China, Comparative Education and the World Order Models Project

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(1) Introduction

Comparative Education has recently begun to flourish in China, largely as a consequence of the 'open door' in both educational and economic activities. At present it is characterised mainly by a precise area study approach to those foreign countries whose educational patterns are of particular interest, and a cautious introduction of certain western approaches to Comparative Education methodology [1]. While studies of Chinese education have long formed a part of the western Comparative Education literature, they have tended to remain 'sui generis' and have not easily been integrated methodologically with the study of education in other societies [2]. The absence of comparable statistical data has been one obstacle, the particularity of the Chinese cultural tradition and the demands it makes on the researcher another. Also China does not easily fit into accepted notions about developing or socialist societies, though it is itself a developing socialist society.

In this paper, I will move within the dialectic of Comparative Education as a subject for China and China as the object of study for Comparative Educationists. The first section will offer a brief outline of three methodological approaches to Comparative Education and a consideration of how far they may be subjectively acceptable to Chinese Comparativists on the one hand, and how far they may illuminate Chinese education as an object of study on the other. In the second section, some key ideas of the World Order Models Project will be introduced with the suggestion that this body of theory may offer a basis for comparative educational methodology that is both illuminative of Chinese educational issues and fundamentally harmonious with Chinese scholarly values. In the third section two ideal types will be constructed applying the empirical and the normative poles of W.O.M.P. theory to China. The final section will consider contemporary issues in Chinese higher education and identify some research directions which these ideal types draw attention to.

(2) China and Comparative Education

The positivist-inductive approach to Comparative Education which was pioneered
by Bereday, Noah, Eckstein & Husen among others [3], offers attractive tools for the rigorous quantitative analysis of the correlation between educational and societal variables across nation states. With China’s present participation in the global educational community, it is at last possible for researchers to get reliable statistical data on Chinese education and society in quantities undreamt of in the Maoist era. The detailed study done by World Bank researchers in the early eighties has been a landmark for this approach, with an unparalleled access to statistical data on the economy, society and education [4]. Many interesting comparisons with other developing countries have emerged, and these have been skilfully used by Chinese policy-makers to ensure the emphases they favour in the planning of World Bank supported educational projects [5]. It has also been very useful to western scholars of Chinese education, bridging gaps in information which had long been a barrier to understanding.

Chinese educationists themselves find this common sense quantitative approach to educational research an attractive refuge after the political buffetting that accompanied the overtly ideological forms of educational research in the Maoist period [6]. Thus, for example, participation in a project which is part of the Swedish-based international study of educational achievement has been welcomed with great enthusiasm and is regarded as a step on the way to making Chinese educational research more ‘scientific’ [7]. This technology for quantitative educational research may illuminate particular educational phenomena in the Chinese context. It should also lead to a solidly empirical body of information on Chinese education in place of the rhetoric of the past. Furthermore, on one level at least, comparisons can be made with other developing and socialist societies within a common framework.

However, there are limitations to this approach in the Chinese context, relating to its potential for illuminating Chinese educational problems at a fundamental level and to the acceptability of its underlying philosophy to Chinese scholarship. The positivist philosophy implicit in it is linear and oriented to the past, as evident in the key assumption that causal factors responsible for educational phenomena across differing societies can be identified and categorised. To the extent that it may be able to anticipate the likely success of the solutions now being applied to China’s educational problems, its evaluation will be limited to quantifiable factors. The deep-level cultural factors fundamental to the long-term success of present educational policies cannot easily be taken into account within this methodology. This cultural inadequacy also limits the validity of comparisons with other nations expressed in educational statistics purporting to represent the same objective realities.

While Chinese scholars are at present enamoured with the idea of an objective, value-free science of education, it is unlikely that they will be able to stay within the limits of positivist thought for long. They may well master the rigour of quantitative empirical techniques for educational research, but they will probably absorb these into a more value-explicit approach stemming from Marxist and Confucian influences. It is unlikely also that they will rest content with the role of delivering technically accurate educational analyses to governmental policy-makers, when Chinese scholarship has had a long, if hazardous, tradition of social and political critique [8].

Probably the most thorough and creditable critique of the positivist-inductive approach to Comparative Education is that developed by Brian Holmes in his
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Holmes proposes a hypothetico-deductive scientific methodology within Popperian views of how scientific knowledge is advanced, and offers a highly specific definition of a problem in terms of asynchronous change. In addition to the quantifiable data which has a place within the 'problem approach', ideal types are proposed as a means of dealing with the cultural values that defy quantification yet are essential to an understanding of educational phenomena. The use of ideal types for comparative study is, of course, derived from Weberian sociology. Another way in which the Holmesian methodology differs from the positivistic approach is in its central notion of a predictive science of education, which does not seek the historic causes of educational phenomena but rather anticipates the likely consequences of various policy choices in specific societal contexts.

