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IMAGINATIONS OF THE UNREAL: Jeff
Lindstrom RLG
206Y Prof.
Neil McMullin Yogacara
has often been saddled with the accusation of “idealism.” Commentators and
scholars have interpreted Yogacara’s concern for the workings of
consciousness and cognition as a belief in the unreality of the external
world, produced by the mind or even some overarching monistic consciousness.
Increasingly, though, some scholars have undertaken a revisionist counterattack
by promoting one or more of these contentions: 1) Yogacara is part of the
continuous development of Buddhist thought and not some radical departure
from the concerns of other Buddhist schools, 2) Yogacara does not see an
ultimate or unique reality in mind or consciousness, 3) the mind does not
“create” an external reality, 4) Yogacara does not deny the existence of
external objects (artha) despite terms such as cittamatra (“mind-only”) and
vijñaptimatra(ta) (“consciousness-only”), and 5) like many other Buddhist
schools, Yogacara emphasizes the unreality not of an external reality but
rather of the subject/object divide, in Yogacara’s version described as the
division between grasper and grasped (grahya and grahaka). Compelling
evidence for any one of these statements seriously weakens the viewpoint that
Yogacara adopts some kind of extreme idealism. It is my contention that the
revisionists are in fact correct on all points based on evidence misread or
ignored in the past. Dan
Lusthaus of Thomas
A. Kochumuttom sees a slightly different bogeyman: monistic idealism. In four
texts attributed to Vasubandhu, one of two half-brothers traditionally said
to have founded Yogacara, Kochumuttom sees a consistency both among its own
texts and with previous traditions in Buddhism: “It has been the belief that
the Yogacarins had broken away from the early Buddhist schools by replacing
the latter’s realistic pluralism with a monistic idealism. In contrast to
this traditional belief, my contention is that the Yogacara position need not
be interpreted as a total rejection of the early Buddhism” (xvi). To the
operation of imagination (parikalpa) the Yogacarins attribute “only the
distinction between graspable and grasper, not the entire external world, as
a monistic idealism would have one believe” (4). Kochumuttom further contends
that in Yogacara “a plurality of beings is taken for granted, while the
dualistic view of reality is emphatically denied” (3). In
a feisty deconstruction of modern Yogacara scholarship, Alex Wayman writes “A
Defense of Yogacara Buddhism.” The professor emeritus of Sanskrit at The tide of misinformation on this, or on any other topic
of Indian lore comes about because authors frequently read just a few verses
or paragraphs of text, then go to secondary sources, or to treatises by
rivals, and presume to speak authoritatively. Only after doing genuine
research on such a topic can one begin to answer the question: why were those
texts [written] and why do the moderns write the way they do? (470) He
cites various textual passages to show that only mistranslation or
misrepresentation supports the claim that Yogacara denied the existence of the
external world: “Of course, the Yogacara put its trust in the subjective
search for truth by way of a samadhi. This rendered the external world not
less real, but less valuable as the way of finding truth” (Wayman 470). On
this and many other points these scholars agree that Yogacara neither denies
external reality nor states that consciousness or mind creates all that
exists. This may not remove the charge of “idealism” entirely. “Idealism,” a
Western invention, is a very fuzzy concept, eventually coming to “encompass
everything that was not materialism, which included so many different types
of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality” (Lusthaus 67).
Lusthaus adds: At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism
which posited the mind as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was
either an unreal illusion, or not as real as the mind that created it. To
avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism),
metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisages and creates
the universe. (67) Lusthaus
feels Yogacarins could be better described as epistemological idealists, who
can be “ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists
substantially,” but deny that matter can be known “in itself directly without
the mediation of mental representations” (Lusthaus 67). These examples are
but a few from the wide world of “idealism,” a term that can be made to mean
almost anything you want. However, when the term is used to imply Yogacarins denied
external reality and posited an ultimate reality to the mind or
consciousness, this meaning cannot be supported. Another
problem with examining Yogacara from a Western perspective, notes Lusthaus,
is that aside from some epistemological idealists, most materialists and
idealists are “concerned with the ontological status of the objects of sense
and thought, as well as the ontological nature of the self who knows” (67).
