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## Online Appendix to “Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods”

### A. Proofs

This online appendix provides all proofs of propositions, and lemmas in our paper. Since it is a trivial case for our analysis that  $s(M) = \text{Es}(M)$  in probability 1, in this appendix we always assume  $\text{Var}(s(M)) > 0$ .

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Let  $H(\alpha) = \bar{G}(p - s(\alpha m))$  for any  $m \geq 0$ . We have

$$H'(\alpha) = g(p - s(\alpha m))s'(\alpha m)m. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

By Assumption 1, it is easy to see that  $H(\alpha)$  is nondecreasing and (weakly) convex in  $\alpha$  if  $p > v^0 + s(m)$  and  $m \leq d^0$ .

Since  $p > v^0 + s(m)$ , it follows that  $H(1) = \bar{G}(p - s(m)) < \bar{G}(v^0) \leq 1$ . Also we have  $H(0) \geq 0$ . Therefore,  $H(\alpha)$  can only have one fixed point on  $[0, 1]$  in this case.  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 2.** We prove the properties in part (i) and (ii) only for  $\alpha_F(\cdot)$ , since the properties of  $d_F(\cdot)$  are direct sequences of the properties of  $\alpha_F(\cdot)$ .

By Equation (1), we have

$$\frac{\partial \alpha_F(m)}{\partial m} = \frac{g(p - s(\alpha_F(m)m))s'(\alpha_F(m)m)\alpha_F(m)}{1 - g(p - s(\alpha_F(m)m))s'(\alpha_F(m)m)m}. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Note that  $g(p - s(\alpha_F(m)m))s'(\alpha_F(m)m)m = H'(\alpha_F(m))$  where  $H(\cdot)$  is defined by Equation (A.1). If  $p > v^0 + s(m)$  and  $m \leq d^0$ , by the convexity of  $H(\cdot)$ , we have

$$H'(\alpha_F(m)) \leq \frac{H(1) - H(\alpha_F(m))}{1 - \alpha_F(m)} < \frac{1 - \alpha_F(m)}{1 - \alpha_F(m)} = 1;$$

hence, the right-hand side of (A.2) is well defined and nonnegative. Then from (A.2) and Assumption 1, we can see that  $\alpha_F(m)$  is (weakly) increasing and (weakly) convex in  $m$  as long as  $p > v^0 + s(m)$  and  $m \leq d^0$ ; if we also have  $\bar{G}(p) > 0$  and  $s'(\cdot) > 0$ , then  $\frac{\alpha_F(m)}{m} > 0$  and strictly increasing, that is, “increasing” and “convex” properties here are in a strict sense.

For part (ii), we have  $H(1) = \bar{G}(p - s(m)) = 1$  if  $p \leq v + s(m)$ . Thus the largest fixed point of  $H(\alpha) = \alpha$ , i.e.,  $\alpha_F(m)$ , is 1. Therefore, the proof is completed.  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 3.** The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.  $\square$

Before we prove Proposition 1, we give the following lemma:

LEMMA A.1. Let  $X$  be a random variable and  $f(\cdot)$  and  $g(\cdot)$  be increasing functions. Suppose  $f(X)$ ,  $g(X)$  and  $f(X)g(X)$  all have finite expectations. Then  $\mathbb{E}[f(X)g(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}f(X) \cdot \mathbb{E}g(X)$ .

**Proof of Lemma A.1.** Define  $x_0 = \inf_x \{g(x) \geq \mathbb{E}g(X)\}$ . We have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[f(X)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X))] &= \mathbb{E}[f(X)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X > x_0] + \mathbb{E}[f(X)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X < x_0] \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E}[f(X)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X = x_0] \\ &\geq \mathbb{E}[f(x_0)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X > x_0] + \mathbb{E}[f(x_0)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X < x_0] \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E}[f(x_0)(g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)); X = x_0] \\ &= f(x_0) \cdot \mathbb{E}[g(X) - \mathbb{E}g(X)] = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus the lemma is proved.  $\square$

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Part (ii) holds because, if  $p \leq v + \mathbb{E}s(M)$ ,  $\alpha_F(m) \leq \alpha_N = 1$  for any  $m \geq 0$ , which yields  $R_N \geq R_F$ . Next we will prove part (i).

