Jennifer Nagel

Download pdf version

Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto
Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada M5R 2M8            (416) 978-3311
and UTM Philosophy Department, Maanjiwe nendamowinan 6148
3359 Mississauga Road, Mississauga, Canada L5L 1C6
              
E-mail: jennifer.nagel@utoronto.ca

EDUCATION
Ph.D. in Philosophy (2000) University of Pittsburgh
B.A. in Philosophy (1990) University of Toronto

EMPLOYMENT
Professor, University of Toronto Department of Philosophy (July 1, 2018-present)
Research Lead, Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society (2020-2021)
Associate Professor, University of Toronto (2007-2018)
Associate Professor and Associate Chair Graduate, University of Toronto (2013 - 2016)
Assistant Professor, University of Toronto (2000-07)
Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico (1999-2000)
Visiting Lecturer, University of New Mexico (1998-99)

FELLOWSHIPS AND DISTINCTIONS
President, Canadian Philosophical Association (2021-22)
President, American Philosophical Association Central Division (2018-19)
Visiting Fellow, Australian National University (July – August 2019)
Chancellor Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Fellow, University of Toronto (2018-19)
Invited Professor, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, May 2018
Visiting Fellow, All Souls College Oxford (January-July 2012)
Visiting Fellow,  Institute for Advanced Studies, Jerusalem, (August-December 2011)

RESEARCH INTERESTS
Main areas of research: epistemology, philosophy of mind

PUBLICATIONS
Book
Knowledge, a Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press, 2014
Arabic translation by Marwa Hashem, Abu Dhabi: Kalima Press, 2019
Mongolian translation by T. Ariunsanaa, Ulaanbaatar, Nepko Publishing, 2021
Chinese translation by Xu Zhu, Yilin Press, 2022

Articles, commentaries, and book chapters

1. "Common Knowledge and its Limits", forthcoming in Themes from Williamson, edited by Alex Burri and Michael Frauchiger; DeGruyter.
2. "Reflection, Confabulation, and Reasoning", forthcoming in Kornblith and his Critics, edited by Joshua DiPaolo and Luis Oliveira; Wiley-Blackwell.
3. "Natural Curiosity", forthcoming in Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology, Arturs Logins and Jacques-Henri Vollet, eds. Oxford University Press.
4. "Seeking Safety in Knowledge", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 97 (2023), 186-214.
5. "New frontiers in epistemic evaluation: Lackey on the epistemology of groups", Res Philosophica 100:3 (2023), 405-413.
6. "Responding to how things seem: Bergmann on skepticism and intuition", Analysis 82:4 (2022), 697-709.
7. "The Distinctive Character of Knowledge", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44 e40 (2021), 47-48.
8. “Mindreading in Conversation" (with Evan Westra), Cognition (210) 2021, 1-15.
9. "Losing Knowledge by Thinking about Thinking”, in Reasons, Justification and Defeat, Jessica Brown and Mona Simion, eds. Oxford University Press, 2021, 69-92.
10. “The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, in Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox, Igor Douven, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2021, 48-73.
11. “The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment” (with Jessica Wright), in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology, John Symons, Paco Calvo and Sarah Robins, eds., New York: Routledge, 2019, 746-765.
12. “Epistemic Territory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93 (2019), 67-86.
13. “Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2018), 35-36.
14. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”,  Mind & Language 32 (2017), 525-544.
15. “The Psychological Context of Contextualism”  (with  Julia Jael Smith), in the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Jonathan Ichikawa, ed. New York: Routledge, 2017, 94-104.
16. “Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy” (with Kaija Mortensen), in A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2016, 53-70.
17. “Knowledge and Reliability,” in Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2016, 237-256.
18. “Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Skepticism and Sensation”, in the Blackwell Companion to Locke, Matthew Stuart, ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2015, 313-333.
19. “The Social Value of Reasoning”, Episteme 12:2 (2015), 297-308.
20. “The Meanings of Metacognition”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89:3 (2014), 710-718.
21. “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88 (2014), 217-39
22. “The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions”  (with Kenneth Boyd); in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. , New York: Routledge, 2014, 109-127.
23. "Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 666-669.
24. “Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs,” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 652-661.
25. “Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:1 (2013), 179-199.
26. “Knowledge as a Mental State,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 275-310.
27. “Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases”, Inquiry 56:1 (2013), 54-62.
28. “Intuitions and Experiments: A Defence of the Case Method in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012).
29. “The Attitude of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84:3 (2012), 678-685.
30. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases”, in Knowledge Ascription: New Essays, Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 171-191
31. “The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Philosophers’ Imprint 11:5 (March 2011), 1-28.
32. “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 407-435.
33. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error” Philosophical Quarterly 60:239 (2010), 286-306.
34. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 279-294.
35. “Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophy Compass 2:6 (November 2007), 792-819.
36. “Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (September 2005), 465-497.
37. “The Empiricist Conception of Experience”, Philosophy 75 (July 2000), 345-376.
    