However, Indian philosophy is much more inclined to examine epistemological
issues. This is particularly the case with Buddhist philosophy, he says: The Buddhist goal is not the construction of a more
perfect ontology. Instead its primary target is always the removal of
ignorance. Hence, while Buddhists frequently suspend ontological and
metaphysical speculation (tarka), denouncing it as useless or dangerous,
correct cognition (samyagjñana) is invariably lauded. (Lusthaus 68) Lusthaus
says that even the Madhyamikas, “who question the feasibility of much of
Buddhist epistemology,” are in basic agreement with the need to correct our
errors of cognition (68). The
continuity argument—that Yogacara is a modification but not a repudiation of
earlier schools of Buddhism—is somewhat problematic if it springs from a
romanticized view of the pristine originality of the historical Buddha’s
thought. Such an approach threatens to fall prey to various essentialist
traps. However, be that as it may, the biographical and textual arguments are
extensive and persuasive. Richard King, another Yogacara revisionist,
discusses why Mahayana Buddhist schools such as Madhyamaka and Yogacara are
depicted as “generally antithetical” to the “Abhidharma” of Theravada and Sarvastivada, for instance: Firstly, it often reflects the tendency to conceive of
internal doctrinal controversies as the source of schisms in a manner akin to
the disputations of Christian history. As Heinz Bechert has pointed out, the
principle of schism (sanghabheda) in Indian Buddhism was based upon disputes
over monastic code (vinaya) and not differences in doctrinal position.
Secondly, increasing examination of Tibetan commentarial materials has
allowed Buddhist scholars to provide a much fuller account of the history of
Mahayana thought. (King 5) Hence
histories are written exaggerating these discontinuities, presented as if
they expose deep divisions that had cut through the heart of Indian Buddhist
communities. Even when doctrinal positions are examined in isolation from
this overall context there is a great continuity. King feels he can draw
strong parallels between early Yogacara and its Abhidharmic predecessors such
as the Sautrantikas, whose doctrines helped shape Yogacarin views on
alayavijñana (“store consciousness”) and vijñaptimatrata
(“cognitive-representation only”) (5, 9). Other
scholars see a similar continuity. For instance, although traditionally
termed Yogacara’s founders, Asanga and Vasubandhu elaborated a system of
thought that bears many similarities to the Samdhinirmocanasutra of a century
or two earlier (Lusthaus 64). In his works Vasubandhu records a similar
transition, first earning prominence with his encyclopedic summary of
Vaibhasika Buddhism. Then he started questioning his previous work.
Kochumuttom infers that “already in writing his commentary on his own Abhidharma-kosa
he had shown his openness to new doctrines and formulations” (xiv), and
Lusthaus sees in Vasubandhu “a deep familiarity with the Abhidharmic
categories discussed in the Abhidharmakosa and attempts to rethink them,”
leading him nearer to Yogacarin conclusions (65). Kochumuttom
acknowledges that because Abhidharma and Yogacara “represent two different
traditions within Buddhism, one begins to wonder if Vasubandhu the author of
the Abhidharma-kosa and Vasubandhu the co-founder of the Yogacara system really
are one and the same person” (xi). Because of limited historical sources and
variations in calculating the year of the Buddha’s nirvana, proposed dates
for Vasubandhu’s life extend “roughly from the early third century A.D. to
the early sixth century A.D.” (Kochumuttom xi) Faced with this lack of
consensus, E. Frauwallner proposed the “two Vasubandhus” theory in 1951
concluding that an older Vasubandhu lived before 400 A.D. and co-founded
Yogacara while Vasubandhu the author of Abhidharma-kosa lived between 400 and
500 A.D. (Kochumuttom xii). However, Kochumuttom believes most scholars
remain unconvinced, with even Frauwellner reported to have abandoned his own
theory (xii-xiii). One
of the more controversial features of Yogacara is the alayavijñana, translated
as “warehouse consciousness” by Lusthaus (64), or “store consciousness” by
Wayman (460) and Kochumuttom (xiii). Kochumuttom cites the history of
alayavijñana to show that “an almost spontaneous transition from
Abhidharma-kosa to the Yogacara system is not altogether unwarranted” (xiii).