In my personal experience, the problem approach proved illuminating for a consideration of aspects of Chinese education, and particularly China's educational interaction with foreign countries, a subject of special interest to me. The central dilemma of Chinese education that became evident in my research was the persistence of Confucian scholarly values antithetical to national goals of economic modernisation yet useful to a modern Chinese leadership needing to consolidate political power. This has been central to policy conflicts in Chinese higher education over this century and can be seen in both the Nationalist and Communist periods. It is a dilemma that may not be unique to China, yet it has a particular Chinese form. The use of ideal typical models made possible some precision in identifying the contours of Confucian and Maoist scholarly values and the ways in which they interacted with distinctive western configurations of scholarship—the French, the German, the American and the Soviet. I believe this approach could help to anticipate possible outcomes of China's present educational interaction with nations of the industrialised world on the cultural level at least.

How far might the problem approach be acceptable to Chinese comparativists? In its emphasis on an understanding of the cultural values that create the context for educational phenomena, it harmonises well with Chinese scholarship. The present re-evaluation of Confucian thought in China indicates a Chinese concurrence with the view that an understanding of Confucian thought is fundamental to any study of Chinese education. Contemporary studies done by Chinese Comparativists on the educational thought and socio-cultural context of the western educational systems currently of interest also suggests some convergence of views.

However, where the problem approach is likely to be unacceptable to the Chinese is in the adherence to critical dualism, an absolute distinction between facts and values that allows for no scholarly contribution to normative choices, beyond the technical one of predicting outcomes in specific societal contexts. Neither the Confucian nor Marxist traditions formative to Chinese scholarship are compatible with this distinction. Chinese comparativists will not be satisfied until they have created an educational science that is synthetic as well as analytic and that makes possible a scholarly contribution to value choices without being forced to 'serve proletarian politics' in the crudely direct manner of the Cultural Revolution period.

My own dissatisfaction with the problem approach lies precisely in the same two areas: the absolute adherence to a fact-value dichotomy and the lack of an integrative global framework. While an analysis of cultural lag within China and the cultural dynamics of Chinese scholarly exchange with foreign countries has proven fruitful, a framework is needed for the exploration of links between these cultural-
educational phenomena and the global political economy. Also there is a need for an evaluative approach that goes beyond predicting the outcomes of differing policy approaches and thus offering a mere technical service to political leaders.

The Dependency Theory approach to Comparative Education that has come into vogue in the past ten years has certain attractive features that address these issues. It aims at a global systems theory in which educational phenomena in different countries are understood in their relation to the international political economy [13]. Thus it may help researchers to anticipate possible outcomes of China's re-integration into a global economic order that has produced certain educational consequences for other developing countries [14]. Furthermore, its roots in Marxist thought and its historicist conviction that an accurate analysis of the historical process can provide compelling normative directions gives it a moral integrity in contrast to the supposed value-free objectivity of the two earlier approaches discussed. China's historical experience in the Cultural Revolution may suggest the unworkability of the radical de-linking solution posed by early theorists [15]. Yet, the more moderate notions of an economic growth characterised by structural distortion, the exacerbation of social divisions and the cultural alienation of the elite may be important for anticipating possible educational implications of China's re-integration into the global capitalist community [16].

However there are serious limitations to the application of this perspective to Chinese education and society. First, the very richness of the historical research on Latin America, which is one of its greatest strengths, makes it even less relevant to China than to other post-colonial nations. Secondly, there is a tendency to economic reductionism and determinism which could well obscure the distinctive dynamics of cultural and educational dependency. In his well argued critique of educational dependency, McLean draws attention to weaknesses in both the economic theories and the deterministic or analogic cultural and educational assumptions drawn from them [17]. In a later article, he suggests that theories of domination within the study of education itself would be more appropriate to an analysis of educational dependency. While this may prove a fruitful exercise, it could also lead back to an absorption in intra-mural educational relations that have no coherently conceived link with the international political economy [18].

Therefore, in this paper, I'd like to suggest that the work of Johann Galtung and the World Order Models Project (W.O.M.P.) may offer a conceptual framework of wider applicability and greater flexibility than Dependency Theory, yet one that includes some of the important gains this approach has brought to Comparative Education methodology. While the latter is historicist and verging on the deterministic, Galtung posits a somewhat more open view of the 'is-ought' relationship. In his view it is the task of social scientists not only to extrapolate empirical trends from the present realities of the global order, but also to exercise scientific rigour in creating relevant utopias to work towards. Social science thus stands at the interface between structure and culture in a dialectic between empirical and potential reality [19].

