MARTA JIMENEZ
CURRICULUM VITAE

40 Alexander St., Suite #914
Toronto, ON
Canada - M4Y 1B5
m.jimenez@utoronto.ca
416.737.5713

Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

170 St. George St.
Toronto, ON
Canada – M5R 2M8

Education

PhD, Collaborative Programme in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy - Department of
Philosophy, University of Toronto (Toronto, ON), Sep. 2002 - March 2011 (expected)
> Dissertation: *Shame and Moral Development in Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics
> Committee: Jennifer Whiting (supervisor), Brad Inwood, Rachel Barney

D.E.A. in philosophy, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Madrid, Spain), 1998-2001
> Thesis: *From Socrates to the Academy. A Study of Plato's* Meno
> Advisor: Miguel García Baró

Licenciatura (B.A. with honors) in philosophy, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
(Madrid, Spain), 1993-1998

Areas of Research

Area of Specialization
Ancient Philosophy

Areas of Competence
Moral and Political Philosophy, Moral Psychology

Honours and Awards

George Paxton Young Memorial Prize in Philosophy, Spring 2010

SGS Doctoral Thesis Completion Grant, 2008-2009

University of Toronto Open Graduate Fellowship, 2002-2008

Visiting Fellowship at the Department of Philosophy at UCLA, Education Abroad Program
(EAP) of the UC and the UCM, 2000-2001

Universidad Complutense de Madrid Graduate Fellowship (F.P.I.), 1999-2002

Caja Madrid Humanities Doctoral Fellowship (declined), 1998-

'Erasmus' EU Visiting Undergraduate Fellowship at the Institut für Philosophie of the Freie
Universität, Berlin, Germany, 1996-1997

Conference Presentations

'Aristotle on Learning Virtue by Doing Virtuous Actions', *2010 Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association*, Concordia University (Montreal, QC), May 30-June 2, 2010; *Princeton-Rutgers Ancient Philosophy Graduate Conference*, Princeton University (Princeton, NJ), April 12-13, 2008

Commentary on Dorothea Frede (UC Berkeley): 'Puppets on Strings: Moral Psychology in Laws I and II', *Workshop on Time and Consciousness in the* Philebus *and Related Texts*, University of Toronto (Toronto, ON), April 12-13, 2008

'Stoic Moral Psychology', with Francesca Pedriali (Humboldt Universität), *Conference on Ancient Moral Psychology*, Humboldt Universität, Berlin, Germany, June 7-8, 2008

'Who Listens to Reason? Aristotle on Shame, Pleasure and Ethical Arguments', Graduate Student Workshop, *Conference on Self and Consciousness from Plato to Kant*, University of Toronto (Toronto, ON), May 16-18, 2007

Commentary on Jacob Klein (Cornell University): 'Aristotle on Responsibility and Moral Development', *6th University of Toronto Graduate Conference*: 'Freedom and Law' (Toronto, ON), May 12-14, 2005

Commentary on Matthew King (York University): "I'd Really Like to Help You Out … How Did You Get In?': Plato, Heidegger, and the Form of a Painting in a Crowded University', *4th University of Toronto Graduate Conference*: 'Pluralism' (Toronto, ON), May 2-4, 2003

Teaching Experience

See http://individual.utoronto.ca/mjimenez/teaching.html for course syllabi and other teaching material.

Lead Instructor (full responsibility for all aspects of course)

- Ancient Greek and Medieval Political Philosophy (Spring 2010)
- Human Nature (Spring 2009)

Teaching Assistant (as a tutorial leader and/or grader)

- Ancient Philosophy (Prof. J. Whiting, 2010-2011; Prof. J. Whiting & B. Inwood, 2008-2009; Prof. R. Barney, 2004-2005; Prof. Thomas Mathien, 2003-2004)
- Philosophy of Human Sexuality (Lauren Bialystok, Spring 2007)
- Introduction to Philosophy (Shelley Weinberg, Summer 2006; Prof. M. Kingwell, 2005-2006; Prof. J. Nagel, 2004-2005)
- Modern Symbolic Logic (Prof. Fred Wilson, Summer 2004)
- Freedom, Responsibility & Human Action (Prof. J. Boyle, Fall 2003)
- Moral, Social and Political Philosophy (Prof. G. Rattan, Spring 2004; Prof. Phil Clark, 2002-2003)

Other Professional Experience

Research Assistant for Jennifer Whiting, 2009-2010

Research Assistant for Brad Inwood on *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. XXXVI, Fall 2008