He continues: “the theory of store consciousness (alaya-vijñana) which is
universally recognized as a basic innovation by the Yogacarins, is after all
only the ‘christening’ of the theory of the seeds (bija) in the
Abhidharma-kosa” (xiii). Buddhist
theorists were fashioning consciousness into an increasingly complex system
of stages and modes. The concept of alayavijñana grew out of these efforts.
In what Lusthaus calls “Standard Buddhism,” there was already a theory of
“six types of consciousness, each produced by the contact between its
specific sense organ and a corresponding sense object” (72). For example: When a functioning eye comes into contact with a colour or
shape, visual consciousness is produced. When a functioning ear comes into
contact with a sound, auditory consciousness is produced. Consciousness does
not create the sensory sphere, but is an effect of the interaction of a sense
organ and its proper object. (Lusthaus 72) In
other words, we are not conscious of the world directly but only through our
senses of eye, ear, nose, mouth, body and mind. Each sense organ is
associated with a kind of consciousness and a sensory object domain (Lusthaus
72). There is no consciousness of a sensory object except through the related
sense organ. Abhidharma then elaborated a concept of cittas (what perceives)
and associated caittas (such as sensory contact, attention, appropriational
intent and anger). Vasubandhu described Abhidharmic views in his
Abhidharmakosa and Wayman details some implications of this system: Abhidharma Buddhism recognizes six senses and their
objects, from the sense of eye with its object of formations (in shape or
color) to the sense of mind (manas) with its object of natures (dharma). But
this does not mean that one necessarily perceives such sense objects. So
Buddhism taught that there is a ‘perception’ (vijñana) based on the eye, and
so with the other senses as bases (ayatana). Because the senses had the power
to apprehend those various objects, they were given the Sanskrit name
indriya, a word which means ‘a power’. It follows immediately that
‘perception’ is powerless; that is, it is unable to contact the object
directly, but must depend on whatever the source organ comes up with. (456) Alayavijñana
made its appearance when Yogacara split manas further into three different
consciousnesses: manovijñana (empirical consciousness), klistamanas (a kind
of manas “obsessed with various aspects and notions of self”), and
alayavijñana (warehouse consciousness). (Lusthaus 73) Kochumuttom believes
that the Yogacarin version of alayavijñana simply collects together the seeds
(bjias) of past experience already described in Vasubandhu’s own Abhidharmakosa: “If so, it is not
impossible that the author of Abhidharma-kosa himself worked out, on his own
or in collaboration with others, the theory of alaya-vijñana and other allied
theories of the Yogacara system” (xiv). Yogacara,
then, built upon rather than undermined previous Buddhist concepts of
cognition and consciousness. One of the more frequent reasons scholars
attribute idealistic motives to the Yogacarins are two terms: cittamatra
(often translated as “mind only”) and vijñaptimatra (often translated as
“consciousness only”). Although Yogacarins sometimes called their system
vijñaptimatratavada, meaning “mere representation of consciousness,” this is
meant in a restrictive sense argues Kochumuttom (5). The mind contributes the
concepts of the grasper and the graspable, and the distinction between them.