The notion of a value-explicit social science is more open than the Marxist historical dialectic. Instead of seeking for the historical 'causes' of contemporary phenomena, Galtung develops a future-oriented approach, which applies such concepts as centre-periphery in a less historically and geographically specific way than Dependency Theory. For example, the dominance relations between the
Soviet Union and its satellites are subsumed under the same structural theory of imperialism as capitalist dominance relations [20].

Galtung avoids economic determinism and reductionism by positing six types of imperialism—economic, political, military, communications, cultural and social. He sees it as matter for empirical research which type of imperialism may be prior in a specific case. For example, he suggests that the relations between western and eastern Europe are characterised by a cultural imperialism that has no parallel economic imperialism. In contrast Japan’s foreign relations in the post-war period are characterised by economic imperialism unaccompanied by cultural imperialism [21]. While the analogic parallels that Galtung draws between different forms of imperialism may be open to criticism, they are nevertheless carefully enough worked out to deserve consideration. Also other scholars associated with the World Order Models Project have explored these linkages in innovative ways.

How acceptable are these theories likely to be to Chinese scholars? China’s own role in the global order and the symbolic influence she exercised in the emergence of demands for a new international economic order suggest a convergence at least on the level of Chinese abhorrence of all forms of imperialism, whether capitalist or socialist. The dry statement made by Huang Hua at one of the plenary sessions leading to the adoption of the Declaration and Program of Action of the New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.) has often been quoted. Interdependence in the contemporary world economic system could turn into an interdependence ‘between the horseman and his mount’ [22]. Foreign influences on Chinese education have not always coincided with foreign economic domination in China [23]. Yet Chinese education has experienced relations of dominance and dependency, culminating in the Soviet influence of the fifties, which make the issue of how to create an indigenous set of modern educational institutions that relate on their own terms to the Soviet Union, Japan and the capitalist West an important one. Chinese educational theorists may also concur with the value-explicit approach of the World Order Models Project and the open yet integrative framework which it provides for the consideration of global educational relations.

The next section of this paper will offer a brief survey of the theoretical framework being developed by W.O.M.P. scholars, both its empirical aspect of extrapolating world trends and its normative aspect of identifying seeds of hope for the transformation of the global order. The focus of interest will be on the way these scholars view the international knowledge system and the university itself, since it is this aspect of recent Chinese educational developments that is of primary interest in the paper.

(3) The World Order Models Project

The World Order Models Project represents a cooperative effort of a group of social scientists in various disciplines to develop a social science that is inter-disciplinary, global and value-explicit. A basic assumption of the project is that certain world goals can be articulated at a level that gains broad normative support, and these can be made central to the scientific endeavour. The goals which shape the project are peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecological balance [24]. The four scholars associated with W.O.M.P. whose ideas I would like to highlight in this section are Johann Galtung, Samuel Kim, Hans Weiler and Ali Mazrui.

On the empirical side, Galtung sees the manifest and growing inequalities
between global centres and global peripheries as the most compelling feature of the present world order. He has developed a precisely defined theory of imperialism that differs from the classical Leninism one in postulating six types of imperialism, none of which is necessarily prior. The three criteria of imperialism as a species of dominance system are the existence of a relation of interest between the elite of centre nations and the elite of periphery nations, a greater disharmony of interest between the periphery and elite of periphery nations than of centre nations and a disharmony of interest between both peripheries. The two key mechanisms of imperialism are defined by Galtung as a feudal interaction structure in which centre nations carry out a policy of ‘divide and rule’ in relation to their peripheries, and a vertical interaction structure from centre to periphery [25]. This vertical interaction structure is divided into four mechanisms of dominance: exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalisation.

An important new concept which Galtung adds to the analysis of global interaction is the distinction between inter-actor effects and intra-actor effects. Whereas inter-actor effects are easily observed in flows of raw material, capital, and financial goods and services, intra-actor effects are concerned with the enrichment or impoverishment that takes place inside the actors participating in this process. Galtung takes as an example interaction across gaps in processing levels, an activity that he defines as imposing culture on nature. He illustrates how the development of new means of production in centre nations has implications for communications networks, the employment of specialised manpower, the development of knowledge and research, greater mobility in the social structure and a psychology of self-reliance and authority, all enriching intra-actor effects. In contrast the periphery nation providing the raw materials for industrial processes experiences impoverishment in each of these areas and falls prey to a basic psychology of dependence [26].

