Inside The Kremlin’s Cold War

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Format: 2 questions; 1 on Germany worth 40 %, the other more general and worth 60%.

1. Germany's role in the Cold War from 1945 through the mid-1960s

2. a) The emergence and evolution of the bilateral superpower relationship
   b) The prospects for stability in the international system after 1945.

The 60 point question will involve a discussion of the latter two questions. It is clearly, the broadest question to date. Zubok is key because gives one perspective on the cold war and you need a non-us perspective on the stability of the global system a well so you need a soviet and a non-aligned perspective and you need to bring in the issue of race.

Discussions of system stability 1945-65 should include economic, political, social perspectives and the question of race.

Don't forget Conrad Adenauer's changing role over time: it may important for both questions.
Table of Contents

This document is split into three sections. As I have not yet received all of the documents it is a work in progress and will be updated over the next day or so. I have attempted to list the shortest summaries of each chapter first so that they are in order by size (the shortest versions are A chapters 1-5) and then, as the numbers decrease the longer versions follow (B and C). In order to get as close to a complete summary of the book, however, some are longer and, unfortunately, some are missing.

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A) Chapter 1: Stalin: Revolutionary Potentate

Italicized items are the most significant, in my estimation. Certain portions aren’t italicized but are relevant for understanding what is.

Stalin, up to 1945
- His guidance: Communist revolutionary universalism, ‘Socialist’ empire; in other words, the revolutionary-imperial paradigm
- Outside world dying; but internal threats were dire
- Strong Russia would strengthen empire and revolution; strong empire would strengthen Russia
- Many Western sympathizers for communism, allowed for tremendous intelligence gains
- Multinational confederation that Lenin set up was risky in his eyes
- Thought himself simultaneous founder of Soviet empire, and heir to the Russian one
- Did not accept the notion that Russia was the Third Rome
- Sought geopolitical goals (like the Bosporus and Dardanelles); wanted them for security and so assumed full control of any territories he gained
- Until and including the 1930s: pragmatic, ideological
- Thought he could manipulate old world system of balance of power to sweep it away; bred cynicism and self-righteousness
- Thought capitalist contradictions would run their course; believed old world would collapse

- Main concerns: preservation and expansion of USSR
- Lonely, neurotic; not Russian by birth, felt inferior
- Xenophobic; bred rigid, rude diplomats
- Expected other leaders to plot as he did, and thus reacted, provoking anti-Sovietism
- Sought respect of other leaders, but never comfortable in their presence

- Post-war goals: new war prevented, rightful share of spheres of influence, US/British money
- Maisky: peace 10 years to repair, 30-50 years to make Europe socialist; keep Germany, France down; play US and Britain off each other
- Litvinov: few decades peace to strengthen USSR; hoped in security zones
- Reparations needed and expected, but only “pittance” with regard to overall need

- 1945, Yalta: Western leaders acknowledged Soviet sacrifices, accepted his geopolitical demands (like Poland)
- USSR treated as equal player; Churchill agreed on divvying up influence in Europe
- Sought US participation in UN so that it would be a “great powers’ club”
- Revolutionary-imperial paradigm put on hold by 1945, focus was on manipulating balance of power; he still believed that the contradictions of capitalism would bring it down
A) Chapter 2 - Stalin and Shattered Peace - Summary

Stalin felt like an equal among the old allied statesmen (Churchill and Roosevelt), even when he was excluded from their talks. When their predecessors began to introduce other ministers into the political arena, he felt insecure about Russia’s – and his own – place in the international system. This fear was confirmed with the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, as he perceived this act as a display of western dominance. Upon realizing that the U.S. could indeed attack the Soviet Union at any time, Stalin ordered the building of soviet bombs on such a large scale that he completely reorganized labour and the economy in Russia. This process was known as a “revolution from above,” to turn peasant Russia into a nuclear superpower. Stalin began to support “decolonization” across the world, because it meant a weakening of British and American spheres of influence. His insecurities over power made him a “bad statesman” in many respects. This is clearly seen with the issue of Germany. He believed that the best course of action for American-Soviet relations would be a united Germany, with strong ties to the USSR. However, his method of achieving this goal involved strong Soviet hegemony in the Eastern zone, with hopes of crushing the British once the Americans withdrew. Unfortunately for Stalin, the Americans didn’t withdraw. The Americans wanted to restore economic life in the Western zones while preventing the refunneling of American resources from Germany to the Soviet Union through reparations. Even the Germans were unwilling to let Stalin build his own Germany. By 1947 Stalin wanted unification to prevent Western hegemony. When Truman unveiled the Marshall plan, Stalin was livid. He forced the Czechoslovakians to reject American aid. In late 1947, despite wanting a united Germany, Stalin began to blockade Berlin as a “defensive” move against the allies, who were violating Yalta-Potsdam. In May 1949 Stalin removed the blockade, admitting strategic defeat when the allies didn’t give in. In Asia, Stalin’s policies were equally confusing. He eventually gave full support to Kim to invade the south, yet refused to bargain fairly with Mao, even though the Chinese communists were far stronger than the Koreans. On discussing the Sino-Soviet treaty, Stalin made it clear to Mao that his top priority was still his relations with the West. As much power as he wielded in the East, Stalin never found an adequate strategy to neutralize the growing U.S. military threat.

Stalin’s xenophobia, together with his love for Lenin and communism, accounted for most of his policies. Which of the two was most prevalent? Analyzing Stalin’s policies in several areas of confrontation, did this style of decision making help or hinder in achieving Soviet gains?
A) Chapter 3 Summary - Molotov: Expanding the Borders

- Molotov translated in Russian means “hammer-man”
- He was a career Communist Party official and achieved the post of Foreign Minister in 1939.
- In 1939 he signed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. The pact became know as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and opened the door to WWII.
- Molotov communicated to Stalin that it was in Soviet Russia’s best interest to reach an agreement with Germany.
- Molotov linked two era’s of international relations the times before and after World War II. He was born near the Ural Mountains in 1890 and builds a formidable reputation within the Communist Party.
- Molotov was so committed to the party that when his wife was sentenced to the Gulag for being a Zionist, he did not speak out. He even voted against her although he did love her.
- Molotov’s training in the politics of the Communist party had proved an advantage when he became a practitioner of diplomacy.
- For Molotov flexibility on policy was wrong and one should never acknowledge mistakes.
- Molotov was perhaps the only true revolutionary. He was a man morally committed to the Revolution and he believed that the great terror which Stalin imposed was a necessity.
- The Will of the party was the most important consideration for him. He and Stalin were united in the belief that the Soviet Union would be destroyed if the party was not cleansed. After Khrushchev denounced Stalin, Molotov was the only one who did not betray Stalin.
- Molotov was consistent about daily routine and had a sense of limits. Molotov had few ambitions to lead; he subordinated his personality to Stalin’s will.
- Molotov always wanted and needed to stay within limits. His life was organized that way: He took daily walks and always had the same routine.
- However, Stalin was still paranoid and assigned an agent to Molotov. This man watched Molotov’s every move and directly reported to Stalin.
- Molotov would prepare a decision and phone Stalin to clear it with him. He possessed a degree of autonomy in his actions.
- Molotov relied on intelligence in order to formulate foreign policy. His main aim was to get evidence about the potential for a British-American split, in this way Molotov could tweak his foreign policy to exploit contradictions and create conflict between the two powers which follows with Marxist theory.
- He used his diplomats as intelligence agents.
- Molotov believed that State power was the only real power in world affairs, Hitler’s Reich impressed him. He believed that without a strong USSR and its mighty Red Army, the world revolution was doomed to fail.
- Molotov was an ardent believer that the Capitalists were ruled by selfishness, expansionism and war tendencies. He believed that Lenin had to be kept in mind whenever dealing with Foreign Policy matters.
- Molotov never distinguished the Cold War as a new stage in international relations with different features like nuclear arms race and global brinkmanship.
- Molotov viewed the West in the same way as before the war. For him, Western powers and leaders were enemies of the Socialist way, they were imperialists who were destined to conflict with the USSR.
- He did not respect the Western leaders, only Churchill attained his respect however his defeat by Attlee in ’45 was difficult for him to understand.
- Molotov’s cold war was different from Stalin’s who was more focussed on RealPolitik, his was soley focussed on the righteousness of the Communist way. It was a very dogmatic ideological outlook on the cold war, thus one can imply that Molotov never saw any positive results after WWII.
- For Molotov as for Stalin, Russian nationalism was only a useful tool of state policy. Molotov thought in terms of social classes and great powers, not just peoples and states. For his vision of
revolution, everything that was weak was not important and must be sacrificed on the altar of Soviet security and promotion of the Communist cause.