These “characterizations are entirely imagined (parikalpita), and are,
therefore, mere representations of consciousness (vijñapti-matra)”
(Kochumuttom 5). Kochumuttom says that never in the four Yogacara works he
presents “has the term vijñapti been used to describe the absolute state of
reality, nor is there any indication that the final state of existence has to
be defined in terms of vijñana. Instead, as already observed, the absolute state
of reality is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of
subject-object distinction” (Kochumuttom 6). Kochumuttom also distinguishes
between vijñapti-matra and vijñapti-matrata: Whenever Vasubandhu uses the term vijñapti-matra he means
to say that the contents of samsaric experience, (such as the subject-object
distinction, the forms of subjectivity and objectivity), are all merely
representations of consciousness. But whenever he uses the term
vijñapti-matrata he refers to the state in which one realizes (saksat-karoti)
the fact that the contents of one’s samsaric experience are, or rather were,
mere representations of consciousness. (Kochumuttom 206) He
then elaborates upon this distinction by quoting his translation of stanzas
26 to 28 in Vasubandhu’s Trimsatika (Kochumuttom 208): As long as consciousness does not abide In vijñapti-matrata, The attachment to the twofold grasping Will not cease to operate. One does not abide in it [i.e. vijñaptimatrata] Just on account of the [theoretical] perception That all this is vijñapti-matra, If one places [=sees] something before oneself. One does abide in vijñapti-matrata When one does not perceive also a supporting
consciousness, For, the graspable objects being absent, There cannot either be the grasping of that, [Namely, the grasping of the supporting consciousness]. Kochumuttom
explains that vijñapti-matrata “stands for the state (of nirvana) in which
one realizes the fact that the contents of the samsaric experience are
vijñapti-matra” (208) and this realization brings about the end to our
“two-fold grasping (graha-dvaya), namely the passion for subjectivity and
objectivity, which is characteristic of any samsaric experience” (Kochumuttom
208). Clearly neither vijñapti-matra nor vijñapti-matrata implies that
reality distinguished from our subject–object delusions is “consciousness
only,” “mind only,” or “representation only.” Wayman
criticizes how editors of a compendium handled vijñaptimatrata in a translation
of Vasubandhu’s twenty-verse treatise, the Vimsatika: “The translation from
the Chinese by Wayman
also disputes the rendering of cittamatra as “mind-only” (including in his
own past essays) (450). He believes “mind” (citta) and “only” (matra) were
reconnected by readers of translations into European languages, thus they
were unaware of the original Sanskrit connotations of citta and matra
(450-451). Wayman examines the Sanskrit meanings of matra and its neuter form
matram to dispute a view that cittamatra
necessarily means mind and only mind. It could also mean “amounting to
mind,” “just mind,” “mirroring mind,” or even “being mirrored by mind” (451).
Wayman says matra could also mean “only” in the sense of “entirety”—meaning
other elements are being ignored, not denied: “For example, there is the
compound sthanamatra, in the meaning ‘a place in general’, thus any and all
places and excluding what is not a place” (451). Buttressing
his semantic analysis, Wayman describes a reported debate between Asanga and
an opponent over cittamatra: As the first attack, the opponent states, “It is not valid
that there is a mind-only in the sense of ‘continuous substantiality’
(dravyatas), because it contradicts scripture.” The opponent is asked: “How
does it contradict scripture?” That person responds: “He (the Buddha) said,
‘If the citta consisted of lust defilement (upaklesa) and consisted of hatred
and delusion defilements, it could not become liberated.’” Asanga replies:
“But what is the objection to that?” He seems to mean that we accept what the
Buddha taught, and so if the citta does not consist of these defilements (or
contain them), it would be liberated; hence your scriptural appeal cannot
deny to mind-only a ‘continuous substantiality’. The opponent does not give
up, and retorts: “Mind-only by itself is invalid, because if there is not two
together, when one does not resort to representation (vijñapti) of lust,
etc., one would be free (of those defilements) [which we know is not the
case].” (Wayman 451) Wayman
concludes, “It is clear that the Buddhist opponents did not criticize on the grounds
that Asanga denied the existence of the external world (which, of course, he
did not do)” (451). Instead, Asanga’s opponent, in this case “obviously a
follower of the Buddhist Abhidharma,” is merely arguing there can be no
cittas without caittas (which, as Lusthaus [73] says, are the “objects,
textures, emotional, moral and psychological tones of citta’s cognitions”)
(Wayman 451-452). This issue is far removed from believing the world itself
is only citta. On
a related topic, Wayman criticizes interpretations of “cittamatram yad uta
traidhatukam” from the Buddhist Dasabhumika-sutra. He disputes the
translation, “This triple world is mind-only,” which “has seemed to support
the claim that the Yogacara denies the existence of the external world” (452).