In an article on international social science research as structural violence, Galtung delineates the vertical linkages between centre and periphery in terms of the four mechanisms of imperialism. He sees exploitation of the periphery by the centre in the vertical division of labour that frequently takes place with centre scholars creating the theory and periphery scholars carrying out humble tasks of data collection or theory application. Penetration takes place to the degree that explanations or theories produced in the centre ‘get under the skin’ of periphery thinkers and researchers, creating the bridgehead of a ‘local bourgoisie’ whose cultural alienation from their own periphery is thereby increased. Fragmentation takes place to the extent that researchers in the periphery are separated from one another. They have close links to one or several centres but no channels of communication among themselves or with other peripheries that would create conditions for an academic counter culture. Marginalisation takes place to the extent that researchers in the periphery are remain in a permanent status as second-class scholars, dependent on and subservient to the first class scholars of the centre [27].

Hans Weiler's work complements that of Galtung in further exploring the linkages between knowledge and power relations. Their symbiotic relationship can be seen in the need of the political order within the modern nation state to legitimate its policies through scientific research on the one hand and the increasing reliance of the scholarly community on political support in the definition of the problems they address on the other. At international level, these links are even more disturbing. In Weiler's words, "the [peripheral] state operates to legitimate an essentially transnational system of knowledge production, while the system of
research and knowledge production in turn serves to legitimate the transnational qualities of the dependent state, and, thus, the transnational power structures of the international system itself. In other words, the 'vertical' kinds of linkages that characterise the political and economic relationship between the centre and the periphery of the international system are not only reflected and reproduced in the vertical linkages prevailing in knowledge production, but derive a good deal of their legitimacy from these very structures of knowledge production" [28].

As for the peripheral university, Ali Mazrui sees it as standing at the pinnacle of the structure of cultural dependency, a cultural corporation with political and economic consequences. He shows how strong cultural links between peripheral universities and those of the metropolitan centres have served the economic interests of capitalist penetration within dependent societies by producing manpower initiated into the cultural norms of the metropolis yet knowledgeable about local culture and so able to promote the exploitation of local markets and raw materials. The political consequences of the dependent university are also important, as these institutions educate successors for the local political leadership who can be expected to support the international political relations of the capitalist world order [29].

If the empirical aspect of these scholar's work is highly pessimistic, the normative side does not prescribe either revolution or de-linking. Rather it seeks to identify emerging signs of hope and action strategies which could promote a peaceful structural transformation of this order towards greater equality. In the international political arena, Galtung sees considerable hope in the alliance of the Group of 77 nations and the use of the United Nations as a forum for legislation and action towards a new international economic order. In his study on China and the United Nations, Samuel Kim describes in detail the development of the N.I.E.O. movement and the important contribution made by China's moral and ideological leadership during the seventies [30]. In a later book, *The Quest for a Just World Order*, he depicts North-South politics as a contest between two kinds of power, normative and material, and sees potential for the new world order in the normative victories already achieved [31].

At the level of international knowledge and research structures, Hans Weiler sees signs of hope in newly formed horizontal alliances among scholars of the periphery, who are winning over a part of the centre research community and gaining structural and financial support through such organisations as the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (S.A.R.E.C.) and the Canadian International Development Research Centre (I.D.R.C.). New approaches to defining the problematic, and new forms of analysis are emerging, which have greater relevance to peripheral cultures and offer the possibility of "restoring knowledge to what has always been its noblest purpose: to liberate" [32]. These might be understood in terms of Galtung's alternative model for non-violent social science, based on values of equity, autonomy, solidarity and participation [33].

Finally, for the university itself, Ali Mazrui proposes three strategies which would contribute to a transformation of knowledge structures and thereby have implications for both political and economic power relations. The strategy of domestication calls for the strengthening of subjects within the higher curriculum relating to local culture and representing locally relevant knowledge. The strategy of diversification calls for the development of a curriculum with a truly global cultural orientation, in the African case including offerings from Chinese, Arabic and other
world cultures along with North American and European influences. The strategy of counter-penetration is defined as the creation of a unique ethos of scholarship strong enough to give back as it takes and make its own impact on world academic centres [34]. A transformation of knowledge structures within the peripheral university along these lines would have important consequences for the cultural and political orientation of the graduates produced and thus for their future role in national and international politics and the global political and economic order.

This summary of key ideas being developed by Galtung, Weiler, Kim and Mazrui suggests two possible roles for the university within the global political and economic order: a potential for sustaining and legitimating the glaring inequalities of the present situation, and the possibility of taking up a role that would contribute to the transformation of that order. The next section develops two ideal typical projections for China, the first based on the empirical aspect of World Order Models Project Theory and the second on its normative aspect.

These projections are purely logical constructs, that are in no way intended to represent Chinese reality. They work out the implications of W.O.M.P. theory for China, and identify roles which the university might play, either supporting Chinese conformity to the present world order or the transformation of that order. Kim describes W.O.M.P. theory as “a non-deterministic theory of human possibility” [35] and I’d like to suggest that the use of ideal types as heuristic tools is suited to this open-ended approach [36].

