Among the concepts central to Plato's metaphysical vision are those of identity, sameness, and difference. For example, it is on the basis of a claim about putative cases of sameness among different things that Plato postulates the existence of separate Forms. It is owing to the apparent sameness between instances of Forms and the Forms themselves that Plato is compelled somehow to take account of potentially destructive vicious infinite regress arguments. Further, in reflecting on the Forms and their relations among themselves, it is their self-identity that seems to be threatened or at least compromised. And in providing an account of the possibility of cognition in *Timaeus*, Plato evidently sees the need to incorporate principles of identity and difference into the soul's very fabric. In this paper, I propose to explore some of the systematic connections between these concepts. Translators have sometimes obscured the fact that there are such connections. The Greek terms *taujtovn*, *eteron*, and *omoion* (*anomoion*) are variously rendered, often in ways that obscure the metaphysics. For example, *taujtovn* is most commonly rendered in English as "same," which, predictably, leads *omoion* to be translated as "like" or "similar." This has suggested to some that if two things are "like" or "similar," then they are not "the same." But "like" and "similar" are not, as I shall show, well-formed or perspicuous metaphysical concepts. There is no justification for foisting them on Plato; rendering the terms thus often leads scholars to miss the force of Plato's arguments. In addition, translating *taujtovn* as "same" threatens to trivialize a fundamental concept in Plato, leading to complaints that to say that something is "the same as itself" is to say nothing at all.

Let us begin with the quasi-technical use of *omoion*. Consider this passage, part of the second regress argument in *Parmenides*:

Ou\dÆ a\]n ta; o{moia metevconta o{moia hæ, oujk ejkei`no e`stai
 aufo;to;eido-Ê

Mary Louise Gill, like most other English translators, translates this line: "But if like things are like by partaking of something, won't that be the Form itself?" The

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1 That there is a non-technical use of *omoion* where a translation of "like" is correct is beyond doubt. The non-technical use comes to the fore especially with the comparative *omoiaveron* and the superlative *omoiavaton*.

2 *Parm. 132E3*-4.

justification for "like things" is clear enough. When two things are large, to take the previous example in the dialogue, Socrates wants to posit a single Form of Largeness. The implication of the meaning of "like things" is that the things are like, in this case, large, with respect to the property of largeness. One avoids saying that the like things are "the same" because if there are two things, they cannot be, simply, the same. Yet they clearly are like, according to this way of thinking, because they have the identical property. If this were not so, that is, if two things were like because they each had a property that was "like" the other, then we could ask about what it is that makes each property like the other. Presumably, this would be because they are the same in some respect. In short, avoidance of a vicious infinite regress requires that likeness be functionally related to sameness. It requires that there be a fundamental sameness in virtue of which any claim about likeness can be made.

Accordingly, it is sameness not likeness that needs to do all the work in the argument that is supposed to lead to the postulation of separate Forms. It is owing to the fact that, say, one "largeness" in one thing is the same as another "largeness" in another that a Form of Largeness is posited in the first place. If it were only likeness and not sameness that is the fundamental datum, then, since anything can be held to be like anything else in some respect, it would be entirely opaque what the Forms are that are supposed to explain this likeness.

If we insist on the logical priority of the concept of sameness to the concept of likeness in the argument, we can see why Socrates' attempt to avoid the first regress argument in Parmenides, the so-called "third man argument," by insisting that instances of Forms are oμοιωματα, is on the face of it feeble. For sameness, unlike likeness, is clearly a reciprocal relation. If instances of Forms are the same as the Forms, then the Forms are the same as their instances. One well-trodden interpretative path is to say that Socrates is right to insist that instances of Forms are images of the Forms and that therefore they are mere likenesses of them; so, there are no grounds for saying that Form and instance require another Form "over and above" to account for their likeness. Reciprocal relatedness is precluded by imagery.

First, however, claiming that an instance of a Form is a oμοιωμα of it seems very much like claiming that one instance is oμοιον another. Second, the same argument that shows that likeness is posterior to sameness among like things shows that likeness is posterior to sameness in the case of a Form and an instance of it, even supposing that we designate this instance an image of a Form. If an instance of a Form is like a Form, it

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5 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In. Met. 84, 1-2: "Further, things that are the same as each other are the same as each other owing to their participation in something self-identical which is, principally, this, and this is the Idea (εἴ τις oμοίωμα τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦτον καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ὅμοιῳ εἶναι, ομοίωμα τοῦτο γίνεται)," quoting from Aristotle's On the Ideas. Cf. 85, 4-5.
6 Parm. 132D4.
7 See, for example, R. Patterson, Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), 51, "the regress of similarities of the Parmenides has no force against Plato's paradigmatism but is best viewed, like the other arguments given there, as bringing out the disastrous consequences of one possible (and in this case very tempting) misinterpretation of participation" (my italics). See also R.E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides, 158-68, who argues that imagery precludes the symmetry entailed by sameness.
must be so in some respect. For example, what makes an instance of a Form of Largeness like the Form of Largeness rather than, say, the Form of Thickness? Presumably, the answer is: its largeness. If this largeness is not the same as the largeness whose name is "the Form of Largeness," it is a mystery as to what makes it an instance of this Form rather than another. And then must it not be the case that the largeness of the Form is the same as the largeness of the instance just as the largeness of one instance is the same as the largeness of another?

Let us use as a frame for the sameness of one instance of a Form and another:

\( (1) \ A_1 = A_2 \)

This, however, is supposedly not meant by Plato to undermine the truth of:

\( (2) \ A_1 = A_1 \)

and:

\( (3) \ A_2 = A_2 \)

Indeed, it is because (2) and (3) are held to be indubitable truths that (1) is held by nominalists to be necessarily false: the only thing \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \) are the same as are themselves. Attempts to take the sting out of the nominalists' complaint against Platonism by holding that the fundamental data of a theory of Forms are the likenesses of things rather than the sameness of instances of Forms are misguided and, in part, inspired by an effort to make a theory of Forms a respectable theory of universals, namely, a realistic one. If, however, Forms are postulated to explain sameness in difference, then Forms are not universals. For universals as such explain nothing.

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8 Parm. 132D5-6: "If, then, he said, something is likened to the Form, is it possible that that Form is not the same as which is likened to it, insofar as that is made the same as it (εἰσαγωγή, εἴκης τὸ ἔμμενον εἰσλειτα, οἴστε εἰκεῖντο τοῖς ἑκοῦς ἐμματικοῦ, ὀνῷ ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐμματικὸν ἐμματικόν εἰς ὀείκειον ὁμοιομοίωσιν, ἐκ τῶν ἑκοῦν ἐμματικόν ὁμοιομοίωσιν)." The word translated as "likened to" is supposed to be the prophylactic against regress. But Parmenides rightly keeps the focus on sameness, supposing as does Socrates that Forms are intended to explain sameness in difference. Cf. Phd. 74E3 where equals are said to "resemble (προσεικεῖαι)" deficiently the Equal itself.

9 See Phd. 102D6-8 where the self-identity of the instance of the Form and the Form is stressed. Cf. 74C1-2; 103B4-5. The instance of Largeness, and Largeness itself, never admit of smallness. Surely, Form and instance are exactly the same in this way. Nothing about imagery is going to change this. If this were not so, then the claim that an instance of Largeness does not admit of smallness would have to be substantiated separately from a claim that the Form of Largeness does not admit of smallness. If imagery makes a difference, why should not an image of the Form of Largeness admit of smallness?


