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Jennifer Nagel

University of Toronto

Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada M5R 2M8            (416) 978-3311

and UTM Philosophy Department, Maanjiwe nendamowinan 6148

3359 Mississauga Road, Mississauga, Canada L5L 1C6

              

E-mail: jennifer.nagel@utoronto.ca


EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy (2000) University of Pittsburgh

Title: The Role of Necessity in Empirical Knowledge; Supervisor: John McDowell

M.A. in Philosophy (1994) University of Pittsburgh

B.A. in Philosophy (1990) University of Toronto


EMPLOYMENT

Professor, University of Toronto (July 1, 2018-present)

Associate Professor, University of Toronto (2007-2018)

Associate Professor and Associate Chair Graduate, University of Toronto (2013 - 2016)

Assistant Professor, University of Toronto (2000-07)

Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico (1999-2000)

Visiting Lecturer, University of New Mexico (1998-99)


FELLOWSHIPS AND DISTINCTIONS

President, American Philosophical Association Central Division (2018-19)

Visiting Fellow, Australian National University (July – August 2019)

Chancellor Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Fellow, University of Toronto (2018-19)

Invited Professor, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, May 2018

Visiting Fellow, All Souls College Oxford (January-July 2012)

Visiting Fellow,  Institute for Advanced Studies, Jerusalem, (August-December 2011)


RESEARCH INTERESTS

Main areas of research: epistemology, philosophy of mind


PUBLICATIONS

Book

Knowledge, a Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press, 2014

Articles and book chapters

  1. 1.“Losing Knowledge by Thinking about Thinking”, forthcoming in Reasons, Justification and Defeat, Jessica Brown and Mona Simion, eds. Oxford University Press.

  2. 2.“The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, forthcoming in The Lottery Paradox, Igor Douven, ed., Cambridge University Press.

  3. 3.“The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment” (with Jessica Wright), in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology, John Symons, Paco Calvo and Sarah Robins, eds., New York: Routledge, 2019, 746-765.

  4. 4.“Epistemic Territory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93 (2019), 67-86.

  5. 5.“Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2018), 35-36.

  6. 6.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”,  Mind & Language 32 (2017), 525-544.

  7. 7.“The Psychological Context of Contextualism”  (with  Julia Jael Smith), in the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Jonathan Ichikawa, ed. New York: Routledge, 2017, 94-104.

  8. 8.“Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy” (with Kaija Mortensen), in A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2016, 53-70.

  9. 9.“Knowledge and Reliability,” in Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2016, 237-256.

  10. 10.“Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Skepticism and Sensation”, in the Blackwell Companion to Locke, Matthew Stuart, ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2015, 313-333.

  11. 11.“The Social Value of Reasoning”, Episteme 12:2 (2015), 297-308.

  12. 12.“The Meanings of Metacognition”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89:3 (2014), 710-718.

  13. 13.“Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88 (2014), 217-39.

  14. 14.“The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions”  (with Kenneth Boyd); in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. , New York: Routledge, 2014, 109-127.

  15. 15.Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 666-669.

  16. 16.“Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs,” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 652-661.

  17. 17.“Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:1 (2013), 179-199.

  18. 18.“Knowledge as a Mental State,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 275-310.

  19. 19.“Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases”, Inquiry 56:1 (2013), 54-62.

  20. 20.“Intuitions and Experiments: A Defence of the Case Method in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012).

  21. 21.“The Attitude of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84:3 (2012), 678-685.

  22. 22. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases”, in Knowledge Ascription: New Essays, Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 171-191

  23. 23.“The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Philosophers’ Imprint 11:5 (March 2011), 1-28.

  24. 24. “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 407-435.

  25. 25.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error” Philosophical Quarterly 60:239 (2010), 286-306.

  26. 26.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 279-294.

  27. 27.“Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophy Compass 2:6 (November 2007), 792-819.

  28. 28.“Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (September 2005), 465-497.

  29. 29.“The Empiricist Conception of Experience”, Philosophy 75 (July 2000), 345-376.


Encyclopedia entries and reviews

  1. 1.“Classical Indian Skepticism: Reforming or Rejecting Philosohy?” Comparative Philosophy 10:2 (2019), 113-118.

