

## SCOTUS'S REJECTION OF ANSELM

### THE TWO-WILLS THEORY\*

**S**COTUS was a close and careful reader of Anselm, for the best of reasons: he thought Anselm was right on many issues, or at least close enough to being right that his views only needed a bit of “filling in” (*coloratio*).<sup>1</sup> Exactly what this amounted to varied. For instance, Scotus adopts Anselm’s notion of a ‘(pure) perfection’ and elevates it to a fundamental principle of his metaphysics. Again, he distills Anselm’s Ontological Argument into something like its original *Monologion* components, and then treats each component part of the argument with a rigor and attention to detail far beyond anything Anselm suggested. In the case of Anselm’s so-called ‘two-wills’ theory, however, Scotus’s revisions are so extensive that they amount to a rejection of Anselm’s account, even though Scotus retains some of Anselm’s terminology.

I’ll begin by looking at Anselm’s initial presentation of the two-wills theory in his *De casu diaboli* (§1), and his later refinements of that account in his *De concordia* (§2). I’ll then look at Scotus’s deployment, revision, and rejection of Anselm’s theory in his three discussions of angelic sin: *Lect.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§3), *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§4), and *Rep.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 (§5). This will be followed by a brief look at whether Scotus’s theory of the self-regulating will is an adequate replacement for Anselm’s account (§6).

#### 1. ANSELM ON MORAL AGENCY

In his *De casu diaboli*, Anselm puts forward (*a*) necessary conditions for being a moral agent, and (*b*) requisite circumstances for moral agency to be actually exercised. He is interested in the case of Lucifer’s primal sin and subsequent fall. Roughly, Anselm holds that a being is a moral agent only if

\* All translations are mine. Latin texts are cited from their respective editions, with the punctuation as given (not always respected in the translations).

<sup>1</sup> See *De primo princ.* 4.65 [ed. Wolter, 123] for this expression. While the history of Anselm’s influence in the High Middle Ages has yet to be studied, it seems clear that Grosseteste’s regard for Anselm had an influence on the Franciscan *studium generale* in Oxford, to which Grosseteste bequeathed his books, including the works of Anselm: see Hunt [1955] 125.

he is capable of being motivated by moral concerns as well as by non-moral concerns; such a being exercises moral agency in a given situation only if he is neither ignorant (which calls for correction) nor irrational (which calls for treatment). Lucifer is a moral agent and, Anselm argues, is neither ignorant nor irrational, and so was justly punished by God for his prideful sin. For our purposes we'll put *(b)* aside to focus on *(a)*.

Anselm begins his analysis of moral agency in *De casu diaboli* 4 by talking about Lucifer's sin as a matter of what Lucifer (positively) wills, initially glossed as a matter of "preserving justice" by "willing what one ought to will" or alternatively "abandoning justice" by "willing what one ought not to will" [ed. Schmitt 1, 241.1-2]. Anselm then rapidly moves to identifying two distinct kinds of willing, associated with distinct objects:<sup>2</sup>

TEACHER. Yet [Lucifer] was able to will nothing but either justice or the advantageous. For happiness consists in advantageous things, which every rational nature wills.

STUDENT. We can recognize this in ourselves, for we will nothing except what we think is either just or advantageous.

There are two styles of willing, as we can introspectively observe; one is directed at justice [*iustitia* or *rectitudo*], the other at advantage [*commodum*].

These observations, true as they may be, are not enough for Anselm. He decides to "start a bit further back"<sup>3</sup> to examine the nature of moral agency. He does so by proposing a question to be answered within a thought-experiment:<sup>4</sup>

TEACHER. Then let us suppose that *(a)* God is making an angel that He wills to make happy; *(b)* He is not making it all at once but instead part by part; and *(c)* the angel has been made to the point that it is now apt to have a will [*uoluntas*] but does not yet will anything. . . do you think, then, that the angel could will anything on its own?

In working out his answer, Anselm argues that such an angel could *not* boot-

<sup>2</sup> Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 4 [ed. Schmitt 1, 241.13-16]: MAGISTER. Nihil autem uelle poterat nisi iustitiam aut commodum. Ex commodis enim constat beatitudo, quam uult omnis rationalis natura. DISCIPULUS. In nobis hoc possumus cognoscere, qui nihil uolumus nisi quod iustum aut commodum putamus.

<sup>3</sup> Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 12 [ed. Schmitt 1, 252.1-2]: longius aliquantulum nos exordiri oportet.

<sup>4</sup> Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 12 [ed. Schmitt 1, 252.8-12]: MAGISTER. Ponamus ergo deum nunc facere angelum quem uelit facere beatum, et non simul totum sed per partes, et hactenus iam esse factum, ut iam sit aptus ad habendum uoluntatem sed nondum uelit aliquid. . . An ergo putas quod ipse angelus per se possit uelle aliquid?

strap itself into having a will. That is, a being lacking will, even if “apt to have a will,” cannot on its own acquire a will, a *uoluntas*. At best a being without will is inert or inactive, never moved to act and hence not really an ‘agent’ at all. Now clearly Anselm does not mean that the angel lacks but could acquire a given psychological faculty, namely the will. His usage of *uoluntas*, here and elsewhere, is like that of his younger contemporary Peter Abelard, a usage for which there is precedent in Augustine: an agent may have several *uoluntates* simultaneously, some occurrent and others not, which move the agent to action, or at least explain the agent’s action should the agent be so moved.<sup>5</sup> Such *uoluntates* may be conscious or unconscious, occurrent or dispositional, settled policies or momentary whims. The closest equivalent to Anselm’s *uoluntas* in our modern conceptual framework, I think, is *motive* (or perhaps *motivation*). Anselm’s substantive claim, then, is that a being that lacked any motive to do anything would *eo ipso* never come to have a motive to do anything – precisely on the grounds that to do so would require a motive to acquire a motive, ruled out by the initial assumption that such a being has no motives at all. Therefore, such a being would never become an agent.

Anselm draws the conclusion that an agent needs to have (or be given) a motive, a *uoluntas*, in order to do anything. Fortunately, most creatures are equipped with such a motive, namely the motive to seek their happiness:<sup>6</sup>

I am speaking right now about the happiness. . . that everyone wills, even those who are unjust. For everyone wills his own well-being. . . which, it seems to me, can be called ‘advantage’, and the evil opposed to it ‘disadvantage’. . . Not only does every rational nature will its own advantage, but so does anything that can sense it, and avoids the disadvantageous.