11 See, e.g., Aristotle, Met. B 6, 1003a11 where "the universal (τὸ οὐκοῦ)" is defined as "that which is predicated in common (τὸ οὔκοῦν ἑκμαῖον τὸ ἑκμαῖον);" cf. EE A 8, 1218a7; De Int. 17a39. At Met. D 26, 1023b29ff, Aristotle identifies the universal with "that which is said as a whole (τὸ ὁμοίως ἐκμαῖον)." See also Physics A 1, 184a24-25: "the universal is a kind of whole" and A 5, 189a5-8. Predicates and wholes are posterior to subjects and parts and so do not explain anything about them. See J. Malcolm, Plato on Self-Predication of Forms: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 54-
If (1) entails that there be two truths expressed as (2) and (3), then we should clearly distinguish sameness from identity, as in fact Plato most certainly does. Every instance of a Form is identical with itself; every Form is identical with itself. Is an instance self-identical because the Form of which it is an instance is self-identical? So it would seem, judging from the claim made in *Euthyphro*:

> Or is the pious itself not identical with itself in every action? And the impious, on the other hand, the opposite of all that is pious, is it not the same as itself, that is, does not everything that is going to be counted as impious have some single character, namely, impiety?\(^\text{13}\)

If the piety in a pious action is the same as the piety whose name is "the Form of Piety," then it is the case both that the piety that is in each is self-identical and that the impiety in one action is the same as the impiety in another action (or in the Form).

And yet in *Phaedo* we read:

> These equals, therefore, and Equality itself are not identical.\(^\text{14}\)

Supposing, as I think we must, that "these equals" refers to instances of equality and not the things that are equal, we are told that the equality in an instance of Equality is not identical with Equality itself.\(^\text{15}\) We have, however, already seen that the instance should be understood to be the same as the Form. So, there is evidently more to identity or self-identity than sameness. Of course. For if (1), (2), and (3) above are to be true, then the non-identity of \(A_1\) and \(A_2\) follows. Or, to put it more circumspectly, something must follow which can be represented by saying that \(A_1\) and \(A_2\) are non-identical or different.

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\(^{12}\) So, too, Aristotle, *Met.* 1, 1054a20-1055a3, who discusses at length the meanings of identical (different), same (not same). The key general point regarding these concepts is that "identical" comes under "one" and "same" comes under "plurality (to; plhho')." See 1054a29-32.

\(^{13}\) *Eud.* 5D1-5: ouj tauta ou to; o{t; en e; pharaxei to; o{t; aut; ou to; o{t; wækai; to; aposition aut; ou to; men o{t; ou pant; o; enantion, aut; o; de; aut; wækai; to; aposition kai; to; on mi; n tina; ideon kata; thn aposioktha pæn o; (iper a{h meWia; aposition elhæ). I take the phrase beginning kai; e; on...as an epexegetic use of kai; v to say that "the impious is the same as itself" is, on this reading, equivalent to saying that impious actions, say, are the same because impiety is identical with itself. If the text is not read in this way, it is obscure what "have some single character with respect to impiety" says in addition to "same as itself." I take the words "is the same as itself" as explicated by what follows.

\(^{14}\) *Phd.* 74C4-5: Ouj tauta ou to; o{t; hli; hæ, tauta ete; to; i; a kai; aut; to; to; i; on. Cf. 74C10-D5.

\(^{15}\) The supposition is clinched by the preceding line: "the equals themselves did not appear unequal nor did Equality to be Inequality." But of course equal things do appear unequal; "the equals themselves" must refer to the equality of equal things. See supra n.9. See D. Gallop, *Plato, Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 121-6, for a good discussion of the problems of understanding how the Form and instance can be both the same and not identical. Also, D. Bostock, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ch. 4.
Hence, we are obliged to say, for example: the equality in A1 is the same as the equality in A2 and is the same as the equality in the Form, but neither A1 nor A2 is identical with that Form.  

If an instance of a Form is the same as the Form, though it is not identical with it, we might suppose that identity is being construed here as straightforwardly numerical. But the claim of non-identity is the conclusion of a line of reasoning ("therefore (α ἄ α)") that contained in 74B7-9, where sensible equals are said to appear unequal in some way.  

Because they are the sort of things to appear unequal, they are not identical with the Form of Equality, even though the equality in them is the same as the equality in the Form. If, however, numerical non-identity were meant in the conclusion, that could have been directly inferred from 74A11, where the Form of Equality is said to be different from (ἐ ἔ ρ όν ≠ not identical to) its instances.

It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to claim that the cogency of Platonism rests upon the successful distinction of sameness and identity. The nominalist will insist that such a distinction rests upon a deviant notion of identity. For the individual identity of A1 or A2 or the putative Form should exhaust all there is to say about them. There could be nothing "left over" for A1 or A2 to be the same as. There is not much doubt that Plato wants to reject this concept of identity. He wants to maintain that something can be the same as something else even though it is identical only with itself.  

Indeed, something can only be the same as something else if it is identical only with itself. Clearly identity is conceptually prior to sameness.  

What we need to ask is what Plato’s concept of identity is such that he can maintain that identity allows for sameness.

Plato’s most direct and concise answer to this question is in the second part of Parmenides. Wishing not to beg any questions about the significance of this part of the dialogue, I point only to an argument whose logic is isolatable, even if its total meaning is inseparable from the meaning of the second part (or, indeed, of the entire dialogue) as a whole. This is the argument that:

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16 Th. 158E5-10 seems to provide an example where ταύτω is used synonymously with ὁμοιόν, but in this passage Socrates is describing how the proponent of the view that sense-perception is knowledge would account for sense-perception being ἂ γευθή or "infallible." Such a person wants to argue that each case of sense-perception is "different (ἐ ἔ ρ όν)" from every other because the perceptual event is different each time. Each perceptual event consists of a perceiver and a thing perceived together producing a new perception. Even if one perceptual event were per impossibile the "same (ὁμοιόν)" as another in some respect, it would still be different (= not ταύτω) from that. Plato here uses the phrase "identical (ταύτω) "in some respect (τι ἡ μεν...τι ἡ δε") as synonymous with ὁμοιόν because the identity of a perceptual event is complex. He is excluding as impossible the case in which, say, the perceived remains the same in two different perceptions.

17 The word "appear (ἀ νέμεται)" must not be understood in the "adversative" sense, as if it indicated that though things appear unequal, they really are equal. If this were meant, then these things would really be instances of the Form of Inequality. The use of "appear" is rather "non-adversative" i.e., things appear unequal because they in fact are so. The problem is exactly how the instances of Equality can appear unequal in this sense. Cf. Soph. 236B7 for the adversative sense; 264B1-3 for the non-adversative sense.

18 This point is related to that expressed at Parm. 146A9-D1 where that which is one, the subject of investigation is said to be "identical with itself (ταύτω ἐ ὑ τι)" and "different from itself (ἐ ἔ ρ όν ἐ ὑ τι οὐ)"). See infra for the conception of the Form according to which this is supposed to make sense.

19 So, being "different (ἐ ἔ ρ όν)" is prior to "not being the same (ἀνομοιόν)." Cf. Tht. 185C9-10; Parm. 148A6-7 for the pairs identical/different, same/not same.
If that which is one is (είν), then is it possible for it to be but not to partake of (μετείχει) essence (ουσία)? – It could not. – Now, that which is one's essence would be, too, not being identical with that which is one; otherwise, that essence would not be ις essence, nor would it, that which is one, partake of that essence, but saying that that which is one is would be like saying that that which is one is one.20

Whatever "that which is one" refers to, there is no indication that this argument is anything but an application of a general principle: if A is, then (i) A's essence is distinct from it and (ii) A partakes of that essence. What exactly it means to say that "that which is one is" is not exactly clear, though it must obviously be contrasted with "that which is one, which is excluded in the last line.21 It cannot simply mean "that which is one is real." The principal evidence for this is that in Republic the Form of the Good is "beyond ουσία" which certainly does not mean that it is beyond reality.22 On the other hand, Plato seems committed to saying that that which is is, that is, it exists, because it partakes of ουσία. Let this be an instance of: (iii) if A exists and has essence, it does so because it partakes of essence.