    

1. “Classical Indian Skepticism: Reforming or Rejecting Philosohy?” Comparative Philosophy 10:2 (2019), 113-118.
2. “Gendler on Alief”, contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology, Analysis 72:4 (2012) 774-788.
3. “Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Problem of Mind-Independence”, Proceedings of the X International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter DeGruyter 2008, 699-709).
4. “Empiricism”, in the The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Sarkar and Pfeifer, eds. (Routledge 2006), 235-243.
5. Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification,  The Philosophical Review (April 2006) 115:2, 251-255.
6. Review of Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophy in Review (August 2001), 282-285.
7. Review of Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton.  Philosophy in Review (February 1998), 19-21.
   
   

• Recognizing Knowledge: Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology, book manuscript
  

1. “Common knowledge and curiosity-driven conversation”, Epistemic Emotions Workshop, University of Antwerp, Belgium, June 13, 2024; Summer Mind Workshop, Columbia University, New York, August 2, 2024.
2. "Common knowledge and its limits” – Lauener Symposium on Themes from Timothy Williamson, Bern, Switzerland, May 30, 2024.
3. "The Skeptical Imagination", Skepticism in the Real World Workshop, Arizona State University, January 14, 2024
4. Seeking Safety in Knowledge", Sosa Lecture in Epistemology, APA Central Division Meetings, Denver, February 24, 2023
5. "Epistemic Anxiety and Natural Curiosity", UBC Workshop on Epistemic Anxiety, Vancouver, December 3, 2023
6. "Social Learning, Natural and Artificial", Absolutely Interdisciplinary Artificial Intelligence Conference, Toronto (delivered remotely), June 21, 2022
7. "Knowing and being right", CPA Presidential Address, delivered remotely, May 17, 2022
8. "The Safety Condition on Knowledge", Understanding Others Factively Workshop, Dortmund, Germany (delivered remotely), March 23, 2022
9. "Publicizing Mental States", Princeton Common Ground Workshop (delivered remotely), June 2, 2021
10. Sharing States of Knowledge”, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (delivered remotely), December 5, 2020
11. “The Hidden Primacy of Knowledge (and its limits)”, University of Geneva workshop on Knowledge and its Limits at 20 (delivered remotely), November 6, 2020
12. The Epistemic Backchannel”, Swedish Congress of Philosophy, Umeå, Sweden, June 16, 2019
13. “Philosophical and empirical methods in the study of mental state attribution”, Philosophical Methodology Workshop, Barcelona, Spain, March 15, 2019
14. “Epistemic Territory”, Presidential Address, American Philosophical Association Central Division, Denver, CO, February 22, 2019
15. “The first contexts of belief attribution”, Belief in context workshop, Hamburg, Germany, February 8, 2019
16. “The epistemological interest of conversational epistemics”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Notre Dame, IN, October 15, 2018
17. “The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, European Epistemology Network Conference, Amsterdam, June 30, 2018
18. “Methods in Epistemology,” Workshop on Philosophical Methodology, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, May 17, 2018
19. “Knowledge and Belief Attribution,” Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative Conference on Higher-Order Cognition, Raleigh, North Carolina, September 23, 2017
20. “Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition,” Urbino Summer School in Epistemology, Urbino, Italy, September 1, 2017
21. Factive and non-factive mental state attribution” Epistemology & Cognition Conference, William and Mary College, Virginia, September 10, 2016
22. “Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Andrews, UK, August 12, 2016
23. “Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, UT Austin, Texas, June 3, 2016
24. “Intuition and Replication,” at the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Helsinki, Finland, August 8, 2015
25. “Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and the Hazards of Reflection,” Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University, June 5, 2015
26. “Closure and Defeat,” Graduate Epistemology Conference, Edinburgh University, May 28, 2015
27. “Intuition and Replication,” Workshop on Methodology, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, May 15, 2015
28. “On the Boundary between Philosophy and Psychology”, Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference, September 19, 2014
29. “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,” Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge, UK, July 13, 2014.
30. “Distinctively Intuitive Judgments,” American Philosophical Association meetings, Chicago, March 1, 2014
