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Jennifer Nagel

University of Toronto

Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada M5R 2M8            (416) 978-3311

              

E-mail: jennifer.nagel@utoronto.ca


EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy (2000) University of Pittsburgh

Title: The Role of Necessity in Empirical Knowledge; Supervisor: John McDowell

M.A. in Philosophy (1994) University of Pittsburgh

B.A. in Philosophy (1990) University of Toronto


EMPLOYMENT

Associate Professor and Associate Chair Graduate, University of Toronto (July 2013 - present)

Associate Professor, University of Toronto (2007-present)

Assistant Professor, University of Toronto (2000-07)

Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico (1999-2000)

Visiting Lecturer, University of New Mexico (1998-99)


FELLOWSHIPS

Visiting Fellow, All Souls College Oxford (January-July 2012)

Visiting Fellow,  Institute for Advanced Studies, Jerusalem, (August-December 2011)


RESEARCH INTERESTS

Main areas of research: epistemology, metacognition

Other area of research: 17th century philosophy


PUBLICATIONS

Book

Knowledge, a Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press, 2014

Articles and book chapters

  1. 1.“The Meanings of Metacognition”, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  2. 2. “Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy” (with Kaija Mortensen), forthcoming in A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter, eds. (Blackwell)

  3. 3.“The Social Value of Reasoning”, forthcoming in Episteme.

  4. 4.“Knowledge and Reliability,” forthcoming in Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, eds.

  5. 5.“Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Skepticism and Sensation”, forthcoming in the Blackwell Companion to Locke, Matthew Stuart, ed.

  6. 6.“Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88 (2014), 217-39.

  7. 7.“The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions”  (with Kenneth Boyd); in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. , New York: Routledge, 2014, 109-127.

  8. 8.Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 666-669.

  9. 9.“Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs,” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 652-661.

  10. 10.“Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:1 (2013), 179-199.

  11. 11.“Knowledge as a Mental State,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 275-310.

  12. 12.“Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases”, Inquiry 56:1 (2013), 54-62.

  13. 13.“Intuitions and Experiments: A Defence of the Case Method in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012).

  14. 14.“The Attitude of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84:3 (2012), 678-685.

  15. 15. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases”, in Knowledge Ascription: New Essays, Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 171-191

  16. 16.“The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Philosophers’ Imprint 11:5 (March 2011), 1-28.

  17. 17. “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 407-435.

  18. 18.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error” Philosophical Quarterly 60:239 (2010), 286-306.

  19. 19.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 279-294.

  20. 20.“Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophy Compass 2:6 (November 2007), 792-819.

  21. 21.“Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (September 2005), 465-497.

  22. 22.“The Empiricist Conception of Experience”, Philosophy 75 (July 2000), 345-376.


Encyclopedia entries and reviews

  1. 1.“Gendler on Alief”, contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology, Analysis 72:4 (2012) 774-788.

  2. 2.“Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Problem of Mind-Independence”, Proceedings of the X International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter DeGruyter 2008, 699-709).

  3. 3.“Empiricism”, in the The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Sarkar and Pfeifer, eds. (Routledge 2006), 235-243.

  4. 4.Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification,  The Philosophical Review (April 2006) 115:2, 251-255.

  5. 5.Review of Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophy in Review (August 2001), 282-285.

  6. 6.Review of Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton.  Philosophy in Review (February 1998), 19-21.


WORK IN PROGRESS

  1. •Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology, book manuscript


PAPERS PRESENTED AT MEETINGS AND SYMPOSIA

  1. 1.“On the Boundary between Philosophy and Psychology”, Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference, September 19, 2014

  2. 2.“Intuition, Reflection and the Command of Knowledge”, Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge, UK, July 13, 2014

  3. 3.Distinctively Intuitive Judgments”, Central APA Meetings, Chicago, March 1, 2014.

  4. 4.“Intuition and Reflection,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston SC, February 8, 2014.

  5. 5.“The Social Value of Reasoning,” Episteme Conference, San Juan, Costa Rica, January 2, 2014.

  6. 6.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Notre Dame University, South Bend, IN, November 8, 2013.

  7. 7.“Gettier Cases and the Limits of Cognitive Agency”, Gettier at 50 Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, June 21, 2013.

  8. 8.“Variations in Evidence Collection”, Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, June 4, 2013.