Research Assistant for Jennifer Whiting on 'The Lockeanism of Aristotle', Spring 2008

Research Assistant for Jennifer Whiting on '*Nicomachean Ethics 7.3* on Akratic Ignorance', Spring 2008

Reviewer for the fifth, sixth and seventh annual University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy, 2004-2006

Languages

Modern Languages
English, Spanish, German, French (reading and basic conversation skills), Italian (reading)

Classical Languages
Greek and Latin

Professional Affiliations

American Philosophical Association, member
Aristotelian Society, member
Asociación Ibérica de Filosofía Griega, member

Academic References

Jennifer Whiting (supervisor)
Chancellor Jackman Professor of Philosophy
170 St. George Street, Room 512, (416) 978-2750, jen.whiting@utoronto.ca

Brad Inwood
University Professor, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada
125 Queen's Park, Room 210, (416) 978-3178, brad.inwood@utoronto.ca

Rachel Barney
Canada Research Chair in Classical Philosophy
170 St. George St., Room 426, (416) 978-8359, rachel.barney@utoronto.ca

Sergio Tenenbaum
Associate Professor of Philosophy
170 St. George St., Room 420, (416) 978-0919, sergio.tenenbaum@utoronto.ca

Phil Clark (teaching reference)
Associate Professor of Philosophy
170 St. George St., Room 503, (905) 828-3759, philip.clark@utoronto.ca

SHAME AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*
MARTA JIMENEZ

Dissertation Abstract

Aristotle famously claims that we acquire virtue by performing virtuous actions. He also recognizes the potential puzzle this claim gives rise to: How can we perform virtuous actions unless we are *already* virtuous? After all, virtuous actions require virtuous motives – in Aristotelian terms, they are performed "for the sake of the noble" – and virtuous motives characteristically belong to virtuous people. Most commentators presume that Aristotle's solution rests upon a distinction between genuinely virtuous actions and actions that merely resemble virtuous actions: While the actions of those learning virtue are externally similar to virtuous actions, they are not genuinely virtuous because they lack virtuous motivation. But this leaves Aristotle with the problem of bridging what I call "the moral upbringing gap" – i.e. the gap between the superficially virtuous actions of learners and the genuinely virtuous dispositions that such actions are supposed to produce. This gap emerges because, as I explain in Chapter One, the weaker the link between the actions of learners and the actions performed by genuinely virtuous agents, the more difficult it is to understand how repeatedly performing superficially virtuous actions could give rise to a genuinely virtuous disposition.

In Chapters Two and Three, I seek to shed light on what is required to bridge the moral upbringing gap by examining the relationship between several kinds of apparently virtuous actions and the corresponding virtuous dispositions. I use as a model the various forms of pseudo-courage discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.8. These include the forms of pseudo-courage produced by shame, fear of punishment, experience, spirit (*thumos*) and ignorance. By examining what is lacking in each case – especially in the citizen's courage due to shame, which Aristotle says is most like genuine courage – I construct an account of what Aristotle thinks the actions of learners must be like if these actions are to lead to genuine courage. I conclude that such actions must be performed from a virtuous motive, whose presence however neither requires nor guarantees that the agent is already virtuous. Shame is thus revealed as crucial to solving our initial puzzle about moral development.

In Chapter Four I offer a criticism of the most frequently adopted explanation of the role of shame in moral upbringing, the hedonistic approach, which understands shame in terms of enjoyment of the noble and makes pleasure the guiding mechanism for virtue acquisition: Virtuous actions become desirable for the learners *because* the learners come to take pleasure in such actions. Against this view, I argue that Aristotle regards taking pleasure in virtuous actions as a consequence, and not the source, of love for noble actions.

The crucial role played by shame is further defended in Chapter Five, where I argue that Aristotle sees shame not as mere fear of external disapproval (as in the traditional view), nor as mere tendency to find pleasure in the noble (as in modern hedonistic interpretations), but as genuine love of noble things and hatred of shameful ones. Understood this way, shame provides learners with the sort of motivation that allows them to perform genuinely virtuous actions before they have acquired practical wisdom and the stable dispositions characteristic of virtuous agents. Shame thus bridges the "moral upbringing gap" by providing the kind of motivation that, when entrenched by understanding, constitutes moral virtue.

4

Marta Jimenez · 40 Alexander St., Suite #914 · Toronto, ON, Canada - M4Y 1B5 · (416) 737-5713 · m.jimenez@utoronto.ca