31. “Intuition and Reflection,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston, SC, February 8, 2014
32. “The social value of reasoning in epistemic justification”, Episteme Anniversary Conference, San Juan, Costa Rica, January 3, 2014
33. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, November 8, 2013.
34. “Gettier Cases and the Limits of Cognitive Agency”, Gettier at 50 Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, June 21, 2013.
35. “Variations in Evidence Collection”, Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, June 4, 2013.
36. Knowledge and Human Fallibility”, Sources of Knowledge Conference, University of Vienna, Austria, May 2, 2013
37. “The Powers of Stipulation”, Experimental Philosophy Conference, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, April 6, 2013.
38. “Intuitions about Gettier cases: a cross-cultural approach”, American Philosophical Association meetings, Atlanta, December 30, 2012.
39. Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, Empirical Data and Philosophical Theorizing Conference, University of Barcelona, Spain, October 7, 2012
40. “Epistemic Intuitions as Evidence”, NEH Summer Institute on Experimental Philosophy, University of Arizona, July 6, 2012
41. “Robust Intuitions”, Arche Methodology Workshop, St. Andrews, Scotland, July 1, 2012
42. “Armchair-friendly experiments (and experiment-friendly armchairs)”, Philosophical Insights Conference, University of London, June 22, 2012
43. “Metacognition and the problem of binary and graded belief”, Epistemic Feelings and Metacognition Workshop, Bochum University, German, October 29, 2011
44. “Can there be progress in Philosophy?” Harvard Conference on Philosophical Progress, Cambridge, MA, September 16, 2011
45. “Intuitions and Experiments”, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, NJ, May 6, 2011
46. “Armchair-friendly experiments”, APA mini-conference on Experimental Philosophy and Epistemology, San Diego, CA April 20, 2011
47. “Gettier and skeptical pressure cases: common mechanism, different value”, Knowledge Ascription Workshop, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 17, 2010
48. “Epistemic Anxiety”, Interdisciplinary Workshop on Epistemic Norms; Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, October 8, 2010
49. “Stakes and the Special Value of Epistemic Intuitions”, Pragmatic Encroachment Workshop, Orange Beach, Alabama, May 2010
50. “The Strange Value of Intuitions about Knowledge”, Intuitions and Methodology Workshop; Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 2010
51. “Gettier Intuitions: Performance and Competence”, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 2009
52. “A dual-systems account of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Ottawa, May 2009
53. “Automatic and Controlled Intuitions”, Toronto Workshop on Thought Experiments, University of Toronto, May 2009
54. “Empirical and Philosophical Approaches to Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition”, Arché Institute, St. Andrews, Scotland; April 2009
55. “Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, Pacific Division APA, Vancouver, April 2009
56. “Evidentials and the Development of Social Reason”, Self and Other: a conference on social reason at Queen’s University, Kingston, December, 2008.
57. “Knowledge Ascriptions, Thoughts of Error, and Cognitive Bias”, Western Canadian Philosophical Association meetings, Edmonton, October 2008.
58. “Ascribing Knowledge and Thinking About Error: A Two-Systems Account”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008
59. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2008
60. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2007
61. “A Narrowly Kantian Objection to Broadly Kantian Epistemology”, International Kant Congress, São Paulo, Brazil, August 2005
62. “Epistemic Compatibilism in Normal Worlds”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, London, Ontario, June 2005
63. “Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Limits of Mind-Independence”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Chicago, April 2005
64. “Epistemic Compatibilism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, March 2005
65. “Flexibility, Fallibility, and the Neo-Kantian A Priori” Conference on the A Priori in Contemporary Epistemology, Sherbrooke, PQ October 2004
66. “Coherence, mind-independence and objectivity”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Halifax, NS, May 2003
67. “Reichenbach’s Relation to Naturalism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, CA, March 2003
68. “Quine and Foley on the Norms of Inquiry”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Seattle, WA, March 2002
69. “The Reichenbach/Carnap Conception of the A Priori”, Assessing the Age of Analysis: 20th Century Philosophy in Retrospect, a conference on the history of analytic philosophy at SUNY Buffalo, November 2001

