Marcin Pęski

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. PERSONAL

Marcin Pęski Home address: University address:

221 Major St. Department of Economics

Toronto, ON M5S 2L4, Max Gluskin House,

647-835-9125, University of Toronto,

150 St. George St.,

Toronto, ON M5S 3G7,

416-978-1970

2. DEGREES

Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL June 2005

M.A. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 2001

M.A. Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland 2000

B.A. Mathematics, Warsaw University, Poland 2000

3. EMPLOYMENT

HEC Paris, Visiting Professor 2018-2019

University of Toronto, Associate Professor (with tenure) 2014-present

University of Toronto, Associate Professor (without tenure) 2011-2014

University of Texas, Austin, Assistant Professor 2008-2011

Princeton University, Visiting Fellow 2007-2008

University of Chicago, Assistant Professor 2005-2008

5. PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Theoretical Economics, Associate Editor

2015-present

Dynamic Games and Applications, Associate Editor

2019-present

Referee activity: American Economic Journals: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Econometric Theory, Econometric Society Monograph, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Political Economy, National Science Foundation, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research , Review of Economic Studies, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, Theoretical Economics

B. ACADEMIC HISTORY

A. RESEARCH ENDEAVORS

Game Theory, Repeated Games, Statistical Decision Theory, Matching

B. RESEARCH AWARDS

SSHRC (Insight Grant), 75,368, 2012-2016

Harrington Fellowship (one-year salary), 2008

National Science Foundation, \$147,608 2007-2010

C. SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY

7. Refereed publications

- 1. A Tractable model of Many-to-Many Matching, conditionally accepted at American Economic Journal: Micro, 2020,
- 2. *Value of persistent information, with Juuso Toikka, Econometrica, (2017) ,vol.85, issue 6, p. 1921-1948
- 3. Large roommate problem with non-transferrable random utility, Journal of Economic Theory, (2017) vol. 168, issue C, 432-471
- 4. A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes, with Thomas Wiseman, *Theoretical Economics*, (2015), vol. 10, 131-173,
- 5. *Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Discounting, Theoretical Economics, (2014), vol. 9, 651-694,

- 6. Spontaneous Discrimination, with Balazs Szentes, American Economic Review; (2013) 103(6), 2412-36
- 7. Anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, Theoretical Economics; (2012) 7, 25–55
- 8. *Critical Types, joint with Jeffrey Ely, Review of Economic Studies; (2011) 78 (3): 907-937
- 9. Prior Symmetry, Categorization and Similarity-Based Reasoning, Journal of Economic Theory; (2011) 146, 111–140
- 10. *The principal-agent approach to testing experts,* joint with Wojciech Olszewski, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,* (2011) 3(2), 89-113,
- 11. *Generalized risk dominance and asymmetric dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory; 2010, 145 (1), 216–248
- 12. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side, Theoretical Economics; 2008, 3 (1), 29–84
- 13. Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games, Games and Economic Behavior; 2008; 62 (2), 732–735
- 14. *Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability, joint with Jeffrey Ely, Theoretical Economics; 2006 1 (1), 19–65
- 15. Generalization of Result on "Regressions, Short and Long, joint with Francesca Molinari, Econometric Theory; 2006, 22(1), 159-163

9. Manuscripts/publication, et.c in preparation and submitted but not yet accepted

- 1. Value-based distance between information structures, joint with Fabien Gensbittel and Jerome Renault, R&R at Econometrica, 2020,
- 2. Local stability of stationary equilibria, joint with Balazs Szentes, April 2013
- 3. A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes, joint with Thomas Wiseman, May 2012
- 4. Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity (GEB R&R).

I am a full co-author of all joint work listed under headings 7 and 9 above.

10. Papers presented at meetings and symposia

- 2004: Stony Brook Game Theory Festival (Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability),
- 2006: North American Summer Meeting The Econometric Society (Prior Symmetry, Categorization and Similarity-Based Reasoning)

- 2007 WashU Conference on Economic Theory and Experimental Economics (*Learning Through Theories*),
- 2008 World Congress of Game Theory (Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity),
- 2011: Stony Brook Game Theory Festival (Asynchronous repeated games with rich private monitoring and finite past),
- 2012 World Congress of Game Theory (Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Discounting), Cowles Theory Conference (Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Discounting)
- 2013 Workshop on Stochastic Games in Bonn (Local stability of dynamic equilibria),
- 2019 CETC, Workshop on Dynamioc Games and Information in Paris, SITE,

11. Invited lectures

- 2005: U, U Wisconsin, University of Pennsylvania, Rochester, U Toronto
- 2006: Olin BS, Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, University of Western Ontario, Harvard-MIT, U. of Minnesota
- 2007: UCL, U Texas at Austin, Yale, Penn State, Caltech, UCLA, UC Davis, Stanford GSB, LSE.
- 2008: Northwestern, Washington University, Simon Fraser, Cornell
- 2009: OSU, Rice, Boston University
- 2010: U Toronto, U Chicago, UC San Diego, U Pittsburg, U Montreal
- 2011: U Toronto, Harvard-MIT, U Wisconsin, U Texas
- 2012: Shanghai Micro Workshop, Yale (Cowles)
- 2013: Paris Game Theory Seminar, HEC Paris, Workshop on Stochastic Games in Bonn, Northwestern University
- 2014: Western Ontario, Stony Brook Game Theory Festival,
- 2015: U Michigan, Penn State, Workshop on Stochastic Games in Singapore,
- 2016: Columbia U, Duke,
- 2017: UT Austin, Minnesota, Rochester, Pittsburgh
- 2018: U of Montreal, Queens
- 2019: WashU, UCL

D. LIST OF COURSES

12.

A. Undergraduate courses taught

• 2018-now, ECO421, Special topics in Theory: Economics of Information

• 2011-now, ECO326 Advanced Economic Theory, University of Toronto.

For the most part I adhered to the previous design of this course, with some changes in content,

• 2010, ECO420K Intermediate Microeconomics, University of Texas at Austin

For the most part I adhered to the previous design of this course, with some changes in content,

• 2009, ECO350K Advanced Economic Theory, University of Texas at Austin

I created a new course.

B. Graduate courses taught

• 2019-now, ECO2020 Microeconomics I (2nd segment), University of Toronto.

2012-2018, ECO2020 Microeconomics I (1st segment), University of Toronto.

• 2011, ECO2101, Topic in Economic Theory, University of Toronto,

• 2010, ECO 387-27 Game Theory, University of Texas at Austin

• 2011, ECO 387L.3 Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory segment, University of Texas at Austin

C. Theses supervised

Doctoral student

Yiyang (Young) Wu, co-advisor, graduated in 2018

Thesis: Three essays on Mechanism Design

Supervised from 2013 to graduation

Qianfeng Tang (primary supervisor), graduated in 2011,

Thesis: Essays on Economic Theory,

Supervised from 2008 to graduation