Not only is this sutra “not really a Yogacara scripture” (452) he cites two
explanations in Vasubandhu’s “great commentary” on the Dasubhumika-sutra,
neither explanation denying the existence of the external world. Wayman also
notes that traidhatu is a derivative noun of tridhatu (meaning “three
worlds”)—similar to how Gautama is a family derivative of Gotama (Wayman
453). Wayman feels that traidhatuka means “derived from, or faithful to, the
three worlds” (453) of desire, form, and the formless world, a standard
Buddhist division. Wayman concludes that traidhatuka is referring to the
concept of twelvefold dependent origination: “That is to say, whatever may be
the ‘three worlds’ in a minimal sense—whatever else may be attributed to
them, an elaboration of them, a product of them—has been added by the mind”
(454). Stating that the mind adds to the three worlds is very different from
having the mind create the three worlds. Examining
the Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan versions of Vasubandhu’s twenty verses, the
Vimsatika, Wayman reviews other statements misunderstood as a Yogacarin
denial of external objects. He translates the second verse of the Sanskrit
version as follows: “This just amounts to representation, as the sight of
unreal hair, moon, etc. of one with an eye-caul—because being the
(subsequent) manifestation of an unreal artha (external thing) (457).” Wayman
states that this verse is not referring to external reality as such. In this
verse: “there is a mental representation that amounts to tinsel, ‘fool’s
gold’, a false wealth. Vasubandhu appears to mean that the mind imagines an
external artha in front, but the mind has only a report or representation of
what the sense organ had sensed” (Wayman 457). Again a Yogacarin text is
avoiding directly commenting on the qualities of an external reality but
contents itself with discussing the relationship between mind and a
sense-organ, which is the only way we know of sense-objects from our
dualistic perspective. The
first verse (found only in the Chinese and Tibetan versions) can be
translated this way: “If representation lacks an external object (artha),
there is no certainty (aniyama) of space and time; there is no certainty of
the composite stream (of consciousness) and agency is not valid” (Wayman 457).
Wayman states, “We notice again that Vasubandhu does not here deny an
external object, because the sentence makes a supposition, ‘If...’” (457). He
also condemns a translation of a commentary on verse 16 “as though there is a
denial of the copula (‘although there is no external object’). But when we
consult the Sanskrit that [Sylvain] Lévi edited, we find the sentence worded
differently: ‘Even in the absence of an external object (vinapy arthena)’”
(458). “Thus,” concludes Wayman, “when we examine the text more carefully, we
find that Vasubandhu does not deny the existence of external objects in this
and in the previously cited materials, even though the translator, just by
his manner of translating, made it appear so” (458-459). Although
there is no denial of an external reality, there is certainly a denial that
descriptions of such an external reality would be particularly useful.
“Careful examination of Yogacarin texts,” writes Lusthaus, “reveals that they
make no ontological claims, except to question the validity of making those
ontological claims” (69). He says that “Yogacara never denies that there are
sense-objects (visaya, artha, alambana, etc.) but it denies that it makes any
sense to speak of cognitive objects occurring outside an act of cognition”
(Lusthaus 71). King elaborates on this issue: At the risk of labouring the point, we should note that
for the Yogacarin it is not the case that we simply ‘imagine’ our
experiences. They are ‘real’ to the extent that they are ‘given’ without our
conscious intervention. The pure given-ness (vastu-matra) of our experiences
is thus beyond our conscious control. The question of ‘externality,’ however,
is prevented from entering the Yogacara account since it is a quality which
cannot be a veridical aspect of our experience (since if x is really external
to our consciousness then it cannot be within its perceptive range). There
may or may not be an external world beyond our perceptions, but this will
have nothing to do with our actual experience which can only be ‘internal’
and subjective. Such, according to the Yogacarin, is the nature of conscious
experience. (King 12-13) As
Lusthaus points out, even thinking about reality outside of cognitive
experience “is itself a cognitive act” (71).