Each creature that by its nature is capable of sensing its own advantage has a motive to seek it (presumably by divine design), and so acts as an agent in pursuit of its own happiness. Brute animals are therefore agents of their own happiness.

There is more to being a moral agent than merely being an agent. Being motivated solely for the advantageous, Anselm holds, makes one at best

<sup>5</sup> Hence in particular an Anselmian/Abelardian/Augustinian *uoluntas* need not be an occurrent volition. Note that the standard later description, *affectiones uoluntatis*, does not appear in the *De casu diaboli* at all: see §2.

<sup>6</sup> Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 12 [ed. Schmitt 1, 255,2–11]: Dico autem nunc beatitudinem. . . quam uolunt omnes, etiam iniusti. Omnes quippe uolunt bene sibi esse. . . quod mihi uidetur posse dici commodum, et huic malum opponitur incommodum. . . Commodum uero non solum omnis rationalis natura sed etiam omne quod sentire potest uult, et uitat incommodum.

merely an agent, not a moral agent. In *De casu diaboli* 13 Anselm argues for four theses:

- [M<sub>1</sub>] An agent that has only the motive-for- $\varphi$  cannot, of its own accord come to have a different kind of motive.
- [M<sub>2</sub>] An agent that has only the motive-for- $\varphi$  has no motive to not- $\varphi$  or not be motivated to  $\varphi$ .
- [M<sub>3</sub>] An agent that has only the motive-for- $\varphi$  must prefer more  $\varphi$  to less  $\varphi$ .
- [M<sub>4</sub>] An agent that has only the motive-for- $\varphi$  is not, strictly speaking, a moral agent.

An agent with a single type of motive has no reason to ever act contrary to that motive, Anselm points out, and so is fully responsive only to that motivation. Squirrels, for instance, desire nuts as a constitutive part of their well-being. There is no reason for a squirrel to develop any sort of non-nutty motive that could ground a non-nutty action [M<sub>1</sub>], nor any reason for a squirrel to refrain from pursuing nuts [M<sub>2</sub>]. Indeed, the natural desire for nuts is intrinsically maximizing: more nuts are better than fewer, and as far as possible the squirrel is a nut-maximizer [M<sub>3</sub>]. Anselm concludes that this limited range of behaviour, in which any action can be explained in terms of its fundamental motivation, does not leave room for *moral* action [M<sub>4</sub>]. A squirrel is not good or evil in its pursuit of nuts; it is merely carrying out the imperatives of its motivational structure. So too for any being having a single type of motive.

The same conclusion holds, Anselm argues in *De casu diaboli* 14, in the case of an agent that has only the motive for justice. His arguments in *De casu diaboli* 13, although couched in terms of an agent with only the motive for advantage, in fact do not turn on any feature of ‘advantage’ (and indeed are represented purely schematically in [M<sub>1</sub>]–[M<sub>4</sub>]). An agent motivated solely by justice, with no motivation to act in any other way, would be a moral robot, not strictly speaking a moral agent at all. Put another way, Anselm concludes that moral agency requires *two* distinct sources of motivation: the motive to do the right thing, seeing oneself as standing under moral norms; and a different nonmoral motivation that may conflict with the demands of morality. Only when an agent is motivated to act in ways that conflict with moral norms, and yet recognize his actions as being bound by moral norms, can there be moral agency, a genuine choice between doing the right thing (because it is right) or doing something other than the right thing (for its intrinsic appeal). The glory and the tragedy of rational natures is that their happiness may diverge from what they ought to do: that is what makes it possible for them to be moral agents, to do the right thing because it is right,

but also to do the wrong thing, for whatever reason.

This is the heart of Anselm's two-wills theory: an agent must have two independent and possibly conflicting motivations [*uoluntates*], each of which has a genuine claim on the agent, in order to be a moral agent. Human beings and prelapsarian angels are moral agents of this sort. Lucifer acts for his advantage rather than as he ought; we understand why he acted as he did while yet being able to morally condemn it. Lucifer was motivated by his advantage, as are all moral agents, and yet he acted upon that motive rather than being motivated by justice – which is what makes his act a moral act, and indeed a morally wrong act. Broadly speaking, then, Anselm's explanation of immoral behaviour is that it stems from the wrong sort of motivation.

## 2. AFFECTIONS OF THE WILL

Anselm's presentation of his two-wills theory in the *De casu diaboli* is directed at the kinds of motives prompting an agent's action. By the time he came to write his *De concordia*, Anselm clarified and refined his theory, and his later remarks were the lens through which his successors read the *De casu diaboli* in their understanding of the two-wills theory.

In *De concordia* 3.11, Anselm distinguishes between (a) the nature of an instrument; (b) what the instrument is suited for, its 'dispositions' [*aptitudines*]; (c) its actual deployed use. A hammer is an instrument constructed in a certain way, which makes it suitable to drive in nails,<sup>7</sup> the use to which it is often put. The same threefold distinction applies in the case of psychological faculties:<sup>8</sup>

Thus since all instruments have natures, their own dispositions, and their own uses, let us distinguish in the will (for the sake of which we are discussing these points) the instrument, its dispositions, and its uses. We can call these dispositions in the will 'affections', since the instrument for willing is affected by its dispositions. . .

Anselm argues that the faculty of the will, the (psychological) 'instrument' of choice, is a single unitary item [*una sola*], clearly the power behind its occur-

<sup>7</sup> Hammers are suitable for driving in nails not merely as a matter of fact, but by design; it is their function – what they are meant to do. As such, their function could arguably be construed either as part of their nature (a), or something for which they are uniquely well suited (b). Anselm opts for (b), while Scotus, as we shall see in §§4–5, opts for (a).