(4) Contrasting Roles for China’s Universities in the Global Order

In the first projection, the increasing penetration of foreign capital and sophisticated technology into China leads to a very rapid development of East Coast cities towards forms of industrial production which suit present world markets. Their orientation as centres of the Chinese periphery is geared more and more towards the economic priorities of the developed capitalist world, resulting in a widening development gap between coast and hinterland and between urban centres and rural areas. Manifest and growing economic inequalities lead to social unrest which makes necessary an increasingly repressive political regime, whose main role is to maintain order so that high levels of economic growth can be sustained. Economic growth is defined in an aggregate way and does not imply economic development.

China’s universities and their linkages with the world academic community serve as primary channels for the introduction of the scientific and technological knowledge required to serve the forms of industrialisation dictated by world markets and the global capitalist order. In addition to providing manpower with sophisticated technological knowhow, they are channels also for the managerial technology needed to operate effectively within the present global economic order. Their curricular offerings are more and more dominated by imported knowledge. The pressure to keep up with the new knowledge coming out of world centers makes it difficult to translate, let alone, re-interpret the inflow of materials related to this new knowledge.

Particular Chinese institutions hold tightly to vertical linkages with particular metropolitan ones and guard these sources of knowledge as a means to power and prestige rather than sharing them horizontally with other Chinese institutions and creating their own collective critique of the foreign knowledge being introduced.
The explicit service of knowledge to economic modernisation, as defined by the global capitalist community, fosters a concentration of advanced knowledge centres along the East Coast, which reinforces the economic focus on this region. The Chinese university system becomes characterised by a hierarchy of rank and prestige directly linked to the connections of East Coast universities with prestigious universities in the world centres.

With a political leadership that stresses economic growth over economic development defining the issues which universities ought to address in their scientific research, China's university scholars find themselves allies of an increasingly repressive regime. It faces internal dissatisfaction at the growing social and economic inequalities resulting from re-integration into the capitalist world order. Scientific knowledge, rather than being widely disseminated and applied to grassroots development, is directed towards legitimating government policy and reinforcing a government emphasis on rapid, yet structurally distorted, economic growth. It comes to be seen as a mechanism of enslavement by the poor and dispossessed.

Added to political alienation is a cultural alienation that may be even more serious. The scientific and technological knowledge which holds highest prestige is foreign and attempts to keep up with rapid changes preclude its cultural domestication. The knowledge areas which dominate the higher curriculum are replicas of those current in the capitalist world, producing graduates capable and willing to work only in the most economically advanced areas, notably those most fully integrated into the capitalist world order. Their cultural orientation, shaped by the knowledge content to which they were exposed in the university, is geared towards world capitalist culture. They are thus alienated from both Chinese socialist culture and aspects of China's traditional culture. They come to be viewed as a compradore elite by their own people. In the name of science they defend both the internal inequalities resulting from China's re-integration into the capitalist world order and the necessity of China accepting a role that serves the interests of Japan, the United States and Europe in her global relations.

Rapid economic growth confirms Chinese political support for the present world economic order, which they have been able to manipulate to their benefit. However China's political leaders gradually lose the support of their people. Radical political factions gain strength on the platform of rejecting the consequences of re-integration into the global capitalist order. China's scholars are unable to convince the people of the scientific validity of the establishment development model, since they themselves have become alienated from their cultural roots. They come under attack in another cultural revolution, which leads to the repossession of knowledge by the people, a parallel transformation of power structures and a revitalisation of Chinese socialist culture. Once again China decides to "go it alone" in the global community.

In the second projection, China achieves not only economic growth but an economic development whose benefits are fairly distributed in terms of geographical area and social grouping. The widely perceived economic benefit to all arising from China's re-integration into the world capitalist order results in strong grass roots support for the political regime, which in turn makes possible genuine progress towards socialist democracy.

China's universities take primary responsibility for the domestication of the knowledge coming from outside. This involves its redefinition along lines that make
it culturally accessible, both in terms of Chinese socialist culture and China's traditional culture. They also undertake the widespread dissemination of the scientific knowledge being introduced from outside so that it is accessible to all areas and groups. This access to knowledge promotes participation in local political processes, as well as promoting economic development. The domestication and democratisation of knowledge are facilitated by strong horizontal links among universities within China and a conscious cooperative effort among Chinese scholars to create a modern Chinese ethos of scholarship. Linkages with other areas in the periphery of the world capitalist order make possible a diversification of influences, including some Indian, Arabic, African and Latin American alongside of North American and European. As it takes vigorous shape, this Chinese ethos of scholarship gradually counter-penetrates the metropolitan centres in a more lasting and effective way than the brief and dramatic impact of the Maoist ethos in the sixties.

