D+CP
Overt Determiners on CP

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1 Recall

(1)   [El que creas   que hay   fantasmas] carece de lógica.   (Spanish)
         the C   believe.2SG that there-is ghosts   lacks   of logic
         'That you believe that there are ghosts is illogical.' (Picallo 2002 (6a))

(2)   [to   oti lei   psemata] ine   fanero   (Greek)
         the-NOM C   tell-3SG lies-ACC   be-3SG obvious-NOM
         'That she tells lies is obvious' (Roussou 1991 (45b))

(3)   man [in-o   ke   Ramin miād   emshab] shenid-am.   (Persian)
         I   this-OBJ that Ramin come.Pres.3SG tonight] heard.Past-1SG
         'I heard that Ramin is coming tonight.' (Farudi 2007))

...also Hebrew, Russian, Danish. . .

D+CP constructions do not need to be factive:

(4)   [To oti   ine   plusios] ine psema.
         The that is-3SG rich   is   lie
         'That he is rich is a lie'.   (P. Pappas, p.c.)

(5)   #The fact that he is rich is a lie.

(6)   man [in-o   ke   Ramin miād   emshab] na-shenid-am.   (Persian)
         I   this-OBJ that Ramin come.Pres.3SG tonight] NEG-heard.Past-1SG
         'I didn't heard that Ramin is coming tonight.
         He may or may not come.' (A. Farudi, p.c.)

D is highly restricted:

(7) *ena oti   efighe...   Greek
    a   that left-3SG
    'A that he left...'

(8) *[**Un(a)** que creas   que hay   fantasmas en la   azotea] carece de lógica (Spanish)
    A   C   believe.2SG that there-is ghosts   in the attic   lacks of logic
    'That you believe that there are ghosts in the attic is illogical.'

(9)   Persian only allows *in* 'this' or *un* 'that' (Farudi 2007)

Is this due to something more general about D+NP+CP?

(10)   a.   the fact/idea/rumour/notion that he was a candidate
        b. #a fact/idea/rumour/notion that he was a candidate

There is a general difficulty of talking about distinct rumours/beliefs/etc. with the same content. This seems to something we can overcome, at least with an overt N:

(11)   a.   Various rumours (are circulating) that Sam is going to retire.
        b.   I heard about a belief (going around) that Sam is going to stay on.

Whatever is going on here, it's nowhere near as categorical as the restriction against definites/demonstratives in the D+CP cases.

> **Outstanding Question:**
> - D in D+CP must be demonstrative/definite and this seems not to follow from the semantics of D+NP+CP. Why? (This is not a trivial issue since below I will show that at least some D+CP probably involve a null N, and hence the prohibition on strong/def. dets should mirror that D+NP+CP constructions.)

1.1   Some syntax

To makes a CP a DP. In Greek, this lets it be a subject:

(12)   [*(to)   oti lei   psemata] apodhiknii tin   enohi tis.
          the-NOM that tell-3SG lies-ACC   prove-3SG the-ACC guilt her-GEN
          'That she tells lies proves her guilt.'

Same restriction after P:

(13)   P *(to) oti....

In object position: Roussou says it's bad (14a) but notices an exception (14b):

(14)   a. *ksero   to   oti efighe.
              know-1 the-ACC that left-3SG
              'I know that he left.'
        b. dhen amfisvito   to   oti efighe
              not   dispute-1SG the-ACC that left-3SG
              'I do not dispute the fact that he left'.

But to dispute a fact/claim, that must be somehow already on the table...

- this should be familiar from Korean: response stance verbs like *dispute* take DP/definite CPs (e.g. in Korean)

And indeed with the same types of contexts as Korean, we get a contrast (Giorgos Spathas, p.c.)

(15)   Context 1 (ϕ not asserted)
        a. CHILD: Why can't I go outside to play?
        b. MOTHER: #Pistevo to oti dhen exis   teliosi   ta mathimata su.
                      believe.1P the that not   have.2P finished the homework yours
              'I believe that you have not finished your homework.'