- Molotov regarded Soviet diplomacy after the Second World War as a total and absolute success. He knew that historically the Czars had been able to win wars but failed at making the peace. Molotov was happy with what the USSR had achieved at the end of the war.
- In May 1945, the Turks wanted to declare a bilateral treaty of friendship with the USSR. Historically, Russia had wanted to close the Black Sea to avoid attack by its enemies. In 1917, the Provisional government recievied a promise of control over the straits, provided that Russia stayed in the war. The Bolshevik revolution voided this agreement and thus the straits were used in 1918-1919 to assist anti-bolshevik forces. In 1936, the USSR signed the Montreu Convention confirming the neutrality of the straits and the disadvantaged situation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 1945 at Yalta Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to revise the agreement. However Stalin instead of negotiating a deal with the allies, presented his ultimatum to Turkey. He wanted a base in the straits and the concession of two territories. The West could not understand this, they actually saw it as the first sign of Stalin's unlimited ambitions. However it is plausible that Stalin looked at the issue as one of prestige and one of security. He knew that the West was aware of the great damage caused to the USSR by German attacks from the straits. He realized that the straits would be given to him because of the great sacrifice by the Red Army. He also expected the Turks, impressed with the victories of the Red Army to give into his demands for a base in the straits. The territory was only a bargaining chip. Molotov believed that Stalin had overplayed his hand and had been to arrogant in 1945.
- After Potsdam, the Truman admin. decided not to give anything to Stalin in the straits, the Soviet leader kept applying pressure to the Turks and wanted to know how far the Americans would go to defend this part of the world. Stalin realized that the Americans were serious about Turkey and he made some concessions and the tension decreased.
- The Turkish lesson reveals that Molotov was less tough and even less risk-prone than Stalin due to his sense of limits.
- Molotov assumed that Truman would not last long and that he was just a tool in the hands of his sec. of state James Byrnes. They believed him to be a weak president.
- Molotov first met Truman in April of 1945 and conflicted with him about the way they had with FDR,
- Molotov viewed Truman as rude, he saw this rudeness as a substitute for Self confidence
- Litvinov presented the final reports of his commission, in which he argued that the Soviets could use cooperation in the UN to claim some trusteeships along with the British.
- Molotov acknowledged Litvinov's suggestions but his and Stalin's tactics were quite different from those Litvinov proposed. Instead of being conciliatory with the West, they were determined to break the united U.S-British front on Eastern Europe. Molotov was concerned about the American atomic monopoly which would allow Truman to dominate the postwar peace in Molotov's eyes.
- At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (CFM), Molotov was defiant and unapologetic about the Soviet Union having influence in its neighboring countries.
- At the meeting he blamed the U.S gov. for employing a double standard: why did it not interfere in the policies of the British in Greece, but try to do so in Rumania. His common comment was that this never happened under Roosevelt.
- Molotov's insistence on Rumania showed Byrnes that it was almost impossible to work out an understanding with the Kremlin.
- Molotov left the meeting having defeated Atomic Diplomacy, the meeting failed as Stalin would have believe due to the British and American obstinance.
- A few weeks later, the Americans worked out a deal with Stalin and Molotov about the peace treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria.
- It was clear that Stalin and Molotov played out a favorite scenario: Molotov would provoke and create a deadlock, Stalin kept his distance and then after repeated calls from the West to return and solve the conundrum in a fair way.
- This strategy worked for a while and blunted the use of Atomic diplomacy but soon they would fail in Iran and Turkey creating a huge rift in Soviet American relations, the Truman administration embraced the doctrine of containment and refused to compromise with Stalin again.
- Molotov believed that the Soviet Union was entitled to special security arrangements in Turkey, Central Europe and the Far East after the defeat of Nazi Germany, and that the United States together with Great Britain thwarted these arrangements.
- For Molotov the problem of interethnic hostility posed a serious threat to peace and stability in Central Europe. Authoritarian regimes in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and various parts of Yugoslavia curbed ethnic hatred with force.
- Molotov realized that as Communist leaders in Eastern Europe attempted to assert their regimes, they had to rely on the Soviet Army to suppress indigenous revolutions: The dilemma was either Sovietization or Titovization
- Since early 1946, Molotov's attention had been focused on Germany in particular with regard to the Ruhr. The Soviets needed their share of production and equipment from the Ruhr to restore their own heavy industry. However they also wanted to destroy the Ruhr to prevent it from becoming a viable part of a new German war machine directed against the Soviet Union.
- Molotov demanded that the Ruhr be included in the Soviet reparation plans. The Americans merged their zone with the British and created Bizonia in 1946 and excluded the Germans from control over Ruhr industry. This proved to be the first step towards the division of Germany.
- Germany was key to the creation of a favorable balance of power within Europe.
- Novikov’s Telegram: In late summer of 1946 Molotov requested a memo on current and prospective American intentions from Nikolai Novikov, at the Washington Embassy. The memo stated the U.S had abandoned its pre-war legacy of isolationism and was now driven by the desire for world supremacy. Hence, America would want to assume the role of the most powerful force in resolving the fundamental questions of the postwar world. The telegram also stressed that American influence would be dependent on the prospects for capital invested into countries hungry for consumer goods.
- This telegram predicted that in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the Americans would work to dislodge the influence of the Soviet Union.
- The telegram suggested what Molotov wanted and that was that the best response was a Marxist Leninist one in which too exploits the contradictions among imperialist powers. The telegram was wrong in believing that U.S-British contradictions would flare in the Middle East over oil. This fit into Molotov's Marxist-Leninist vision of hidden capitalist aspirations.
- The telegram said that either Britain would be America’s greatest competitor or the two powers would reach strategic alliance against the USSR.
- Molotov's first reaction to the Marshall plan was positive, however he slowly turned to it being American economic blackmail. He wanted to obtain long-term American loans and credit however Stalin had been espousing the view that the U.S Capitalist economy was on the verge of collapse.
- The intent of the Marshall Plan was to deprive the Soviet Union of its influence in Germany and Central Europe.
- Molotov received information which presumably he passed on to Stalin that stated the American plan consisted of building “a strategic circle around the USSR, in the North, the East and the South.
- The Americans had no way of achieving this goal, they did not have the capacity, and however it was Molotov’s wrong belief, his ideological dogmatism that led him to believe this and challenged the system.
In fall of 1947, the U.S government made it clear that it would not tolerate a neutralized unified Germany that might be under the influence of the Soviets. It wanted to create a separate West Germany. The Soviet Union was isolated.

