[by Johannes Brenz, 8 May 1530]
First, it is true that the New Testament speaks of two kingdoms on earth, namely a spiritual kingdom and a secular kingdom, etc.
Second, it is also true that each kingdom has its own distinct king, sceptre, goal, and purpose, as the memorandum says.
Third, it is also true that it is not appropriate for secular government to protect true faith by force or by force to drive out and punish false faith, etc.
But it is unacceptable that the author of the memorandum makes no distinction between true or false faith on the one hand and the works and deeds of true or false faith on the other. Indeed, he mixes the two things together and concludes that because secular government has no authority to punish false faith, it has no authority to prevent or to punish the works or external deeds of that false faith either. For this conclusion follows from his own words where he maintains that every secular government is bound in conscience to tolerate in its territory the public assembly of every sect or faith, whether true or false, and at the same time to guarantee peaceful conditions for them.
But there is a great difference between these two things, true or false faith on the one hand and public behaviour based on true or false faith on the other, and if we carefully distinguish between the two and keep them separate, it will be clear what secular government may with good conscience prevent or hinder.
First of all, faith, whether true or false, is located in the heart. And since secular government is neither master nor lord of the human heart or conscience, it is in no way appropriate for government to undertake to punish or forcibly to prevent unbelief in the heart or conscience, as is known from the works of all the jurists.
But then this same faith produces an external confession, which is done with the mouth. And this confession, as long as it remains personal and merely reveals and displays the heart and mind of a solitary individual, and as long as it is not used to teach others or cause them to band together, is not subject to the authority of secular government. On the contrary, like faith in the heart, personal confession with the mouth should also be free and secure from governmental authority. And both things are in fact matters of faith, which should not be subject to any worldly power. For even though confession with the mouth is an external, public act, it is nevertheless so integrated with the faith of the heart that both are counted as the same thing, and when one says that faith should be free, everyone understands this to include the confession of that same faith.
But when it does not remain a matter of faith in the heart and confession with the mouth but rather goes to the point that people band together, whether in public or in private, and establish and begin a new teaching office, then it begins to be appropriate for secular government to intervene in such actions, and, if the assembly and teaching office appear to be useful and peaceful, to promote them, or, if there be good grounds for judging them to be damaging and unpeaceful, to check them. [. . .]
Second, there is proof of this in the New Testament, namely in St. Paul, 1 Tim. 2[:1-2]: “I exhort,” says Paul, “that first of all intercessions be made for kings and all governments, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life.” Observe that it is incumbent on government to maintain a quiet and peaceable life among Christians. Now there is nothing that makes Christians more agitated and disquieted than the emergence among them of false preachers and separate sects. We are told that if two people were to quarrel and wrangle with one another over two cents, the government should intervene but that if, on the other hand, they were to quarrel with one another publicly from the pulpit over doctrinal matters and were not to keep it a matter of personal disagreement but were rather to awaken disquiet and confusion in the congregation, that the government should not intervene and restore peace by convenient, untyrannical means. It is true that the government cannot step in as a judge of doctrines, but it should step in as the judge of disorder and disunity, because it pertains to its office to maintain a quiet and peaceable life among its subjects.
Moreover, this is proved by the words of the author of the memorandum himself, for he writes as follows: “The secular government has been commanded to punish public crimes that it sees manifest in words and deeds” etc. But is it not a public crime if ten or twenty citizens in a town (where perhaps one or two thousand live) are peaceful members of the church and are content with the preacher that has been properly appointed by their government but then, over a period of four or six weeks, separate themselves and try to establish their own assembly and even, contrary to the order established by their government, to inaugurate a new preaching office? If they do not like the preacher who has been properly appointed by the government, they can still believe what they wish or move away. But to go beyond their personally chosen faith and to establish a new assembly and preaching office in a community that is not theirs to govern and in which they have no public authority, that is a public crime. And when the government intervenes, one cannot accuse it of attempting to control faith. Let everyone believe and confess for himself whatever he wishes, that is certainly no concern of the secular magistrate; but it does concern the magistrate when someone establishes a new sect or a new preaching office without its permission.
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