<sup>8</sup> Anselm, *De concordia* 3.11 [ed. Schmitt 2, 279.6–10]: Quoniam ergo singula instrumenta habent et hoc quod sunt, et aptitudines suas, et suos usus: discernamus in uoluntate propter quam ista dicimus instrumentum, et aptitudines eius, et usus eius. Quas aptitudines in uoluntate possumus nominare 'affectiones'. Affectum quippe est instrumentum uolendi suis aptitudinibus.

rent volitions or ‘uses’. What is novel is Anselm’s notion of a ‘disposition’ or ‘affection’, which he explains as follows:<sup>9</sup>

An ‘affection’ of this instrument [=the will] is that by which the instrument itself is affected so as to will something, even when it is not thinking of what it wills – so that if it comes into the memory, it wills it either immediately or at the right time... The instrument of willing has two dispositions, which I call ‘affections’: one for willing the advantageous, the other for willing uprightness. In fact, the will *qua* instrument wills nothing but the advantageous or uprightness. For whatever else it wills, it wills either for the sake of the advantageous or for the sake of uprightness, and even if mistaken it thinks itself to relate whatever it wills to them. By the affection which is for willing the advantageous, a human being always wills happiness and to be happy; by the affection which is for willing uprightness, one wills uprightness and what is upright, that is, what is just.

The two types of motivation canvassed in the *De casu diaboli* are here aligned with the unitary psychological faculty of the will as its ‘affections’: permanent dispositions to respond positively to their proper objects, namely *justice* (or *uprightness*) and *advantage*, which exhaust all motives for action. This is where later mediæval philosophers learned to speak exclusively of the ‘affection-for-advantage’ and the ‘affection-for-justice’ (as I shall regiment the terminology). From this point onwards it would be more accurate to speak of Anselm’s ‘dual-affections’ theory.

As in the *De casu diaboli*, Anselm explains choice and action in his *De concordia* by appealing to two fundamentally different kinds of willable objects. To that extent, the ‘affections’ are still recognizable as distinct types of motivations – now located firmly in the faculty of the will itself, but motivations nonetheless, preserving the key idea that they may come into conflict. This conflict is recast as a question about which way in the end the single and unitary will is going to tend, but it is still a matter of one motive winning out

<sup>9</sup> Anselm, *De concordia* 3.11 [ed. Schmitt 2, 279.17–20 and 281.5–12]: *Affectio huius instrumenti est, qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad uolendum aliquid etiam quando illud quod uult non cogitat – ut si uenit in memoriam, aut statim aut suo tempore illud uelit... instrumentum uolendi duas habet aptitudines, quas uoco ‘affectiones’. Quarum una est ad uolendum commoditatem, altera ad uolendum rectitudinem. Nempe nihil uult uoluntas quae est instrumentum, nisi aut commoditatem aut rectitudinem. Quidquid enim aliud uult, aut propter commoditatem aut propter rectitudinem uult, et ad has – etiam si fallitur – putat se referre quod uult. Per affectionem quidem quae est ad uolendum commoditatem, semper uult homo beatitudinem et beatus esse. Per illam uero quae est ad uolendum rectitudinem, uult rectitudinem et rectus, id est iustus esse.*

over the other. Morally praiseworthy behaviour stems from the agent's action on the affection-for-justice; morally blameworthy behaviour stems from the agent's action on the affection-for-advantage when the affection-for-justice would prescribe a different action.<sup>10</sup> Exactly how this gets sorted out in a particular choice situation – why Lucifer acts on his affection-for-advantage whereas Gabriel acts on his affection-for-justice – is left unanswered, on the grounds that it is unanswerable. In *De casu diaboli* 27, Anselm declares that there is no further explanation for Lucifer's treachery and Gabriel's fidelity. Lucifer acts on his affection-for-advantage “simply because he willed it; there was no other cause by which his will was incited or attracted; instead, his will was its own efficient cause and its own effect, if I may put it that way.”<sup>11</sup> The moral agent's free will is therefore radically free.<sup>12</sup> Anselm's clarification in his *De concordia* of the psychological mechanisms underlying choice has an unexpected benefit. His two-wills theory, now couched in terms of a basic faculty affected by motives that strive to influence it one way and another, can be readily assimilated to the fully-developed aristotelian faculty psychology of the High Middle Ages. And so it was.

### 3. SCOTUS ON PRIMAL SIN

Scotus raises the question whether Lucifer's sin was, strictly speaking, the sin of pride in his *Lect.* 2 d. 6 q. 2, *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2, and *Rep.* 2 d. 6 q. 2. His response is much the same in all three discussions. Scotus begins with what he takes to be the key point, namely the fact that there is an intrinsic order among kinds of acts of willing, as follows. Rejecting something [*nolle*], Scotus maintains, is logically posterior to willing something [*uolle*], for something is rejected only because there is something else the agent wants to have instead. Scotus offers an example taken from Anselm: the miser may give up or ‘reject’ some of his money for the sake of food (*De casu diaboli* 3 [ed. Schmitt 1 239.30–34]), which, Scotus argues, shows that one thing is given up (money) only for

<sup>10</sup> Anselm therefore allows for (a) overdetermination, where both the affection-for-advantage and the affection-for-justice prescribe the same action, and (b) moral neutrality, where the affection-for-advantage is in play but the affection-for-justice is not.

<sup>11</sup> Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 27 [ed. Schmitt 1, 275.31–33]: Non nisi quia uoluit. Nam haec uoluntas nullam aliam habuit causam qua impelleretur aliquatenus aut attraheretur, sed ipsa sibi efficiens causa fuit, si dici potest, et effectum.

<sup>12</sup> Anselm is following Augustine here, who poses the same question in *De libero arbitrio* 3.17.47.161–162 [ed. Green, 303.1–9], replying that free will is “the root of the matter” and there is no further cause behind its choice (3.17.48.164 [ed. Green, 303.17–21]; see also 3.17.49.168 [ed. Green, 304.42–47]).

the sake of something else that is chosen (food). Hence rejecting presupposes willing, or to put the point another way, positive willing is logically prior to negative willing.

There is a further intrinsic order among positive acts of willing, Scotus continues, since positive willing takes two forms: ‘friendly willing’ [*uolle amicitiae*] and ‘covetous willing’ [*uolle concupiscentiae*],<sup>13</sup> the former directed at the person for whom one wills some good, the latter directed at the good so willed.<sup>14</sup> Since that ‘for the sake of which’ something is willed is logically prior to that which is willed for its sake, covetous willing depends on a prior act of friendly willing. Scotus’s point is meant to be evident: willing a good for someone presupposes the selection of the one for whom the good is willed.

The logical order among acts of will should now be clear. First there is an act of friendly willing; then an act of covetous willing; and finally an act of rejecting anything opposed. This ordering holds whether the acts are regulated by right reason (and hence are *prima facie* morally permissible) or not (and hence are morally wrong). Of course, if the acts are not regulated by right reason, they are, in Scotus’s terms, ‘inordinate’ – perhaps excessive; perhaps insufficient; perhaps directed at the wrong object; perhaps flawed in some other way. But they are not, they logically *cannot*, be structured in any other way than as an initial act of friendly willing, an act of covetous willing, and the rejection of anything opposed.