Molotov's rationalization in international politics was that if your enemy criticizes you, it means you have won, beware when your enemy praises you.

Molotov did not have the skill and vision to compromise and achieve Stalin's goals.

There were no contradictions in his views or his system of values. After Stalin died he was the only one left to defend the revolutionary -imperial paradigm. For Molotov, Khrushchev's vision of more stability even at the cost of ideological concessions was wrong. He lived out the rest of his days devoted to the party.
A) Chapter 4: Zhdanov And The Origins Of The Eastern Bloc

-Sept 22-28, 1947: Szklarska Poremba, Poland; Creation of Cominform—signalled new and brutal Soviet policy; consolidation of Soviet sphere of influence in E. Europe

-At Poremba conference Zhdanov Report (though formulated under Stalin’s guidance) given: new Soviet Foreign Policy ‘signalled Stalin’s failure to abandon revolutionary imperial paradigm and switch to purer realpolitik mode.’

-Ideology in Stalinist State: controlled by Stalin; Zhdanov not responsible for grand ideological construct (despite being ‘propagandist-in-chief’), but had manoeuvrability within well-developed institutions; Stalinist ideology promoted ‘monolithic unity of Soviet people (suppression of all antagonisms) and foreign policy asserting political and physical control over socialist states’; ‘fifth column’ vs. enemy in Europe and Asia.

-In West ‘detachment from fragile peace (‘45-‘47) had to be transformed into something more definite’...intellectuals and propagandists (i.e., Arendt) characterizing emerging conflict as “free world vs. totalitarianism”; ideological, cultural and doctrinal justification for Cold War

-In East system of alliances had to remain loyal to Kremlin ideology; 2nd phase of terminal crisis (1st being war in 1917) has come in shape of two blocs: U.S. (imperialism and war) vs. USSR (peace, democracy and socialism). Why ideology necessary in light of Cold War? a) curb western influence b) reinvigorate poor and exhausted Soviets-more resources needed; Russia as senior brother among slavs (Czarist ideology) also utilized.

-In 1946, before cominform and greater centralization to come, Kremlin’s foreign policy still based on realpolitik, balancing among powers; Zhdanov’s ideological forces kept away from international arena by Stalin; Czechoslovakia and Finland examples of ‘friendly neighbours’: ‘not satellites, but not quite independent in security sphere.’ Realpolitik evident in Iranian dealings; Stalin wanted only oil—ignored Tudeh, created separatist puppet party...would not tolerate autonomy of communist allies in Mid East.

-Why the Cominform? 1) Soviets’ perceptions of a threat from the West to their zone of security in Europe 2) Stalin and Molotov’s conviction that the Soviets could manage this zone only with iron ideological and party discipline.

-Events of ’46-’47 explain emergence of ‘Soviet Camp’ and sudden demand for unifying ideological message for this camp: 1) ‘in Balkans lack of coordination between Greek communist rebels and USSR foreign policy caused misunderstanding and conflicts of interest between Kremlin and Yugoslav leadership as well as Stalin’s suspicion of, and then fury against Tito’ (‘deal with Britain over Greece means Stalin not wanting to get involved there; but Tito’s help in Greece makes Stalin’s lack thereof make him look bad among Commies, and invites suspicion of USSR involvement, even when there is none) 2) Tito’s and Dimitorov’s Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty of friendship: undermining Soviet leadership and plans; West, because of suspicion might expand Greek/Turkey job to include Yugo and Bulg.3) French and Italian communist parties went into opposition without consulting Moscow; view from above the moustache: ‘West closing its rank supported by U.S. resources, while Soviet strategic rear in central Europe and in Balkans in turmoil -enter the Z man: Stalin asks Zhdanov to create Cominform at Sept. ‘47 conference; Z’s 6 points in report: analysis of Marshall Plan, international resistance to imperialism, increased role of Communist parties, USSR leads, criticism of past blunders (Tito et al.) and coordinating communist party actions (more detail text pg. 130); Conference marks return of revolutionary-imperial doctrine; a necessity for ‘fifth column’ to be in western capitals; west European communists should ruin home economies, work toward live national forces, all the while being controlled by Kremlin; two ‘camps’ (as Stalin put in Z’s conference speech) shows rigidity of future structure of Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; by ‘47, more control over Czech, Yugo asserted by Kremlin.
**A) Summary: Chapter 5- « Beria and Malenkov: Learning to Love the Bomb »**

Aug 1953:
- Soviet Union (SU) has the H-bomb
- Stalin is dead
- significant stage in the CW. At this point (as the time of Stalin’s death), SU is locked into a revolutionary-imperial paradigm.

1954- window of opportunity to pursue detente and change Soviet foreign policy (SFP)
Beria and Malenkov were part of Stalin’s inner circle and owed their careers to him. They were brief but significant actors. During Stalin’s era, they were in charge of the construction of large military industrial complexes dealing with WMD, missile and air defences.

**Beria**: «extreme version of the police-state dictator: » Saw fear as the most efficient way to get things done, e.g. of this is the way he ran the system of « gulag economy. » He remained the only person adequately informed about the nuclear developments. Created a knowledge gap that contributed to his very different attitude towards the international situation and the balance of power.

Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Zhdanov and Kruschev = inner circle of Cold Warriors.

For Beria and Malenkov, the CW was about an arms race rather than an ideological struggle. This was the ultimate solution for security and international foreign policy was the A-bomb.

In 1954- Communist party of the SU (CPSU) had been led to believe that war with the US was imminent. After Stalin’s death, Malenkov and Beria successfully planned a distribution of power to fill the power vacuum; Malenkov was chairman of the Council of Ministers, Beria controlled the Ministry of the Interior and merged it with Ministry of State Security. Krushchev was to defacto control of the central party apparat.

Molotov, Beria and Malenkov moved towards a less dangerous FP. Stalin had been the biggest obstacle to compromise b/w West, Peking and Pyongyang on the Korean armistice.

**This was a period of internal power struggles in the Kremlin as well as divisiveness on FP - issues like Germany and the future of Soviet influence there. Beria was thrown out of the game after his apparent ease with which he was willing to sell the GDR to the West in exchange for detente and after his attempts to replace party cadres in Ukraine and Lithuania.)**

Out of the key figures Malenkov, Molotov and Kruschev remained. The outcome of the debates on the German question were a reinstatement of the old revolutionary-imperial paradigm-supporting the GDR at any cost was the only FP option.