From lemma A.1, we see  $\mathbb{E}d_F(M) \geq \mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M)\mathbb{E}M$ . Consequently, to prove  $\mathbb{E}d_F(M) \geq d_N$ , it suffices to prove  $\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M) \geq \alpha_N$ .

Given  $p \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ , we have  $G(\cdot)$  is concave on  $[v^0, \infty)$ . From the definition of  $\alpha_F(M)$ , i.e., Equation (1), we have

$$\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M) = \mathbb{E}\bar{G}\left(p - s(\alpha_F(M)M)\right) \geq \bar{G}\left(p - \mathbb{E}s(\alpha_F(M)M)\right).$$

Note that when  $p > v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ , by Lemma 3,  $\alpha_N$  is the unique solution to (2). Thus it suffices to prove

$$\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M) \geq \bar{G}\left(p - \mathbb{E}s(M\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M))\right). \quad (\text{A.3})$$

In fact, if (A.3) holds, then  $\alpha_N$  must be between 0 and  $\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M)$ . To show (A.3), it suffices to show that

$$\mathbb{E}s(\alpha_F(M)M) \geq \mathbb{E}s(M\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M)). \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Now we prove (A.4). For any  $M$ , because of the convexity of  $s(\cdot)$ , we have

$$s(M\alpha_F(M)) \geq s(M\mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M)) + [\alpha_F(M) - \mathbb{E}\alpha_F(M)] \cdot M \cdot s'(M\alpha_F(M)). \quad (\text{A.5})$$

By Lemma A.1 and taking expectation of both sides of (A.5) with respect to  $M_1$ , we have (A.4). This completes the proof.  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 4.** We will only prove the properties of  $\alpha_F(\cdot)$  in part (i) and (ii), because the properties of  $d_F(\cdot)$  follow directly.

From Equation (5) we see that  $\alpha_F(p_1, p_2, m) = \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_1, p_2, m)$  if  $m \geq m_0$ . By comparing Equations (1) and (4), we have that  $\tilde{\alpha}_F(p_1, p_2, m)$ , a function of  $m$ , has the same properties as  $\alpha_F(m)$ , defined as the largest fixed point of (4). Therefore, this lemma follows from Lemma 2.  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 5.** (i) We have known that

$$\begin{aligned} H_F(x) - H_N(x) &= \delta \left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - \mathbf{E}s(\max\{x, \alpha_N(p_2)\}M) \right]^+ \\ &\quad - \delta \mathbf{E} \left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(\max\{x, \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M)\}M) \right]^+. \end{aligned}$$

For  $x \leq \alpha_N(p_2)$ ,  $G^{-1}(1-x) - p_2 + \mathbf{E}s(\max\{x, \alpha_N(p_2)\}M) \geq G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_N(p_2)) - p_2 + \mathbf{E}s(\alpha_N(p_2)M) = 0$ . Thus in this case we have  $H_F(x) - H_N(x) \leq 0$ , which yields  $\alpha_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) \leq \alpha_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$ .

We now consider the case when  $x > \alpha_N(p_2)$ . In this case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbf{E} \left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(\max\{x, \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M)\}M) \right]^+ \\ &= \mathbf{E} \left[ \left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(\max\{x, \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M)\}M) \right] \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{\tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M) \leq x\}} \right], \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - \mathbf{E}s(\max\{x, \alpha_N(p_2)\}M) \right]^+ = \mathbf{E} \left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(xM) \right].$$

Since

$$\begin{aligned} &\left[ -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(\max\{x, \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M)\}M) \right] \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{\tilde{\alpha}_F(p_2, M) \leq x\}} \\ &\geq -G^{-1}(1-x) + p_2 - s(xM), \quad \forall M, \end{aligned}$$

it follows that  $H_F(x) - H_N(x) \leq 0$ . Hence we still have  $\alpha_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) \leq \alpha_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$ .

