This document is mainly meant to help students of PHL241 ("Freedom And Determinism"), a course offered at the University of Toronto Mississauga. This document was last edited in December 2017.
Note: The readings for the course change every semester. Many of the notes in this document might not be useful.
Note: Read the articles/books yourself. Do not rely solely on this document.
When a person is able choose what (s)he does, we say that person has "free will".
Determinism is the idea that the way things are along with the laws of nature fixes the way things will be in the future. In other words, everything has a cause, and that all events could be predicted (or "determined").
Incompatibilism is the idea that if determinism is true, then a person doesn't actually have free will. In other words, determinism and free will are "incompatible".
Compatibilism is the opposite of incompatibilism and states that people can have free will even if determinism is true.
Soft determinism is the combination of determinism and compatibilism. So someone that believes that determinism is true, but also believes we can hold individuals responsible is a soft determinist.
Hard determinism is the combination of determinism and incompatibilism. So someone that believes that determinism is true, and also believes determinism and responsibility cannot coexist is a hard determinist.
Libertarianism is the following idea: we do have free will so determinism is false.
In this paper, Chisholm argues that determinism is false. More specifically, he argues for libertarianism. He claims that there are human actions that science cannot predict: "there can be no science of a man".
Transeunt causation (or event-causation) occurs when events are caused by inanimate natural objects.
Immanent causation (or agent-causation) occurs when events are caused by humans ("agents").
Note: The paper supports incompatibilism (that if determinism is true, responsibility makes no sense).
In this paper, Strawson argues for compatibilism. He refers to compatibilists as "optimists", and incompatibilists as "pessimists".
Pessimists claim determinism and responsibility cannot coexist. Optimists argue that moral responsibility should exist even if determinism is true, because holding people responsible has social benefits.
Strawson states that social benefits are not a valid reason, and that optimists have to admit this (make a "vital concession"). He states that there is a "lacuna" (a gap) in their argument, and that optimists need to provide a better reason for holding people responsible. Strawson attempts to provide a valid reason, and he states that pessimists must make a "formal withdrawal" by giving up the idea that determinism and responsibility cannot coexist.
Strawson identifies two kinds of attitudes humans can have: reactive attitudes; and objective attitudes. Reactive attitudes are attitudes towards humans that have free will.
| Reactive Attitudes | Objective Attitudes |
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The paper is an argument for incompatibilism, and is divided into 4 parts:
Note: The paper makes no claims about whether or not determinism is true.
In part III, van Inwagen talks about a judge and a criminal on trial. If the judge raises his right hand, it means the judge thinks the criminal should be killed. A very simple summary of van Inwagen's argument: if the judge "can" render the statement "The judge raised his right hand" true, then he could have rendered the laws of nature false (but that's not possible); hence, determinism is incompatible with free will.
Two of Frankfurt's papers are explored:
If a person is morally responsible, (s)he could have done otherwise.
This paper argues that the principle of alternate possibilities is false. Towards the end of the paper, Frankfurt provides a replacement for the principle: if a person does X only because (s)he could not have done otherwise, (s)he is not morally responsible. To set up his argument, Frankfurt presents four scenarios:
Jones1 decides to do X. Someone threatens Jones1 to do X. But Jones1 doesn't care about the threat at all. Jones1 acts on his initial decision to do X. Frankfurt states Jones1 is morally responsible.
Jones2 decides to do X. Someone threatens Jones2 to do X. Jones2 is "stampeded" to do X by the threat. In other words, Jones2 is effected by the threat, and the threat becomes the reason he does X. Frankfurt states Jones2 is not morally responsible.
Jones3 decides to do X. Someone threatens Jones3 to do X. Jones3 is effected by the threat. In other words, if Jones3's intial decision was not to do X, the threat would have forced him the do X. However, Jones3 ends up doing X only because of his intial decision (not because of the threat). Frankfurt states Jones3 is morally responsible.
In Jones4's scenario, a new character named Black is introduced. Black wants Jones4 to do X, and is able to manipulate Jones4 to do X. However, Black never has to take any action because Jones4 does X.
Frankfurt argues that Jones4's scenario disproves the principle of alternate possibilities.
In this paper, Frankfurt defines a person with free will as someone that can have second-order volitions.