Rapid economic development is accompanied by a socialist democratisation, that gives China both material and normative power in the global community. The Chinese now take up leadership of the Third World in a more realistic way than their leadership of the sixties. They themselves exemplify a genuine inter-dependence, characterised by mutuality, and so are able to exert both moral and material pressures towards the re-structuring of the global economic order along lines envisaged by the N.I.E.O. legislation and program of action.

(5) Research Implications for Chinese Higher Education

The crude application of these two projections to an understanding of Chinese higher education would obscure more than it could reveal. The first point to make is that this approach should be seen as complementary to two other research perspectives. The first and primary one is a careful empirical study of the Chinese higher education system and its evolution in recent decades, interpreted within the political and economic policy developments of post-Liberation China. Fortunately there are a number of competent scholars taking this approach at present [37]. The second is a historically oriented approach, which interprets some of the conflicts of post-Liberation Chinese higher education in light of certain Chinese cultural continuities whose interaction with foreign and 'modern' views of scholarship can be clearly seen in the pre-Liberation period. This approach draws attention to cultural dynamics which may be independent of the policy swings assumed by some researchers to be the only shaping force of post-Liberation higher education developments [38].

However, neither of these two approaches is able to encompass a systematic and theoretically based study of the educational consequences of China's re-integration into the global political economy. It is for this reason that I am raising the question of whether we can find in the World Order Models Project analytical tools that will help identify both the implications of this process for China's universities and the subjective possibilities open to them in the present situation.

For the purpose of logical coherence, the models lined up two potential roles for Chinese universities within opposite poles of government policy. The models would be useful for an exploration of the realities of the present political-economic situation, and the role presently being assigned to the higher education system by Chinese political leaders. They also create a framework for considering the subjec-
tive possibilities open to Chinese universities and their leadership in a situation in which they have been given greater autonomy than ever before in China’s post-Liberation history. An important new reform document of May 1985, states that individual universities have decision-making power over the organisation of their curricula, their international relations, the internal budget and the planning of teaching and research programs beyond those allocated to them within the state plan [39]. It is on this subjective aspect of the possibilities for individual institutions and the system as a whole that I wish to focus in this concluding section.

At the individual level, China’s universities now have an opportunity unprecedented since 1949 to create for themselves a new ‘ethos’ expressed in the way in which they advance, organise and transmit curricular knowledge and in the aims they set for themselves as institutions of higher learning. Formerly nationally standard teaching plans and teaching outlines had a law-like authority, ensuring common standards and a stereotyped service to national development needs [40]. Now each institution has “the power to readjust the objectives of various disciplines, formulate teaching plans and programs, compile and select teaching materials” [41].

How will university scholars and administrators use this power? Will they aim for their institution to become a Harvard, an M.I.T. or a University of Tokyo, absorbing large quantities of ‘modern curricular knowledge’ from foreign sources and encapsulating it, for example, in smart new schools of management, economics and law? [42] Will this knowledge be used to offer an ideological and technical service to government policy-makers, by providing the ‘scientific’ legitimation and technical skill needed for success in the present rush to conquer world markets? Or will they take on the more demanding and hazardous task of domesticating the foreign knowledge that is being introduced, re-interpreting it in terms of China’s socialist culture and adapting it to the broader development needs of the country? Will they create for themselves a new ethos that has genuine Chinese characteristics or take the old short-cut following a ready-made foreign model?

The critical and selective integration of foreign knowledge into an existing Chinese body of knowledge will be crucial to a second issue: the dissemination of knowledge. Here, there are a number of lines along which Chinese institutions may differ. For example, what comparative importance is given to vertical linkages with institutions in the metropolis as against horizontal linkages with other Chinese institutions, particularly hinterland ones? Is the new knowledge being encapsulated and used to enhance institutional prestige within the system or being freely disseminated and applied to development needs? Another line of investigation will be the relative importance given to the ‘regular programs’ with students assigned according to national planning quotas and intended for job allocations within the state plan, and the various non-formal and continuing education programs which are intended to reach a wide clientele. Each institution has choices to make, which will express its ‘ethos’. Will it choose to demystify the new knowledge and make it culturally and technically available to people who can use it to transform the environment? Or will curricula be reformed along foreign lines, building up reservoirs of knowledge that are inaccessible to ordinary people and limited to the role of legitimating present government policy?

World Order Models Theory draws attention to the global as well as the national significance of these choices and of the new university ethos being created in China. If Chinese universities succeed in a domestication of foreign knowledge and its
integration into the rich body of Chinese socialist and traditional scholarship, the newly emerging ethos may have the strength to counter-penetrate metropolitan institutions in a more integrative and interactive way than the brief symbolic penetration of Maoist thought in the sixties. Also the post-1978 cohort of university graduates who are assigned to roles within the foreign ministry and international organisations may have a level of critical understanding that makes possible a strongly independent Chinese contribution to the transformation of the world order. The ethos of the individual university, as it is shaped by decisions concerning the organisation of knowledge in the curriculum, is thus fundamental to an independent and indigenous Chinese higher education system as well as being a contributing factor to China’s role in the world order.