The ground thus prepared, Scotus argues that Lucifer’s sinful act began with an inordinate act of friendly willing, in that Lucifer took himself to be the proper end whose good is sought – not that there is anything wrong with seeking one’s own good, but Lucifer sought his own good in preference to God’s own good. Roughly, Lucifer was first a friend to himself, rather than first a friend to God. Less roughly, Lucifer’s moral duty is to be a friend to God first and foremost, and then a friend to himself only to the extent permissible. Lucifer, however, reversed the right order. The ensuing act of covetous willing, Scotus declares, was Lucifer’s inordinate (Scotus often says “immoderate”) desire for happiness. Lucifer wanted a fuller measure of happiness for himself than right reason would prescribe, which would put God

<sup>13</sup> Scotus derives his terminology from the traditional distinction of love (*amor*) into two kinds, namely the sort of love associated with friendship (*amor amicitiae*), ‘friendly love’ directed at persons, and the sort of love associated with desire (*amor concupiscentiae*), ‘lusty love’ concerned with acquisition – hence the rendering ‘covetous’.

<sup>14</sup> Scotus states this distinction pithily in *Rep.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 4 [ed. Viv. 22, 619A]: *Velle uero duplex est: uelle amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Et prius est uelle amicitiae, quia illud cui uult est finis respectu istius quod sibi concupiscit.*

first and Lucifer second. Just as there is nothing inherently wrong about befriending oneself, but there is about befriending oneself at the expense of God, so too there is nothing inherently wrong about wanting happiness, but there is about wanting more happiness than God would permit as appropriate. Since in each case God acts as a kind of ‘constraint’ on Lucifer’s willing, in friendly willing having equal or greater status as the end sought and in covetous willing as setting the permissible limits to happiness, God is therefore ‘opposed’ to Lucifer’s own good (or so it appears to Lucifer), and hence Lucifer is led to the third and final volitional act, his rejection of God. Scotus finds Lucifer’s progression through these three inordinate volitional acts to be encapsulated in Augustine’s remark that the City of the Devil, the earthly city, “was fashioned through self-love [*amor sui*] extended up to contempt for God.”<sup>15</sup> Strictly speaking, then, Lucifer’s sin was not the sin of pride, but a series of sins of unregulated willing: excessive friendly willing towards himself, excessive covetous willing of his own happiness, and rejecting God.

Scotus’s account of primal sin, details aside, seems complete as it stands. There is no obvious place at which he needs to appeal to Anselm’s two-wills theory. This impression of sufficiency is borne out by a look at the way in which Scotus does make use of Anselm in his three treatments of the question. For Scotus does not make use of Anselm to extend or modify his general answer to the question, sketched above, which depends on the order in which acts of willing occur and whether they are as prescribed by right reason. Instead, Scotus makes use of Anselm to explain only one component of his account, namely the inordinateness of Lucifer’s covetous willing.<sup>16</sup>

In each of his discussions, Scotus runs through Lucifer’s three inordinate acts of will in detail. When he turns to the second inordinate act of will, Lucifer’s covetous willing of his own happiness, Scotus offers three objections to his claim that Lucifer’s covetous willing is inordinate. First, everything pursues its own happiness to the extent it is capable of so doing; the uniformity and universality of this desire is grounds for thinking that the impulse for one’s happiness is natural, and hence implanted by God and therefore morally correct – not ‘inordinate’ at all. Second, just as the intellect cannot be mistaken about first principles, so too the will cannot be mistaken about ultimate ends, and so not about the pursuit of happiness. Third, good and bad angels alike will their own happiness, and if this is culpable then the good angels also deserve punishment. It is in responding to these objections that Scotus appeals

<sup>15</sup> Scotus refers to Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei* 14.28 [eds. Dombart & Kalb 48, 451.1–3]: *Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui.*

<sup>16</sup> See Delahoussaye [2004] Ch. 1.

to Anselm's two-wills theory, seen through the lens of Anselm's later account in his *De concordia*. Of course, Anselm meant his theory to provide a complete account of angelic sin, whereas Scotus applies it only to one moment in his explanation. But merely restricting the scope of Anselm's theory does not mean that Scotus changes its essential character.

Scotus's first run at the question in *Lect.* 2 d. 6 q. 2, while an Oxford bachelor of theology, hardly mentions Anselm. He begins his general reply to the three objections as follows:<sup>17</sup>

I reply that the affection-for-justice, whether it be infused or innate, itself inclines the will to willing as it ought to will. Now it ought to will in conformity with the Divine Will in the character of its willing. But since the will is an appetite, it can only pursue – according to the affection-for-advantage – advantage inasmuch as it is for itself, but not for other potencies. And since the will does not follow the inclination of the intellect, it can thereby in virtue of its freedom will or reject what it does not naturally will.

The line of thought here, while not completely transparent, seems to run like this. The affection-for-justice, by its very nature, inclines the will to act in conformity with the Divine Will. The affection-for-advantage also inclines the will, but it does so only for the advantage of the will, not to the benefit of any other cognitive powers (such as the intellect). Yet since the will is independent of the intellect, its freedom keeps it from being determined by the affection-for-advantage.

While keeping Anselm's terminology, there is at least one stark departure in theory, namely Scotus's peculiar claim that the will seeks its own advantage, not the advantage of the agent (as in Anselm). Exactly how this is supposed to play out in the will's freedom from the intellect isn't clear, much less the fact that the intellect, like the affections, also 'inclines' (the will?). But Scotus does appeal to the two affections as inclining the will, and, while he is careful to emphasize that it is the will's freedom that ultimately grounds action, this may be not only compatible with Anselm's view but actually be Anselm's considered view.