  2. 2.“Gendler on Alief”, contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology, Analysis 72:4 (2012) 774-788.

  3. 3.“Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Problem of Mind-Independence”, Proceedings of the X International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter DeGruyter 2008, 699-709).

  4. 4.“Empiricism”, in the The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Sarkar and Pfeifer, eds. (Routledge 2006), 235-243.

  5. 5.Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification,  The Philosophical Review (April 2006) 115:2, 251-255.

  6. 6.Review of Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophy in Review (August 2001), 282-285.

  7. 7.Review of Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton.  Philosophy in Review (February 1998), 19-21.


WORK IN PROGRESS

  1. •Recognizing Knowledge: Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology, book manuscript


PAPERS PRESENTED AT MEETINGS AND SYMPOSIA

  1. 1.“The Epistemic Backchannel”, Swedish Congress of Philosophy, Umeå, Sweden, June 16, 2019

  2. 2.“Philosophical and empirical methods in the study of mental state attribution”, Philosophical Methodology Workshop, Barcelona, Spain, March 15, 2019

  3. 3.“Epistemic Territory”, Presidential Address, American Philosophical Association Central Division, Denver, CO, February 22, 2019

  4. 4.“The first contexts of belief attribution”, Belief in context workshop, Hamburg, Germany, February 8, 2019

  5. 5.“The epistemological interest of conversational epistemics”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Notre Dame, IN, October 15, 2018

  6. 6.“The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, European Epistemology Network Conference, Amsterdam, June 30, 2018

  7. 7.Methods in Epistemology”, Workshop on Philosophical Methodology”, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, May 17, 2018

  8. 8.“Knowledge and Belief Attribution,” Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative Conference on Higher-Order Cognition, Raleigh, North Carolina, September 23, 2017

  9. 9.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Epistemology and Cognition Conference, William and Mary College, Virginia, September 10, 2016

  10. 10.“Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St Andrews, UK, August 12, 2016

  11. 11.“Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, UT Austin, Texas, June 3, 2016

  12. 12.“Intuition and Replication,” at the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Helsinki, Finland, August 8, 2015

  13. 13.“Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and the Hazards of Reflection,” Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University, USA, June 5, 2015

  14. 14.“Closure and Defeat”, Graduate Epistemology Conference, Edinburgh University, UK May 28, 2015

  15. 15.“Intuition and Replication,” at the Workshop on Methodology at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, May 15, 2015

  16. 16.On the Boundary between Philosophy and Psychology”, Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference, September 19, 2014

  17. 17.“Intuition, Reflection and the Command of Knowledge”, Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge, UK, July 13, 2014

  18. 18.Distinctively Intuitive Judgments”, Central APA Meetings, Chicago, March 1, 2014.

  19. 19.“Intuition and Reflection,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston SC, February 8, 2014.

  20. 20.“The Social Value of Reasoning,” Episteme Conference, San Juan, Costa Rica, January 2, 2014.

  21. 21.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Notre Dame University, South Bend, IN, November 8, 2013.

  22. 22.“Gettier Cases and the Limits of Cognitive Agency”, Gettier at 50 Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, June 21, 2013.

  23. 23.“Variations in Evidence Collection”, Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, June 4, 2013.

  24. 24.“Knowledge and Human Fallibility”, Sources of Knowledge Conference, University of Vienna, Austria, May 2, 2013

  25. 25.“The Powers of Stipulation”, Experimental Philosophy: Possibilities and Limits Conference, CUNY, New York, April 6, 2013

  26. 26.“Intuitions about Gettier cases: a cross-cultural approach”, American Philosophical Association meetings, Atlanta, December 30, 2012.

  27. 27.“Disagreement and Variation in Epistemic Intuitions”, Empirical Data and Philosophical Theorizing Conference, University of Barcelona, Spain, October 7, 2012

  28. 28.“Robust Intuitions”, Arche Methodology Workshop, St. Andrews, Scotland, July 1, 2012

  29. 29.“Armchair-friendly experiments (and experiment-friendly armchairs)”, Philosophical Insights Conference, University of London, June 22, 2012.