(16)   Context 2 (ϕ asserted)
        a. CHILD: Don't you believe I finished my homework?
        b. MOTHER: Pistevo   to oti exis   teliosi   ta mathimata su.
                      believe.1P the that have.2P finished the homework yours.
              Apla   ine ora gia vradhino.
              Simply is   time for dinner
              'I believe that you have not finished your homework. It's just that it's time for dinner.'

The non-*to*-clause is ok here, too, perhaps preferred (Spathas, p.c.)

Doesn't work with *nomízo* 'think' though which probably doesn't have a response stance life.

What is the right analysis of the cases with D? (and, by extension, the nominalized ones?)

1. D complement
   [D [CP]]

2. A null N
   [D ∅_N [CP]

3. CP is a sentence adjoined element (or afterthought) to D(P)
   [DP]....[CP]

4. DP and CP form a constituent but are in apposition (e.g. *My sister, Alice*, where CP adjoins at the DP level)

Similar questions arises for *es*-correlates of CPs in German:

(17)   Hans glaubt   **es**, [dass Sydney die Haupstadt von Australien ist].
        H.   believes it   that Sydney the capital   of   Australia is.
        .

- See the the recent volume Frey, Meinunger, and Schwabe (2016) for lots of interesting papers on this.

Kornfilt and Whitman 2011 argue against option #3 (for Greek at least) becuase the D+CP forms a constituent.

(18)   [To   oti efighe]   dhen amfisvito
        the.ACC that left.3.SG NEG dispute.1.SG
        'I do not dispute that he left' (Lit.: 'That he left I do not dispute.')

(19)   A: Ti   se   stenoxori?
            what you.ACC upset.3.SG
            'What upsets you?'
        B: To   oti efighe.
            the.ACC that left.3.SG
            'That he left.'

Can *es*+CP be a fragment answer:[1]

(20)   a.   Was glaubst/bedauern du?
             what believes/regret   you
             'What do you believe/regret?'
        b.   *Es dass Uli krank ist.
             it   that Uli sick   is.
             'it that Uli is sick.'

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[1]Andreas Haida suggested (p.c.) that these fragments might be out because the *es* would required stress and *es* doesn't like such stress.

In any event, *es+dass* does not form any obvious surface constituent like *D+CP to+oti*:

(21)   a.   Bedauerst du es, dass Uli krank ist oder (*es) dass   Maria   unglcklich ist?
            claim   you it that Uli sick is (or) that Maria unhappy is.
            'Do you claim it that Uli is sick or that Maria is unhappy?'
       b.   Ich bedauere es, dass Uli krank ist und (*es) it dass Maria unglcklich ist.
       c.   *Ich habe es, dass Uli krank ist, geglaubt.
            I   have it that Uli sick is   believed.
            'I thought it that Uli is sick.'

This seems to be different from *to+oti*:

(22)   The determiner *to* and *oti* always have to be adjacent. (N. Angelopolous, p.c.)
       a.   dhen amfisvito   to   (*ADVERB) oti   efighe
            not dispute-1SG the-ACC   that left-3SG
            'I do not dispute it (ADVERB) that he left'.

Farsi

Farsi D+CP constructions in some ways work like German *es+dass*: D can be separated
from CP:

(23)   man [**in-o**   ] shenid-am   [ke Ramin miād   emshab]
       I   this-OBJ heard.Past-1SG that Ramin come.Pres.3SG tonight]
       'I heard that Ramin is coming tonight.' (Farudi 2007))

But they can also sit in the middle field position as a constituent (compare to the German
(21c) above) and be subjects.