At this point, Scotus drops Anselm's terminology, and spends the next

<sup>17</sup> Scotus, *Lect.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 36 [ed. Vat. 18, 381.13–20]: Respondeo quod affectio iustitiae, siue sit infusa siue innata, ipsa inclinat uoluntatem ad uolundum sicut ipsa debet uelle; debet autem uelle secundum conformitatem uoluntati diuinae in ratione uolendi. Sed quia uoluntas est appetitus, non potest appetere – secundum affectionem commodi – commodum nisi tantum sibi, sed aliis potentiis non; et quia uoluntas non sequitur inclinationem intellectus, ideo ex libertate sua potest uelle et nolle quod non naturaliter uult.

several paragraphs discussing the ways in which Lucifer's desires are immoderate, answering the first two of the three objections. When Scotus turns to the third and last objection, he contents himself with remarking that the good angels willed their own happiness moderately and in accordance with the affection-for-justice, unlike the bad angels. And that is all he has to say about Anselm in his *Lectura* – at best perfunctory, at worst confused.

#### 4. ANSELM UPDATED

When Scotus returns to primal sin in his *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2, by contrast, his use of Anselm is much more informed and nuanced. Now Anselm's theory is the theoretical underpinning of Scotus's replies to the three objections repeated from his earlier *Lectura* discussion. Unlike before, Scotus has a clear view about how Anselm's account is related to the freedom of the will. Scotus begins with a distinction taken from Henry of Ghent,<sup>18</sup> and then refers to Anselm's thought-experiment, as follows:<sup>19</sup>

'Justice' can be understood as either (a) infused, which is called 'gratuitous'; (b) acquired, which is called 'moral'; (c) innate, which is the very freedom of the will. For if, in line with Anselm's story in *The Fall of the Devil*, it were understood that there were an angel "having the affection-for-advantage and not for justice" (*i. e.* having an intellectual appetite purely *qua* appetite and not *qua* free), then such an angel would not be able not to will advantageous things, nor even not to will such things in

<sup>18</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 13 q. 11 [ed. Decorte, 123.19–22]. It is possible that Henry's careful treatment of Anselm caused Scotus to look at Anselm more closely here. Henry prefaces his interpretation of Anselm with a warning about textual criticism [121.50–52]: *Propter quod dico quod in his dictis et in aliis consimilibus oportet Anselmum exponere et per se ipsum, sed requirit diligentem lectorem.*

<sup>19</sup> Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 49 [ed. Vat. 8 48.370–49.387]: *Iustitia potest intelligi uel infusa (quae dicitur 'gratuita'), uel acquisita (quae dicitur 'moralis'), uel innata (quae est ipsamet libertas uoluntatis). Si enim intelligeretur – secundum illam fictionem Anselmi De casu diaboli – quod esset angelus 'habens affectionem commodi et non iustitiae' (hoc est, habens appetitum intellectiuum mere ut appetitum talem et non ut liberum), talis angelus non posset non uelle commoda, nec etiam non summe uelle talia; nec imputaretur sibi ad peccatum, quia ille appetitus se haberet ad suam cognitiuam sicut modo appetitus uisuius ad uisum, in necessario consequendo ostensionem illius cognitiuae et inclinationem ad optimum ostensum a tali potentia, quia non haberet unde se refrenaret. Illa igitur affectio iustitiae, quae est 'prima moderatrix affectionis commodi' et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet uoluntatem actu appetere illud ad quod inclinatur affectio commodi et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet eam summe appetere (quantum scilicet ad illud ad quod inclinatur affectio commodi), illa – inquam – 'affectio iustitiae' est libertas innata uoluntati, quia ipsa est prima moderatrix affectionis talis.*

the highest degree. Nor would it be chalked up as a sin for him, since this appetite would be related to its [associated] cognitive [power] in the way the visual appetite is currently related to sight, in necessarily following what is shown by that cognitive [power], and with an inclination to the very best that is shown by such a power since it would not have grounds to restrain itself. Hence the affection-for-justice, which is the ‘primary regulator’ [*prima modulatrix*] of the affection-for-advantage, both (a) insofar as it is not necessary for the will to actually pursue that towards which the affection-for-advantage inclines it, and (b) insofar as it is not necessary for it to pursue it in the highest degree (namely as far as that to which the affection-for-advantage inclines it), – that ‘affection-for-justice’, I declare, *is* the innate freedom of the will, since it is the primary regulator of the affection-for-advantage.

Scotus’s initial distinction of the types of justice is due to his belief that Anselm is concerned with infused rather than innate justice (as we shall see shortly). Whether this is the best reading of Anselm I leave to one side; for our purposes, what matters most is the gloss Scotus immediately offers on innate justice: it is “the very freedom of the will” itself. He repeats the point at the end of the passage: Anselm’s affection-for-justice “*is* the innate freedom of the will.”<sup>20</sup> He gets to this conclusion by a route that might seem circuitous but actually depends on having Anselm’s account of the two-wills theory in mind.

Begin with Anselm’s thought-experiment. Scotus conflates Anselm’s presentation in *De casu diaboli* 12 with his discussion in *De casu diaboli* 13 of an angel having only the affection-for-advantage, but otherwise accurately recounts Anselm’s conclusions – even to the point of endorsing [M2]–[M3], arguing that an agent with only a single affection (whichever it might be) would necessarily act on that affection and do so to the highest degree possible.

These points of contact, though, are swamped by the differences. Scotus identifies the two affections with the will itself: the affection-for-advantage is the will *qua* intellectual appetite, the affection-for-justice the will *qua* free. Anselm went only so far as to call them ‘dispositions’ [*aptitudines*] of the will, which a will might have or lack: in scholastic terminology, Anselm seems to identify the two affections as really distinct from one another and from the will itself, whereas Scotus wants to identify them as really the same thing, namely the will itself. How Scotus takes them to be related isn’t entirely clear yet.

<sup>20</sup> This point has been noted, and exploited to good effect, in Ingham [2002] – an account with which I find myself in much agreement.

Nor is it clear that Scotus takes the two affections to be on a par. If anything, the opposite seems true. The affection-for-advantage seems to be (identical to) the will itself, taken purely as an appetite. That is, the will of its nature has an inborn tendency to its own advantage. The affection-for-justice, by contrast, does not seem to be a competing kind of inborn tendency of the will. Instead, Scotus is at pains to emphasize that the affection-for-justice is the will's self-regulative activity (as the "primary regulator" of the affection-for-advantage), which just is the will's very freedom.

This might be thought to overstate the differences in two ways. First, Scotus could mean no more than that the affection-for-justice "is" the (freedom of the) will in the sense that all and only agents capable of regulating their behaviour in accordance with moral norms are, strictly speaking, moral agents. Second, while Scotus does insist that the affection-for-justice regulates the affection-for-advantage, that need not mean that it is different in kind: just as my desire to exercise regularly might regulate my diet by cutting into my lunch hour, so too action on the affection-for-justice might regulate action on the affection-for-advantage.

