 The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:

 1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one for a special purpose, may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.

 2. A warden or other authorized official of a jail, prison or correctional institution may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is authorized by the correction law.

 3. A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, may use physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order, but he may use deadly physical force only when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

 4. A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself may use physical force upon such person to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart such result.

 5. A duly licensed physician, or a person acting under his direction, may use physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient if (a) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is under the age of eighteen years or an incompetent person, with the consent of his parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his care and supervision, or (b) the treatment is administered in an emergency when the physician reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

 6. A person may, pursuant to the ensuing provisions of this article, use physical force upon another person in defense of himself or a third person, or in defense of premises, or in order to prevent larceny of or criminal mischief to property, or in order to effect an arrest or prevent an escape from custody.  Whenever a person is authorized by any such provision to use deadly physical force in any given circumstance, nothing contained in any other such provision may be deemed to negate or qualify such authorization.
 

Section 35.15 Justification;  use of physical force in defense of a person

 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless:

  (a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor himself with intent to cause physical injury to another person;  or

  (b) The actor was the initial aggressor;  except that in such case his use of  physical force is nevertheless justifiable if he has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force;  or

  (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.

 2. A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:

  (a) He reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force.  Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating;  except that he is under no duty to retreat if he is:

   (i) in his dwelling and not the initial aggressor;  or

   (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter's direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30;  or

  (b) He reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery;  or

  (c) He reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting  to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20.
 

Section 35.20 Justification;  use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary

 1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises.  He may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and he may use deadly physical force if he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson.

 2. A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises.  He may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and he may use deadly physical force in order to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson, as prescribed in subdivision one, or in the course of a burglary or attempted burglary, as prescribed in subdivision three.

 3. A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or an occupied building, who reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling or building, may use deadly physical force upon such other person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of such burglary.

 4. As used in this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

  (a) The terms "premises," "building" and "dwelling" have the meanings prescribed in section 140.00;

  (b) Persons "licensed or privileged" to be in buildings or upon other premises include, but are not limited to, police officers or peace officers acting in the performance of their duties.
 

Section 35.25 Justification;  use of physical force to prevent or terminate larceny or criminal mischief

 A person may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of larceny or of criminal mischief with respect to property other than premises.
 

Section 35.27 Justification;  use of physical force in resisting arrest prohibited

 A person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a police officer or peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a police officer or peace officer.
 

Section 35.30 Justification;  use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape

 1. A police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, or to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force;  except that he may use deadly physical force for such purposes only when he reasonably believes that:

  (a) The offense committed by such person was:

   (i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person;  or

   (ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime;  or

  (b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony and that, in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly weapon;  or

  (c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend the police officer or peace officer or another person from what the officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force.

 2. The fact that a police officer or a peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force under circumstances prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision one does not constitute justification for reckless conduct by such police officer or peace officer amounting to an offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom he is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.

 3. A person who has been directed by a police officer or a peace officer to assist such police officer or peace officer to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such police officer's or peace officer's direction, unless he knows that the arrest or prospective arrest is not or was not authorized and he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances when:

  (a) He reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force;  or

  (b) He is directed or authorized by such police officer or peace officer to use deadly physical force unless he knows that the police officer or peace officer himself is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances.

 4. A private person acting on his own account may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense;  and he may use deadly physical force for such purpose when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to:

  (a) Defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force;  or

  (b) Effect the arrest of a person who has committed murder, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or forcible sodomy and who is in immediate flight therefrom.

 5. A guard, police officer or peace officer who is charged with the duty of guarding prisoners in a detention facility, as that term is defined in section 205.00, or while in transit to or from a detention facility, may use physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner from a detention facility or from custody while in transit thereto or therefrom.

Article 40--Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability

Section 40.00 Duress

  1. In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

 2. The defense of duress as defined in subdivision one of this section is not available when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
 

Section 40.05 Entrapment

 In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it.  Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active inducement or encouragement.  Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
 

Section 40.10 Renunciation

 1. In any prosecution for an offense, other than an attempt to commit a crime, in which the defendant's guilt depends upon his criminal liability for the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant withdrew from participation in such offense prior to the commission thereof and made a substantial effort to prevent the commission thereof.

 2. In any prosecution for criminal facilitation pursuant to article one hundred fifteen, it is an affirmative defense that, prior to the commission of the felony which he facilitated, the defendant made a substantial effort to prevent the commission of such felony.

 3. In any prosecution pursuant to section 110.00 for an attempt to commit a crime, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort and, if mere abandonment was insufficient to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative steps which prevented the commission thereof.

 4. In any prosecution for criminal solicitation pursuant to article one hundred or for conspiracy pursuant to article one hundred five in which the crime solicited or the crime contemplated by the conspiracy was not in fact committed, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant prevented the commission of such crime.

 5. A renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" within the meaning of this section if it is motivated in whole or in part by (a) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose, or (b) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar objective.
 

Section 40.15 Mental disease or defect

 In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect.  Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:

 1. The nature and consequences of such conduct;  or

 2. That such conduct was wrong.
 

Part Three--Specific Offenses
Titlte G--Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100--Criminal Solicitation

Section 100.00 Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree

 A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

 Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree is a violation.
 