(ii) If  $p_1 \geq p_2$ , we have  $\alpha_{1,N}(p_1, p_2) \leq \alpha_N(p_2)$ . Thus we have

$$0 \leq H_N(\alpha_{1,N}) = G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_{1,N}) - p_1 - \delta[G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_{1,N}) - p_2],$$

which yields  $G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_{1,N}) \geq p_1 \geq p_2$ . Here, we write  $\alpha_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$  as  $\alpha_{1,N}$  for short. Therefore, we conclude that  $H_F(\alpha_{1,N}) - H_N(\alpha_{1,N}) = 0$ , which yields  $\alpha_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) = \alpha_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$ .  $\square$

**Proof of Proposition 2.** (i) As alluded to in the proof of Proposition 1,  $\mathbf{E}\tilde{d}_F(p_2, M) \geq d_N(p_2)$  if  $p_2 \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$  and  $\bar{m} \leq d^0$ . Since  $d_F(p_1, p_2, M) \geq \tilde{d}_F(p_2, M)$ , we have that  $\mathbf{E}d_F(p_1, p_2, M) \geq d_N(p_2)$ .

Consider  $p_1 \geq p_2$ . In this case, we have  $d_N(p_1, p_2) = d_N(p_2) \leq \mathbf{E}d_F(p_1, p_2, M)$ . By Lemma 5, we also have  $d_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) = d_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$ . Therefore,  $R_F(p_1, p_2) \geq R_N(p_1, p_2)$ .

Then consider  $p_1 < p_2$ . We also consider  $\delta = 0$ . In this case, we have  $H_F(x) = H_N(x)$  for all  $x \in [0, 1]$ , which yields  $d_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) = d_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$ . Since we have assumed  $\text{Var}(s(M)) > 0$  at the beginning of this appendix, either of the following two results holds: (a)  $\mathbf{E}d_{2,F}(p_1, p_2, M) > d_{2,N}(p_1, p_2)$ , (b)  $d_{2,N}(p_1, p_2) = d_{2,F}(p_1, p_2, \bar{m}) = 0$ . Thus we must have either that  $R_F(p_1, p_2) > R_N(p_1, p_2)$  for  $\delta = 0$  or that  $R_F(p_1, p_2) = R_N(p_1, p_2)$  for all  $\delta$ . Therefore, there must be a threshold  $\delta_c > 0$  such that  $R_F(p_1, p_2) \geq R_N(p_1, p_2)$  when  $\delta \leq \delta_c$ .

(ii) If  $p_2 \leq \min\{p_1, \underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)\}$ , then we have  $d_{1,F}(p_1, p_2) = d_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$  by Lemma 5 and  $\mathbf{E}d_F(p_1, p_2, M) \leq d_N(p_1, p_2)$  by Lemma 4(ii). Therefore,  $R_F(p_1, p_2) \leq R_N(p_1, p_2)$ .  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 6.** First we prove  $\alpha_{2,N}^* > 0$ . Suppose  $\alpha_{2,N}^* = 0$ . Thus  $\alpha_{1,N}^* = \alpha_N^*$  must be the largest fixed point of the following equation:

$$\alpha = \bar{G}(p_{1,N}^* - \delta \mathbf{E}s(\alpha M)),$$

and hence  $R_N(p_{1,N}^*, p_{2,N}^*) = p_{1,N}^* \alpha_N^*$ . If we take  $p_{2,N} = p_{1,N}^*$  and take  $p_{1,N}$  such that  $p_{1,N} > p_{2,N}^*$  and  $\bar{G}(p_{1,N}) > 0$ , then  $R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) > R_N(p_{1,N}^*, p_{2,N}^*)$ . That is a contradiction. Hence we have  $\alpha_{2,N}^* > 0$ .