1. "Common knowledge and curiosity-driven conversation”, Northwestern University, November 1, 2024.
2. "The Concept of Knowledge in Human Conversation”, University of Vienna, Austria, June 11, 2024.
3. "Recognizing Knowledge: Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology", the Trinity Term John Locke Lectures, University of Oxford, UK, May 29-June 14, 2023.
4. "Philosophy for better, for worse, and in itself", Benefit Conference for the Ukraine, an international online event hosted by the Munk School of Public Policy, Toronto, March 17, 2023
5. "Natural Curiosity", Lehigh University Colloquium talk, January 31, 2022
6. "Natural Curiosity", Georgia State Philosophy and Neuroscience talk, January 27, 2022
7. "Natural Curiosity", Princeton University Colloquium talk, November 18, 2022
8. "Mindreading as a Problem and as a Solution", University of Göttingen (delivered remotely), June 23, 2022
9. “New Frontiers in Social Cognition", The Ryle Lectures, Trent University, Ontario, October 12, 13 and 14, 2022
10. Knowing and being right", Purdue University Colloquium, April 22, 2022
11. "Epistemic Mapping", CUNY Cognitive Science talk series (delivered remotely), November 5, 2021
12. "Knowledge and knowledge attribution in neural networks", Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University (delivered remotely), June 24, 2021
13. Knowledge and Knowledge attribution in neural networks", Oxford Epistemology Group talk (delivered remotely), April 27, 2021
14. "Intuitive Knowledge Attribution: Lessons from Deep Learning", Cogito workshop, University of Glasgow (delivered remotely), April 15, 2021
15. "Intuitive Knowledge Attribution: Lessons from Deep Learning", University of Southern California Collloquium talk (delivered remotely), March 26, 2021
16. "Gettier case recognition in humans and other animals”, New York City SWIP Colloquium talk (delivered remotely), December 18, 2020
17. “Initiating Common Knowledge”, University of Zurich colloquium talk, Switzerland, March 4, 2020
18. “Initiating Common Knowledge”, Princeton Cognitive Science Colloquium talk, Princeton, NJ, USA, November 21, 2019
19. “Epistemic Interaction”, a series of six lectures (the 2019 Frege Lectures), University of Tartu, Estonia, September 17-19, 2019
20. “World-oriented mindreading,” Monash University Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 9, 2019
21. “Epistemic Cooperation,” University of Melbourne Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 8, 2019
22. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, Macquarie University Seminar talk, Sydney, Australia, July 30, 2019
23. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, Australian National University Colloquium talk, July 18, 2019
24. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Helsinki Colloquium talk, Finland, May 16, 2019
25. Comments on Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, Vancouver, BC, April 17, 2019
26. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Connecticut Colloquium talk, March 29, 2019
27. “Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, University of Maryland Colloquium talk, College Park, MD, October 31, 2018
28. “Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, Stanford University Colloquium talk, October 5, 2018
29. “Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking”, UMass Amherst Colloquium talk, April 6, 2018
30. Symposium session commentator, Pragmatic Approaches to Skepticism, Pacific APA, San Diego, CA, March 30, 2018
31. “Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking”, Ohio State University Colloquium talk, February 9, 2018
32. Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception, APA Eastern Division Meetings, Savannah, January 3, 2018.
33. “The Natural Basis of Skepticism”, Washington University at St Louis, April 20, 2017
34. Comments on Michael Lynch, The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data, APA Pacific Division Meetings, Seattle, April 2017
35. “Attitudes and Biases: Implicit and Explicit”, New York University, March 24, 2017
36. “Closure, Skepticism, and Defeat”, Mind & Language Seminar, New York University, February 28, 2017
37. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, University of Calgary, Alberta, February 3, 2017
38. “Extracting belief from knowledge,” Rutgers University, NJ, January 26, 2017
39. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Arizona State University, January 20, 2017
40. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Western University, December 2, 2016
41. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, MIT, November 19, 2016
42. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Indiana University, October 14, 2016
43. “Knowledge and Belief in Development,” Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, March 14, 2016
44. “Attitudes and Biases, Implicit and Explicit,” University of Oxford, November 26, 2015
45. “Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Southern California Colloquium, April 24, 2015
46. “Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Antwerp, March 26, 2015
47. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Washington Colloquium, April 10, 2015
48. “On the Boundary Between Philosophy and Psychology,” Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, March 4, 2015
49. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Pennsylvania, February 27, 2015
50. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of British Columbia, January 30, 2015
51. “Knowledge and Defeasibility”, University of Delaware, October 17, 2014
52. “Knowledge and Luck”, Cornell University, May 2, 2014
53. “Intuition and Reflection”, Claremont McKenna College, April 21, 2014
54. “Knowledge and Luck”, University of Michigan, April 4, 2014
55. “The Social Value of Reasoning”, University of Waterloo, January 10, 2014.
56. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, University of Rochester, December 6, 2013
57. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, McMaster University, November 22, 2013.
58. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, Johns Hopkins University, October 24, 2013.
59. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Caltech University, Pasadena, February 15, 2013
60. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Carleton University, Ottawa, February 1, 2013
61. Comments on Tamar Szabo Gendler, Chapel Hill Colloquium, November 2, 2012
62. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, University of Cincinnati Colloquium talk, October 26, 2012
63. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, McGill University Colloquium talk, September 21, 2012
64. Comments on Lara Buchak, Harvard University Belief Workshop, September 15, 2012
65. Intuition and introspection in epistemology”, University of Leeds, April 20, 2012
66. “Naïve and systematic theories in physics and epistemology”, University of Groningen, April 11, 2012
67. “Intuitions and Experiments”, Sheffield University, February 24, 2012
68. “Knowledge as a Mental State”, Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem, September 2011
69. Comments on Lee Iacono, “Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases”, Central APA, Minneapolis, March 31, 2011
70. “The Intuitive Appeal of the KK Principle”, Stockholm University Colloquium talk, February 24, 2011
71. “Trustworthy and tricky intuitions about knowledge”, York University, January 24, 2011.
72. “Gettier Case Recognition”, UC Berkeley Colloquium talk, February 25, 2010
73. Comments on Jacob Caton, “Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?” Central APA, Chicago February 19, 2010
74. “Skepticism and the Hindsight Bias,” McMaster University, February 2009
75. “Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, University of Victoria, November 2008
76. Comments on Patrice Philie, “Entitlement as a Response to I-II-III Scepticism”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008
77. Comments on Victor Kumar, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Saskatoon, May 2007
78. “Intrusive thoughts, blind hunches, and belief-forming mechanisms”, University of Alberta, October 2005
79. “Objectivity and the Constitutive A Priori”, Warwick University, UK, February 2005
80. “Internalism and Externalism in the Good Case”, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, October 2004
81. Some Aspects of the Relation between Internalism and Externalism” Toronto M&E Workshop, September 2004
82. “Stroud’s Skepticism and the Cartesian God”, April 2003, Toronto Early Modern Philosophy Group
83. “Descartes on the difference between knowledge and comprehension”, Colloquium Talk, Carleton University, November 2000.
84. Comments on Daniel Flage’s “Hume’s Systematic Skepticism”, Conference: Reason and Rationality (Inland Pacific Northwest Philosophy Conference), April 1999
85. “Detection, Projection, and Knowledge of Necessity”, University of Toronto February 1999, University of New Mexico, January 1999
86. “Revising One’s Notion of Revision”, University of New Mexico, March 1998
87. “Two Dogmas of Naturalism”, University of Pittsburgh February 1997, University of Alberta, March 1997
88. “The Role of Knowledge of God in Descartes’ Epistemology”, Kansas State University, November 1995