A first-order desire is a desire to do an action. A second-order desire is a desire to have or not have other desires. A second-order volition is a type of second-order desire: desires to have other desires be effective. To explain what Frankfurt means by "effective", he talks about a physician.
A physician wants to better understand her patients' drug addictions; so, the physician desires the desire for drugs. The physician only wants to know what the desire for drugs feels like, and doesn't want to actually end up taking drugs. This is a second-order desire, but not a second-order volition, because the physician doesn't want the desire for drugs to be effective.
A wanton is anything that may have first-order desires and second-order desires, but not second-order volitions. Frankfurt states that non-human animals, and very young children are examples of wantons.
In this paper, Susan R. Wolf explains her thoughts on what is necessary to be responsible. Wolf claims that a person needs to be morally sane to be held morally responsible. Being morally sane means that your beliefs about what's right/wrong are correct.
First, the paper summarizes the view that Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Charles Taylor share: the deep-self view. The deep-self view states: if your actions are in agreement with your deepest beliefs and values (e.g., second-order volitions), then you are responsible.
In order to demonstrate that the deep-self view doesn't always work, Wolf discusses JoJo, the son of an evil dictator (Jo the First). JoJo has been raised up by his father to think torturing people is morally acceptable. Note that JoJo can act in accordance with his deep self. For instance, JoJo can have second-order volitions that are effective (but according to us, immoral). However, most of us wouldn't hold JoJo responsible.
Because of this flaw in the deep-self view, Wolf proposes the sane deep-self view. The sane-deep self suggests that you must be morally sane/correct to be held responsible.
In this paper, Pereboom argues for hard determinism. The paper claims that hard determinism isn't as bad as some people think. "Al Dente" is a term used to describe pasta that is a bit hard. By "Determinism Al Dente", Pereboom's implying that his "hard" deterministic view isn't radical or extreme (his view is only a bit hard).
Pereboom talks about 4 made-up scenarios/cases in which Mr. Green is a rational egoist and kills Ms. Peacock. An egoist is someone that only care about themselves.
In case 1, Mr. Green is created and controlled by neuroscientists through radio-like technology. The neuroscientists manipulate Mr. Green to think and behave like a rational egoist.
In case 2, Mr. Green is created by neuroscientists and programmed from the start to be a rational egoist.
In case 3, Mr. Green is trained by his home and community to be a rational egoist.
In case 4, determinism is true, and Mr. Green is an ordinary human raised in normal circumstances. But he is still a rational egoist.
I took this course in 2017 (fall semester) during my 4th year as an undergrad. I specialized in Computer Science. I was motivated to take PHL241 by striking realisations and questions about free will that had dawned on me during the prior years.
Philip Clark was my professor. On the first day of lecture, he said something along the lines of, "you have as much of a say in this stuff as I do." His lectures contained a lot of class-discussion (which I loved). He was extremely empathetic and approachable, and was definitely one of the best professors I had in undergrad.
If you were born to Mennonite parents in rural Cananda, you'd probably be a Mennonite. If you were born to strict Islamic parents, somewhere in Saudi Arabia, you'd most likely possess Islamic views. So can you really blame someone for having opinions that conflict with yours?
Your beliefs and desires are a product of your environment and the hardwirings of your brain. By environment, I mean influences such as your parents, your teachers, your peers, and your local news source. By "hardwirings", I means restrictions such as cognitive dissonance and psychological biases. You certainly do not get to choose the initial state of your brain, or your parents. Every "choice" you make is influenced by factors you had no control over. This includes choices as trivial as choosing an apple over chocolate. You might choose the apple because other people have convinced you that apples are healthy and that your health is important. To put it briefly, you are a product of nature and nurture which are out of your control. Thus, it makes no sense to say we have "free will".
But I don't think the disappearance of "free will" is a big issue. I think, of course, responses such as blame disappear. It makes no sense to blame. However, I think we should still make use of the social utility of things such as rewarding and praising people for altruism and restricting people that cause harm to others. For instance, we may not blame or condemn cyber-criminals, but we have good reason to put them through therapy and/or restrict their computer usage. With this respect, you could say my view is similar to that of Derk Pereboom.
Note: My views are open to change.