**March 1954- Marshall Islands (Pacific Ocean)** the US detonated the largest explosion ever. Malenkov responded with assertion that the « reduction of tensions and negociations was the only alternative to the so-called Cold War » p.166.- signified his acceptance of a pacificist position that drifted from the marxist notion of revolution and struggle against the capitalist threat. It also distanced him from the accepted Kremlin position ultimately leading to his decline. Although it didn’t prevent him from getting re-elected but was ultimately self-destructive as it lead sharp criticism from his Politburo colleagues.

**Jan 1955- he was dismissed from the position of Prime Minister.** Seen as too soft and lacking in firm principles to represent the SU abroad.
Kruschev begins to consolidate power through foreign policy initiatives - he looked to the East for the developments of diplomacy. PRC's leaders saw an opportunity to exploit the internal struggles in the Kremlin to initiate the trade agreements and aid concessions that Stalin had denied them. Khruschev surpassed their expectations and despite opposition from technocrats in the system, insisted that it was in following with communist ideals and the CW struggle.

Jan 1954 - visits Beijing: highly successful. Est. Krushchev as a formidable statesman - challenges Molotov's position. He opened talks with Austrian chancellor (Karl Raab) culminating on the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 that established Austria as a neutral in CW Europe. Also took the lead with West German Chancellor Adenauer in negotiations.

Although on the surface it seems like he just exploited the detente already set into motion by his predecessors; Beria and Malenkov, his international activities were actually v. different in their premise. « He posed as a leader of the internat'l order of Communists that transcended mundane state interests. » (p.172)

The military industrial complex was the central focus of Soviet state and economy after 1953. Produced a new class of elites that became a new power in state bureaucracy. Under Khruschev, he integrated these elites and made them « put their aggressive patriotism and pride to the service of a rejuvenated revolutionary-imperial paradigm. » For the next decade, he took SFP in a new direction in the CW
A) Chapter 6 Summary

Nikita Khrushchev's flamboyant personality, style, and beliefs help explain the most serious rises in US-Soviet relations. On one hand he denounced Stalin's brutal policies and seemed to genuinely desire reaching a "peaceful coexistence" with the United States but he was still committed to pursuing the revolutionary-imperial paradigm and thus exacerbated tensions with the United States. Khrushchev's ascendance to power took many by surprise considering his background as a peasant and his unimpressive demeanor. Nevertheless, by September 1953 he became the First Secretary of the Central Committee in Moscow and eventually ruled the USSR single-handedly until he was ousted in 1964. It is important to note that Khrushchev saw the foreign policy of other powers through the personalities of their leaders. He desperately wanted the United States to accept the USSR as a legitimate power in the international system. He was especially infuriated by Dulles' policy of encirclement and roll-back of the Soviet Union. He desperately wanted a foreign policy breakthrough, which came in the form of the armaments program during the 1950s. Khrushchev saw nuclear bi-polarity as being the basic feature of the Cold War and did realize the ultimate limits imposed by nuclear weapons on statesmanship. However, he was hardly paralyzed by the fear of a nuclear war and did authorize (late in 1955) the shooting down of any aircraft that violated USSR air-space. (the USA lost 130 pilots in the undeclared air-reconnaissance war). Surprisingly, Khrushchev managedto bluff the United States into thinking that the Soviet Union was operating from a position of nuclear strength when, in actuality, they were playing from a position of inferiority. Essentially nuclear power became the weapon with which Khrushchev sought to obtain Washington's recognition of the USSR as an equal global power. However, he did not break with his revolutionary background and believed that the nuclear impasse would create a favourable environment for the spread of socialism among the new revolutionary nationalist regimes and this made him impatient and crude in his foreign policy calculations. Tensions erupted over Berlin on November 27th, 1958 when Khrushchev publicly proposed that the Western powers sign a treaty that would recognize two Germanies and ensure "the free city of West Berlin". This shocked the West – who feared another blockade. Adenauer's government (as well as the USA) rejected Khrushchev's offer of peaceful coexistence and instead West Germany remained a pillar of the Western defense alliance against the Soviet Union. The USSR also greatly feared the fact that West Germany could become a nuclear power – Adenauer did not deny that this was a possibility. Khrushchev certainly did not always act rationally and, despite the fact that the GDR was economically lagging behind West Germany, he truly believed that the Communist system would prevail. The Berlin episode illustrates the fact that Khrushchev did not want to appear as if he was being soft on the USA and that he underestimated the importance of Berlin to the United States. Khrushchev genuinely respected Eisenhower and, after a visit to Washington in September 1959, believed that he had made much progress. Therefore he felt betrayed when Eisenhower claimed responsibility for the CIA spy missions that were taking place in U2 high altitude planes. His response was hard handed and on May 1st, 1960 a U2 spy plane was shot down. From a Western viewpoint Khrushchev acted irrationally however he was likely trying to save face in front of the East Germans and the Chinese but his ensured that the Summit in Paris would be a failure.
A) Ch 7 (pp 210-235) “Khrushchev and the Sino-Soviet Schism” summary

- pragmatic bias of Krushchev that led him to pursue a ‘truce’ with West rather than risk outbreak of nuclear war caused rift in relations between USSR and China = prolonged Sino-Soviet confrontation
- split first obvious in 1958 Quemoy and Matsu crises, these crises not approved by Krushchev or Soviet Union and represented possible challenge to leadership of worldwide Marxist empire = disintegration of absolute bipolarity in CW
- 1949, Mao’s troops stopped pursuit of Chinese Nationalist forces on banks of Taiwan Strait; Nationalist forces took refuge on island of Taiwan = symbol to Chinese that Mao’s People’s Liberation Army hadn’t fulfilled promise to change land completely and did not have power to unify whole country
- August 1958, Mao began shelling Taiwan islands of Quemoy and Matsu in Taiwan Strait, = commenced attack on islands in response to Krushchev’s detente with U.S., as challenge to Krushchev, connected to desire to display power/strength of Chinese Communism and reunite China, and also challenge to strict bipolarity of system
- late 1950’s China strongest supporter of CW in Communist camp, but didn’t want to be dependent on USSR
- Mao revolutionary leader, had won Communist victory for China without aid from USSR, by 1949 was prepared for independent Chinese Crusade for Communism but several factors prevented this: (1.) - CW system of bipolarity by 1949, (2.) Stalin’s leadership, in 1940-50s still those among top of leadership in China who saw USSR as leader of Communist nations, after Stalin’s death, late 1950’s USSR became more focused on managing IR for own interests and not on principles of Communist revolution = one of main sources ideological difference between Moscow and Beijing
- Mao believed USSR was threatening domestic stability of his regime, and Moscow could not longer be seen as central revolutionary force for Communism, at time of Great Leap, Soviets shocked were not informed = Krushchev critical of Mao’s domestic policies
- China also kept Soviets in the dark about timing, course, purpose of second Taiwan crisis, 1958 = greater evidence of increasing rift in relations between USSR and China = in Soviet’s mind the act was challenge to Soviet power, clear violation of hierarchical nature of global bipolarity = Mao wanted to establish independence from Moscow
- clear attempts by China, because of sense of nationalistic revolutionary vigor to challenge bipolarity of system, and view of Moscow as leader of global Communism
- events of 1958-59 signaled larger direction of CW, bipolarity becoming obsolete, by 1960 military cooperation had ended between USSR and China, Sino-Soviet split + USSR-U.S. detente occurred same time = beginning of changing CW system, had both split Soviet bloc and brought West and Moscow closer together
A) Chapter 8