  30. 30.“Metacognition and the problem of binary and graded belief”, Epistemic Feelings and Metacognition Workshop, Bochum University, Germany, October 29, 2011

  31. 31.“Intuitions and Experiments”, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, NJ May 6, 2011.

  32. 32.“Armchair-friendly Xphi”, Pacific Division APA, San Diego, April 2011.

  33. 33.“Gettier and skeptical pressure cases: common mechanism, different value”, Knowledge Ascription Workshop, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 17, 2010

  34. 34.“Epistemic Anxiety”, Interdisciplinary Workshop on Epistemic Norms; Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, October 8, 2010

  35. 35.“Stakes and the Special Value of Epistemic Intuitions”, Pragmatic Encroachment Workshop, Orange Beach, Alabama, May 2010

  36. 36.“The Strange Value of Intuitions about Knowledge”, Intuitions and Methodology Workshop; Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 2010

  37. 37.“Gettier Intuitions: Performance and Competence”, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, October 2009

  38. 38.“A dual-systems account of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, May 2009

  39. 39.“Automatic and Controlled Intuitions”, Toronto Workshop on Thought Experiments, May 2009

  40. 40.“Empirical and Philosophical Approaches to Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition”, Arché Institute, St. Andrews, Scotland; April 2009

  41. 41.“Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, Pacific Division APA, Vancouver, April 2009

  42. 42.“Evidentials and the Development of Social Reason”, Self and Other: a conference on social reason at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, December, 2008.

  43. 43.“Knowledge Ascriptions, Thoughts of Error, and Cognitive Bias”, Western Canadian Philosophical Association meetings, Edmonton, October 2008.

  44. 44.“Ascribing Knowledge and Thinking About Error: A Two-Systems Account”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008

  45. 45.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2008

  46. 46.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2007

  47. 47.“A Narrowly Kantian Objection to Broadly Kantian Epistemology”, International Kant Congress, São Paulo, Brazil, August 2005

  48. 48.“Epistemic Compatibilism in Normal Worlds”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, London, Ontario, June 2005

  49. 49.“Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Limits of Mind-Independence”,  American Philosophical Association Meetings, Chicago, April 2005

  50. 50.“Epistemic Compatibilism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, March 2005

  51. 51.“Flexibility, Fallibility, and the Neo-Kantian A Priori”  Conference on the A Priori in Contemporary Epistemology, Sherbrooke, PQ October 2004

  52. 52.“Coherence, mind-independence and objectivity”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Halifax, NS, May 2003

  53. 53.“Reichenbach’s Relation to Naturalism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, CA, March 2003

  54. 54.“Quine and Foley on the Norms of Inquiry”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Seattle, WA, March 2002

  55. 55.“The Reichenbach/Carnap Conception of the A Priori”, Assessing the Age of Analysis: 20th Century Philosophy in Retrospect, a conference on the history of analytic philosophy at SUNY Buffalo, November 2001



INVITED LECTURES AND COMMENTS

  1. 1.“Initiating Common Knowledge”, Princeton Cognitive Science Colloquium talk, Princeton, NJ, November 21, 2019

  2. 2.“Epistemic Interaction”, a series of six lectures (the 2019 Frege Lectures), University of Tartu, Estonia, September 17-19, 2019

  3. 3.“World-oriented mindreading,” Monash University Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 9, 2019

  4. 4.“Epistemic Cooperation,” University of Melbourne Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 8, 2019

  5. 5.““The Epistemic Backchannel”, Australian National University Colloquium talk, July 18, 2019

  6. 6.“The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Helsinki Colloquium talk, Finland, May 16, 2019

  7. 7.Comments on Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, Vancouver, BC, April 17, 2019

  8. 8.“The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Connecticut Colloquium talk, March 29, 2019

  9. 9.“Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, University of Maryland Colloquium talk, College Park, MD, October 31, 2018

  10. 10.“Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, Stanford University Colloquium talk, October 5, 2018

  11. 11.“Losing Knowledge by thinking about thinking”, UMass Amherst Colloquium talk, April 6, 2018

  12. 12. Symposium session commentator, Pragmatic Approaches to Skepticism, Pacific APA, San Diego, CA, March 30, 2018