Plato's argument against the claim that identity excludes sameness must be something like this: for a thing's individual identity to exhaust all there is to say about it would mean that that something could not exist; therefore, if something does exist, its individual identity cannot exhaust all there is to say about it.23 For something to have an individual identity such that we can refer to it as something that exists, it must be (i) distinct from the essence of which it partakes and (iii) the essence in virtue of which it exists. The notion of identity that absolutely excludes sameness among self-identical things is the aberrant notion, as the first hypothesis of the second part of Parmenides shows. For a one that is nothing but one (i.e., absolutely self-identical) cannot exist. Indeed, it cannot even be one.24

20 Ibid., 142B5-C2. Cf. Soph. 244B-C where substantially the same argument is made against Eleaticism: to say that the Eleatic One is, is to implicitly distinguish it from its essence.
21 This is questioned by V. Harte, Plato on Parts and Wholes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 75-6.
22 See Rep. 509B8-9. If the Form of the Good is not real, it could not "exceed ουσία in power;" nor could also not be "the brightest thing that is (του' οθτο' το; οιμοθατον, 518C9); nor could the 'greatest study' (μεγιστον μαθημα, 504D2) be of it." See M. Baltes, "Is the Idea of the Good in Plato's Republic Beyond Being?" Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Edited by M. Joyal (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1997), 1-23. For what I take to be a conclusive demonstration of this point. A most useful general study is that of R. Ferber, Platon's Idee des Guten 2nd edition (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1989). See Ferber's further elaborations in "L'Idea del bene è non è trascendente? Ancora su epekeina t' ouσia'," in Platone e la tradizione platonica. Edited by M. Bonazzi and F. Trabattoni (Milano: Cisalpino, 2003), 127-49.
23 Excluding, of course, the Form of the Good, which is real or exists in some way but is "beyond being." See infra as to why this is not an arbitrary exclusion. By "individual identity" I mean whatever is included conceptually by reference to it.
24 See Parm. 137C4-142B5. I am supposing here, without further argument, that if existence flows from partaking of essence, then the Form of the Good does not exist, though it is in some sense real. I think it is least misleading to express this by saying that the reality of the Form of the Good constitutes a different sort of existence, i.e., infinite existence or, if one prefers, non-existential being.
What is the justification for claiming that identity requires partaking of essence that is distinct from that which partakes? Let there be two existents, A and B, and let each be self-identical and this self-identity be understood as excluding the possibility that A be the same as B.²⁵ Either A's identity as this existent consists in the fact(s) about what A is, its essence, or it consists in these facts plus an additional fact, namely, that A exists. Even if there are things whose identity does not entail existence, no one, we may presume, wants to argue that identity actually excludes existence, that is, that nothing that is self-identical exists. At least in those cases in which identity entails existence, we have two existents, each with their own identity. Then, a process of identifying A or B could not exhaust all that we can say about either of them. In addition to giving the content of the identity of A or B, we can and must say that A and B exist. So, it is not impossible that something of A's identity escapes being absorbed into A's existence. Plato captures this point by saying that if something exists, it is because it partakes of essence (iii).²⁶

That Plato has something like the above argument in mind is indicated by his explicit linking of an implicit denial of Forms in Parmenides with the Eleaticism of Zeno,

If things are many, you say, then it is necessary for them to be the same and not the same; but this is impossible. For it is not possible that things that are not the same be the same or that things that are the same be not the same.²⁷

If a plurality of things exists, they must be the same and not the same; the same because each is one and not the same because each is not the other, that is, because each has its own individual identity.²⁸ If part of what something is entails its being the same as something else – in this case, its being one – then its identification as this existent does not exhaust all that it is, where identity is supposed to guarantee unqualified uniqueness. Conversely, if identity does exhaust all that it is, then it cannot be the same as something else. We could not in this case even say that there are two things – two "ones" of whatever sort – meaning that these are the same insofar as each is one so-and-so. Thus, a rigorous or even a consistent nominalism collapses into Eleaticism.²⁹

²⁵ I use "self-identical" as synonymous with "is identical with itself" or "has identity with respect to itself."
²⁶ Aristotle takes fundamentally the same approach in designating a basic existent, a "substance (ουσία)," as a "this something (τὸ ἔτι τίγ." The identity of the substance is cognized through its "whatness (τί; ἔτι εἶχαί)" or "essence (ουσία τοῦ...)," Cf. Met. A 10, 993a18; Ἡ 1, 1043a18. A substance or individual exists because it has essence (= (iii) "partakes of essence" in Plato's language).
²⁷ Parm. 127E1-4: eij pollȃ aμeşt̄i ta; ȏhta, μ- α̑fa dȇl' aȗta; ȏfōiȃe el̄hai kai; ȃph̄omoȋa, toutȏ de; dh; ȃph̄umaton: ȏfē gar̄t̄a; ȃph̄omoȋa ȏfōiȃa oȗfē t̄a; ȏfōiȃa ȃph̄omoȋa ol̄ȗte el̄hai.
²⁹ See R.E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides, 80, "…Aristotle’s and Plato’s diagnosis of Eleatic monism is the same: that monism rested on an implicit and unstated nominalism…" Platonists I think assumed that a solution to extreme nominalism that stopped short of positing the separateness of Forms (or something doing the job that Forms do) was not sustainable. The most extensive treatment of Plato's arguments for
Allowing that there can be two things that are the same insofar as each is one entails a distinction between whatever it is that constitutes each thing's individual identity and the oneness (in this case) of which each thing partakes. Generally, anything with an identity must exist and so must be distinct from the ωσια of which it partakes and in virtue of which it exists as the sort of thing it is. But then something with an identity can be the same as something else if the ωσια of which each thing partakes is the sort of thing such that when it is partaken of, it does not get absorbed into that thing's identity as the existent it is. For example, two things can be large (or, equivalently, largeness can be in two things) so long as largeness is the sort of thing such that when something partakes of largeness, that largeness does not get absorbed into that thing's individual identity as this existent. If it did get so absorbed, then by definition nothing else could partake of it.

We may, however, wish to object at this point that the largeness in one thing, or any other property it may have, is or can be absorbed into that thing's identity by the simple expedient of stipulating it so. Thus, recurring to (2) and (3) above, we say that the large man is self-identical; he cannot be the same as anything else. After specifying his identity, or the identity of his largeness, there is nothing "left over" to constitute his or its sameness to something else.

Before we try to address this problem, let us recall that in a crucial and difficult passage in Timaeus, Plato recognizes, among other things, the need to distinguish between two types of ωσια. Here he is giving the "recipe" for the construction of the soul of the universe by the demiurge:

Between indivisible essence that is always self-identical and the divisible essence that comes to be in bodies, he composed out of both a third type of essence. Again, for the nature of identity and difference, he constructed according to the identical principle a type intermediate between the indivisible [types of identity and difference] and the divisible type found in bodies. Then, taking these three, he composed them into one form, forcing the hard to mix nature of difference with identity, mixing them with essence and making one out of three.
Leaving aside for the moment the main point of this passage regarding the human soul, which is that it must have certain ingredients if it is to be able to cognize all that is intelligible, let us focus on the distinction between indivisible essence, identity, and difference, and their divisible, bodily counterparts.