Consider  $\alpha_{2,N}(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) > 0$ . Thus  $\alpha_N$  is the largest fixed point of the following equation:

$$\alpha = \bar{G}(p_{2,N} - \mathbf{E}s(\alpha M)),$$

which implies that  $\alpha_N$  depends only on  $p_{2,N}$ . Hence,  $R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) = p_{2,N} \alpha_N(p_{2,N}) + (p_{1,N} - p_{2,N}) \alpha_{1,N}(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N})$ . Since  $R_N(p_{2,N}, p_{2,N}) > R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N})$  if  $p_{1,N} < p_{2,N}$ , it follows that  $p_{1,N}^* \geq p_{2,N}^*$ .  $\square$

**Proof of Proposition 3.** (i) From Proposition 2(i) and Lemma 6, we see that, to prove  $R_F^* \geq R_F(p_{1,N}^*, p_{2,N}^*) \geq R_N^*$ , it suffices to prove  $p_{2,N}^* \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ .

We first show  $p_{1,N}^* \geq r$ . Suppose  $p_{1,N}^* < r$ , which yields  $p_{2,N}^* < r$ . We have  $R_N(r_1, r_1) \geq r_1 \cdot \bar{G}(r_1) \mathbf{E}M \geq r \mathbf{E}M > R_N(p_{1,N}^*, p_{2,N}^*)$ . That is a contradiction. Hence,  $p_{1,N}^* \geq r$ .

Now we prove  $p_{2,N}^* \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ . Suppose  $p_{2,N}^* < v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ . Then we have that  $\alpha_{1,N}(p_{1,N}^*, r_2) \geq \alpha_{1,N}(p_{1,N}^*, p_{2,N}^*)$ , which yields  $R_{1,N}(p_{1,N}^*, r_2) \geq R_{1,N}^*$ , and that  $R_{2,N}(p_{1,N}^*, r_2) \geq r_2 \cdot \mathbf{P}\{r_2 \leq V \leq \frac{r - \delta r_2}{1 - \delta}\} \geq (v^0 + s(\bar{m})) \mathbf{E}M > R_{2,N}^*$ . That is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have  $p_{2,N}^* \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ , which completes the proof.

(ii) Now we show that, for any  $p_{1,F}$  and  $p_{2,F}$ , there always exist  $p_{1,N}$  and  $p_{2,N}$  such that  $R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) \geq R_F(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F})$ . We first consider the case in which  $p_{2,F} \leq \underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)$ . Take  $p_{2,N} = p_{2,F}$  and  $p_{1,N} = p_{1,F}$ . Thus  $d_N(p_{2,F}) = \mathbf{E}M \geq \mathbf{E}d_F(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F}, M)$ . By Lemma 5(i) we have  $R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) \geq R_F(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F})$ .

Then we consider  $p_{2,F} = r(\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M))$  where  $r > 1$ . Consider also  $p_{1,F} > \underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)$ . Since  $\mathbf{P}\{V \leq \beta \mathbf{E}M\} = 1$ , it follows that 0 is the unique fixed point of (7). Hence,  $\alpha_{1,F}(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F}) \leq \alpha_{1,N}(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F}) = 0$ . The  $F$  setting boils down to the  $N$  setting, earning 0 profit. Next, we consider  $p_{1,F} \leq \underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)$ .

If  $s(M) < \min\{p_{2,F}^* - v^0, s(d^0)\}$ , then we can see from Lemma 1 that  $\tilde{\alpha}_F(p_{2,F}^*, M)$  is the unique fixed point of (4), and furthermore we have  $\alpha_F(p_{2,F}^*, M) = 0$  because  $\mathbf{P}\{V \leq \beta \mathbf{E}M\} = 1$ . Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned} R_F(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F}) &= p_{1,F} \alpha_{1,F} \mathbf{E}M + r(\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)) \mathbf{E}[\max\{0, \tilde{\alpha}_F(p_{2,F}, M) - \alpha_{1,F}\} M] \\ &\leq p_{1,F} \alpha_{1,F} \mathbf{E}M + r(\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)) (1 - \alpha_{1,F}) \mathbf{E}[M \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{s(M) \geq \min\{p_{2,F} - v^0, s(d^0)\}\}}] \\ &\leq (\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)) \alpha_{1,F} \mathbf{E}M + (\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)) (1 - \alpha_{1,F}) \mathbf{E}M \\ &= (\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)) \mathbf{E}M \\ &= R_N(\underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M), \underline{v} + \mathbf{E}s(M)), \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality uses the fact that  $\mathbf{E}[M \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{s(M) \geq \min\{p_{2,F} - v^0, s(d^0)\}\}}] \leq \frac{\mathbf{E}M}{r}$ . Therefore, we conclude that  $R_N^* \geq R_F^*$ .  $\square$