The resulting metaphysical description is “appropriated by its
interpreters whose proclivities would project onto it what they wish reality
to be”—through a process of cognitive projection (parikalpita) resulting in
ontological attachment (pratibimba) (Lusthaus 69). Lusthaus says this
projective reductionism is “to mistake one’s projections for that onto which
one is projecting” and is the central concern of the vijñaptimatra doctrine
(69), or as King describes it: Attachment to the objects of experience (alambana) as if
they were independent and external to the subject is the primary cause of the
perpetuation of one’s cognition of samsara. Ignorance and attachment (based
upon past karman) thereby cause the bifurcation of consciousness into
subjective and internal and objective and external. This is the ‘myth of the
transcendent object’—that is the fallacious belief that one is having a
veridical experience of an exteral world; the myth (maya) under which all
unenlightened beings are labouring. (King 13) If
consciousness is not the ultimate reality, then what is the meaning of
enlightenment for a Yogacarin? “Enlightenment consists in bringing the eight
consciousness to an end,” writes Lusthaus, “replacing them with enlightened
cognitive abilities (jñana)” (73). “Overturning the basis” replaces
manovijñana with the “immediate cognitive mastery” of non-conceptual
discernment. Klistamanas is replaced by “the immediate cognition of equality”
that equalizes self and other. The “great mirror cognition” replaces the
warehouse consciousness. It “sees and reflects things just as they are,
impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or
distortion,” writes Lusthaus. “The grasper–grasped relation has ceased”
(Lusthaus 73). According to Kochumuttom: Right in the beginning of his
Madhyanta-vibhaga-karika-bhasya Vasubandhu makes it unquestionably clear that
‘the imagination of the unreal’ [abhuta-parikalpa] means the discrimination
between graspable and grasper [grahya-grahaka-vikalpah]. Then the text goes
on to say how the whole world of experience, including the experiences of
inanimate and animate beings, self and ideas, is mere imagination of the
unreal, and how it rests on the unreal distinction between graspable and
grasper. (4) Following
along with this approach, “samsara is the illusory consciousness of
grahya-grahaka distinction, the cessation of which will automatically result
in one’s liberation (mukti). Thus, graspable-grasper distinction is the only
factor the Yogacarins attribute to the operation of imagination” (Kochumuttom
4). This
weight of evidence seems to satisfy the five criteria for accepting a revised
view of Yogacara: 1) Yogacara is not some radical departure from the Buddhist
mainstream, 2) mind or consciousness is not the ultimate reality, 3) mind
does not “create” some external reality, 4) Yogacara does not deny an
external reality, and 5) the way to liberation is realizing the illusory
nature of a subject/object divide (grasper/grasped in Yogacara). Yet
despite this mass of textual evidence the misinterpretations continue.
Lusthaus’s argument against Yogacara’s “metaphysical idealism” takes up much
of his article on Yogacara in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(1998). The very same publisher has since produced the Encyclopedia of Asian
Philosophy (2001), which includes these opening lines from the entry on
“Yogachara” written by Chris Bartley: Yogachara, ‘the practice of meditation’, is a Buddhist
Mahayana school asserting the unreality of objective duality and denying the
mind-independence of the material sphere. Yogacharins hold that while
consciousness is the only genuine existent, it has the constructive capacity
to bifurcate itself into experience of subjects and objects (vikalpa).