What made him think that Soviet missiles on Cuban soil would stop US aggression against the Castro regime?
What other factors made him risk war for his country and the whole world?
- The competition between the two superpowers was constrained by a mutual fear of nuclear force.
- Khrushchev viewed the situation as a competition with Kennedy for Cuba, and for status quo in the Cold War.
- Khrushchev and Kennedy:
  o Khrushchev believed that a new era in US-Soviet relations would open up with the new president – he even shifted his foreign policy toward détente.
- April 17, 1961 CIA launched offensive to overthrow Castro's regime.
- Soviet position at the beginning of Cuban crisis: Cuban people would receive all the help needed. He added that if conflict continued there, it might also start in West Berlin.
- Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy after Bay of Pigs incident; he saw him as young and inexperienced, influenced by his advisors – in Vienna he was going to use this and make Kennedy make concessions on Berlin especially.
  o Kennedy's main goal from meeting: suggest retreat from Cold War, a broadening of the zone of neutrality.
- Khrushchev believed that the revolutionary situation in the world wasn't cause of the Soviet Union; it was a response to the Western “holy alliance.”
  o Kennedy admitted revolutions couldn't be stopped by force.
- Khrushchev believed that now that the SU had acquired means of retaliation against the US, the Americans saw him as a child playing with fire.
  o Kennedy viewed nuclear deadlock through prism of geopolitics, with expectations of some sort of partnership between the two.
  o Khrushchev saw it a recognition of the Imperliasts states that socialism was catching up.
- On the question of Germany, Khrushchev hopped they could both look at it from the perspective of mistrust of German militarism.
  o He threatened with signing a separate peace with the GDR, but if he did, the US knew that the SU would never accept US rights in West Berlin after this.
  o This wasn't convenient for Ulbricht, would lead to Western economic sanctions against the Soviet bloc.
- 1961 – The flight of people from East to West Berlin was signalling the collapse of East Berlin, something had to be done. Khrushchev wouldn't allow this cause its collapse would mean a soviet defeat in the Cold War.
  o Separate peace not convenient, therefore opted for closing the loophole.
- Khrushchev tried to create situations in other parts of the world to distract US attentions from the question of a German peace treaty. Some of the distractions were wars of liberation, exaggerate the Soviet strategic arsenal – revealed that he took US military might and NATO seriously.
- Khrushchev sent missiles to Cuba because he tried to move as a bold stroke that would alleviate pressures from several directions.
  o Wouldn't give up idea of Cuba for the sake of communism – he wanted to save the Cuban revolution, not the Cubans.
- There's little evidence that gamble in Cuba was part of a bigger plan involving West Berlin – only linked because of fear of loosing Cuba, and the survival of the GDR.
- Khrushchev never believed that Cuban crisis would get as far as it did, he thought he could control it just like he did with West Berlin.
  o Khrushchev lost faith in the nuclear deterrent.
- Khrushchev ended up accepting Kennedy’s peace terms – a unilateral withdrawal of all soviet offensive arms from Cuba.
  - However, he had not informed Castro about his decision, leading to fissures between the Soviet alliance system and Cuba. This pushed Castro to consider joining China in the great opposition of the Socialist camp. Also led to the Latin American countries to mistrust the Soviet Union’s promise of support.
B) Chapter 1: Stalin: Revolutionary Potentate

- vision of world transformation through the construction of socialism in ‘one single state’
- the victory over Nazism led to an unprecedented increase in sympathizers and admirers
- imperialism became an early part of Stalin’s strategy
- the philosophy of the Kremlin leader was based on a different kind of determinism – materialist faith in the laws of history
- he was determined to accomplish geopolitical tasks that the Soviets had pursued, but had either been too weak or too inept to complete
- he wanted security, not cohabitation, liquidation of the bourgeoisie, not trade, and this required undiluted control over territories, control over population, households and minds
- concept of territorial security was the cornerstone of his regime – ‘spheres of influence’
- Stalin brought the Soviet system to its peak; he followed the logic of absolute power with frightening precision – mind and character were crucial to that success
- Soviet xenophobia became an institutional pillar in Stalin and the state
- at the end of WWII Stalin felt that he had found the company of equals (the Big Three), statesmen who could fully appreciate his political genius
  - important psychological motive that pushed him in the direction of postwar cooperation – the feeling of comfort was never complete enough to achieve it
  - felt he needed to prove his superiority
  - felt Soviets needed to be reimbursed for enormous loss during the war
  - believed that the principle sum should come form German reparations
- Feb. 1945, at Yalta the Western Allies regrettably acknowledged that the enormous Soviet sacrifices and success in the war entitled the USSR to a pre-eminent role in East Europe (but the area was not supposed to be “Sovietized”)
  - altered the boundaries of Poland, and Outer Mongolia
  - would neutralize traditional geopolitical threats: Germany and China
- idea of World equality led to the USSR’s full participation in post war preparations
B) Chapter 2

The chapter focuses on Stalin’s policies, views, and beliefs in the immediate post war period. He was suspicious of the new diplomatic landscape mostly due to the death of FDR and Truman’s dropping of the Atomic bomb. Moreover, when Churchill was not reelected he lost his two foreign partners who he knew he can trust. His success to manipulate Truman for reparations from Germany and a status quo over Poland reduced his tensions for a short while. The dropping of the bomb threw him off balance. Stalin and his major two cronies Moltov and Beria interpreted the atomic bomb as blackmail against the USSR, a threat to unleash a devastating war. His belief of a U.S. return to isolationism something he strongly believed after Yalta, was thrown on its head with the attack on Hiroshima. Thus, Stalin responded to the attack with deliberate contempt and arrogance diplomacy against the concessions the Americans assume they can squeeze from him. Moreover, in Aug 1945 he ordered the mobilization of all resources in order to break the American nuclear monopoly. By doing so he altered both his internal and external policies. Internal-he was actually creating a new revolution however it was based on the ashes of the Peasantry in order to transform the USSR into a scientific nuclear power and thus reorganizing the entire domestic economy and society. External- he realized that his Yalta’s goal of building a secure periphery around the USSR, was no longer efficient due to the A-Bomb.

Stalin’s strategy between 1945-1947: Germany- He wanted to establish a Soviet hegemony in its zone of occupation, later he believed the U.S. will withdraw from the Western region and then it will not be a problem for him to undermine the British in the Western zone, thus turning all of Germany under the Communist umbrella. However, rapes, and brutality acts by the Red Army towards the German people resulted in resentment of the Germans towards the Soviet occupation. Moreover, the U.S. instead of withdrawing began to separate west Germany economic benefits from the east. Stalin tried to avoid a German separation in order to keep his future view of Germany alive. His vision was seriously challenged with the announcement of the Marshal Plan (fall of 1947), this plan for him was a strategic challenge just as the US atomic monopoly. Thus, his xenophobia grew and he began a blunt outspoken anti-imperialist and anti-American campaign. A division of Germany would be for him a major geopolitical defeat.