In the context of the above discussion, divisible essence, identity, and difference, must be what are possessed by those things whose sameness and difference constitutes the fundamental data of a theory of Forms. It is not surprising that Plato here speaks of divisible identity and not divisible sameness since, as we have seen the latter is functionally dependent upon the former. Divisible identity and divisible essence are possessed by bodily entities capable of manifesting sameness and difference among themselves.33 The essence of which a self-identical bodily thing partakes is distinct from indivisible essence and identity.

What are divisible and indivisible essence, identity, and difference? Divisible essence, identity, and difference belong to bodies, which have parts outside of parts or extension. These include temporal parts. Because their existential identity and essence are extended, the samenesses they have with other bodies are indirectly extended as well. And insofar as identity and essence are divisible, their differences are divisible as well. For example, being large consists in having a divisible kind of essence, in the sense that we can specify in divisible terms what the largeness consists of. The only way that the identity of that which is bodily can be indicated is by referring to its divisible parts.34 By contrast, indivisible identity and essence do not require parts outside of parts (though as we shall see, this does not exclude complexity).

Divisible identity entails divisible essence; otherwise, the essence of that which is self-identical would be separate from it (or some of its parts) and, among other absurdities, these parts would not partake of essence. Judging from the Parmenides argument above, something with divisible identity exists because it partakes of divisible essence. The key to understanding what divisible and indivisible essence are is that they refer to what is cognizable by or intelligible to the soul, as opposed to what is sensible.35 If things with divisible identity owe their existence to partaking of divisible essence, then, if they are cognizable (as opposed to sensible) at all, their essence must be distinct from their identity, even if their existence is not.

The answer to the objection that we could specify identity and have nothing left over for sameness is this. The attempt to identify, let alone re-identify, an existent with divisible identity requires the inclusion of its divisible essence. That is, it is by using divisible essence as a criterion that we identify something. For example, we determine that this man has the same height today that he had yesterday. The divisible essence cannot itself be constitutive of the existential identity. In the above frames (2) and (3), to identify A1 or A2, we have to cognize it as something, as having some structure or other. We have to cognize its divisible essence, regardless of our theory of what essence is exactly or how we cognize it. The only way that the sameness of A1 and A2 could be

33 Numerical difference among things possessing divisible essence is posterior to the difference that obtains among things with indivisible essence. For these latter are only equivocally numerable.
34 Cf. Parm. 157B6-158B4, where the "others," that is, participants in the "one," must be said to have "parts" (movía), each of which must itself have parts.
35 See Tim. 37A-B.
made impossible is by claiming that the identity of each is utterly uncognizable. Since we do cognize divisible essence, the impossibility of sameness among different self-identical things is refuted, which is all Plato really needs to do. For the nominalist objections do not amount to a quibble about this or that case of sameness; they typically rest on the denial of the very possibility of sameness among self-identical things.

In order to see this point more clearly, let us consider an additional frame:

(4) A = B

This frame is usually called "material identity" as opposed to "formal identity" in (2) and (3) above. (4) represents the typical structure of scientific and mathematical equations like the definition of force in classical mechanics, F=ma, or the mathematical expression of Boyle's Law, PV=k, or 12/4=\(\sqrt{27}\). It is the frame Plato implicitly employs when he asks the question of whether the virtues are really one. It is also, for example, the frame implicitly employed in claiming that, say, "the Morning Star = the Evening Star." There is, at least superficially, something deeply paradoxical about claiming (1), (2), and (3), and yet insisting on the cogency of (4). What we are saying in all these cases is, basically, that two or more things that appear to be different in some way or another really are identical or one. In Platonic terms, we are saying that a diversity of essence rests upon an identity. Note that this is an entirely separate point from that concerning sameness. (4) does not indicate sameness or at least it does not indicate it in the same manner. In the case of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, the diversity is explained by the various conditions under which the single entity is perceived. In the case of the Forms, the diversity is owing to cognition. That is, the only way that that which unites the Forms can be cognized is as the array of intelligible reality. The array is fixed, like the color spectrum. It is not open to alteration, though simulacra of it, ensconced in language and thought, can represent or misrepresent it.

Material identity as in (4) amounts to a way of expressing (1) as in the case of a "many" which a Form is supposed to be "over and above." For example, when Parmenides offers Socrates a statement of the reason for positing Forms, he does so in a manner that is most perspicuously understood as making a claim about material identity:

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36 A root and branch objection would maintain that all our cognition of divisible being is constructive. There is nothing "there" to cognize.

37 See Protag. 329Dff. Note that Plato assumes that Justice is just (330C4-8, A = A) and Piety is pious (330D8ff, B = B), though he apparently sees no contradiction in also asking whether Justice and Piety are identical (A = B). At Soph. 217Aff, an analogous question is raised of whether "sophist," "statesman," and "philosopher," do or do not refer to one thing.

38 Cp. Wittgenstein in Tractatus 5.5303: "Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all." This passage from Wittgenstein is quoted in P. Butchvarov, Being qua Being (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1979), 9. My account of material identity owes much to this book.

39 Plato's main word for expressing (4) is "one (\(\epsilon\eta\))." Note that in Platonic language this is not equivalent to saying that they are the same. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are not instances of Venus. Material identity is broader than the relation that consists of sameness, though it includes it as a special case. Thus frame (4) is a generalization of frame (1).
I think that on this basis you think that each Form is one: whenever many things seem to you to be large, it perhaps seems to you that you are looking at some one self-identical Idea over all, whence you think that Largeness is one.  

The nominalist wants to say that the very grounds for identifying diverse objects of perception or thought precludes their sameness. As we have seen, Plato replies that identification could not occur apart from the recognition of divisible essence. Even to say, "this color is not, that is, could not be, the same as that color" is to employ a self-defeating strategy. It is much as if one were to maintain that the star seen at night could not be the same as the star seen in the morning. Yet if the identity of the one permits of re-identification, then the criteria of identity are distinct from that that which is identified. Re-identifying one thing involves the employment of material identity claims that are in principle no different from those used in claiming that many large things are the same, that Largeness is the one self-identical nature that variously manifests itself. It is the self-identical nature whose presence allows us to say that multiple instances of it are the same.

What then of indivisible essence, identity, and difference? One important clue as to their meaning is that, though Plato wants to affirm a "communion of Kinds (koinwniaw tw'n genwh)" and an "interweaving of Forms (sumplokh; tw' eijdwh)," he never says that Forms can be said to be the same as each other. Even if it is true, that in some way some nature pervades many or all Forms, this does not make it true that Forms are the same in this respect. For example, though every Form partakes of Difference and so is different from every other Form, it does not follow that all the Forms are the same in virtue of partaking of Difference. And the reason for this is that for two things to be the same, they must have an individual identity specifiable or referable to independently of their essence. Two instances of a Form can be identified by their spatial separation or otherwise by that which accounts for their divisible identity. Thus, in the above passage "many larges" are presumably so identified. Yet the two putative instances of a Form located in two other Forms cannot be so specified. The "instance" of difference in the Form of Identity is not as such distinguishable from the "instance" of Difference in the Form of Existence. The only way the indivisible identity of a Form can be specified is, it seems, through its own indivisible essence.