  9. 9.“Knowledge and Human Fallibility”, Sources of Knowledge Conference, University of Vienna, Austria, May 2, 2013

  10. 10.“The Powers of Stipulation”, Experimental Philosophy: Possibilities and Limits Conference, CUNY, New York, April 6, 2013

  11. 11.“Intuitions about Gettier cases: a cross-cultural approach”, American Philosophical Association meetings, Atlanta, December 30, 2012.

  12. 12.“Disagreement and Variation in Epistemic Intuitions”, Empirical Data and Philosophical Theorizing Conference, University of Barcelona, Spain, October 7, 2012

  13. 13.“Robust Intuitions”, Arche Methodology Workshop, St. Andrews, Scotland, July 1, 2012

  14. 14.“Armchair-friendly experiments (and experiment-friendly armchairs)”, Philosophical Insights Conference, University of London, June 22, 2012.

  15. 15.“Metacognition and the problem of binary and graded belief”, Epistemic Feelings and Metacognition Workshop, Bochum University, Germany, October 29, 2011

  16. 16.“Intuitions and Experiments”, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, NJ May 6, 2011.

  17. 17.“Armchair-friendly Xphi”, Pacific Division APA, San Diego, April 2011.

  18. 18.“Gettier and skeptical pressure cases: common mechanism, different value”, Knowledge Ascription Workshop, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 17, 2010

  19. 19.“Epistemic Anxiety”, Interdisciplinary Workshop on Epistemic Norms; Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, October 8, 2010

  20. 20.“Stakes and the Special Value of Epistemic Intuitions”, Pragmatic Encroachment Workshop, Orange Beach, Alabama, May 2010

  21. 21.“The Strange Value of Intuitions about Knowledge”, Intuitions and Methodology Workshop; Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 2010

  22. 22.“Gettier Intuitions: Performance and Competence”, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, October 2009

  23. 23.“A dual-systems account of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, May 2009

  24. 24.“Automatic and Controlled Intuitions”, Toronto Workshop on Thought Experiments, May 2009

  25. 25.“Empirical and Philosophical Approaches to Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition”, Arché Institute, St. Andrews, Scotland; April 2009

  26. 26.“Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, Pacific Division APA, Vancouver, April 2009

  27. 27.“Evidentials and the Development of Social Reason”, Self and Other: a conference on social reason at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, December, 2008.

  28. 28.“Knowledge Ascriptions, Thoughts of Error, and Cognitive Bias”, Western Canadian Philosophical Association meetings, Edmonton, October 2008.

  29. 29.“Ascribing Knowledge and Thinking About Error: A Two-Systems Account”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008

  30. 30.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2008

  31. 31.“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2007

  32. 32.“A Narrowly Kantian Objection to Broadly Kantian Epistemology”, International Kant Congress, São Paulo, Brazil, August 2005

  33. 33.“Epistemic Compatibilism in Normal Worlds”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, London, Ontario, June 2005

  34. 34.“Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Limits of Mind-Independence”,  American Philosophical Association Meetings, Chicago, April 2005

  35. 35.“Epistemic Compatibilism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, March 2005

  36. 36.“Flexibility, Fallibility, and the Neo-Kantian A Priori”  Conference on the A Priori in Contemporary Epistemology, Sherbrooke, PQ October 2004

  37. 37.“Coherence, mind-independence and objectivity”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Halifax, NS, May 2003

  38. 38.“Reichenbach’s Relation to Naturalism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, CA, March 2003

  39. 39.“Quine and Foley on the Norms of Inquiry”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Seattle, WA, March 2002

  40. 40.“The Reichenbach/Carnap Conception of the A Priori”, Assessing the Age of Analysis: 20th Century Philosophy in Retrospect, a conference on the history of analytic philosophy at SUNY Buffalo, November 2001



INVITED LECTURES AND COMMENTS

  1. 1.“Defeasibility and Knowledge”, University of Delaware, October 17, 2014

  2. 2.“Knowledge and Luck”,  Cornell University, May 2, 2014

  3. 3.“Intuition and Reflection”, Claremont McKenna College, April 21, 2014

  4. 4.“Knowledge and Luck”, University of Michigan, April 4, 2014

  5. 5.“The Social Value of Reasoning”, University of Waterloo, January 10,2014

  6. 6.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, University of Rochester, December 6, 2013

  7. 7.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, McMaster University, Baltimore, Hamilton, ON, November 22, 2013

  8. 8.“Knowledge and Fallibility”, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, October 24, 2013

  9. 9. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Caltech University, Pasadena, February 15, 2013

  10. 10.“Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Carleton University, Ottawa, February 1, 2013.