(24)   a.   man [in-o   ke   Ramin miād   emshab] shenid-am.
            I   this-OBJ that Ramin come.Pres.3SG tonight] heard.Past-1SG
            'I heard that Ramin is coming tonight.' (Farudi 2007))
       b.   [in [ke   to   u-ra   da?vat   na-kard-i]]   mādar-at-ro   nārā
              this that you he-OBJ invitation NEG-DID-2SG]] mother-2sg-obj upset
            hatkard
            DID.3SG
            'That you did not invite him made your mother upset.? Darzi (1995:50,8b)

Also unlike *es+dass* constructions (right Andreas?) an overt N is possible:

(25)   man [in (vaqi'at) [CP ke   Giti mi-ā-d]]   mi-dun-am
       I   this (fact)   that Giti DUR-come-3SG DUR-know-1SG

'I know (this) that Giti is coming.' (Farudi 2007)

Outstanding Question:
- What distinguishes German *es+dass* from Farsi *in+ki* constructions and those from D+CP (Greek *to+oti* and Spanish *el+que*) constructions?

1.2 Arguments for D+CP in Greek

Roussou gives a number of arguments that there isn't a null Noun in the *to+CP* construc-
tions, i.e. that (26a) does not have (26b) as its source:

(26) a. to   oti   efighe...
          the-NOM that left-3SG...
      b. to   **gheghonos** oti   efighe
          the-NOM fact   that left-3SG...
          'the fact that he left..."

Na-clauses

to can appear with *na*-clauses, which don't complement *gheghonos* 'fact':

(27) a. to   na ehis   ipomoni   ine   proson
          the-NOM PRT have-2SG patience-NOM be-3SG advantage-NOM
          'That you have patience is an advantage'
      b. *to   gheghonos na   ehis   ipomoni...
          the-NOM fact   PRT have-2SG patience-NOM
          'the fact to have patience'

(Presumably *na*-clauses are semantically compatible with the N 'fact', otherwise this could
just show that the null N in *na*-clauses is too irrealis to deliver facts...we all should read
Iatridou 2014.)

D+wh-clauses

wh-clauses can appear with D, but not with nouns:

(28) a. to   poso kostise...
          the-NOM how much   cost-3SG
          'How much it costs...'
      b. *to   gheghonos poso kostise...
          the-NOM fact   how much   cost-3SG

   - but maybe these are more like free relatives, which are usually assumed to have a
     D+CP structure anyway, and so maybe not part of the same class as *to-oti* clauses)

Gender

The gender of D is always neuter *to*, even though CP taking Ns can be gendered (using *i*)

(29)   a.   i   fimi   oti eghine   ipurghos
               the-FEM.NOM rumour that became-3SG minister-NOM
               'The rumour that he became minister'
        b. *i   ∅ oti eghine   ipurghos
               the-FEM.NOM   that became-3SG minister-NOM
               'The that he became minister'

Maybe not so fast...

- Rousseau's arguments speak against there being a null N for each type of overt N. But maybe there is a null N that just refers to some *thing* with **propositional content**, like Korean *kes* can.

- Nikos Angelopolous (UCLA, PhD prospectus) shows that *know* doesn't take overt D+fact:

  (30)   a. *I   Ekavi kseri to oti   efighes.
                the Ekavi know the that you   left
                'Ekavi knows that you left'
          b. *I   Ekavi kseri to jeghonos oti   efighes.
                the Ekavi know the fact   that you   left
                'Ekavi knows the fact that you left'

- Angelopolous says that this pattern would follow if indeed there is a null N in these constructions.

- I want to develop another argument that there is indeed a null N here, based on a contrast in Spanish.

2   Spanish D+CP

All data from Picallo (2002), unless otherwise noted.

(31)   a.   [**El**   [que creas   que hay   fantasmas en la azotea]] carece de
                 that   that believe.2SG that there-is ghosts   in the attic   lacks of
              lógica.
              logic.
              'That you believe that there are ghosts in the attic is illogical.'
    b.   Lamento   mucho [el   [PRO haberme visto obligado a explicar todo esto]]
              regret.1SG lot   the   to-have seen forced   to explain all   this
              'I regret a lot to have been forced to explain this.'

As with Greek, earlier authors said there was a null noun *hecho* 'fact' here (Demonte 1977, Plann 1981, Iatridou and Embick 1997).

