The Barcelona Report „A Human Security Doctrine for Europe“ has been prepared by a private international “Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities” and was presented to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana in September 2004. The group’s convenor and the driving force behind the group’s activities is Mary Kaldor, Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economy and Political Science. The political intention of the group can best be described as an attempt to influence the goals and methods of the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in terms of a soft power-approach.

The authors of the Barcelona Report are not primarily interested in reflections about the concept of human security. They regard this term more or less as a valuable tool which helps them to elaborate an alternative, partly avantgardistic foreign and security policy for the European Union. What the authors call “a human security doctrine” has a good chance to become a part of the European security discourse which is still less audible than the different discourses in Europe’s nations but which will probably become more important in the near future. The reference document of the Barcelona Report is the European Security Strategy of December 12, 2003 which was endorsed by the European Council. It is interesting to note that both documents, the official ESS and the private Barcelona Report gain much of their special political flavour by emphasizing in all diplomatic politeness the different world views of the EU and the U.S.A.

I shall give a short overview of the report’s contents, and then add some remarks to the transatlantic differences (referring mostly to the USA and emphasizing the role of Canada). I shall finish with some criticism of the shortcomings of the current European security discourse.

1. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe

1.1 The European Security Strategy of December 12, 2003 defines the following global challenges and key threats to Europe:

*Global challenges:* indissoluble linkage of internal and external aspects of security; considerable dependence on an interconnected global infrastructure; poverty and disease in developing countries; competition for natural resources; energy dependence.
**Key threats**: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts and their impacts on European interests; state failure; organised crime.

**European strategic objectives**, according to ESS are threefold: (1) To fight terrorism both on the civil and the military level in cooperation with other countries, notably the U.S.A.; to strengthen the international control of WMD non-proliferation; to intervene in regional conflicts in order to help restoring and building peace. (2) To build security in Europe’s neighbourhood, notably the Balkans, the Near East, and the Mediterranean area. (3) To further develop an international order based on effective multilateralism with stronger international organizations and regimes.

The policy implications for Europe are to become (1) more active in pursuing these strategic objectives, (2) to become more capable in terms of military forces without duplications and also in terms of civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. The European Union should also (3) generate a more coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and also a better coordinated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). ESS renders homage to the United States: “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership the U.S.A. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.” The very last paragraph of ESS concludes that Europe has the potential to make a contribution to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer, and more united world.

1.2 The **Human Security Doctrine for Europe** is designed to make the EU a more active and more capable actor in international relations. It is based on a set of general assumptions about the changing international security landscape and on the firm belief of the doctrine’s authors that today only a bottom-up approach is able to increase the security of individual human beings in different parts of the world. The perception of the international security landscape is highly compatible with the threat perception of ESS. The doctrine’s authors are, however, more concerned with “**individual freedom from basic insecurities**” (that is their definition of human security) and less with state security.

The EU should adopt this concern out of **three main reasons**: morality, legality, and enlightened self-interest. European security policy should be grounded in pragmatism which means that the EU is not expected to act always and everywhere when human security is endangered. The process of prioritising conflict situations should work with following categories: (1) gravity and urgency of the situation; (2) practicality of the mission, risks, chances of success and availability of other actors; (3) special responsibility for neighbouring countries; (4) historic ties and historic responsibilities; (5) public concern and public pressure. Thus, the European contribution to global security could be both effective and highly legitimate.

In order to make the human security doctrine more operative the authors offer **seven principles** which form a kind of guideline for politicians, diplomats, soldiers, civil aides and the European public alike. These principles are (1) the primacy of human rights; (2) clear political authority; (3) multilateralism: (4) the bottom-up-approach; (5) regional focus; (6) use of legal instruments only and (7) appropriate use of force.

In order to implement a security policy based on these perceptions and principles, the EU is asked to create an integrated set of civil-military capabilities (the **Human Security Response Force**) and a **legal framework** for its operations.

2. **Transatlantic Developments**

Although ESS underlines the strong ties between the EU and the U.S.A. is seems clear to me that this document has been shaped by the intention to make Europe a different international
actor. The potential and real differences have often been described in terms of unilateralism vs. multilateralism or military power vs. soft power. Europeans have been very often dissatisfied with American world policy, not only because of a certain competition but also because of either too much value-oriented missionarism or too much political cynicism (or the peculiar mixture of both). The public (not always the governments’) discontent with America’s war policy in the Near East 2002/2003 and since are a case in point. The transatlantic link functioned quite successfully during the East-West conflict. After the end of this deep structural conflict, this link has somewhat weakened. The EU attempts to become a global actor in the champions’ league of actors which is because of internal and external reasons a difficult process, consuming both time and financial resources.

The ultimate goals of their international policies do not really differ very much: America and Europe are both propagating democracy as the best possible political system, human rights as the basic legitimation for any government, a market-oriented economy in a global free trade-system, and the reduction of violence in politics. It is mainly on the level of political methodology where we find the differences. In politics, however, methods are often more important than ultimate goals. The preference for a certain method, e.g. unilateralism or multilateralism, is often determined by the position of the political actor in the international system.

As the positions of the United States and the EU in the international system differ considerably we can assume that the methodological differences between them will not only prevail but will grow. This is an enormous challenge for the responsible politicians and diplomats on both side of the Atlantic. For neither America nor Europe could easily change the current course in international system (or only in very small steps). Both continents should, in spite of these differences, resist the temptations of Anti-Americanism or Anti-Europeanism. They have to cooperate because without their cooperation the ultimate goals they share will be endangered.

This is the moment to look at the Canadian experience. Canada has a long history of antagonistic cooperation with its southern neighbour. Canada has also a long history of keeping to its own political methodology, e.g. multilateralism. Canada has tried to implant the concept of human security into the body of its foreign policy doctrines. It follows that Europe which is bound to use the same political methodology as Canada in its quest to become a real global player is well-advised to (a) study the Canadian experience and (b) intensify the political links with Canada in order to gain a bridgehead in North America (without threatening psychologically the United States).

3. Some Critical Remarks

The Human Security Doctrine for Europe is a valuable and thought-provoking attempt to influence the European security discourse. It has, however, two problems.

3.1 The first of these problems is rather serious – there is practically no European security discourse. It is very difficult to exercise some influence on a barely existing discourse. Consequently, it will take some time until the ideas and concepts of this document will have trickled down to the interested public. Contributions which help to speed up this process are welcome.

3.2 The second problem stems from the consequence of a certain blindness of the group for the cultural dimension of human security. We have so often heard in our countries of the salient importance of cultural diplomacy. And we have so often been disappointed by the performances of our respective governments as far as cultural diplomacy is concerned. My contention is that any human security agenda which is to be successful should integrate a
cultural component in its economic and political (military and civilian) actions. Governments tend to neglect this component as do international organizations. When cultural activities on various levels have become part of a peace building this is mostly due to a NGO. Much individual insecurity stems from cultural conflicts, in our countries as well as elsewhere. Any doctrine which proclaims individual freedom from basic insecurities has to dedicate at least some ideas to this problem.

**Literature**