  11. 11.Comments on Tamar Gendler, 46th Annual Philosophy Colloquium, UNC Chapel Hill, November 2, 2012

  12. 12. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, University of Cincinnati, October 26, 2012

  13. 13.“Disagreement and Variation in Epistemic Intuitions,” McGill University, September 21, 2012

  14. 14.Comments on Lara Buchak, “Belief and Credence”, Harvard University, September 15, 2012

  15. 15.“Intuition and introspection in epistemology”, University of Leeds,  April 20, 2012

  16. 16.Naïve and systematic theories in physics and epistemology”, University of Groningen, April 11, 2012.

  17. 17.“Can there be Progress in Philosophy?” Harvard Conference on Philosophical Progress, Cambridge, MA, September 16, 2011.

  18. 18. Comments on Lee Iacono, “Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases”, Central APA, Minneapolis, March 31, 2011.

  19. 19.“The intuitive appeal of the KK principle”, Stockholm University Colloquium,  February 24, 2011.

  20. 20.“Trustworthy and tricky intuitions about knowledge”, York University Colloquium, January 24, 2011.

  21. 21.“Gettier Case Recognition”, UC Berkeley Colloquium, February 25, 2010

  22. 22.“Comments on Jacob Caton, “Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?” Central APA, Chicago February 19, 2010

  23. 23.“Skepticism and the Hindsight Bias,” McMaster University Colloquium, February 2009

  24. 24.“Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, University of Victoria Colloquium, November 2008

  25. 25.Comments on Patrice Philie, “Entitlement as a Response to I-II-III Scepticism”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008

  26. 26.Comments on Victor Kumar, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Saskatoon, May 2007

  27. 27.“Intrusive thoughts, blind hunches, and belief-forming mechanisms”, University of Alberta, October 2005

  28. 28.“Objectivity and the Constitutive A Priori”, Warwick University, UK, February 2005

  29. 29.“Internalism and Externalism in the Good Case”,  Bowling Green State University, Ohio, October 2004

  30. 30.Some Aspects of the Relation between Internalism and Externalism” Toronto M&E Workshop, September 2004

  31. 31.“Stroud’s Scepticism and the Cartesian God”, April 2003, Toronto Early Modern Philosophy Group

  32. 32.“Descartes on the difference between knowledge and comprehension”, Colloquium Talk, Carleton University, November 2000.

  33. 33.Comments on Daniel Flage’s “Hume’s Systematic Skepticism”, Conference: Reason and Rationality (Inland Pacific Northwest Philosophy Conference), April 1999

  34. 34.“Detection, Projection, and Knowledge of Necessity”, University of Toronto February 1999, University of New Mexico, January 1999

  35. 35.“Revising One’s Notion of Revision”, University of New Mexico, March 1998

  36. 36.“Two Dogmas of Naturalism”, University of Pittsburgh February 1997, University of Alberta, March 1997

  37. 37.“The Role of Knowledge of God in Descartes’ Epistemology”, Kansas State University, November 1995




GRANTS AND AWARDS


•Connaught  New Staff Matching Grant 2000 Conditions of Objectivity: a study of the application of rationality to perception; $8,700

•SSHRC SIG 2002-04 Rationality and Revision: A New Account of A Priori Knowledge $2000

•SSHRC SIG 2004-07: Internalism, externalism and the locus of epistemic appraisal; $2,300

•SSHRC SIG 2005-08: Metacognition and Justification; $816.46

•SSHRC SIG 2005-08: Metacognition and Epistemic Assessment; $4,277.00

•SSHRC SIG 2008-2010: Knowledge and intuitive knowledge ascription, $3,000

•SSHRC SIG 2008-2010: Heuristic and systematic factors in knowledge ascription, February 2009-February 2011, $3,351.01

  1. •    SSHRC Standard Research Grant: Metacognition and epistemic assessment, April 2009 – March 2012,  $38,220

  2. •    SSHRC Insight Grant: Intuitive Knowledge Ascription, April 2012 - March 2017, $104, 920

•Dean’s Merit Award, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014


CONFERENCES ORGANIZED


•“What we all think about knowing”.  An interdisciplinary workshop on cross-cultural uniformity and diversity in epistemic assessments, May 17, 2008.