Picallo argues against this using an interesting counter-part to D+CP constructions: *Lo+de+CP*.

- In traditional grammar, *lo* is neuter (*el* is masc.).

(32)   a.   **Lo de** ir   a Mallorca este verano   no nos convence.
              the of to-go to Mallorca this summer not us   convince
              'The (idea/proposal) of going to Mallorca this summer does not convince us.'
    b.   **Lo de** que se   tenga que pagar un impuesto adicional   provocará un
              the of that people have that to-pay a   tax   additional will-cause a
              unánime   rechazo.
              unanimous revolt
              'The (idea/proposal) that people have to pay an additional tax will cause a unanimous revolt.

Note that *de* is **required** when a CP complements N in the language.

(33)   Lamento   el   hecho *(de) que no me saludara.
        regret.1SG the fact   of   that not me greet.3SG
        'I regret the fact that he did not greet me.'

But *de* is **disallowed** in the D+CP construction (with an exception I'll show below):

(34)   Lamento   el   (*de) que no me saludara.
        regret.1SG the of   that not me greet.3SG
        'I regret that he did not greet me.'

So Picallo's argument is that there must **not** be an N in the *el-que* (D+CP) constructions, but there *is* one in the *lo-de-que* constructions.

- In *el-que* constructions we have a clear and established instance of D+CP.

One thing to note further is that the *lo-de-que* constructions do not appear to involve an *elided* N. Those *also* exist in the language, e.g. with a stranded *el*:

(35) Consideró   varios **hechos** independientemente. **El** [*e*] **de** que hubieran
      considered.3SG several facts   independently   the   of that had.3PL
      apoyado   tal   propuesta era el más conspicuo.
      supported such-a proposal   was the most conspicuous
      'S/he considered several facts independently. The (fact) that they had supported
      such a proposal was the most conspicuous one.'

The noun *hecho* 'fact' in first clause antecedes N-ellipsis.

You can also get masc. (and fem.) NPs (with their gendered Ds) antecedent N-ellipsis:

(36)

a. [La hipótesis   de que las oraciones tienen Caso] y [la
    the hypothesis of that the sentences have Case and the
    ~~hipótesis~~   de que no tienen rasgos φ] era*n*   consideradas,
    ~~hypothesis~~ of that not have features φ were.3PL considered
    las dos,   incompatible*s*.
    the two.FEM incompatible.PL
    'The hypothesis that sentences have Case and the (hypothesis)
    that they do not have φ-features were, the two of them,
    considered incompatible.'

No similar linguistic N antecedent is needed (so far as I can tell) in a *lo de que* constructions. I have not systematically tested this though. The impression I have is that (36) is * if there isn't an overt N antecedent.

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Tentative conclusion:
- Do *el/la+de+que* constructions require a linguistic antecedent whereas *lo+de+que* do not?

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Interim Summary

- in *Lo+de+CP*, there is probably a null N (Picallo's conclusion; I agree)

And crucially:

- *Lo+de+CP* is not factive:

(37) [Lo de que María compró una casa   nueva] es una mentira.
      The of that Maria bought a   house new   is a   lie
      'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

And it can complement propositional attitude verbs:

(38) No me creo   lo de que María compró una casa   nueva.
      Not me believe.1SG the of that Maria bought a   house new
      'I don't believe that Maria bought a new house'. (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

N.B. Preliminary testing suggests here, like Greek *to-oti* or Spanish *kes*-clauses, there's a constraint such that there is an asserted antecedent clause.

- **BUT:** *el que* cannot be predicated of *is a lie* nor can it complement standard propositional attitudes:

(39) *[El que María haya   comprado/compró   una casa   nueva] es una mentira.
      The that Maria has.SUBJ bought/bought.INDIC a   house new   is a   lie
      'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

(40) *Dijo/pensa/sabe   el que María estaba en la   tienda.
      said/thought/knew.3SG the that M.   was   in the store
      'He/she said/thought/knew that Maria was in the store.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

This contrast suggests that *el que* does **not** denote things with propositional content, but that *lo de que* does.