Wrong on both counts: Scotus really does identify the affections with the will, where the affection-for-justice is the will's freedom. He continues his discussion of Anselm as follows:<sup>21</sup>

Although Anselm often speaks not only of the act of justice that is acquired but the one infused (since he says that it is lost through mortal sin which is only true as regards infused justice), nevertheless, by distinguishing two primary aspects [*rationes*] in reality [*ex natura rei*] of these characteristics – insofar as the one inclines the will in the highest degree to advantage, whereas the other 'regulates' it (so to speak) so that in eliciting its act it need not follow its inclination – these [aspects] are nothing other than the will itself *qua* intellectual appetite and *qua* free. For, as mentioned, *qua* purely intellectual appetite it would be actually inclined

<sup>21</sup> Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 50 [ed. Vat. 8, 49.388–50.401]: Et licet Anselmus frequenter loquatur non tantum de actu iustitiae quae est acquisita, sed infusa (quia illam dicit amitti per peccatum mortale, quod non est uerum nisi de iustitia infusa), tamen distinguendo ex natura rei duas rationes primas istarum rationum, in quantum altera inclinatur uoluntatem summe ad commodum, altera autem quasi moderatur eam ne in eliciendo actum oporteat sequi inclinationem eius, – nihil aliud sunt ista quam eadem uoluntas in quantum est appetitus intellectiuus et in quantum libera; quia, sicut dictum est, in quantum est appetitus mere intellectiuus, summe inclinatur actualiter ad optimum intelligibile (sicut est de optimo uisibili et uisu), in quantum tamen liber est, potest se refrenare in eliciendo actum, ne sequatur illam inclinationem – nec quantum ad substantiam actus nec quantum ad intensionem – ad quam potentia naturaliter inclinatur.

in the highest degree to the best intelligible thing (just as for the best visible thing and sight), yet *qua* free it can restrain itself in eliciting an act so that it not follow the inclination (neither as regards the substance of the act nor as regards its intensity) to which the potency is naturally inclined. One affection ‘inclines’ (namely the affection-for-advantage), the other ‘regulates’ (namely the affection-for-justice). Each is grounded in reality, that is, *ex natura rei* (literally “by the thing’s nature”), as two ‘aspects’ of the selfsame thing, which are “nothing other than the will itself,” as Scotus declares. The affection-for-advantage qualifies the will as an appetite, since it imparts a tendency and direction to the will. The affection-for-justice, on the other hand, is a matter of the will’s capacity for self-restraint. There is no sign that Scotus thinks of this restraint as being accomplished by the presence of a counter-vailing tendency within the will. Quite the contrary: Scotus describes the very affection-for-justice as the self-regulation of the will, rather than the self-regulation of the will being a by-product or consequence of acting from a different kind of motive.

The two affections, then, are ‘aspects’ of the will. Are they really different? Formally different? Different only conceptually? There is some ground for each of these views in what Scotus has said to date. He tries to clarify his position when he turns to summarizing his view:<sup>22</sup>

This selfsame [power], which has already been rendered free (since it is nothing but for one thing [*res*] to include several perfectional aspects virtually that it would not include were it without the feature of freedom) – this [power], I declare, can through its freedom regulate itself in willing, both (*a*) as regards willing what the affection-for-advantage inclines it towards; and (*b*) even though it inclines it in the highest degree to will advantage. In virtue of this it can be regulated: it is bound to be regulated according to the rule of justice, which is taken from a higher will. Therefore, it is clear from this that a free will is not bound to will happiness in every way (which the will, if it were only an intellective appetite without freedom,

<sup>22</sup> Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 51 [ed. Vat. 8, 50.407–51.419]: *Ipsa eadem, facta iam libera (quia nihil aliud est nisi quod una res includit uirtualiter plures rationes perfectionales, quas non includeret si esset sine ratione libertatis), ipsa – inquam – per libertatem suam potest se moderari in uolendo, et quantum ad hoc quod est ‘uelle’ ad quod inclinat affectio commodi, et licet inclinēt summe ad uelle commodum; et ex quo potest moderari, tenetur moderari secundum regulam iustitiae, quae accipitur ex uoluntate superiore. Secundum hoc ergo patet quod uoluntas libera non tenetur omni modo uelle beatitudinem (quae uoluntas, si esset tantum appetitus intellectiuus, sine libertate, – uellet eam), sed tenetur – in eliciendo actum – moderari appetitum unde appetitus intellectiuus, quod est ‘moderari affectionem commodi’, ne scilicet immoderate uelit.*

would indeed will). Instead, it is bound, in eliciting its act, to regulate the appetite whereby it is an intellective appetite, which is ‘to regulate the affection-for-advantage’ so that it does not will in an unregulated fashion. This is as clear as Scotus will get in the *Ordinatio*: one and the same thing [*res*], the will, includes “several perfectional aspects virtually” due to its innate freedom. That is to say, the selfsame thing, the will, is capable of perfecting itself in two different ways – presumably by acquiring happiness, as an exercise of its affection-for-advantage, and by being just or upright, which it accomplishes by regulating its pursuit of its inborn affection-for-advantage. The latter is no more than another way to describe the freedom of the will, to say that an agent is a moral agent – not simply at the mercy of his or her inborn tendencies but can endorse or reject them *ad libitum*. As with virtual containment in general, there need be no ontological plurality in the thing itself; God virtually contains all creatures, but this does not entail any real, or even formal, distinctness in God. Hence the “perfectional aspects” of the will are nothing other than the will itself.

The self-regulation accomplished by the freedom of the will – or, what amounts to the same thing, through the affection-for-justice – is a matter of subordinating one’s will to a higher will, namely the Divine Will, through adopting from it the “rule of justice.” Scotus says nothing here about the (possible) content of such a rule of justice, or how God might arrive at it; he says only that abiding by such a rule is what it is to be just, or, more precisely, willing to follow such a rule because it is the rule of justice is what it is to be just. The conclusion Scotus draws from his discussion is that *free* wills need not pursue their happiness in every way, and indeed that is constitutive of what it is for a will to be free. The hallmark of free will is its capacity to regulate itself in accordance with the rule of justice for its own sake: arguably true, but inarguably not Anselm’s two-wills theory.