Section 100.05 Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree

 A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fourth degree when:

 1. with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct;  or

 2. being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

 Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
 

Section 100.08 Criminal solicitation in the third degree

 A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the third degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

 Criminal solicitation in the third degree is a class E felony.
 

Section 100.10 Criminal solicitation in the second degree

 A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the second degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a class A felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

 Criminal solicitation in the second degree is a class D felony.
 

Section 100.13 Criminal solicitation in the first degree

 A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the first degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

 Criminal solicitation in the first degree is a class C felony.
 

Section 100.15 Criminal solicitation;  no defense

 It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal solicitation that the person solicited could not be guilty of the crime solicited owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the crime in question.
 

Section 100.20 Criminal solicitation;  exemption

 A person is not guilty of criminal solicitation when his solicitation constitutes conduct of a kind that is necessarily incidental to the commission of the crime solicited.  When under such circumstances the solicitation constitutes an offense other than criminal solicitation which is related to but separate from the crime solicited, the actor is guilty of such related and separate offense only and not of criminal solicitation.

Article 105--Conspiracy

Section 105.00 Conspiracy in the sixth degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the sixth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the sixth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
 

Section 105.05 Conspiracy in the fifth degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the fifth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:

 1. a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct;  or

 2. a crime be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
 

Section 105.10 Conspiracy in the fourth degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the fourth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:

 1. a class B or class C felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct;  or

 2. a felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
 

Section 105.13 Conspiracy in the third degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the third degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class B or a class C felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the third degree is a class D felony.
 

Section 105.15 Conspiracy in the second degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the second degree is a class B felony.
 

Section 105.17 Conspiracy in the first degree

 A person is guilty of conspiracy in the first degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

 Conspiracy in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
 

Section 105.20 Conspiracy;  pleading and proof;  necessity of overt act

 A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act is alleged and proved to have been committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
 

Section 105.25 Conspiracy;  jurisdiction and venue

 1. A person may be prosecuted for conspiracy in the county in which he entered into such conspiracy or in any county in which an overt act in furtherance thereof was committed.

 2. An agreement made within this state to engage in or cause the performance of conduct in another jurisdiction is punishable herein as a conspiracy only when such conduct would constitute a crime both under the laws of this state if performed herein and under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.

 3. An agreement made in another jurisdiction to engage in or cause the performance of conduct within this state, which would constitute a crime herein, is punishable herein only when an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is committed within this state.  Under such circumstances, it is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that the conduct which is the objective of the conspiracy would not constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.
 

Section 105.30 Conspiracy;  no defense

 It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that, owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the agreement or the object conduct or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of conspiracy or the object crime, one or more of the defendant's co-conspirators could not be guilty of conspiracy or the object crime.
 

Section 105.35 Conspiracy;  enterprise corruption:  applicability

 For purposes of this article, conspiracy to commit the crime of enterprise corruption in violation of section 460.20 of this chapter shall not constitute an offense.

Article 110--Attempt

Section 110.00 Attempt to commit a crime

 A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.
 

Section 110.05 Attempt to commit a crime;  punishment

 An attempt to commit a crime is a:

 1. Class A-I felony when the crime attempted is the A-I felony of murder in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree or criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree;

 2. Class A-II felony when the crime attempted is a class A-II felony;

 3. Class B felony when the crime attempted is a class A-I felony except as provided in subdivision one hereof;

 4. Class C felony when the crime attempted is a class B felony;

 5. Class D felony when the crime attempted is a class C felony;

 6. Class E felony when the crime attempted is a class D felony;

 7. Class A misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a class E felony;

 8. Class B misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a misdemeanor.
 

Section 110.10 Attempt to commit a crime;  no defense

 If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be.

Article 115--Criminal Facilitation

Section 115.00 Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree

 A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid:

 1. to a person who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony;  or

 2. to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct which would constitute a crime, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a crime.

 Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
 

Section 115.01 Criminal facilitation in the third degree

 A person guilty of criminal facilitation in the third degree, when believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony.

 Criminal facilitation in the third degree is a class E felony.
 

Section 115.05 Criminal facilitation in the second degree

 A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the second degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a class A felony, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such class A felony.

 Criminal facilitation in the second degree is a class C felony.
 

Section 115.08 Criminal facilitation in the first degree

 A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the first degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such a class A felony.

 Criminal facilitation in the first degree is a class B felony.
 

Section 115.10 Criminal facilitation;  no defense

 It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal facilitation that:

 1. The person facilitated was not guilty of the underlying felony owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of such felony;  or

 2. The person facilitated has not been prosecuted for or convicted of the underlying felony, or has previously been acquitted thereof;  or

 3. The defendant himself is not guilty of the felony which he facilitated because he did not act with the intent or other culpable mental state required for the commission thereof.
 

Section 115.15 Criminal facilitation;  corroboration

 A person shall not be convicted of criminal facilitation upon the testimony of a person who has committed the felony charged to have been facilitated unless such testimony be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with such facilitation.