Before proving Corollary 1, we first introduce some symbols and some lemmas (see below). Let  $v_{1,N}(p_1, p_2)$  and  $v_{2,N}(p_1, p_2)$  be the lowest valuations among consumers buying respectively in periods 1 and 2 in the  $N$  setting. If they are interior points of the support of  $V$ , then we must have

$$\begin{aligned} v_{1,N}(p_1, p_2) &= \frac{p_1 - \delta p_2}{1 - \delta} = \frac{p_1 - p_2}{1 - \delta} + p_2, \\ v_{2,N}(p_1, p_2) &= p_2 - \mathbf{E}s(\alpha_N(p_2)M) \end{aligned}$$

Under state-independent pricing, the firm's problem in the  $N$  setting is equivalent to

$$\max_{p_1, p_2} R_N(p_1, p_2) = p_1 \bar{G}(v_{1,N}) \mathbf{E}M + p_2 \left( G(v_{1,N}) - G(v_{2,N}) \right) \mathbf{E}M. \quad (\text{A.6})$$

Let  $v_{1,N}^*$  and  $v_{2,N}^*$  be values of  $v_{1,N}(\cdot)$  and  $v_{2,N}(\cdot)$  at  $p_{1,N}^*$ ,  $p_{2,N}^*$ .

**Proof of Corollary 1.** By the FOCs of (A.6), we have

$$\bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*) = (p_{1,N}^* - p_{2,N}^*) g(v_{1,N}^*) \frac{1}{1 - \delta}.$$

Since  $g(\cdot)$  is nonincreasing on  $(0, +\infty)$ , it follows that  $(v_{1,N}^* - v_{2,N}^*)g(v_{1,N}^*) \leq G(v_{1,N}^*) - G(v_{2,N}^*)$ . Since  $v_{1,N}^* - v_{2,N}^* \geq \frac{p_{1,N}^* - p_{2,N}^*}{1-\delta}$ , we have

$$\bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*) \leq G(v_{1,N}^*) - G(v_{2,N}^*),$$

which yields  $\alpha_{1,N}^* \leq \alpha_{2,N}^*$  and  $\alpha_{1,N}^* \leq 1/2$ .

To prove this corollary, it suffices to prove  $p_{2,N}^* \geq v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ . Suppose  $p_{2,N}^* < v^0 + s(\bar{m})$ . Then we must have  $\frac{R_N^*}{EM} < p_{1,N}^* \bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*) + (v^0 + s(\bar{m})) \cdot G(v_{1,N}^*)$ . Take  $p_{2,N} = r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))$  where  $r > 1$  and take  $p_{1,N}$  such that  $p_{1,N} - p_{1,N}^* = \delta(r(v^0 + s(\bar{m})) - p_{2,N}^*)$ , which implies  $v_{1,N}(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) = v_{1,N}^*$  if  $v_{2,N} \leq v_{1,N}^*$ . Next we prove  $R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) > R_N^*$  for some  $r > 1$ .