- This should make us really re-question Roussou's conclusions about Greek:
  - Perhaps Greek has a null N in *to oti*, at least in those cases were it denotes propositional content.
  - Given the presence of a Null content noun in Spanish, why couldn't that exist in Greek?
- And, correlatively, this all suggests that D+CP constructions (lacking N) can't denote propositions of the normal sort (what they *do* denote, we'll talk about later).

3 D+CP vs. D+N+CP

Proposal: Greek and Spanish *lo+de+que* have a null **content noun** (always neuter):

(41)   [Lo $\varnothing_{Content}$ de que María compró una casa nueva] es una mentira.
         The N   of that Maria bought a   house new   is a   lie
         'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

Following Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2009, 2013, 2015, content nouns are things with propositional content and CPs are **predicates** that modify such nouns.

3.1 The predicate theory of CPs (Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2009, 2013, 2015)

A: The Parallelism Hypothesis

> C is like D, turning a sentence into an argument (Davidson 1968, Szabolcsi 1987, Abney 1987, Kiparsky 1995, Roberts and Roussou 2003, Manzini and Savoia 2003, 2011).[2]
>
> *che lavoro* 'which job'; *that job*: *che/that* = a D or like a D

B: The Predicate Hypothesis

> C turns a sentence into a predicate (Aboh 2005, Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2009, Arsenijevic 2009, Kayne 2009, Moulton 2015) in complement *and* relative clause CPs.[3]
>
> *The guy/Il ragazzo **that/che** I saw/ho visto*: *che/that* = always a relativizer

Some arguments for the predicate hypothesis

CPs are not nominal or DP-like (Emonds 1972, Stowell 1981, Grimshaw 1982).

(42)   a.   John is aware of that.   [P DP]
         b. *John is aware of that Fred left.   *[P CP]

(43)   a.   This captures the fact that he's appreciated.   DP-only taking verb
         b. *This captures that he's appreciated.

(44)   a. *John complained that.   CP-only taking verb
         b.   John complained that she left.

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[2]This view is supported by the historical development of Old English 'þæt' from demonstrative to complementizer

[3]This view is supported by the common identity between complementizers and relativizers (Arsenijevic 2009).

In OV languages, we can see how CPs distribute differently from DP:

(45) a. Hans hat [$_{DP}$ diese Lüge] verbreitet.   (German)
          Hans has   this   lie   spread.about
          'Hans has spread this lie'
      b. *Hans hat [$_{CP}$ dass Joachim Marlene liebt] verbreitet.
          Hans has   that Joachim Marlene loves   spread.about
      c. Hans hat verbreitet   [$_{CP}$ dass Joachim Marlene liebt   ].
          'Hans has spread.about   that Joachim Marlene loves.'

CPs can combine with nouns, while DPs need rescuing by Case-assigning *of*.

(46) a. The destruction *(of) the city.   [N *(P) DP]
      b. The idea (*of) that Fred would leave.   [N CP]

Moulton 2009, 2013, 2015: C doesn't "turn" a clause into an argument semantically, but rather into a predicate.

CP complements to N cannot be arguments—these Ns don't take proposition-denoting arguments at all:

(47) a. He claimed that./*his claim of that
      b. I believe the story./*the belief of the story   (Zucchi 1989, 14 (28c))
          cf. lexical P *belief in the story*

CP 'complements' of nouns behave like Modifiers in obviating condition C violations, unlike arguments (Lasnik 1998, Moulton 2013 *contra* Freidin 1986 and Lebeaux 1988):

(48) a. *Which depiction [of John's$_1$ face] does he$_1$ hate most?   *argument*
      b. Which book [from John's$_1$ library] did he$_1$ read?   *modifier*
      c. Which book [that John$_1$ hated most] did he$_1$ read?   *modifier*

(49) a. The fact that [John$_1$ has been arrested] he$_1$ generally fails to mention.
      b. Whose allegation [that Lee$_1$ was less than truthful] did he$_1$ refute vehemently?
          (Kuno 2004: 335(72))

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(50) **The CP Predicate Hypothesis** (Moulton 2009, 2015, Kratzer 2006)

      Complementizers turn closed sentences into predicates of various semantic types

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(51) *Traditional Relative clauses:* predicates of individuals (derived by movement)

        The story [that John told]
        [that John told] $\rightsquigarrow$ { x: John told x }
        [story] $\rightsquigarrow$ { x: story x }
        [the story that John told] $\rightsquigarrow$ THE { x: x is a story & John told x }

(52) *Traditional Complement clauses:* predicates of individuals with propositional content

                                                              (no movement)

The story that John is a liar $\rightsquigarrow$ THE { x: x is a story & **the content of x** is that John is a liar }

NP *restricted predicate*
NP *predicate*   CP *predicate*
                     C   S/TP
          clause$\rightarrow$predicate *clause*

3.1.1 The proposal in more detail

Content nouns describe individuals with propositional content, x_c.

(53) $[\![\boldsymbol{idea}]\!] = \lambda x_c \lambda w.\mathrm{idea}(x_c)(w)$

- Such things can be old, mean, and funny.

Kratzer (2006): CPs identify the propositional content of such an individual

(54) $[\![$ **that Bob is a fraud** $]\!] = \lambda x_c \lambda w[\mathrm{CONT}(x_c)(w) = \lambda w'.$ Bob is a fraud in w']

    $\mathrm{CONT}(x_c)(w) = \{w': w'$ is compatible with the intentional content

                 determined by x_c in w}   <small>(after Kratzer 2013, 195(25))</small>

CPs combine with content nouns by predicate modification.

DP ⟨s,e⟩
Dthe   NP: ⟨e⟨s,t⟩⟩
   NP: ⟨e⟨s,t⟩⟩   CP: ⟨e⟨s,t⟩⟩
      idea   that Bob is a fraud

$\iota x_c \lambda w \ [\text{idea}(x_c)(w) \ \& \ [\text{CONT}(x_c)(w) = \lambda w'. \text{ Bob is a fraud in } w']]$

⤳ 'the idea **the content of which is** that Bob is a fraud'

It's "like" a relative clause (insofar as it involves predicate modification with an N—but no abstraction or movement creating gaps, cf. Arsenijevic et al.; see De Cuba (2017) for arguments against the relation to relatives.)

Argument against Apposition analysis of N+CP

Stowell 1981 said the CP was in apposition (e.g. *My sister, Alice*). See also Potts 2002.

You can marginally extract from CP complements of N (Ross 1967) (55a), just as with some relative clauses (55b). But you cannot extract from appositives (56).

(55)   a.   The money$_i$ which I have {hopes/a feeling} that the company will squander t_i amounts to \$400,000 (Ross 1967:85(4.45a))   N+CP
            b.   Then you look at what happens in languages that you know and languages$_i$ that you have a friend who knows t_i. (McCawley 1981p.108)   RC

(56)   a.   The press never liked Katherine Hepburn, [the winner of 4 oscars].
            b.   *How many Oscars$_i$ did the press never liked Katherine Hepburn, [the winner of t_i].

No stacking

You can't stack CP 'complements' unlike relatives:

(57)   a. *The claim [that John left] [that he was angry]
            b.   The claim [that John made __] [that Sally didn't buy __]

(57a) is ruled out because the proposition *that John left* $\neq$ *that he was angry*, which is required by the analysis of CPs.

This won't work for mathematical statements (the proposition that 2+2=4 **is** *equal to* the proposition that 1+1=2)

Some issues to think about

Patrick Elliott (UCL, handout): It can't be the C itself that introduces the CONT function:

(58)   John made the claim that Mary left and that Sally is upset.
        cont(x) = λw'. Mary left in w' & cont(x) = λw'. Sally is upset in w'

But this would say the two propositions are equivalent, which isn't not right.

Patrick Elliott suggests locating the CONT function separately from *that*, so that you can simply conjoin $\langle s,t \rangle$ propositions as usual and then apply CONT to that. *That* is vacuous.