Nevertheless, the indivisible identity of a Form and its indivisible essence have to be distinguishable in some manner. This is evident if we consider "the greatest Kinds": the Form of Identity (to; taejto), the Form of Difference (to; qaiveron), the Form of Existence (to; o[no), the Form of Motion (hJkivnhsi") and the Form of Rest (hJstagi"). The reason why the Form of Identity must be different from the Form of Existence is that

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40 Parm. 132A1-4: Oi'maiv se ejk tou` toiou`de e}n ejkaston eirno- ojseqai eihai: o{jan povlæafta meΓavai sol dovhaæehai, miw ti-išw-dokelidew hjaufh;eihai ep; panta iæonti, ojgen ehto;mega ḥh' eihai.

41 See Soph. 257A9; 259E5-6. Cf. Rep. 476A6-7 where it is a koinwniaw tw' eijdwh. So, I do not take the use of genwh here as significant. In fact, throughout the Sophist passage eirno" and geno" see to be used interchangeably. Cf. 254C2, D4.

42 See Soph. 255E3-6.

43 Ibid., 254Bff. It is evident from 254C2 that "Kind (geno") is being used synonymously with "Form (eirno"). Cf. 253D1; 258C3. This seems to be ignored only by those who have an unduly rigid notion of what Form is supposed by Plato to be.
if they are not, then if we say that the Form of Rest has existence and the Form of Motion has existence, we shall be affirming, counterfactually, the identity of these Forms. So, each Form has identity and existence. And this general principle must cover the Forms of Identity and Existence themselves. Similarly, each Form is different from the others because it partakes of the Form of Difference, not because of its own nature.

This initially seems surprising. One might have supposed that in fact one Form is different from another precisely because of its own nature. Thus, it would seem that, say, the Form of Rest is different from the Form of Motion precisely because of its having a contrary nature. Since, though, the point about difference is unrestricted, too, the Form of Difference is different from other Forms owing to its partaking of Difference, not owing to its own nature. And the Form of Identity is self-identical owing to its partaking of Identity, not owing to its own nature. Whatever the words "its own nature" can mean, they must refer to something other than that of which the Form of Difference partakes.

That which a Form partakes of is what the Form's name names or its essence, "itself according to itself (αὑτό 0; καὶ ἀὑτό 0)." So, "its own nature" cannot be that. One might conjecture that the phrase refers to "bare particularity" or something like haecceitas, analogous to the spatially unique divisible identity of a sensible instance of a Form. The problem with this is, however, that a multitude of distinct "thises" leaves unexplained and perhaps inexplicable what the communion or participating or interweaving of Forms is supposed to be. I would suggest another way of looking at the matter.

Begin with the following question. How does diversity of essence square with the claim that a Form is "uniform (μονοειδέω)?" As in the frame (4), uniformity of essence is relativized. That is, the one entity that variously appears as A or B is uniform relative to these. The relativization of uniformity is accounted for by the relativization of essence or οὐσία in Republic. That is why the Form of the Good is beyond οὐσία. That is also why such a superordinate Form is needed to make Forms knowable. Thus, to

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44 Ibid., 255B11-C1: "But if Existence and Identity did not have different meanings, once more, when we say that Motion and Rest both exist, we would be saying that they are identical (ἐιτὸ 0; καὶ τὸ; τὰ ὑπὸ ἔν διάρκειαν ἰδέαν ἐπικαίρων τῷ ὁμοίων καὶ παράποσιν καὶ στῶσιν ἄμφοτερα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἑνεκείνεται ἀμφότερα ὑπάρχοντες)"

45 Ibid., 255E4-6: "For each one is different from the others not owing to its own nature, but owing to the fact that it partakes of the Idea of Difference (ἐὰς ἐκαστὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος αἱ ἐνεκείνεται τῷ ἡμιρρήσιμῳ τῷ ὁμοιοτέρῳ ἄμφοτερος ὑπάρχοντα)."

46 I suggest that the words "not owing to its own nature (οὐ στὸν ἄμφοτερα ὑπάρχοντα)" need not imply that that a Form has a nature apart from the essence that it is.

47 See Phd. 66A2; 78D5, where the phrase is associated with ὁ ἔστι τοί; 100B6; etc. At 100D7 it is by the "presence" of the Form of Beauty or by "communion" with it that beautiful things are beautiful.

48 This seems to be the view of M.M. McCabe, Plato's Individuals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 224-37, who argues that in Sophist the individuality of a Form is constructed out of its identity and difference, the latter providing the "context" for individuation.

49 See Phd. 78D5; 80B2; 83E2; Symp. 211B1, E4.

50 Rep. 509B7-8 tells us that "the Form of the Good provides existence and essence to Forms (άλλα καὶ τὸ; εἴναι τὸν οὐσίαν ὑπὸ ἑκατέρων ὑποψειασάμενοι)". The eternal dependence of essences upon that which is "beyond essence (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας πάντως)" seems to me to be the proof text for the claim that Forms are not to be taken to be independent entities.

51 Ibid., 509B6-7: "And, so, for things knowable, you should say not only that the Good provides them with their knowability… (Καὶ τὸ; γνώσκειν αἴσθησιν τοῖν πρώτων μῷον τῷ; γνώσκειν τὸ; γνώσκειν τὸ; γνώσκειν τὸ; γνώσκειν τὸ; αἰσθητά πάντως τῶν ὁμοίων…)." Cf. 517C4.
know that which has relativized essence is to know it as relative to its ultimate explanation.\textsuperscript{52}

The relativization of essence amounts to each Form's not having an independent identity or existence. Another way of stating the same point is that relativized essence negates the \textit{substantiality} of each Form in the Aristotelian sense of that word. That is why, strictly speaking, a Form, insofar as it is an essence, does not partake; it is only partaken of.\textsuperscript{53} A Form is not an individual or a \textit{tode tivn} the Aristotelian sense. Aristotle was right to argue that a universal could not be a substance and a substance could not be a universal.\textsuperscript{54} Just as Plato did not maintain that a Form was an (Aristotelian) universal, so he did not maintain that a Form was an (Aristotelian) substance.\textsuperscript{55} Recurring to frame (4) above and the example of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, neither of these have an existence independent of Venus such that something we could say truly about it would not be said truly about Venus.

We can with (4) and its justification rooted in the relation of the Form of the Good to the other Forms explain what it means to say that a Form has parts. We read in \textit{Timaeus} that the Demiurge created the world according to a divine model:

\ldots the world is the same as, above all things, that Living Being of which all other living beings, individually and according to their kinds, are parts. For that contains and encompasses all the intelligible living beings...\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} Aristotle makes the same basic point in reference to sensible substances and their attributes at \textit{Met. Z 5}. The dependent essence of an attribute is not "capable of being clarified apart from" its subject. \textit{Cf. Z 5}, 1030b24-5. Just as no attribute is knowable apart from that of which it is an attribute, so no Form is knowable apart from that first principle of all of which it is an expression. One expression is materially identical with another expression which is its definition.

\textsuperscript{53} It is true that the term \textit{metevcein} is used frequently in reference to the relations among the Greatest Kinds. See 255B3, E5; 256A1, 7, D9, E3; 260D7. However, these relations are not among existents that have any essence apart from that of which they "partake." Consider the contrast between Helen's partaking of beauty and the Difference of which the Form of Identity partakes. In the first case, Helen has properties specifiable independently of her beauty; in the second case, the Form of Identity has no properties independently of the essence it is. The Form of Identity "partakes" \textit{both} of Identity and Difference. This does not mean that "it" has an identity in addition to the essence that it is.