(Bartley 586) This
is a rather confused introduction to Yogacarin doctrine. As has been
demonstrated, the whole point of Yogacara is in fact to assert, not deny,
“the mind-independence of the material sphere.” What Yogacara objects to is
the mistaken belief that our mind’s projections, our imagination of the
unreal, should be considered real! Bartley appears to be confusing
sense-objects with objects of consciousness. Similar misrepresentations
follow: The school differentiates itself from the universal
emptiness teaching (shuna-vada) of the Madhyamikas in asserting the
irreducible reality of constructive consciousness. Mind, which imagines or
constructs duality (the non-existent), exists in its own right. (Bartley 587) Again,
more nonsense. As Lusthaus points out, with the overturning of the bases even
the alayavijñana fades away, the relative nature of the grasper/grasped
distinction having been replaced by a “great mirror consciousness,”
non-dualistic and hence having no object (73). The projective constructions
of the mind have ceased, and Yogacara would deny that mind itself still
“exists in its own right.” Wayman
in his caustically deconstructive fashion describes our last example of
dubious scholarship. He comments on T.R.V. Murti’s classic The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism. Wayman says readers of chapter 13, “supposedly on the
‘absolutism’ of Vedanta, Madhyamika, and Vijñanavada, will readily find out
that the Yogacara position (called here ‘Vijñanavada’) is set forth, not from
Yogacara books, but from their rival Vedanta and Madhyamika books” (Wayman
459). In Wayman’s opinion, Murti then inserts a Yogacara text and makes it
conform to his preconceptions: Having decided that the opponents must be right, when he
then cites a Yogacara treatise it must be made to agree with Murti’s
suppositions. So, referring to the Madhyatavibhaga, he says, “The constructed
subject-object world is unreal; but this does not make the abhutaparikalpa
unreal; for, it is the substratum for the unreal subject-object duality. It
is, however, non-conceptual.” So abhutaparikalpa, which means “the
imagination of what did not (really) happen,” is ‘non-conceptual’! (Wayman
459) So,
according to Murti, abhutaparikalpa—the “imagination of the unreal” in
Kochumuttom’s translation—is somehow more “real” than its projections.
However, ahbhutaparikalpa isn’t some transcendent mechanism for creating the
subject–object duality—instead it is that very duality, and hence unreal.
This duality would seem to be just about as conceptual as you can get. Wayman
concludes with this stinger: “I conclude that Murti in this chapter does not
advance the understanding of Yogacara Buddhism” (459). Modern
scholarship of Yogacara has been hampered by dubious scholarship and the
imposition of Western attitudes about philosophy onto a very different
tradition. In such ways texts are cited to portray Yogacara as an idealistic
philosophy in which mind creates reality, an external reality is denied, and
mind itself stands as some kind of ultimate reality. In fact, Yogacara makes
no ontological claims about external reality, does not believe mind is the
ultimate reality, and believes that the imagination of the unreal projects
objects of consciousness and not material objects. “Ironically,” writes
Lusthaus, “Yogacara’s interpreters and opponents could not resist reductively
projecting metaphysical theories onto what Yogacarins did say, at once
proving Yogacara was right and making actual Yogacara teachings that much
harder to understand” (69). Although there are signs of hope, it seems many
modern Buddhologists—and their own imaginations of the unreal—continue to
construct a Yogacarin projection bearing little resemblance to what a careful
examination of the texts and the tradition can uncover. WORKS
CITED Bartley, Chris. “Yogachara.”
Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy. Ed. Oliver Leaman. King, Richard.
“Vijñaptimatrata and the Abhidharma Context of Early Yogacara.” Asian
Philosophy March 1998: 5-17. Kochumuttom, Thomas A. A
Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the
Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin. Lusthaus. “Buddhism, Wayman, Alex. “A Defense of
Yogacara Buddhism.” Philosophy East and West March 1996: 447-476. © 2002 Jeff Lindstrom
<jeff.lindstrom@utoronto.ca> |
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