1950-Korean war. June 25th 1950 North Korea invaded the South. The US interpreted it as a direct Soviet aggression and as first step for an invasion of Europe in order to unite a strong Communist block. However, this was not an attack conducted by Stalin. Stalin supported Kim in order to advance his geopolitical position in the Far East, and strengthen his revolutionary prestige due to the rise of Mao Zedong, and thus keep his superiority position in the Communist world. Stalin assumed the US will not intervene in Korea, why? 1. The Sino-Soviet Alliance will deter the Americans, based on his realpolitick world views. 2. In Aug 1949 the USSR broke the American nuclear monopoly, while at the same time the American troops stationed in Korea since WWIR withdrew. 3. South Korea was not included in Dean Acheson “defense perimeter” in the pacific. 4. His fear of being perceived as putting breaks on a communist revolution cause and Mao stepping in to support the cause and thus become the Communist block leader. - Thus, when Truman obtained international approval from the UN (Stalin withdrew from the UN earlier) to intervene in Korea, Stalin was completely surprised. Stalin as the war went on succeeded both to keep Mao from joining the war directly and thus bring the Soviets into it, and through his manipulating diplomacy able to maintain a façade that he was not afraid of confronting the West. In essence Stalin’s realpolitick views overshadowed his communist imperialistic revolution ideology. He was willing to accept the lose of a Communist regime in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the West. The consequences of Stalin not stopping the Korean War altogether were harsh for the soviets: 1. The US adopted a view of the Sino-soviets trying to achieve global conquest, thus the US military quadrupled. 2. the rearmament of West Germany began, and NATO’s powers rose.
In Conclusion- The Marshal Plan marked the beginning of a new postwar foreign policy by Stalin, a transformation from one based on coexistence and relative relaxation into ruthless determination for a world based on coalition and blocs of influence. Yet, there was never a master plan (as Truman, Eisenhower etc believed) to rule the world, Stalin’s ambitions for sphere of influence were always tied down due to the Soviet destruction state after the war and the US atomic monopoly. Stalin died in 1953, thus a new period of Soviet communist leaders and policies emerged.
B) Ch. 6: The Education of Nikita Khrushchev

Intro

- Nikita Khrushchev inherited the Cold War from Stalin
- His flamboyant personality, style, and beliefs help explain the most serious crises in U.S.-Soviet relations that held the world in suspense and finally brought it to the brink of nuclear war
- 2 sides to him: the ignorant and crude accomplice of Stalin's criminal system and the man of surprisingly human reactions
- Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes at the 20th Party Congress in Feb 1956, because Stalin offended his sense of justice and the revolutionary promise
- Also attempted to reach a “peaceful coexistence” with the United States because he wanted to divert the resources spent on the Soviet war machine to peaceful Socialist construction
- Both intentions backfired
- The semipublic acknowledgement that Stalin had been a despot and a tyrant dealt an irreparable blow to Soviet Cold War propaganda
- The attempt to reach an understanding with Washington precipitated the loss of the Soviets major geopolitical ally- Communist China
- At the same time, Khrushchev's campaign to wind down the CW brought about a sharp increase in world tensions, in part because he refused to abandon the revolutionary-imperial paradigm for the sake of “peaceful coexistence” with the West
- Incensed by American arrogance and superiority, and proud of Soviet technological achievements, he began using revolutionary nationalism and nuclear threats in the global competition with the United States on a new, unprecedented scale.
- Yet even when he shook the world with massive thermonuclear tests, he clung to the hope of winding down the CW and the arms race, in some kind of glorious truce with the West

His Roots and Career

- Nikita Khrushchev deceived many people
- Not perceived initially as a serious rival by Beria, Melankov and Molotov, or serious threat by the West
- Born on April 17, 1894 in a small Russia village to a poor peasant family
- Spent youth doing physical labour
- Marxist propaganda awakened his political radicalism even before the Russian Revolution
- After Lenin seized power in 1917, Khrushchev was elected chairman of the union of Metal Workers and joined the Red Army during the civil war
- In 1929- the party organization of the mines of Donbass sent Khrushchev to Moscow to study at the Industrial Academy
- Stalin’s wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, a student at the Academy, brought Khrushchev to Stalin's attention
- From that moment, his career took off
- By 1957, he ruled the USSR single-handedly
- Died on September 11, 1971, at the age of 77
K. was impulsive and mercurial
Acted before thinking, on intuition, spontaneously and unpredictably
Fierce and smart
Could be a warm and humane family man, while also being a rude and nasty despot

Never sought to distance himself from his peasant roots, which to his mind, was his right to rule
The other source of Khrushchev’s self-legitimacy, the foundation of his sense of mission, was the Revolution
Genuinely believed that the old and rotten capitalist world was doomed to perish and that a brave new world would come to replace it
Milestones of the century also deeply influenced K.- Stalin’s despotism and WW2
Saw Stalin as a revolutionary and great statesman, but also treacherous murderer
In WWII, strongly felt people and not the leadership saved the country and defeated the Nazis
After war, rejected Stalin’s postulate about the inevitability of war

Khrushchev clashed with Molotov
K. was his own foreign minister
Saw foreign policy of other powers through the personalities of their leaders, and assumed that large, historic events could be arranged through secret channels to these leaders
His attitude toward foreign leaders was highly emotional and subject to abrupt reassessments
Although he liberated the new elites from terror, he continued to hold many of them in a state of constant uncertainty, who thus eventually ousted him

Khrushchev’s View of the Cold War

Never thought about the CW in systematic terms
Believed that the USSR had been wrongly treated by the U.S. after WWII
To him, the CW was a continuation of the policies of isolation, non-recognition and intervention that the West pursued against Soviet Russia since 1917
Bitter about devastation of USSR and prosperity of U.S.
Placed the blame for the U.S.-Soviet confrontation on Western politicians
Churchill and Truman deemed warmongers
According to K., Churchill wanted to “destroy” the soviet Union, while Trumans’ policy towards the Soviet Union was intolerable, and deemed narrow minded
Did not however believe that the clash with the West was preordained
Acknowledged that both sides had made mistakes in the past, blaming Stalin, Molotov and Beria for the rigid and sometimes erroneous soviet foreign policy that played into American hands
Had a desire to overcome Stalin’s entangled international legacy and make the U.S. abandon their policies of arrogance, nonrecognition and strength towards the USSR
Rejected the “inevitability of global war” and the violent revolutionary transition of the world from capitalist to socialist order
Beliefs marked fundamental shift from thinking of Stalin and Molotov, who saw the Cold War as a prelude to another world war among great powers, to a view of the Cold war as a transitory period between the era of imperialist wars and an era of peaceful economic competition between the two social systems
The future, in Krushchev’s opinion, would be a cold peace perhaps, but hardly a Cold War
The main problem for Khrushchev was how to accelerate this historic inevitability
- Counted on the ability of Soviet foreign policy to generate “soft power” to undermine the West and undo U.S. made anti-soviet blocs