Chinese higher institutions have largely been researched in terms of a system, seen as responding to the policy directives of successive political factions in the three decades since Liberation. Only briefly in the Cultural Revolution period did particular institutions stand out as having roles of individual significance within the system [43]. Now, in a new set of circumstances, considerable differences can again be expected in the roles which Chinese universities create for themselves, and detailed ethnographic studies of particular institutions could shed light on the broader issue of China’s future role in the global community [44]. For example, Fudan and Jiaotong Universities are currently featured regularly in the Chinese press as representing distinctive ‘models’ of curricular reform [45]. They share the commonality of geographical location in Shanghai, which has an almost unlimited opportunity for international relations yet also a long-term commitment to supportive linkages with the hinterland [46]. Distinctions in ethos which are emerging between these two universities could be evaluated in the framework provided by World Order Models theory.

The second question to consider briefly is the higher education system as a whole, and the effect of re-integration into the global order on it. What has emerged since 1978 is a highly hierarchical and elitist formal system, distinguished administratively into three echelons: institutions administered by the State Education Commission (formerly the Ministry of Education) or other national ministries, institutions administered by provincial-level authorities, and institutions administered by city governments, a new category largely made up of 2–3 year higher technical colleges [47]. A further distinction is made within this framework in terms of priority treatment and funding accruing to those institutions that are designated as ‘keypoints’. In 1980 this included 88 of the 264 centrally administered institutions, but only eight of the 411 provincially administered institutions [48]. Most of the growth since then has taken place at the level of the 2–3 year colleges, where there are no keypoints, although participation in World Bank sponsored support has made 17 of these institutions virtual keypoints.

This hierarchical and elitist structure, however, cannot be seen as either a remnant of colonial policy, as is often suggested in the Indian case, or the result of any other form of foreign domination. Rather it is a Chinese creation, reflecting a level of economic development that cannot sustain mass higher education, except through compensatory efforts in the provision of inexpensive nonformal education through television, correspondence and other media. Also it is the result of a Chinese political decision to reject Mao’s mass-mobilisation development model, followed in the Cultural Revolution, in favour of pursuing ‘four modernisations’. This has meant an emphasis on the formation of ‘experts’ and the revival and
gradual modification of the Soviet-borrowed patterns for the training of professional manpower which were adopted in 1952. The Soviet model could, of course, be seen as an imposition and an expression of domination, yet its fundamental acceptability to China is probably related to the way in which it harmonised with Confucian meritocratic norms.

The question of interest from the perspective of W.O.M.P. theory, is how the reintegration of China's higher education system into the international knowledge system is affecting the hierarchy which the Chinese themselves have put in place. Present indications are that institutions in the upper echelons of the system, nationally administered keypoints, tend to monopolise most of the foreign linkages. This can be seen in the quotas given by the State Educational Commission to allow institutions to send their staff abroad for graduate study. Of the total of three thousand places which are available each year within the state plan, it is usual for a province to be allocated between ten and twenty places, which in turn are divided among 20-30 institutions, while nationally administered keypoints often get 20-30 places a year each, either directly through the State Education Commission or through other ministries. Naturally these opportunities lead to all sorts of other linkages and programs of cooperation in keypoint institutions which cannot be emulated by second-echelon institutions. The latter, however, are gaining some opportunity for international exchange through newly developing provincial level programs for sending scholars abroad, and through provincial level cultural agreements with parallel administrative regions in Europe and North America [49].

Two questions deserve careful investigation. Are the lower level institutions which serve regional and local development needs being enriched through a ‘trickle-down’ effect of the knowledge being introduced into higher echelon institutions? Or are they being impoverished by the flight of their best scholars to better endowed institutions and the lack of accessibility to the new knowledge networks of the upper level? In other words, is the hierarchy being exacerbated by China’s international educational relations or progressively moderated? To answer these questions, research is needed into the various horizontal linkages among institutions administered at different levels, and in different regions. How far are these relations characterised by solidarity and participation?

To be truly effective, the new ethos referred to in an earlier part of this section, cannot be limited to particular institutions but must be collectively created within the system as a whole. The situation thus presents a kind of test for the resilience of Chinese culture and the strength of Chinese socialist institutions. Will these two qualities make it possible for the Chinese university system to be not merely reactive on the periphery of a world order dominated by metropolis institutions and the knowledge they create, but interactive in the strength of a new Chinese university ethos?