#### 5. ANSELM DISCARDED

Scotus’s discussion in his *Ordinatio* grapples with Anselm’s views in a subtle and sophisticated fashion. Yet Anselm’s terminology, if nothing else, invites the misunderstanding of Scotus that the affection-for-advantage and the affection-for-justice are really distinct from one another and from the will, and indeed that the two affections are the same sort of thing (namely distinct kinds of motivation). Nor does Scotus make the ontological status of the affection-for-justice entirely clear, since it’s hard to know what kind of status to grant a ‘perfectional aspect’ – or even just an ‘aspect’ – of a power.

Scotus himself seems to have been dissatisfied with his account in the *Ordinatio*. When we turn to reports of his Parisian lectures, we find him re-

formulating his view with an eye to clearing up these very points.<sup>23</sup> Scotus again reserves his discussion of Anselm for the response to the series of three objections, as in the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, and likewise starts his response by outlining Anselm's theory. Then he diverges from the *Ordinatio* to offer a strikingly new way of putting his position forward:<sup>24</sup>

The affection-for-advantage and the affection-for-justice do not stem from free will as though they were something added on to it. Instead, the affection-for-justice is (so to speak) its ultimate differentia, such that just as *human being* is *animate substance* and *animal*, yet these are not attributes of the essence but rather belong *per se* to the understanding of *human being*, so too *appetite* can be conceived first, then [conceiving of it as] *intellective and cognitive* [appetite] while not yet conceiving the affection-for-advantage and the affection-for-justice – and if there were an angel that had a cognitive appetite without an affection-for-justice, it would lack justice, and would not be a free appetite; accordingly, an intellective [appetite], if it were to lack the affection-for-justice, would then naturally pursue what is suitable to the intellect the way that sensitive appetite [pursues] what is suitable to sense, and it would be no more free than sensitive appetite – and so the affection-for-justice is the ultimate specific differentia of free appetite. And although it could be understood more generally, not understanding the specific [nature], these affections are nevertheless not really distinct from the will itself.

The syntax is tangled but the point is clear. The affection-for-justice, Scotus declares, is “the ultimate specific differentia” of free will. Neither the affection-for-advantage nor the affection-for-justice is “added on” [*superaddita*] to the will, outside its essence. Rather, each affection is intrinsic to it, though in different ways. On the one hand, the affection-for-advantage is constitutive

<sup>23</sup> The discussion here is confined to the so-called *Reportatio* II-A as printed in the Wadding-Vivès edition. A critical edition of this text is sorely needed.

<sup>24</sup> Scotus, *Rep.* 2 d. 6 q. 2 n. 9 [ed. Viv. 22, 621A-B]: . . . affectiones commodi et iusti non sunt sicut a uoluntate libera, quasi superaddita; sed affectio iusti est quasi ultima differentia, ita quod sicut homo est substantia animata et animal, non tamen illae sunt passioness essentiae, sed per se de intellectu hominis; sic primo potest concipi appetitus, deinde intellectiuus et cognitiuus, et adhuc non concipiendo affectionem commodi et iusti; et si esset unus Angelus, qui haberet appetitum cognitiuum absque affectione iusti, careret iusto, et non esset appetitus liber. Unde intellectiuus, si careret affectione iusti, ita naturaliter appeteret conueniens intellectui, sicut appetitus sensitiuus conueniens sensui, nec esset magis liber quam appetitus sensitiuus; ideo affectio iusti est ultima differentia specifica appetitus liberi. Et licet posset intelligi generalius, non intellecto speciali, non tamen distinguuntur re illae affectiones ab ipsa uoluntate.

of the kind of thing the will is, namely an appetite. Every appetite is, after all, an appetite for something; in the case of the will, the appetite is naturally aimed at advantage – broadly speaking, at the agent’s well-being. On the other hand, the affection-for-justice is what sets *free* will, found in humans and angels, apart from *unfree* will, found in cats and weasels. The affection-for-justice is to intellective appetite as rationality is to animate substance: the differentia that sets it off from other things of the same generic kind. Rationality sets humans apart from other animals, with which they are otherwise generically similar. Likewise, the affection-for-justice sets free wills apart from other wills, with which they are otherwise generically similar. Yet as such, the affection-for-justice is not an attribute of the essence of will; there are non-free wills, after all. Rather, the affection-for-justice is the metaphysical feature that makes one kind of will the kind of will it is, namely free. We can conceive of free wills “more generally” by not thinking of the affection-for-justice, just as we can conceive of human beings generically as animals by not thinking of rationality, but when we do so we are deliberately leaving out of consideration features that are intrinsic to these kinds of things being the very kinds of things they are.

In the *Reportatio*, Scotus has found a new way to express the metaphysical relation between Anselmian affections: the affection-for-advantage constitutes the generic nature of an appetite, the affection-for-justice its specific differentia – as different as chalk and cheese, though each is intrinsic to the species they jointly constitute, namely free intellective appetite. That is why they are “not really distinct” from the will itself, as Scotus asserts; together they *are* the will, just as rationality and animal nature together *are* the human being.

If we pursue Scotus’s analogy, we can get a clear answer to the several metaphysical questions raised in the *Ordinatio*, by looking at what Scotus has to say about the ontological status of the genus, differentia, and the constituted species. The genus and its differentia are really distinct things: the genus *animal* is really distinct from the differentia *rationality*: not all animals are rational, after all. But when these two items are combined into a *per se* unity, as they are in constituting the species, they are fused together such that they are no longer really distinct in the specific nature, but only formally distinct.<sup>25</sup> So too in the case of the affection-for-advantage (genus) and the affection-for-justice (differentia): being an appetite with a given direction is really different from the feature of being self-regulating, but when these two are fused into a

<sup>25</sup> Scotus, *Lect.* 1 d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 nn. 102–103 [ed. Vat. 17, 34.6–35.22]; *Ord.* 1 d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 nn. 103–107 [ed. Vat. 4, 200.5–202.11]; *Ord.* 2 d. 3 p. 1 qq. 5–6 nn. 189–190 [ed. Vat. 7, 484.11–485.22].

single nature, namely *free will*, they are only formally distinct from each other, and each is really identical with the will (the *free will*) in which it is found.