1955-1956- Krushchev believed that a reduction of tensions would result in the capitalists’ interest in profitable trading with the USSR
- K. looked for partners, Western politicians with common sense and without ideological prejudices against the USSR
- During this 1st stage of his career as a statesman, K. was filled with the enthusiasm of a neophyte
- After Stalins death there were many trips abroad
- K. decided to use the opportunities of revolutions in the Third World
- 
- Soon, however began to think that a quiet termination of the Cold War could not be accomplished, inasmuch as policy-making in the U.S. and other capitalist nations remained in the hands of staunch enemies who could only be convinced by force
- Two developments influenced this conclusion
- 1) the relentless policy of encirclement and roll-back of the Soviet Union conducted by John Dulles
- 2) A revolt of party oligarchs against Khrushchev and his increasingly autocratic policymaking in June 1957
- 1) The policy of Dulles, from K’s viewpoint, culminated in anti-Stalinist revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956- the revolts that threatened to topple soviet control over Eastern Europe
- The revolts underscored the fragility of the Socialist camp and cast a long shadow on K’s optimistic expectations
- “Peaceful coexistence” remained his long-term project, but he learned a lesson about the bipolar and zero-sum nature of the Cold War
- 2) June 1957- K. won the power struggle in Moscow, but the struggle itself affected his approach to the CW
- he was seen as giving away the initiative in the CW and expected to much from negotiations with the United States, naive and inclined towards “appeasement”
- His newly acquired authority and legitimacy depended on the success of his personal diplomacy
- By the end of the 1950’s, he had means to convince the West to accept the terms of “peaceful coexistence”- with the development of its nuclear superpower

The Making of a Nuclear Romantic

- Stalin, despite his interest in the Bomb, had never grasped the new meaning the CW acquired in the nuclear age
- K. understood that nuclear bipolarity became the basic feature of the Cold War, as both the soviet Union and the U.S. gained the capacity to destroy each other and the world
- K. understood the limits imposed by nuclear weapons on statesmanship
- Yet the philosophy of prudence and caution went against K. grain
- “we could never possibly use these weapons, but all the same we must be prepared.”
- He felt personally humiliated by American military and technological arrogance
- K.’s revolutionary side could not help rejoicing at the thought that, with the advent of nuclear deadlock and missile technology, the end of American arrogance and superiority was within sight.
- Understood that the nuclear sword cut both ways: the Americans used it to contain communism and if possible, roll it back
- First occurred to K. that nuclear bluff was a good thing in Nov. 1956, during the Anglo-Franco-Israeli-Arab war, where K. threatened the aggressors and allies of the U.S. with a nuclear strike
- K. also took steps to convince the world of Soviet superiority in long-range missiles
- For many years, K. produced the impression of Soviet strength among the western public, while actually playing from a position of inferiority
- The U.S. believed that K. was finally able to implement, under the shield of Soviet nuclear deterrence, his expansionist designs
- K.’s romantic side hoped that the missiles would:
  - Force the west to treat the USSR with respect
  - Promote national security and world revolution
  - Help assure universal peace through disarmament
  - Help K. with the implementation of his program of the “highest” stage in the construction of communism in the USSR
- In his attitude toward nuclear weapons, K. was torn between the imperatives of world politics and the credo of the ultimate transformation of the world
- The realpolitik applications of his nuclear education conflicted with and often were overshadowed by his great hope that the nuclear deadlock would make it possible for the USSR to defend and protect the movements of national liberation colonial powers
- Khrushchev’s conviction that the nuclear impasse was a natural prelude to “peaceful coexistence” between superpowers and a favorable environment for the spread of socialism among the new revolutionary-nationalist regimes made Khrushchev more impatient, more bold and crude in his foreign policy calculations
- The lessons that K. had drawn from the thermonuclear revolution played themselves out in his pressure on Western powers to settle the German question in the late 1950s and early 1960s
- He believed that if the question of Germany were settled, that would remove the chief obstacle to the process of negotiating a truce between the SU and Western bloc and a peaceful transformation of the world from capitalism to socialism

The Struggle for Berlin

- Nov 27, 1958, K. proposed that the Western powers sign a German peace treaty that would recognize the existence of two Germanies and the “free city of West Berlin”- free from the presence of the west
- If the West refused to negotiate, he warned, the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and then all the rights of the Western powers in Berlin and their access routes to the city would be subject to negotiations with the sovereign state of the GDR
- This proposal produced a shock in the West
- For years the second Berlin crisis kept Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States in a state of extreme tension
- In K’s eyes, the lack of a formal German peace settlement was the biggest threat to Soviet security interests in Europe
- Adenauer’s gov’t as well as the U.S. administration, rejected K’s offer of the “peaceful coexistence” of two German states allied with the opposing blocs
- West Germany remained a pillar of the western defense alliance against the Soviet Union
- Khrushchev decision to propose a peace treaty was a result of:
  - A) the Kremlin’s fear of the nuclearization of West Germany
  - B) Ulbricht and his sympathizers
- The East German leader believed that eradication of capitalism in the Eastern zone was a communist duty and a precondition for staying in power
- Instead of profiting from the proximity to capitalist west Berlin, he wanted to take it over and repeatedly tried to persuade Soviet leadership to help him in this task
- **K. was committed to the construction of socialism in the GDR, supporting Ulbricht and the dream that there would be a German proletarian state in the heart of Europe**
- K. also feared that West Germans were possible heirs to Hitler's Reich
- K. assumed responsibility for the economic problems of the GDR, linking them to soviet confiscatory policies in East Germany and to the USSR's inability to match U.S. aid to the FRG
- Support of the GDR for K. was first and foremost a strategic imperative, recognizing that if they did not strengthen the regime inside East Germany then the Soviet army would be surrounded
- The refusal of the Americans to negotiate about the German peace settlement infuriated K.
- He came to think that West German politicians were using the United States to gain power over the GDR and to move to domination in Central Europe
- In Sept. 1959, K. arrived in the U.S. at the invitation of Eisenhower
- He was determined to turn this visit into the greatest success of his personal diplomacy

- Mao Zedong and the rest of the Chinese leadership were deeply insulted by K's decision to come to Beijing via Washington, not the other way around
- When they did meet, k. demanded that the Chinese authority accept “two Chinas” and also wanted to defuse a possible flare-up of Sino-Indian hostilities over a territorial dispute
- The Chinese Communists, who considered the territorial integrity of their country ver much a part of their revolutionary state-building were outraged and blamed K. for putting his geopolitical scheme- a settlement with the U.S., above the Sino-Soviet alliance
- The visit led to the open estrangement of the leadership of the two communist empires

- When on May 1 1960, on the eve of the summit, the U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down, K. showed the world that he was anything but lenient with the West
- The espionage activities of the CIA, like the nuclear rhetoric of the Secretary of State, symbolized for K. long years of technological inferiority, humiliation and impotence
- The triumph of Soviet technology on May 1 gave Khrushchev an excellent opportunity to teach his arrogant adversaries a lesson: to unmask and compromise them before the whole world on the eve of the summit
- He hoped that Eisenhower might be an easier negotiator once he administration was embarrassed
- But this was not the case
- Although K. felt as though he had a mutual faith with Eisenhower, and did not want to believe that Eisenhower was personally responsible, after Eisenhower's acknowledgement, K. was unable to continue dealing with him because that would have meant a public loss of face