\textsuperscript{54} See \textit{Met. Z 13}, 1038b35-1039a3; Z 16, 1040b25-30; M 9, 1086a32-5. See F. Gonzalez, "Plato's Dialectic of Forms," \textit{Plato's Forms}. Edited by W. Welton (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), 31-83., esp. 46-7, for a perspicuous expression of the view that Aristotle has constructed a theory of Forms according to which Forms are both universals and substances. M.M. McCabe, \textit{Plato's Individuals}, 255, believes that Plato is vulnerable to Aristotle's objection because he does in fact make Forms into substantial individuals.

\textsuperscript{55} At the beginning of \textit{Met. Z 6} (1031a15-18) Aristotle says: "we should examine whether each thing is identical with or different from its essence. This is of some use for the investigation of substance; for each thing does not seem to be other than its own substance and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing\textit{(Poteron de; taqon estin hjeron to;tvnh eibai kai; ekaston, skepton. esti gavti pro; efgou pro- thn peri;th- oujia- skeyin: ekastom te gar ouk a[l dokei eibai th- eputou' oujia-, kai; to;tvnh eibai legetai eibai hjekastou oujia.)." A Form, in contrast to a "this something," is not a thing of which would even make sense to ask whether it is identical with its \textit{oujia}. This is what Aristotle himself goes on to argue in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Tim. 30C5-8}: ouid efitintalla zwaj kaqj ekai; kata; gejov movia, touwcpautwn omoiohtaton auton eibai tiqwen. ta; gar dh; nohta; zwa apauta ekeino ej eputwperilabon efei.
Without the frame (4), the notion of a part of a Form is incoherent. Many scholars have sought to defend Plato from the charge that The Form of Living Being is not a *summum genus* with all the absurdities this supposedly implies. Cornford, for example, argues that this Form "must be conceived, not as a bare abstraction obtained by leaving out all the specific differences determining the subordinate species, but as a whole, richer in content than any of the parts it contains and embraces." Cornford, though, cannot explain how a "rich content" can be "uniform in essence" or, indeed, how an intelligible entity can have parts.

Similarly, the very idea of the method of collection and division, so prominent in the later dialogues, assumes a partitioning of Forms that scarcely seems to make sense. After all, what is it exactly to "divide" an immaterial entity? If it is divisible, is it not already "divided?" And in that case, what does it mean to say that it is "one?" Whatever the division might be supposed to accomplish, it cannot leave us with extensive parts outside of parts, as in "part of my belongings are in Los Angeles and part of them are in London." On the other hand, the "division" of number into odd and even can be understood according to (4): odd and even are *virtually* identical or materially identical. That is, odd and even are the two expression of that which is one, namely, number or integer. In general, any definition, including those per genus and differentia, can be understood in the same way, according to (4): $x = dyz$.

The truth of a material identity statement may be completely in doubt or it may be accepted for no good reason or it may be grasped as self-evident. In the latter case, it borders on a formal identity statement, as in $2 + 2 = 4$. Presumably, an omniscient mind would be the locus of formal identity where all true material identity claims converge. The philosophical passage from doubt and lack of clarity to self-evidence is what the science of dialectic is supposed by Plato to be. At the end of Book Six of *Republic*, Plato distinguishes the mathematicians who take as hypotheses their definitions and axioms. They are contrasted with true dialecticians who are able to ascend to a first unhypothetical principle and then able to grasp the array of Forms in their complexity.

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57 For example, the recourse in the literature to Venn diagrams to explain this obviously will not do. Sometimes, the absurdities adduced at *Parm.* 130E-131E if Forms have parts is cited as evidence that Forms do not have parts. It is clear enough that Forms do not have extensive parts. But partitioning of Forms in some sense is evident in the *Timaeus* passage as well as in the *Parmenides* passage cited above and in the method of collection and division.


59 See *Phdr.* 264E-266D; *Soph.* 221B-C; 253C-254B; *Sts.* 262B-D; 287C; *Phil.* 16C-19A.

60 Cf. *Phdr.* 244Bff on "the four kinds of madness."

61 See K. Sayre, *Plato's Analytic Method*, 216-31, for a good discussion of definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and for the differences between the method of definition employed in *Phaedo* and *Sophist*. Sayre operates entirely within the formal or logical mode, abstracting from questions about what makes possible defining a Form in terms of other Forms. See also A. Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 6, esp. 207-17, though Silverman does not see the need for virtuality, that is, ultimate ontological identity.

62 See *Rep.* 510Bff.
The former engage in "discursive thinking (διανοια)" while the latter have "understanding (νοησις)" or "knowledge (ἐπίστημη)." There is little doubt that this first unhypothetical principle is the Form of the Good described just one Stephanus page earlier as being "beyond ὄντα" and the explanation for the essence, existence, and knowability of Forms. Leaving aside for the moment why the superordinate Form is called "Good" and even whether Aristotle accurately represents Plato as holding that "the Form of the Good" and "the One" refer to the same thing, we can give a reasonably precise meaning to the claim that this Form accounts for the essence and knowability of the other Forms. For one thing, to know a Form would seem to entail being able to give a λόγος of it. Further, insofar as we may assume that the science of dialectic at least includes the practice of collection and division, knowing a Form will amount to grasping its "location" in the entire array of intelligible entities. Therefore, the knowability of a Form depends upon there being a self-identical entity expressed or represented in the material identity statement that is the definition. One could not know what F is unless one knows why F = df GH. And this could not be true unless there were one self-identical entity underlying the material identity statement. In similar fashion, to see the "one Form extended everywhere through many Forms lying apart" requires that there be a virtual identity of these many Forms. It is not difficult to make the conceptual connection between the two points. Since knowability and essence of Forms depend on the Good unrestrictedly, they apply to the Forms that are divided, the putative generic Forms, too. Either we must suppose that these Forms are not knowable or, if they are, then their knowability and essence rest on their being expressions of the self-identical Form of the Good. In this light, the identification of the Form of the Good as "that which is one" makes excellent sense. Virtual identity and difference in essence amounts to the relativization of the essence of the Forms, that is, to their ontological dependence, like the ontological dependence of the Morning Star and Evening Star on the planet named "Venus" or red and blue light on "white" light. Plato tells us that this ontological dependence is on the first principle of all, "that which is one."

63 For the identification of the two see 533D4-7.
64 Soph. 253D5-6. Cf. Phil. 16D1-7.
65 Aristotle explicitly identifies the One with the Good at Met. N 4, 1091b13-14, though he does not here refer specifically to Plato. Cf. EE A 8, 1218a24-8; Met. A 6, 987b18-22. The term ἐν οἷς can, of course, be used as a name or a definite description. Since the first principle is "beyond ὄντα," however, a "definite description" of it is not, strictly speaking, available. Still, "that which is one" would be the best way to refer to that which is the identifying unity beneath the multiplicity of Forms.
66 The Form of the Good is virtually all the Forms roughly in the sense in which white light is virtually all the colors of the spectrum or a working calculator contains virtually all the answers to the questions that can be legitimately asked of it. Cf. Phil. 65A1-5 where the Good is said to be "one" and a "mixture (συμμετέχει)" of "beauty," "measure," and "truth." I am not here claiming that the account of the "contents" of the Good is the same in Republic and Philebus. I am claiming only that material identity is the concept relevant to understanding the complexity of the unity or "mixture." See M. Miller, "Figure, Ratio, Form: Plato's Five Mathematical Studies," Recognition, Remembrance, and Reality. Edited by M. McPherran (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1999), 86, who speaks of the Forms as "cases of the [Form of the] Good." I take it that his formulation is equivalent to mine. G. Santas, Goodness and Justice. Plato, Aristotle, and the Modern (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell's Publishing Ltd., 2001), 186, has I think the same basic intuition when he claims that "the ideal attributes of all the other Forms are the proper attributes of the Form of the Good." Ideal attributes are those that belong to Forms qua Forms; proper
An obvious objection to this interpretation is that identity flows from essence. Therefore, diversity of essence requires diversity of identity and hence multiple existents. Indeed, if each of the "greatest Kinds" is different owing to partaking of the Form of Difference, must it not also be the case that each of them is self-identical owing to participating in the Form of Identity? There must be something to this objection, for the intelligibility of (4) rests on it. It is answered only in part by pointing out that virtual identity is not formal identity, what is expressed in (2) and (3). Plato must show that the formally self-identical A and B can be virtually identical and that it is virtual identity, not formal identity, that undergirds the diversity of essence discovered in dialectic.