TEACHING EXPERIENCE


At the University of New Mexico (1998-2000):

Undergraduate courses taught:

Introduction to Philosophy

Early Modern Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge

Seminar on Locke

Independent Study on Epistemology

Graduate courses taught:

Graduate Seminar on Epistemological Naturalism

Independent Study on Plato’s Theaetetus


At the University of Toronto (2000-present):

Undergraduate courses taught:

17th and 18th Century Philosophy

Introduction to Philosophy

Topics in Epistemology: The Rise and Fall of Logical Positivism

Epistemology

Later Analytic Philosophy

Senior Seminar in Philosophy: Scepticism


Graduate Courses taught:

Seminar in Epistemology: Theories of Knowledge

                Seminar in Philosophy: Skepticism, Old and New

                Seminar in Epistemology: Evidence and Justification

                Seminar in Philosophy of Language: Contextualism

Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge in Recent Epistemology

Independent study course on the metaphysics and epistemology of necessity

Seminar in Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism

Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge and Objectivity

Seminar in Epistemology: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Responsibility

Seminar in Epistemology: Basic Knowledge


Graduate Supervisions:

Postdoctoral supervisor: Jane Friedman, Suspended Judgment (March 2011-March 2012)

Postdoctoral supervisor: Chris Lepock, Metacognition and Epistemic Virtue (2008-2010)

PhD supervisor: Kenneth Boyd, “The Structure of Epistemic Norms” (PhD 2014)

PhD Thesis Committee Member for Tom Rand (PhD 2008); Michael Lachelt; Scott Howard (2011); Charles Repp (2013), Matthew Siebert (2014); Zachary Irving.

PhD Oral Committee member for Francisco Gomez-Holtved (Russell on Logical Form); Jack Kwong (An Individualist Theory of Concepts); Shelley Weinberg (Consciousness in Locke’s Essay), Matt Fulkerson (The Sense of Touch)

Area or Qualifying Committee member for Jane Friedman, David DeDourek,  Elena Derksen, Dan Ioppolo, Michael Lachelt, Karen Deuel, Kenneth Boyd, Paul Wlodarski, Matthew Siebert, Zachary Irving

At University of New Mexico:  Kevin Olbrys (MA) “The Problem of False Judgment in Plato’s Theaetetus” secondary supervisor; defended April 2001


ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS

Associate Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (July 2013-present)

Member, UTM Campus Affairs Committee (July 2013-present)

Search Committee Member (Seven searches from 2001-present)

Member, Planning and Policy Committee (2010-2011)

Member, Banting Fellowships Committee (2010)

Member, UTM Resource Planning and Priorities Committee (2010-2012)

Member,  UTM Committee on Standing (2005-08)

Member, Graduate Admissions Committee (2009; 2011)

Member, Graduate Executive Committee (2007-08; 2009-2010)

Departmental colloquium co-coordinator (fall 2000-fall 2003; fall 2004-2005)

Teaching Excellence Awards Selection Committee, UTM (Spring 2003)

Undergraduate Steering and Curriculum (fall 2000-fall 2003)

UTM First Year’s Instructors’ Council Member (2000-2002)



OUTREACH


Co-organizer of The Aristotle Canadian National High School Philosophy Essay Competition (2007-2010).

Philosophy TV debate with Joshua Alexander (2014)

Philosophy Bites Interview with Nigel Warburton (2014)

OUP Blog Post: What Commuters Know about Knowing (2014)


PROFESSIONAL


Referee for the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Philosophical Association, Cognition, Dialogue, Episteme, Erkenntnis, European Journal of Philosophy, FQRSC, Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Psychology Press, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Society for Exact Philosophy, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Studia Philosophica Estonica, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Synthèse, Teorema, Thought, Oxford University Press.


Adjudicator, SSHRC Standard Research Grants panel, 2010; SSHRC Insight Grants panel, 2012.

Editorial Board, Oxford Studies in Epistemology

Section Editor, Epistemology, for Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy