Research

Recent Work

‘Intellect and Concept’, forthcoming in B. Armour–Garb, D. Patterson, and J. Woodbridge (eds.), The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Meaning, Understanding, and Knowledge

The connections between theories of concepts and issues of knowledge and epistemic normativity are complex and controversial. According to the general, broadly Fregean, view that stands in the background of this paper, these connections are taken not only to exist, but also to be fundamental to issues about the individuation of concepts. This kind of view fleshed out should clarify the nature and role of epistemic norms, and of different kinds of epistemic norms, in concept individuation. This paper takes up an aspect of this general task and tries to make explicit the nature and role of intellectual norms, and to argue that extant paradigms for theorizing concepts fail because they fail to recognize the nature and individuative relevance of intellectual norms.

‘Metarepresentation and the Cognitive Value of the Concept of Truth’, forthcoming in Cory D. Wright and Nikolaj Pedersen, New Waves in Truth

This paper explicates the concept of truth in terms of the notion of cognitive value at three interconnected levels of increasing concreteness. The first level is programmatic and exploratory, aiming to illuminate both the concept of truth and the notion of cognitive value. The second level of explication is dialectical, aiming to reveal a blind spot in a broad range of contemporary views of the concept of truth. The third level of explication is substantive, aiming to explain the cognitive value of the concept of truth in terms of its partially constitutive role in critical reflective thinking.

Review of Semantic Relationism, by Kit Fine, forthcoming in Mind

The key idea in Kit Fine’s referentialist account of meaning and thought is coordination, not relationism. But coordination is a very Fregean idea. This makes it difficult to distinguish Fine’s referentialist view from Fregean views. The review concludes with a discussion of some deeper differences between Fine’s view and Fregean views.

‘Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement’ (with Imogen Dickie), forthcoming in dialectica

Recently, a moderate Fregean view of sense and communication has been developed in response to challenges posed by anti-Fregean arguments. We criticize the moderate Fregean view and describe instead a more fully Fregean view that nevertheless respects the challenges posed by anti-Fregean arguments.

‘Indeterminacy, A Priority, and Analyticity in the Quinean Critique’, forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy

Significant issues remain for understanding and evaluating the Quinean critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. These issues are highlighted in a puzzling mismatch between the common philosophical attitude toward the critique, and its broader intellectual legacy. A discussion of this mismatch sets the larger context for criticism of a recent tradition of interpretation of the critique. I argue that this tradition confuses the roles and relative importance of indeterminacy, a priority, and analyticity in the Quinean critique.

‘On the Value and Nature of Truth’ (2008), Journal of Philosophical Research 33: 235-251

Truth is an epistemic value in the sense that a commitment to the value of truth plays a role in the justification and explanation of a fundamental aspect of our epistemic practice, namely critical reflection. This feature of truth is inconsistent with deflationary accounts of truth.

‘The Two Worlds of Deflationism’ (2007), Journal of Philosophy, 104: 609-638

A structural similarity between deflationism and a certain semantically excessive interpretation of the results of cognitive science is developed. Both views incorporate "two-worlds" accounts of the nature of representation. But two-worlds accounts are committed to what I call quasi-technically “the worst possible theory of truth”. This renders the semantically excessive interpretation committed to the worst possible theory of truth; but it renders deflationism internally inconsistent or incoherent.

Older Work (available upon request)

‘Davidson, Semantic Deflationism, and Dummett’s Dilemma’ (2005), Iyyun, 54: 39-63

‘The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning’ (2004), European Journal of Philosophy, 12: 214-243

‘Tacit Knowledge of Grammar: a Reply to Knowles’ (2004), Philosophical Psychology, 15: 135-154

‘Prospects for a Contemporary Republicanism (2001)’, The Monist, 84: 113-130