Understanding formal identity is parasitic on understanding material identity, at least for all existing things. For the way we understand that something is formally identical or identical with itself is by a series of material identity claims, converging on a formal identity claim. These material identity claims often originate in claims that two things are the same and so the respect in which they are the same constitutes a material identity indicating a formal identity. Thus, for example, for cases of spatiotemporal formal identity, we say that the A here and now is (materially) identical with the A there and then. Stated otherwise, we say that the formally identical thing appears in the same way or as having the same attributes in a succession of spatiotemporal "cuts." In the latter case, we mean that formal identity is constituted out of the actual or supposed potential material identity of all the "cuts."

As for how this applies to the intelligible world, let us return for a moment to the implication of the deductions for the "greatest Kinds." The Form of Difference is different from other Forms because it partakes of the Form of Difference, not because of its own nature, that is, not because its own nature is just different from every other Form. Analogously, the Form of Identity is self-identical owing to its partaking of the Form of Identity, not because of its own nature, that is, not because its own nature is just self-identical. Presumably, what is true for a Form and its partaking of the nature that its own name names is also true for every other Form of which it partakes. Each Form has an identity, to be sure, but that identity is entirely expressed in the essence or nature of which it partakes. In other words, the determination of the formal identity of the Form is just what results from the analysis in dialectic of the essence of which it partakes.

The formal identity of the relativized essence of Forms underlies the description of Forms in the later dialogues as "ones." In Philebus, the question is raised whether such "ones (monads)" should be hypothesized at all.
First, should we hypothesize the real existence of such monads; second, how should we hypothesize the essence of each, since each is always self-identical and accepts neither generation nor destruction, but is nevertheless most assuredly the one thing it is. It is then and is found in an unlimited number of generable things. Should it in this case be hypothesized as dispersed and having become many or as a whole that has become separate from itself, being simultaneously self-identical and one though it comes to be in one and many things (which would seem to be the most impossible alternative).  

The unity at issue here is the "weak" or relative unity that is entailed by relativized essence. This is the essence or nature that is variously present in the intelligible and the sensible world. To take the immediate Philebus example, "sound (φωνή)" is or has a sort of unity, which means its nature is distinct from other natures. Similarly, kinds of sound are each one in the same way. But sound or its "species" are not in themselves one or many. To take a different example, "the whale" is a distinct nature, though it is itself neither one nor many. Therefore, neither sound nor the whale exist independently as such. Dependent existence entails "weak" unity. A genuine intelligible nature does, however, have "strong" existence in the Form of the Good and as instantiated in its images. In the Philebus example, Socrates says that

We should hypothesize a single Form with respect to everything and then search for it – for we will find it – and if we then attain it, we should look for two, if there are two, or else for three or whatever the number is; each should be dealt with in the same way until one can see of the original one not only that it is one, a plurality, and an indefinite number, but also its precise quantity.

The "one" that is a "plurality" (= many ones) and an "indefinite number" is one precisely in the above "weak" sense. The one nature that sound is, is present in its multiple species and in the indefinite number of sensible instances of it. The definition of sound – or of any other nature – is materially identical with it. The entity underlying this material identity is the first principle of all, the Form of the Good or "that which is one," which is virtually all the intelligible natures there are.

68 15B1-8: prw`ton me;n ei[tina~ de; toi`aυtata~ ei`hai monad`a~ upolambavein a]j`hqw~ ou`ga~: eit`a
pw`~ aultau`a~-, miwn ekaythn ou`san a]p`i: thn a]uthn kai; mhve` gemosi`n mhve` o]e]gron
pros de`komwvn, o]phw~ ei`hai b]e]hai o]tata` miwn tauvthn`meta; de; toi`a~ e]n toi`~ gignomevnoi~ aujkaiv;
69 I take it that this analysis complements the insightful account of M. Miller, ""Unwritten Teachings' in the Parmenides," Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995), 591-633.
70 Ibid., 16C10-D7: dei`n ou`b h]ma`~ tou`tw ou`f diakexos mhme`wvn a]pi; miwn ipe`wv peri;pantow~
e]kastote gemoswou; zhtei`n~ eu]te`sein gar epousan~ e]n` ou`b meta`l`awmen, meta; miwn duv, ei[l
w`a`υw~, megriper a]t`o; kat`e]fi`ca~ e]g` mh; o]i e]j` kai; pol`la; kai; a]peirawe]stei mowo`n i]h]a`e`i~,
a]l`a; kai` o]p]wa. 

17
Understanding the Forms in this way, we can see the point Plato is making in claiming that

that which is one is self-identical and different from itself, and,
in the same way, identical with and different from the others.  

The self-identical intelligible nature can be present in an instance of the Form, which is at the same time different from it.  This is what we saw Plato wanted to indicate at *Phd.* 74C4-5 by saying that Form and instance were the same but not identical.  The identical nature is (a) present in Form and instance (hence their sameness), but (b) the instance is different from the paradigm.  How can this be?  The first point is glossed by saying that, e.g., neither the Form of Largeness nor the largeness in us admit of smallness.  The second point is glossed by saying that an account or *logos* of the instance would necessarily be different from an account of the Form.  Thus, to give an account of Largeness would not be equivalent to giving an account of, say, Simmias' largeness.  The latter account would have to include his particular "amount" of largeness – his divided essence.  That this account is not equivalent to the account of Largeness follows immediately from the fact that it would also be an account of Simmias' smallness, whereas of course the account of Largeness is not an account of Smallness. 

Understanding Forms in this way, that is, as natures rather than as really distinct entities or substances, is also the only way I believe that enables us to take seriously talk about "interweaving" or "communing" of Forms and of the very process of dialectical investigation.  For in dialectic we do not "connect" entities; rather, we conceptualize the diverse natures belonging to the intelligible realm.  The collecting and dividing of Forms is neither the conceptualizing itself nor, absurdly, the collecting and dividing of entities, like heaps of mined gold portioned into pieces of jewelry.  It is the mental operations performed on the natures which, since their essence is relativized and relativizable, can be "worked on" in thought.  Yet as *Republic* makes clear, the dialectical operation is only available for someone who recognize the first principle, first in the

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71 *Parm.* 146A9-B1: Καὶ μὴν ταῦτα οὐ γε δεῖ εἰς οἷα αὐτὸ; ἐπιθυμῶ αἰτείρον ἐπιθυμοῦ; καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς οὖν ταῦτα τε καὶ ἐπείρας ταῦτα εἶναι, "The others" here I take it refers to instances of "that which is one."  Since each of these is one, the point made at 142B5-C2 applies generally to them.  That is, each one of "the others" partakes of essence; if it did not, it would not exist.

72 Ibid. 146C8-D1: εἶναι αὖθις, ὡς ἐπικεῖται, εἰς ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιθυμοῦ; εἶναι:εἰς ἐπιθυμοῦ τοῦ ἕπιθυμοῦ.

73 See *Phd.* 102D6-8.  Cf. 103B5.

74 Ibid. 102C10-D2 which literally says that Simmias "takes the name of small and large."  The account of Simmias' smallness and largeness is the same account because smallness and largeness are not understood by Plato as relations between entities but properties that, in this case, one entity has.

75 Cf. *Parm.* 135B5-C2 where Parmenides makes the remarkable claim that if "one will not grant that there are Forms of things (μὴ ἐρωτεῖτε ἐὰν τὸν κόσμον)," "the power of conversation (τῆς τοῦ διάλεγης καὶ δοκιμάζων) will be destroyed.  This claim makes little sense if it takes Forms to be entities rather than natures, whose existence is a condition for the intelligibility of the identities and differences constituting conceptualization.  See G. Damschen, "Grenzen des Gesprächs über Ideen. Die Formen des Wissens und die Notwendigkeit der Ideen in Platon's *Parmenides*," *Platon und Aristoteles – sub ratione veritatis*  Edited by G. Damschen, R. Enskat, and A. Vigo (Göttingen: Vandenhoec & Ruprecht, 2002), 31-75, esp. 59-64, for a good discussion of this passage and the claim that the Forms are the condition for the possibility of discourse.
sense of being the cause of existence, essence, and knowability for the Forms. In addition, we can in the above way understand the "communing" of Forms with "actions" and "bodies" as well as with one another, as Republic states. That communing is the "divisible" presence of the nature or essence in something said to partake of it, like a just action or a beautiful body. Finally, understanding that the relativization of the essence of the Form means that the Form has become just what the Form's name names allows us to give a non-arbitrary account of why the regress arguments in Parmenides do not get off the ground. Partaking of the nature of, say, largeness does not require that there be an intelligible entity that is also large. The only "entity" with which the Form is associated is the first principle. And that "entity" is only virtually large. Consequently, there are no grounds for saying that the large man and that putative entity are the same because they are both large, even though we can say that the nature which is present both in the intelligible world and in the sensible world is self-identical.

Supposing that the relations among Forms can be understood according to the unity underlying the various cases of material identity, we still need to ask about the cogency of the distinction between identity and sameness. It is important to see that here the "strong" identity of the first principle of all entails its uniqueness. It is only the "weak" identity of the Forms that guarantees the uniqueness of each of these. The Form of the Good or "that which is one" is unique in exactly the way that the nominalist claims that identity entails uniqueness. The Form of the Good could not be the same as anything else. Necessarily, it is uniquely not a composite of "that which exists" and "the essence of which it partakes." The identity that the subordinate Forms possess does guarantee their own sort of uniqueness, too. It is, however, the identity of that which is composite, that which is distinct from the essence of which it partakes. And this identity also entails that no Form could be the same as any other. If this were not so, then no Form could be uniform. The identity that a Form as nature has, though, is not strong enough to entail the impossibility that its essence should be multiply partaken of, as the nominalist claims. It is not impossible that the identical nature should be multiply present such that we can say

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76 Rep. 511C8-D2: dia; de; to; mh; ep; ajch nh ajelq tw; skopei`n ajl ejce in peri; aujta; dokou`sivoi, kai`voi noht nh o`h tw; meta; a`jch -. Most English translators miss the force of the last phrase, "although the things themselves are intelligible with a first principle." The implication is that without such a first principle, the objects of mathematical science are not intelligible. They are intelligible only with this. J. Adam, Plato's Republic Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary, and Appendices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 2nd edition, v.2, appendix XI, 86-7, argued that the puzzle in this passage is that Plato seems to imply that the objects of mathematics are intelligible (cf. 510B2, 511A3, B3) independently of the first principle. But recurring to 509B6, it is the first principle that makes all intelligibles knowable. Mathematicians do not use the first principle, that is, they do not affirm the virtual identity of their objects.

77 See Rep. 476A4-7.

78 This is the only way to exclude the self-predication of Forms non-arbitrarily. See G. Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 61-4, who thinks that Plato is committed to "broad" self-predication. It is not clear to me whether broad self-predication is different from the Form's identity being just what its name names. Fine, 230-1, takes one implication of broad self-predication to be that the Form and instance are "synonymous," although this synonymy is not sufficient to generate the third man argument. Malcolm, Plato on Self-Predication, 159-66, believes that Plato failed to distinguish the Form as paradigm from the Form as universal.

79 See ibid., 597C1-9 where an argument for the uniqueness of the Form of the Bed is provided. No such argument is necessary for the uniqueness of the Form of the Good, understood as virtually all the other Forms.
that several things are the same with respect to that nature. And this is because the nature in itself is neither one nor many; it does not have the oneness of an entity or substance and it does not have the manyness of a universal.

The uniqueness of that which is "beyond essence" entails its simplicity. For being composite entails having essence. Partaking of essence is the only way that something gets to be composite. Therefore, anything that is not beyond essence, that is, everything else, must be "composite" in the relevant sense. That is, it must be a composite of that which identifies it as this existent and the essence of which it partakes. To claim that identity precludes sameness, from a Platonic perspective, amounts to claiming that each identical thing is utterly unique in the way that only the Form of the Good can be utterly unique. Four-dimensional uniqueness – presumably, the sort of uniqueness that the nominalist wants to argue precludes sameness among non-identical things – does not get the job done or rather it gets the job done too well. For what is four-dimensionally unique cannot even be re-identified. And without the ability to re-identify, it is not even clear what it would mean to claim that such things exist. If, however, the identity is construed such that re-identification is possible, then that is because the thing has an identity distinct from the essence of which it partakes. For the only way to identify things that are unique in this way is to re-identify them on the basis of the essence of which they partake. The relativization of the essence of Forms belongs in the account of why partaking of essence does not just re-establish a unique identity for each putative participant. I mean that on the basis of the "weak" identity of Forms as natures, we do not have to suppose that frame (1) represents an impossible state of affairs. The identity of the Form as nature or essence is not "strong" enough to entail that one instance of that Form cannot be the same as another. The essence does not overwhelm the identity of the instance. Indeed, on this line of reasoning, nothing that partakes of essence has an identity that is overwhelmed by that essence. The fact that the identity and essence must be really distinct precludes this.

I have tried to show in this paper that comprehending Plato's metaphysics requires serious attention to his use of the concepts of identity, sameness, and difference. That is perhaps a not surprising claim. I have also tried to show, admittedly in a sketchy and indecently peremptory fashion, that inattention to these concepts leads to some exegetically and philosophically unsatisfactory results. To say for example, as some do, that Plato does not really take the Form of the Good seriously or that the "interweaving" of Forms is just a metaphor or that the regress arguments in Parmenides are not meant seriously and in need of a serious solution is simply to sell Plato short. To do this is not only to betray the text again and again; it amounts to making the success of anti-Platonic arguments all but inevitable.

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80 This would result from relaxing the criteria for identity such that we could say that something was self-identical if either the spatial coordinates or the temporal coordinate varied while the other remained the same.

81 I am especially grateful to Prof. Mitchell Miller for reading an earlier draft of this paper. Miller saved me from a number of errors and encouraged me to clarify numerous points. I have also been immensely stimulated by his own writings on Plato's metaphysics, more so than the citations in this paper indicate.