- **K. thus boycotted the Paris summit, to prevent humiliation and to prove its strength to its communist allies, particularly China**
- There were no serious challenges to K. inside the Kremlin, as he reversed the vessel of Soviet foreign policy from détente to confrontation
- The collapse of former colonies was at its climactic moment just as Khrushchev cancelled the summit
- K. shrewdly exploited major problems in international relations of his greatest enemy, the United States
- His enthusiasm for the Third world peaked as he decided to lead the Soviet delegation at the U.N. General Assembly
- The Soviet leader “discovered” and embraced the Cuban revolution, seeing the young Cubans as heroes who had revived the promise of the Russian Revolution and dared to do it under the very nose of the most powerful imperialist country on earth
- K.'s attachment to Castro's Cuba was the most visible symptom of his “leftist disease” in late 1960 and early 1961
- Another symptom was Soviet policy in the Congo, sanctifying Lumumba, the Congolese nationalist
- **K. insisted that by supporting the “sacred” struggle of colonies and former colonies for independence, the Soviets would be taking a shortcut toward communism and would succeed in “bringing imperialism to its knees.”**
- Most of the soviet elites were startled by K's behavior abroad
- The first to betray Mr. K came from the ranks of the KGB and the GRU
- They justified their treason on the ground that K's behavior might trigger a third world war
- The soviet revolutionary-imperial paradigm saw a spectacular revival in 1960- perhaps the most remarkable in the history of the Soviet Cold War, and certainly the most visible since the advent of the thermonuclear revolution
- **K. hoped that the groundswell of social transformation even more than soviet successes in the nuclear arms race and missile technology would demonstrate to the world, and particularly to the U.S., that the cause of communism was the wave of the future**
- But he was prepared, should the American leadership prove slow to recognize new realities, to make full use of the new image of a nuclear superpower that he as the leader of the USSR, possessed
- The stage was set for the decisive chapter in Khrushchev's cold War: his confrontation with John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Notes:

The following are questions I think are important to the understanding of this chapter. The fundamental points to the answers are found in the bolded text.

1. How did Khrushchev's campaign to wind down the CW bring about a sharp increase in world tensions?
2. How did Khrushchev’s view on the CW fundamentally differ from the views of Molotov and Stalin?
3. Why did Khrushchev begin to think that a quiet termination of the Cold War could not be accomplished?
4. What was Khrushchev's attitude toward nuclear power for the Soviet Union in the Cold War international system?
5. Why did Khrushchev propose a German Peace treaty in 1958?
6. Why did Khrushchev boycott the Paris summit in 1960?
7. Why did Khrushchev support the revolutions of the Third World?
B) Chapter 7 “Khrushchev and the Sino-Soviet Schism” summary

Comment: I think that this is a very important chapter, as it deals with China’s attempt to remake the world order. I would highly recommend that everyone at least skim it before the test.

Mao was different from most of the other leaders in the communist block. Unlike most Eastern European leaders (with the exception of Tito) who had been installed in power by the Soviet Union after WWII, Mao had come to power on his own, leading his own revolution. He was both China’s Lenin and its’ Stalin. After seizing power in 1949, Mao was ready to take China on an international communist crusade. He was stopped from doing this by the bi-polar world system, which forced China to toe Moscow’s line for military and political support against the West. With the death of Stalin in 1953 and the emergence of Khrushchev as the new leader of the Soviet Union, Mao was able to secure China’s independence from Moscow’s political and ideological control. Differing opinions between the two leaders would lead to the two socialist states drifting apart, and then, later, becoming enemies.

In September 1954, China began to shell the Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu (occupied by Nationalist forces). This started the first Taiwan crisis. At this point, the USSR and China’s relations were still sound, and Moscow stood by its Chinese ally. China, having made its’ political point (about it’s refusal to accept a two state solution to the Chinese civil war), ended the crisis by backing down in April 1955. At this time, the USSR was going out of its way to appease its’ Chinese allies. Nuclear knowledge and financial aide, negligible under Stalin, now poured into China. However, the Khrushchev and Mao saw the world in fundamentally different ways. Khrushchev was becoming more and more “right” – loosening domestic controls and seeking to improve relations with the West, while Mao was becoming more and more “left,” – beginning the “Great Leap Forward” and cracking down on his population. In a sense, Mao was becoming like Stalin, at a time when Khrushchev and the leadership of the Soviet Union were trying to move away from that period in the Soviet Union’s history. The USSR and the PRC slowly began to drift apart.

Khrushchev and Mao took radically different stances on international policy. Mao did not see the nuclear threat in the same way that Khrushchev did, and Khrushchev was unable to convince him of the dangers that it posed. Revolutionary Mao regarded Moscow’s pragmatic post-Stalin, post-secret speech policies (a softening of Stalin’s tough line) as a betrayal of the communist “common cause.” In November 1957, at a conference of world communist parties, Khrushchev called for “peaceful coexistence” between the communist world and the West. Mao opposed this view, and he unleashed a second crisis in Taiwan the next year as a way of responding to this Soviet rapprochement with the West.

Khrushchev was torn between two opposing desires: the desire to uphold the ideals of the Soviet state and the October revolution on one hand, and the desire to create a safe international environment for the USSR in a nuclear armed world on the other. When the tension between supporting a global revolution and preventing a war with the United States finally came to a head during the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962), Khrushchev chose the latter; pragmatism trumped ideological dogmatism. This was different from the very ideological governing style of Stalin (which Mao supported), and helped strengthen American-Soviet relations. However, at the same time, this choice precipitated a split between the USSR and China. This came to a head with Chinese provocation of the USSR in 1958 in Taiwan.

In August 1958, China again began to once more shell Quemoy and Matsu. This was a dangerous revolt in the socialist camp, as China was challenging Soviet leadership, and with that, the bi-polar system (see page 221). Indeed, China never meant to invade Taiwan, the whole event was merely to provoke Moscow (see page 222). Mao wanted to send a message to Khrushchev
that he was not happy with the way that the USSR was getting close to the United States. Moscow was worried that China could start a war with the USA over Taiwan, and that this could draw the Soviet Union into conflict with the USA (see pages 226-227). However Mao may have been using Khrushchev in Taiwan, this did not end the Sino-Soviet relationship. The USSR was still helping China develop its nuclear program. Soon, though, Khrushchev began to have some serious doubts about this, fearing that the Chinese were merely using the Soviets. Following this, in 1959 the USSR cancelled its’ atomic aide to the PRC (removing the option of the Chinese getting a nuclear device and using it to further threaten/deter the USA over Taiwan). This lack of nuclear cooperation dealt a serious blow to the Sino-Soviet alliance.

As the 1950’s drew to a close, Khrushchev was in a difficult position of trying to mend fences between the USA and the PRC, two powers who were close to war. Things were not helped by his ham handed diplomacy. Tensions further deepened when the USSR refused to support China in its’ war against Non Aligned Movement leader India (see page 230). The Chinese also began to further disparage Khrushchev for his efforts at strengthening ties with Washington. By 1960, the split was in the open; the differences in world outlook and foreign policy between the two countries were too great (see page 233). In July 1960 the USSR withdrew all Soviet advisers from China, and by 1961 Khrushchev ceased paying lip service to the idea of a Sino-Soviet block.

As China began to assert itself as a world power, traditional, 1950’s bi-polarity started to become obsolete (see page 235). China challenged the USSR on Khrushchev’s view of the world order. It should come as no surprise that a strengthening of Soviet – American relations happened at the same time as a weakening in Sino – Soviet relations. The USSR and the PRC had different views on the world system and the United States, and China was now what Russia had been under Stalin.

Questions

1) Why did Mao have such a different view of the United States? (Consider how he got to power)
2) Was the Sino-Soviet socialist alliance always a marriage of convenience, or did it have some ideological background?
What would you have done if you were Khrushchev? Mao?