But what is the coordination?

There is also something to consider about non-intersective conjunction of propositions.

Relevant here is McCloskey 1991: conjoined sentential subjects CPs can trigger plural agreement if they are somehow *distinct* propositions:

(59)   That the president will be reelected and that he will be impeached are equally likely at this point.

(60)   a.   That UNO will be elected and that sanctions will be lifted **is** now likely.
        b. ??That UNO will be elected and that sanctions will be lifted **are** now likely

(McCloskey 1991), pp.564–565.

Maybe we want to make a plurality of things with content? If we did we might expect a plural D, but I don't think we ever get this, but this would require asking about plural determiners on clauses. And I don't have any data for that.

Picallo does report that in the McCloskey style contexts, there is a contrast between $D+de+que$ and $el+que$: the latter never shows plural agr on verb even if the events are distinct.

(61)

a.   [La hipótesis   de que las oraciones tienen Caso] y   [la
      the hypothesis of that the sentences have   Case and the
      ~~hipótesis~~   de que no tienen rasgos φ] era*n*   consideradas,
      ~~hypothesis~~ of that not have features φ were.3PL considered
      las dos,   incompatible*s*.
      the two.FEM incompatible.PL
      'The hypothesis that sentences have Case and the (hypothesis)
      that they do not have φ-features were, the two of them,
      considered incompatible.'

(62)

17

[El que hubiera desaparecido] junto   con [el que no
the that had.3SG disappeared   together with the that not
tuviera una coartada] lo   hiz*o*/*hicier*on* sospechoso ante
had.3SG an alibi   him made.3SG/*PL suspect   to
la   policía.   (cf. (28))
the police
'(The fact) that he had disappeared together with (the fact) that he
did not have an alibi made him a police suspect.'

3.2   But why a null N?

Recall that only the constructions with a postulated null N could be interpreted as fully "propositional" where *el+que* cannot, using *is a lie* as a diagnostic.

(63)   [Lo de que María compró una casa   nueva] es una mentira.
        The of that Maria bought a   house new   is a   lie
        'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

(64)   *[El que María haya   comprado/compró   una casa   nueva] es una mentira.
        The that Maria has.SUBJ bought/bought.INDIC a   house new   is a   lie
        'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

The question, though, is *why* an N is needed

- The predicate analysis could just involve D selecting a bare content-predicate CP

- We know such things are independently possible given the *el+que* construction (and various types of free and raising relative clauses)

So perhaps **the CP predicate analysis is wrong**:

- If CPs are just type $\langle s,t \rangle$, then perhaps putting a D on it won't return a proposition (just a situation)

- The N would be needed to give D something that returns a proposition-like entity

Alternatives:

- N selects CP of propositional type as a complement (but what about the evidence that it doesn't?)

- CP is a "referential" in close apposition (De Cuba 2017)

- Or a completely different structure (See Mikkelsen (2014) for a very different approach to a certain class of content DP constructions)

3.3 Implications for Chierchia (1984)

There is an influential proposal due to Chierchia (1984) that propositions can be nominalized by a type shifter NOM, that maps type ⟨s,t⟩ into e, the latter he dubs the **individual correlate of a proposition**.

- Regardless of the ontological claims...
    - if Chierchia's NOM is available, it cannot be available freely (there needs to be a noun)
    - we would have to say that Chierchia's NOM **is** the noun (....I thought these type-shifters are usually maps to Ds, if they're mapped to anything)
    - I don't see how the type-shifting analysis explains the the presence of a syntactic N....