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

journals, *Waiguo Jiaoyu* [Foreign Education], put out by the Central Institute for Educational Research, *Waiguo Jiaoyu Dongtai* [Foreign Educational Conditions], put out by Beijing Teachers University, and *Waiguo Jiaoyu Ziliao* [Materials on Foreign Education], put out by East China Teachers University.


[5] For example, since the adoption of the 'Basic Human Needs Approach', World Bank support for educational projects in developing countries has been largely focused on primary and basic level education. However with the statistics China provided on their achievements in these areas, and the relative underdevelopment of both formal and non-formal higher education, Bank representatives have agreed to support nine projects relating to higher education out of a total of eleven educational projects in planning so far. See FRANK FARNER 'World Bank Group Education Projects in China: Project Summaries', paper presented to the World Congress of Comparative Education, Paris, July 1984, and updated in February 1985.


[7] Interview with Professor WANG SHIQING, Central Institute for Educational Research, Beijing, 19 September 1985. Professor Wang is responsible for the overall supervision of the project and he described how two Chinese cities, two provinces and the 14-year-old age group were selected for the initial stage of China's first study. China was accepted into the I.E.A. in 1984.


[16] The economic aspects of this approach are based on F. CARDOSO (1972) Dependency and development in Latin America, *New Left Review*, 74. While it is an economic analysis, rooted in Latin American history, the assumption of important parallels between the colonial experience and neo-colonial patterns of dominance in education seems to underly the study of *Education and the Colonial Experience*, edited by ALTBACH & KELLY (London, Transaction Books).


[26] Ibid., pp. 85–91.
[33] GALTUNG, Is peaceful research possible?
[35] KIM, *The Quest for a Just World Order*, p. 44.
[36] H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS (1964) *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, Ch. 3 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul), comment on Weber's view that Marxist theory is useful in an ideal typical way, as a heuristic principle. It is in that spirit that I'd like to try out this application of W.O.M.P. theory to the Chinese situation.
[38] I attempted this approach in my Ph.D. thesis, German, French, American and Soviet university models and an evaluation of Chinese higher education policy since 1911, University of London Institute of Education, July 1984.
[40] This was reiterated again and again by university leaders in a series of interviews I held recently in China on aspects of higher curricular reform. For a clear and comprehensive account of the evolution of highly standardised and regulated curricular plans and outlines from 1952 to 1981, see Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian [Chinese Educational Yearbook] (Beijing, Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu Chubanshe) 1984, pp. 239–329.
[42] I take the example of these practical social sciences intentionally. These areas, unlike literature, history and the natural sciences, do not have a well developed Chinese scholarly base, so that the hazards of dominance and dependency are likely to be greater than in other fields. See LUKE CHAN & ZHIAN GUAN, Management education in the P.R.C. with special reference to recent support programs by foreign countries, Program for Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population, Research Report No. 111, McMaster University, October 1984. This report lists 164 Chinese higher institutions which now offer bachelor-level programs in management and 39 which offer masters-level programs, all developed in recent years and many linked with the field of engineering.
[43] WILLIAM HINTON (1972) *Hundred Day War: the cultural revolution at Tsinghua University* (New York

[44] An interesting example of this type of approach, which could perhaps be applied to a Chinese university, is PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE (1973) *Power and Privilege at an African University* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).

[45] Press articles would be too numerous to quote. Fudan has summed up its educational reform experiences in a new internal journal, entitled *Fudan Jiaoyu* [Fudan Education] which already has two issues. Jiaotong has published *Shanghai Jiaoda Jiaoyu Gaige* [Educational Reform in Shanghai Jiaotong University], Shanghai, Renmin Chubanshe, 1985.

[46] Shanghai has been consistently used by the Communist leadership for the development of the hinterland, as evident in educational policies of the fifties that moved parts of certain Shanghai higher institutions inland to create the basis for new institutions. Wuhan Medical College and Xi‘An Jiaotong University are two examples. Recent press releases indicate that Shanghai is again taking a leadership role in building hinterland linkages. See for example *Xinhua New Agency* [London], 27 January 1983, 3 October 1983, and 15 March 1985. Historically this provides an interesting contrast to the pre-Liberation situation when Shanghai's universities reflected the city's absorption in international commercial interests and so contributed little to hinterland development except during the Sino-Japanese war when they were forced to move inland. Y.C. WANG (1966) *Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1872–1949* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press), chronicles the change from a traditional scholarly elite who had their roots in the rural areas and represented broad regional interests to a westernised group who became concentrated in large East Coast cities and isolated from China's rural areas.

[47] These three levels are clearly delineated in the *Decision of the CPC central committee on reform of the education system*, pp. K8.


[49] This information was drawn from interviews with the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Educational Commission and provincial bureaus of higher education in four Chinese provinces, held in September–October 1985.