  13. 13. “Losing Knowledge by thinking about thinking”, Ohio State Colloquium talk, February 9, 2018

  14. 14. Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception, APA Eastern Division Meetings, Savannah, January 3, 2018

  15. 15.“The natural basis of skepticism”, Washington University at St Louis, April 20, 2017

  16. 16. Comments on Michael Lynch, The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data, APA Pacifi Division Meetings, Seattle, April 2017

  17. 17.“Attitudes and biases: implicit and explicit”, New York University, March 24, 2017

  18. 18.“Closure, skepticism and defeat”, Mind & Language Seminar, New York University, February 28, 2017

  19. 19.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution,” University of Calgary, February 3, 2017

  20. 20.“Extracting belief from knowledge,” Rutgers University, NJ, January 26, 2017

  21. 21.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Arizona State University, January 20, 2017

  22. 22.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Western University, December 2, 2016

  23. 23.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, MIT, November 19, 2016

  24. 24.“Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Indiana University, October 14, 2016

  25. 25. “Knowledge and Belief in Development,” Institut Jean-Nicod, March 14, 2016

  26. 26.“Attitudes and Biases, Implicit and Explicit,” University of Oxford, November 26, 2015

  27. 27.“Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Southern California Colloquium, April 24, 2015

  28. 28.“Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Antwerp, March 26, 2015

  29. 29.“Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Washington Colloquium, April 10, 2015

  30. 30.“On the Boundary Between Philosophy and Psychology,” IHPST, Toronto, March 4, 2015

  31. 31.Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Pennsylvania, February 27, 2015

  32. 32.“Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of British Columbia, January 30, 2015

  33. 33.“Defeasibility and Knowledge”, University of Delaware, October 17, 2014

  34. 34.“Knowledge and Luck”,  Cornell University, May 2, 2014

  35. 35.“Intuition and Reflection”, Claremont McKenna College, April 21, 2014

  36. 36.“Knowledge and Luck”, University of Michigan, April 4, 2014

  37. 37.“The Social Value of Reasoning”, University of Waterloo, January 10,2014

  38. 38.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, University of Rochester, December 6, 2013

  39. 39.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, McMaster University, Baltimore, Hamilton, ON, November 22, 2013

  40. 40.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, October 24, 2013

  41. 41. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Caltech University, Pasadena, February 15, 2013

  42. 42.“Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Carleton University, Ottawa, February 1, 2013.

  43. 43.Comments on Tamar Gendler, 46th Annual Philosophy Colloquium, UNC Chapel Hill, November 2, 2012

  44. 44. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, University of Cincinnati, October 26, 2012

  45. 45.“Disagreement and Variation in Epistemic Intuitions,” McGill University, September 21, 2012

  46. 46.Comments on Lara Buchak, “Belief and Credence”, Harvard University, September 15, 2012

  47. 47.“Intuition and introspection in epistemology”, University of Leeds,  April 20, 2012

  48. 48.Naïve and systematic theories in physics and epistemology”, University of Groningen, April 11, 2012.

  49. 49.“Can there be Progress in Philosophy?” Harvard Conference on Philosophical Progress, Cambridge, MA, September 16, 2011.

  50. 50. Comments on Lee Iacono, “Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases”, Central APA, Minneapolis, March 31, 2011.

  51. 51.“The intuitive appeal of the KK principle”, Stockholm University Colloquium,  February 24, 2011.

  52. 52.“Trustworthy and tricky intuitions about knowledge”, York University Colloquium, January 24, 2011.