3.4 D+CP: no null N

Recall that *el+que* do not combine with propositional attitude verbs or content predicates (e.g. *is a lie*):

(65)   *[El que María haya   comprado/compró   una casa   nueva] es una mentira.
       The that Maria has.SUBJ bought/bought.INDIC a   house new   is a   lie
       'That Maria has bought a new house is a lie.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

(66)   *Dijo/pensa/sabe   el que María estaba en la   tienda.
       said/thought/knew.3SG the that M.   was   in the store
       'He/she said/thought/knew that Maria was in the store.' (P. Menéndez-Benito, p.c)

As far as I can tell, *el+que* clauses only combine with predicate that in English can take gerunds:

(67)   Predicates that combine with *el+que* in Spanish (from Picallo):
           a.   __ pleases X
           b.   __ is surprising
           c.   __ lacks logic
           d.   regret __
           e.   __ shows
           f.   __ seem important/irrelevant/amazing
           g.   demonstration/observation of __
           h.   __ made him suspect to the police
   i.   __ triggered

A too simple idea:

El+que (D+CP) clauses not refer to contents or possibilities, but to (?actual) situations:

(68)   A CP denotes a set of (possible) situations:
           that John left ⤳ λs. John left in s (the set of possible situations in which John left)
           type ⟨s,t⟩

(69)   **Possible situations** (Kratzer 1989, et seq): Situations are parts of possible worlds; a world being the limiting case

- In this way, situation semantics generally allows propositions to be /describe sets of "smaller things" than whole worlds.

- Simple idea: if you stick a (definite/ maximalizing /choice functional) determiner on top of a situation description, you get a (possibly unique/salient) member of that set: (Interesting questions about where the CP can denote **pluralities** of situations...)

(70)   With individual denoting DPs:

    a.   NPs denote sets of individuals $\langle e,t \rangle$
dog $\rightsquigarrow$ λx. x is a dog

    b.   determiners can convert this to an individual type e
the dog: $\rightsquigarrow x$: where x is a dog.
(could involve an iota, max, type-shifters, etc. and carry various presuppositions, like uniqueness etc.)

(71)   *s*: s is a situation in which he left

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \diagup\diagdown & \\ \text{D} & & \langle s,t \rangle \\ & & \diagup\diagdown \\ & \text{que he left} & \end{array}$$

If *el+que* constructions denote individual situations, these are not the things that can be lies:

(72)   #[el que he left] is a lie
    s is a lie (where s is a situation in which he left)

Nope! Concrete situations cannot be lies! See with English gerunds:

(73)   #/*John's leaving was a lie.

But you can **regret** such things or be surprised by them:

(74)   John's leaving was regrettable/surprising.

(75)   Lamento   el   que   no   me saludara.
    regret.1SG the that not me greet.3SG
    'I regret that he did not greet me.'

However, we need to make a distinction between just plain particulars (situations, events) and *El que* constructions, are semantically opaque: (76) does not entail (77) (but note that my consultant prefers the subjunctive over the indicative in the embedded clause—this could be very relevant).

(76)   Lamentaba el   que María estuviera bailando tango
    lament.3SG the that Maria was.SUBJ dancing tango
    'He regretted that Maria was dancing the tango.'

(77)   Lamentaba el   que María estuviera bailando
    lament.3SG the that Maria was.SUBJ dancing

'He regretted that Maria was dancing.'

And they can't sit where we generally get semantically transparent situation/event denoting complement: direct perception!

(78) *Vi   el   que María estaba bailando.
       Saw.3SG the that Maria was   dancing.
       'He saw that Maria was dancing.'

Isn't this just a factive/non-factive distinction?

- Should we that *el+que* constructions denote FACTS, whatever those are, as distinct from PROPOSITIONS and EVENTS? (Asher 1993, Peterson 1997, Ginzburg and Sag 2000)

- We're getting close to very difficult philosophical questions about **ontology** and the role of information content in natural language, something that was central to debates between possible world semanticists and certain brands of situation semantics.

- This is hard stuff, so I'd rather use the natural language/linguistics as a guide before entertaining these more abstract issues.

And in any event, I don't see how these semantic/philosophical proposals is going to connect with the syntax, which is my interest.

And it's not so clear that we are dealing with facts here. Zucchi 1989 shows that the arguments of verb like *regret* and *surprise* are more than just facts. Let's talk about these constructions next.

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