© Jean Calvin, Commentary of Jeremiah, 5 [Lamentations], pp. 428-30; p. 192; Commentary on Romans, pp. 202-3; p. 207; Commentary on Acts, 1, p. 66; Institutes, III, xxi, 1; III, xxi, 5; II, xxxii, 7.


01b.40 Calvin: providence and predestination ©


When we raise our eyes to the secret providence of God, who shapes and directs the counsels of men according to his own will, it is certain that how ever much men may change in their purposes, yet God never changes.

Let us then hold this doctrine, that nothing is done except by God's command and ordination, and, with the Holy Spirit, regard with abhorrence those profane men who imagine that God sits idly (as it were) in his watch-water and takes no notice of what is done in the world, and that human affairs change at random, and that men turn and change independently of any higher power. Nothing is more diabolical than this delirious impiety; for, as I have said, it extinguishes all the acts and duties of religion. For there will be no faith, no prayer, no patience, in short, no religion, except we believe and know that God exercises such a care over the world, of which he is the creator, that nothing happens except through his certain and unchangeable decree.

Now they who object and say that God is thus made the author of evils, may easily be refuted; for nothing is more preposterous than to measure the incomprehensible judgment of God by our contracted minds . . . .

Let us then learn not to subject God to our judgment, but adore his judgments, though they pass all our understanding; and since the cause of them is hidden from us, our highest wisdom is modesty and sobriety.

Thus we see that God is not the author of evils, though nothing happens except by his nod and through his will - for his design is far removed from that of wicked men.

* * * * * * *

God intimates that men would in vain clamour against his judgments, for he would nevertheless perform what he has decreed. He does not, of course, claim for himself that absolute power about which the sophists prattle, (separating that power from justice); but God intimates that the causes are not always manifest to men when he executes his judgments. For it is not without reason that the Scripture testifies that God's judgments are a deep abyss; but by such an expression it is not mean that there is anything in God's judgments which is confused or in disorder. What then? Simply that God works in an extraordinary way and that therefore his judgments are sometimes hidden from men.

* * * * * * *

Men stumble at many small difficulties, particularly when they hear what Scripture teaches concerning predestination.

The predestination of God is truly a labyrinth from which the mind of man is wholly incapable of extricating itself. But the curiosity of man is so insistent that the more dangerous it is to inquire into a subject, the more boldly he rushes to do so. Thus, when predestination is being discussed (and because mankind cannot keep himself within proper limits), he immediately plunges into the depths of the ocean by his impetuosity. What remedy will there be for the godly? Must they avoid every thought of predestination? Not at all.

* * * * * * *

It has seemed good to God to enlighten some in order that they may be saved, and blind others in order that they may be destroyed, so that we may be satisfied in our minds with the difference which is evident between the elect and the reprobate, and not inquire for any cause higher than His will.

* * * * * * *

Peter would seem to suggest here that the wicked obeyed God, from which one of two absurdities would follow; either that God is the author of evil, or that men do not sin whatever evil they commit. Concerning the second, I would reply that the wicked are very far from obeying God, in whatever way they execute what God in his own counsels has determined. For obedience springs from a voluntary affection, and we know that something far different is true of the wicked. Again, no one obeys God except the man who knows His will. Obedience therefore depends upon the knowledge of the will of God. Furthermore God has revealed His will to us in the Law. Therefore only those men obey God who do what is agreeable to the Law of God, who, again, submit themselves willingly to His government. We see nothing of this kind in any of the wicked whom, in their ignorance, God drives to and fro. No one then would say that they are to be excused for the reason that they obey God, for the double reason that we are to seek the will of God in His Law and that they desire as far as they can to resist God. As for the other point, I deny that God is the author of evil because this expression carries certain implications. For a wicked deed is judged according to the end at which it is aimed. When men commit theft or murder, they sin in being thieves or murderers; in theft and murder there is a criminal intention. But God who uses their wickedness stands on a different. His object is entirely different, for He wishes to chastise the one and exercise the patience of the other; but in this He never declines from His own nature; that is, from perfect righteousness. So then, when Christ was delivered by the hand of wicked men and was crucified to came to pass by the appointment and ordinance of God. Treachery, however, which is wicked in itself and murder in which such wickedness is found must not be thought to be the work of God.

* * * * * * *

We shall never be clearly persuaded, as we ought to be, that our salvation flows from the fountain of God's free mercy until we come to know his eternal election, which illustrates God's grace by this contrast: that he does not indiscriminately adopt all into the hope of salvation, but give to some what he denies to others.

* * * * * * *

No one dares simply deny predestination, by which God adopts some to hope of life, and sentences others to eternal death. But our opponents, especially those who make foreknowledge its cause, envelop it in numerous petty objections . . . When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things always were, and perpetually remain, under his eyes, so that to his knowledge there is nothing future or past, but all things are present. And they are present in such a way that he not only conceives them through ideas . . . but he truly looks upon them and discerns them as things placed before him. And this foreknowledge is extended throughout the universe to every creature. We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man. For we are not all created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others.

* * * * * * *

The decree [of eternal predestination] is, I admit, a fearful one; and yet it is impossible to deny that God foreknew what the end of man was to be before he created him, because he had so ordained by his decree. If anyone inveighs at this point against the foreknowledge of God, he does so rashly and thoughtlessly. Why indeed should the heavenly judge be blamed because he was not ignorant of what was to happen? If there is any just or plausible complaint it applies to predestination. It ought not indeed to seem ridiculous for me to say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and in him the ruin of his posterity, but also brought it about in accordance with his own will. For as it belongs to his wisdom to know beforehand everything that is to happen, so it belongs to his power to rule and direct everything by his hand.


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