If  $v_{2,N} \leq v_{1,N}^*$ , then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) - R_N^*}{EM} &> r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))[G(v_{1,N}) - G(v_{2,N})] + p_{1,N} \bar{G}(v_{1,N}) - p_{2,N}^* G(v_{1,N}^*) - p_{1,N}^* \bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*) \\ &= r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))[G(v_{1,N}) - G(v_{2,N})] - p_{2,N}^* G(v_{1,N}^*) + (p_{1,N} - p_{1,N}^*) \bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*) \\ &\geq r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))[G(v_{1,N}) - G(v_{2,N})] - (v^0 + s(\bar{m}))G(v_{1,N}^*) \\ &= (v^0 + s(\bar{m}))[(r-1)G(v_{1,N}^*) - rG(v_{2,N})] \\ &\geq (v^0 + s(\bar{m}))\left[\frac{(r-1)}{2} - rG(v_{2,N})\right]. \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality uses the fact that  $\alpha_{1,N}^* \leq 1/2$ . Since  $v_{2,N} \leq p_{2,N} = r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} R_N(p_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) > R_N^* &\Leftrightarrow G(v_{2,N}) \leq \min\left\{\frac{(r-1)}{2r}, G(v_{1,N}^*)\right\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow G(r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))) \leq \frac{(r-1)}{2r} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \mathbb{P}\{V \geq r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))\} \geq \frac{r+1}{2r}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if  $\mathbb{P}\{V \geq r(v^0 + s(\bar{m}))\} \geq \frac{r+1}{2r}$  for some  $r > 1$ , then  $R_F^* \geq R_N^*$ .  $\square$

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Let  $p_{1,N}^*$  and  $p_{2,N}^*$  be the optimal prices in the  $N$  setting. And let  $\alpha_{1,N}^*$  and  $\alpha_{2,N}^*$  be the corresponding adoption fractions. Let  $\alpha_N^* = \alpha_{1,N}^* + \alpha_{2,N}^*$ . We have  $p_{1,N}^* \geq p_{2,N}^*$ . By the definition of  $\alpha_{2,N}(\cdot)$ , we have

$$p_{2,N}^* = G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_N^*) + \beta \alpha_N^* EM.$$

where  $G^{-1}(x) = \inf_{y \geq 0} \{y : G(y) \geq x\}$ . We will prove that there exist  $p_{1,F}$  and  $\{p_{2,F}(M)\}$  such that  $R_F(p_{1,F}, p_{2,F}) \geq R_N^*$ . Note that this proposition will hold if we prove this result.

Take  $p_{1,F} = p_{1,N}^*$  and  $p_{2,F}(M) = G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_N^*) + s(\alpha_N^* M)$ . Thus at least  $\alpha_N^*$  fraction of customers will buy the good in the  $F$  setting for any  $M > 0$ , since  $p_{2,F}(M)$  and  $\alpha_N^*$  satisfy the REE condition

(9), implying  $\tilde{\alpha}_F(p_{2,F}(M), M) \geq \alpha_N^*$  and furthermore  $\alpha_F(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}, M) \geq \alpha_N^*$  for any  $M > 0$  by Equation (10). Hence,  $d_F(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}, M) \geq d_N^*$  for any  $M > 0$ .

For any  $M$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_{1,N}^*) - p_{2,F}(M) + s \left( \max\{\alpha_{1,N}^*, \tilde{\alpha}(p_{2,F}(M), M)\} M \right) \\ &= G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_{1,N}^*) - p_{2,F}(M) + s(\alpha_N^* M) \\ &\geq G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_N^*) - p_{2,F}(M) + s(\alpha_N^* M) \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Since  $\mathbb{E}p_{2,F}(M) = p_{2,N}^*$ , we can see from Equation (11) that  $\alpha_{1,F}(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}) = \alpha_{1,N}^*$ , which yields  $d_{1,F}(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}) \geq d_{1,N}^*$ . We also have

$$\begin{aligned} R_F(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}) &= (p_{1,F} - \mathbb{E}p_{2,F}(M))d_{1,F}(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}) + \mathbb{E}[p_{2,F}(M)d_F(p_{1,F}, \mathbf{p}_{2,F}, M)] \\ &\geq (p_{1,N}^* - p_{2,N}^*)d_{1,N}^* + p_{2,N}^*d_N^* \\ &= R_N^*, \end{aligned}$$

which completes the proof.  $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 7.** As in the proof of Proposition 4, we take  $p_{2,F}(M) = G^{-1}(1 - \alpha_N^*) + s(\alpha_N^* M)$  where  $\alpha_N^* \geq \alpha_1$ . Thus we have

$$R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M) = \max_{p_2} p_2 \alpha_{2,F}(\alpha_1, p_2, M) M \geq p_{2,F}(M)(\alpha_N^* - \alpha_1)M.$$