  53. 53.“Gettier Case Recognition”, UC Berkeley Colloquium, February 25, 2010

  54. 54.“Comments on Jacob Caton, “Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?” Central APA, Chicago February 19, 2010

  55. 55.“Skepticism and the Hindsight Bias,” McMaster University Colloquium, February 2009

  56. 56.“Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, University of Victoria Colloquium, November 2008

  57. 57.Comments on Patrice Philie, “Entitlement as a Response to I-II-III Scepticism”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008

  58. 58.Comments on Victor Kumar, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Saskatoon, May 2007

  59. 59.“Intrusive thoughts, blind hunches, and belief-forming mechanisms”, University of Alberta, October 2005

  60. 60.“Objectivity and the Constitutive A Priori”, Warwick University, UK, February 2005

  61. 61.“Internalism and Externalism in the Good Case”,  Bowling Green State University, Ohio, October 2004

  62. 62.Some Aspects of the Relation between Internalism and Externalism” Toronto M&E Workshop, September 2004

  63. 63.“Stroud’s Scepticism and the Cartesian God”, April 2003, Toronto Early Modern Philosophy Group

  64. 64.“Descartes on the difference between knowledge and comprehension”, Colloquium Talk, Carleton University, November 2000.

  65. 65.Comments on Daniel Flage’s “Hume’s Systematic Skepticism”, Conference: Reason and Rationality (Inland Pacific Northwest Philosophy Conference), April 1999

  66. 66.“Detection, Projection, and Knowledge of Necessity”, University of Toronto February 1999, University of New Mexico, January 1999

  67. 67.“Revising One’s Notion of Revision”, University of New Mexico, March 1998

  68. 68.“Two Dogmas of Naturalism”, University of Pittsburgh February 1997, University of Alberta, March 1997

  69. 69.“The Role of Knowledge of God in Descartes’ Epistemology”, Kansas State University, November 1995



GRANTS AND AWARDS



•SSHRC Insight Grant: Knowledge first, then belief: the emergence and application of core epistemic concepts, April 2017 – March 2022, $127,250

•SSHRC Insight Grant: Intuitive Knowledge Ascription, April 2012 – March 2017, $104,920

•SSHRC Standard Research Grant: Metacognition and epistemic assessment, April 2009 – March 2012,  $38,220

•SSHRC SIG 2008-2010: Heuristic and systematic factors in knowledge ascription, February 2009-February 2011, $3,351.01

•SSHRC SIG 2008-2010: Knowledge and intuitive knowledge ascription, $3,000

•SSHRC SIG 2005-08: Metacognition and Justification; $816.46

•SSHRC SIG 2005-08: Metacognition and Epistemic Assessment; $4,277.00

•SSHRC SIG 2004-07: Internalism, externalism and the locus of epistemic appraisal; $2,300

•SSHRC SIG 2002-04 Rationality and Revision: A New Account of A Priori Knowledge $2000

•Connaught  New Staff Matching Grant 2000 Conditions of Objectivity: a study of the application of rationality to perception; $8,700

•Dean’s Merit Award, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

•Philosophers’ Annual: “Intuitions and Experiments: a Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology” ranked as one of the top ten philosophy articles of 2012



WORKSHOPS ORGANIZED


•“New Perspectives on Mental State Attribution”, A workshop bringing together researchers in artificial intelligence, social cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, linguistics and philosophy, on the topic of mental state attribution. December 10-11, 2018.

•“What we all think about knowing”.  An interdisciplinary workshop on cross-cultural uniformity and diversity in epistemic assessments, May 17, 2008.


TEACHING EXPERIENCE


At the University of New Mexico (1998-2000):

Undergraduate courses taught:

Introduction to Philosophy

Early Modern Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge

Seminar on Locke

Independent Study on Epistemology

Graduate courses taught:

Graduate Seminar on Epistemological Naturalism

Independent Study on Plato’s Theaetetus


At the University of Toronto (2000-present):

Undergraduate courses taught:

17th and 18th Century Philosophy

Introduction to Philosophy

Topics in Epistemology: The Rise and Fall of Logical Positivism

Epistemology

Later Analytic Philosophy

Senior Seminar in Philosophy: Scepticism


Graduate Courses taught:

Seminar in Philosophy of Mind: Self-Knowledge

Independent Study Course: Social Epistemology

Independent Study Course: Implicit Attitudes

           Seminar in Epistemology: Theories of Knowledge

           Seminar in Philosophy: Skepticism, Old and New

           Seminar in Epistemology: Evidence and Justification

           Seminar in Philosophy of Language: Contextualism

Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge in Recent Epistemology

Independent Study Course: the metaphysics and epistemology of necessity

Seminar in Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism

Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge and Objectivity

Seminar in Epistemology: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Responsibility