It follows that  $\mathbb{E}R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M) \geq \mathbb{E}[p_{2,F}(M)(\alpha_N^* - \alpha_1)M] \geq p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_N^* - \alpha_1)\mathbb{E}M = R_{2,N}^*(\alpha_1)$ , where the last inequality holds by Lemma A.1.  $\square$

The proof of Proposition 5 makes use of the following lemma.

**LEMMA A.2.** *Suppose  $\sup \left\{ \frac{\tilde{G}(x)}{g(x)} : g(x) > 0 \right\}$  is finite. Then  $R_N^*$  is continuous in  $\delta \in [0, 1)$ ;  $\alpha_{1,N}^*$  and  $R_{1,N}^*$  are left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ ; furthermore,  $\alpha_{1,N}^* \rightarrow 0$  and  $R_{1,N}^* \rightarrow 0$ , as  $\delta \rightarrow 1^-$ .*

**Proof of Lemma A.2.** Let  $y_2(\alpha_{1,N}, p_{2,N}) = p_{2,N}[\alpha_N(p_{2,N}) - \alpha_{1,N}]$ . We note that the second-period problem in the  $N$  setting is equivalent to

$$\max \left\{ \max_{p_{2,N}} y_2(\alpha_{1,N}, p_{2,N}), \mathbb{E}s(M)(1 - \alpha_{1,N}) \right\}.$$

We can see that  $y_2^*$  is continuous in  $\alpha_{1,N}$ . By the submodularity of  $y_2$  with respect to  $\alpha_1$  and  $p_{2,N}$ , we have  $p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N})$  decreasing in  $\alpha_1$ . We can also have  $p_{2,N}^*$  right-contiguous in  $\alpha_{1,N}$ . Let

$$\hat{y}_2^*(\alpha_{1,N}) = p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N})\alpha_N^*(\alpha_{1,N}) = y_2^*(\alpha_{1,N}) + p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N})\alpha_{1,N}.$$

It can be seen that  $\hat{y}_2^*$  is right-continuous in  $\alpha_{1,N}$ . By the Envelope theorem, we have

$$\frac{\partial \hat{y}_2^*}{\partial \alpha_{1,N}} = \frac{\partial y_2^*(\alpha_{1,N})}{\alpha_{1,N}} + p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N}) + \frac{\partial p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N})}{\partial \alpha_{1,N}}\alpha_{1,N} = \frac{\partial p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N})}{\partial \alpha_{1,N}}\alpha_{1,N} \leq 0.$$

Hence  $\hat{y}_2^*$  is decreasing in  $\alpha_{1,N}$ .

Let  $y_1(\delta, v_{1,N}) = \frac{R_N(\delta, v_{1,N})}{EM}$ . Since  $v_{1,N} - p_{2,N} = \frac{p_{1,N} - p_{2,N}}{1-\delta}$  for  $\delta < 1$ , it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} y_1(\delta, v_{1,N}) &= [p_{1,N} - p_{2,N}^*(v_{1,N})]\bar{G}(v_{1,N}) + \hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N}) \\ &= (1-\delta)(v_{1,N} - p_{2,N}^*(v_{1,N}))\bar{G}(v_{1,N}) + \hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N}). \end{aligned}$$