Seminar in Epistemology: Basic Knowledge

Professional Development Seminar


Graduate Supervisions:

Postdoctoral supervisor: Evan Westra, The action-prediction hierarchy: An integrative framework for social cognition (current)

Postdoctoral supervisor: Jane Friedman, Suspended Judgment (March 2011-March 2012)

Postdoctoral supervisor: Chris Lepock, Metacognition and Epistemic Virtue (2008-2010)

PhD supervisor: Kenneth Boyd, “The Structure of Epistemic Norms” (PhD 2014), Elena Derksen (current student), Jessica Wright (current student, co-supervised), Julia Smith (current student), Evan Taylor (current student), Daniel Munro (current student), Liang Zhou Koh (current student)

PhD Thesis Committee Member for Tom Rand (PhD 2008); Michael Lachelt; Scott Howard (2011); Charles Repp (2013), Matthew Siebert (2014); Zachary Irving (PhD 2016), Mason Westfall (current student), Lisa Doerksen (current student), Catherine Rioux (current student), Kayla Wiebe (current student), Eliran Haziza (current student)

PhD Oral Committee member for Francisco Gomez-Holtved (Russell on Logical Form); Jack Kwong (An Individualist Theory of Concepts); Shelley Weinberg (Consciousness in Locke’s Essay), Matt Fulkerson (The Sense of Touch), Sean Smith (The Affective Point of View: Cross-Cultural Philosophical Investigations of Embodiment, Feeling and Consciousness)

At University of New Mexico:  Kevin Olbrys (MA) “The Problem of False Judgment in Plato’s Theaetetus” secondary supervisor; defended April 2001


ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS

Associate Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (July 2013-June 2016)

Member, UTM Campus Affairs Committee (July 2013-present)

Search Committee Member (Seven searches from 2001-present)

Member, Planning and Policy Committee (2010-2011)

Member, Banting Fellowships Committee (2010)

Member, UTM Resource Planning and Priorities Committee (2010-2012)

Member,  UTM Committee on Standing (2005-08)

Member, Graduate Admissions Committee (2009; 2011)

Member, Graduate Executive Committee (2007-08; 2009-2010, 2017--2019)

Departmental colloquium co-coordinator (fall 2000-fall 2003; fall 2004-2005)

Teaching Excellence Awards Selection Committee, UTM (Spring 2003)

Undergraduate Steering and Curriculum (fall 2000-fall 2003)

UTM First Year’s Instructors’ Council Member (2000-2002)



OUTREACH


Co-organizer of The Aristotle Canadian National High School Philosophy Essay Competition (2007-2010).

Philosophy TV debate with Joshua Alexander (2014)

Philosophy Bites Interview with Nigel Warburton (2014)

OUP Blog Post: What Commuters Know about Knowing (2014)

Daily Nous Blog Post: Effective Altruism and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Canadian Response (2015)

Brains Blog Posts on Knowledge and Knowledge Attribution (2016)

Theory of Knowledge: a series of videos for Wireless Philosophy, Khan Academy (2016, starting here)


PROFESSIONAL


Referee for Analysis, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Philosophical Association, Cognition, Dialogue, Episteme, Erkenntnis, European Journal of Philosophy, European Science Foundation, Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture, Formal Epistemology Workshop, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, National Science and Engineering Research Council, Noûs, Oxford University Press, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Psychology Press, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Society for Exact Philosophy, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, South African Journal of Philosophy, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Studia Philosophica Estonica, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Synthèse, Teorema, Thought, WIREs Cognitive Science.


President, APA Central Division, 2018-19.

Vice President/President-Elect, APA Central Division, 2017-18

Adjudicator, SSHRC Standard Research Grants panel, 2010; SSHRC Insight Grants panel, 2012.

Program Committee, APA Central Division 2015

Nominating Committee, APA Central Division 2015-16

Advisory Committee, APA Eastern Division 2015-18

APA Lectures, Publications and Research Committee 2015-18

Executive Committee, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2015-18

Section Editor, Epistemology, for Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy

Editorial Board, Oxford Studies in Epistemology

Editorial Board, Mind