We note that  $\max_v v\bar{G}(v)$  is bounded if  $\sup \left\{ \frac{\bar{G}(x)}{g(x)} : g(x) > 0 \right\}$  is finite. Thus,  $(v_{1,N}^* - p_{2,N}^*(v_{1,N}^*))\bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*)$  and  $\hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N}^*)$  must be bounded for all  $\delta < 1$ . It follows that  $(1-\delta)(v_{1,N}^* - p_{2,N}^*(v_{1,N}^*))\bar{G}(v_{1,N}^*)$  is continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . Since

$$\left| \max_v y_1(\delta_1, v) - \max_v y_1(\delta_2, v) \right| \leq \max_v \left| y_1(\delta_1, v) - y_1(\delta_2, v) \right|,$$

we can deduce that  $y_1^*(\delta) = y_1(\delta, v_{1,N}^*)$  is continuous in  $\delta \in [0, 1)$ , i.e.,  $R_N^*(\delta)$  is continuous in  $\delta \in [0, 1)$ . Hence  $\hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N}^*)$  is continuous in  $\delta \in [0, 1)$ . Since  $\hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N})$  is increasing and left-continuous in  $v_{1,N}$ , it follows that  $v_{1,N}^*$  is left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ , implying  $\alpha_{1,N}^*$  is left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . We have shown  $y_2^*(v_{1,N})$  is continuous in  $v_{1,N}$ . It follows that  $y_2^*(v_{1,N}^*)$  is left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ , i.e.,  $R_{2,N}^*(\delta)$  is left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ , which yields that  $R_{1,N}^*(\delta)$  is left-continuous in  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ .

Consider  $\delta \rightarrow 1^-$ . By the monotonicity of  $\hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N})$ , we must have  $v_{1,N}^* \rightarrow \infty$  (or the supremum of the support of  $g(\cdot)$ ), implying  $\alpha_{1,N}^* \rightarrow 0$ . We note that  $p_{2,N}^*$  is bounded for all  $\delta$  because  $\max_v v\bar{G}(v)$  is bounded. Hence  $y_1(1, v_{1,N}^*) = \hat{y}_2^*(v_{1,N}^*) = p_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N}^* + \alpha_{2,N}^*) \rightarrow p_{2,N}^*\alpha_{2,N}^*$ , therefore it follows that  $R_{1,N}^* \rightarrow 0$ .  $\square$

**Proof of Proposition 5.** It can be seen from Lemma A.2 that, for any sufficiently small  $\epsilon > 0$ , there exists  $\delta_c < 1$  such that  $\alpha_{1,N}^*(\delta) < \epsilon$  and  $R_{1,N}^*(\delta) < \epsilon$  if  $1 > \delta > \delta_c$ . For any  $\delta > \delta_c$  ( $\delta < 1$ ), take  $p_{1,F}(\delta)$  such that  $\alpha_{1,F}^*(\delta) = \alpha_{1,N}^*(\delta)$  ( $> 0$ ). In this case, the total profits in the  $F$  and  $N$  setting mainly come from the second-period profits. More precisely, we have

$$R_F(\delta, p_{1,F}(\delta)) - R_N^*(\delta) \geq -\epsilon + ER_{2,F}^*(\alpha_{1,N}^*, M) - R_{2,N}^*(\alpha_{1,N}^*)$$

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As alluded to in the proof of Lemma 7,  $R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M)$  is strictly convex in  $M$ , which yields that  $\mathbf{E}R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M) - R_{2,N}^*(\alpha_1) > 0$  for all  $\alpha_1$  as long as  $\text{Var}(M) > 0$ . Since  $\mathbf{E}R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M) - R_{2,N}^*(\alpha_1) > 0$ , it follows that there exists  $\epsilon > 0$  such that  $\epsilon < \mathbf{E}R_{2,F}^*(\alpha_1, M) - R_{2,N}^*(\alpha_1)$  for all  $0 < \alpha_1 < \epsilon$ . Therefore, there must be a  $\delta_c < 1$  such that  $R_F(\delta, p_{1,F}(\delta)) - R_N^*(\delta) \geq 0$  if  $1 > \delta > \delta_c$ .  $\square$