Scotus has now clarified his position to the point where it is clear, I think, that it isn't really Anselm's theory any more. To be sure, Scotus has kept several of Anselm's themes: an unfree power must pursue its object to the highest degree possible; an agent with only a single affection is not really free, and hence not a moral agent; every moral agent must have the affection-for-advantage and the affection-for-justice. Scotus's understanding of these themes, though, is radically different. Here they are in the service of Scotus's own account of the will – no longer a two-wills theory, or even a dual-affection theory, but Scotus's own self-regulation theory of the will. In an act of philosophical piety, Scotus has retained Anselm's terminology. But he might have done better to junk it altogether, rather than mislead his reader into the false belief that his theory has anything much to do with Anselm's.

## 6. FREEDOM AND PERVERSITY

There seems to be an obvious and powerful objection to Scotus's theory of the self-regulating will, though, which might be thought to explain why Scotus hangs on to Anselm. It is this. If human (free) will is essentially an appetite that is directed at its own well-being – if the only motivational structure a human agent possesses is the affection-for-advantage, that is – why would even a free agent ever be motivated to act in any way but for his advantage? It's all very well to insist that free will essentially has the capacity to regulate itself. But why would it? What would motivate a free agent to actually regulate its behaviour, since it is only ever motivated by its own advantage? Scotus's account seems to fall afoul of Anselm's arguments in *De casu diaboli* 13–14 (described in §1) that a single kind of motivation isn't sufficient for moral agency.

Scotus's answer to this objection shows the depths of his departure from Anselm. Putting aside his development of the answer and the arguments by which he supports it, his answer runs like this. Right reason, by its nature, is capable of recognizing the moral principles that obtain in a given choice situation (*Quodl.* 18). More exactly, right reason can recognize what appropriate conformity to the Divine Will dictates in a given situation.<sup>26</sup> Yet the mere recognition by right reason of the moral norms that apply to a set of circum-

<sup>26</sup> The goodness of an action depends on the degree to which it stems from the will (its freedom), from the appropriateness of the circumstances (moral virtue), and from the meritorious love of God (theological virtue): *Ord.* 2 d. 7 q. un. nn. 28–33 [ed. Vat. 8, 88.271–90.308].

stances does not, by itself, count as a *motive* for abiding by those norms, much less be part of a standing motivation for the will. Right reason may dictate behaviour in accordance with moral norms, but that is not enough for an occurrent or dispositional tendency of the will towards doing the right thing – that is: intellectual recognition of moral norms is not the same as a motivating tendency of the will, an affection-for-justice in Anselm’s sense.

For all that, Scotus is careful to point out, the will *is* capable of following the dictates of right reason. It can do so through its radical freedom, through the very feature that makes it capable of blameworthy evil, namely through perversity: the will can opt for a given course of action without having any dispositional or occurrent motive to do so – indeed, without even having any reason, or in the teeth of reasons to the contrary.<sup>27</sup> The will can choose to follow the dictates of right reason, precisely because they *are* the dictates of right reason, without (a) being determined to do so, or (b) having any dispositional or occurrent motive for doing so. The agent, of course, has a reason – a good reason – to follow the dictates of right reason, namely because they are the dictates of right reason. But that neither requires nor entails that the agent has any kind of motive to do so. On that score, Scotus is an externalist about reasons: agents can have reasons for action that do not correspond to any internal desire or motive. Our native freedom of the will guarantees that we can act on such external reasons.

Moral agents can go wrong in a multitude of ways. They can recognize what right reason prescribes, and through perversity choose to do otherwise; they can recognize what right reason prescribes, and act in a way consonant with right reason, but not because it is the way prescribed by right reason; they can fail to recognize what right reason prescribes. The first two of these failures are morally culpable, the third depends on whether the failure is itself morally culpable. By the same token, though, they can act in conformity with the dictates of right reason precisely because they are the dictates of right

<sup>27</sup> Freedom of the will guarantees its ability to act even against its interests: Scotus insists on this point at length in his *Ord.* 1 d. 1 p. 1 qq. 1–2. The general intuition at work in the case of choice, namely that it is possible to choose without having a motive or desire for the choice made, is controversial. Take a nonmoral case to isolate the intuition. Jones can pick exactly one of three identical items set before him. Most people would agree that he does not need a reason to pick one over the other – some philosophers have argued that a coin-toss is the correct response to such situations. Scotus thinks that all choices are more or less like this one. You can have good reasons or bad reasons for what you do; you can desire one outcome and not the other; but, since the will is free, it can always just pick one of the alternatives, as though by a coin-toss, no matter the relative merits or demerits of the alternatives, no matter the desires of the agent.

reason. When they take the latter course, they are morally praiseworthy, regulating their motivated action for the sake of their advantage freely in accordance with right reason.<sup>28</sup> Thus self-regulation of the will, Scotus holds, does *not* in the end depend on the prior existence of a motive for justice. And this completes Scotus's break with Anselm: the affection-for-justice, or in Scotus's terms the self-regulation of the will, has no motivational force whatsoever. It does provide the agent with reasons, but they are external reasons, not in themselves motivating. Instead, the agent must do the right thing not because the intellect determines it to do so, but because it freely chooses to follow the dictates of the intellect, precisely because these dictates are prescribed by right reason; the agent self-regulates his behaviour in pursuit of his well-being in this light.

A final question. If Scotus's picture is right, why should an agent act so as to do the right thing precisely because it is right? After all, the agent could also maximize advantage precisely because it is advantage, or do something unexpected precisely because it is unexpected, and so on. Even if a moral agent is free to do whatever he chooses to do, once we open the floodgates to unmotivated action, why think an agent will engage in moral action?

Scotus's answer is that moral reasons are peculiarly self-supporting. Action in accordance with moral norms validates an action as morally good precisely because it is in accord with moral norms, after all. But there is no further reason. An agent ought to do the right thing precisely because it *is* the right thing. That is what it means to love justice for its own sake, to love it for itself; any other reason would vitiate the moral force of the action. There is no other motive and no other reason for moral action. That is all that can be said. And Scotus thinks that it is all that needs to be said.

## CONCLUSION

Scotus read Anselm carefully, at least after his Oxford bachelor days, and was sufficiently impressed by the depth and power of Anselm's two-wills theory to try to incorporate it into his own explanation of angelic sin. But the revisions he made along the way were such as to make of the theory something far different from what it had been in Anselm. The heart, and in many ways the appeal, of Anselm's two-will theory was to see that moral agency de-

<sup>28</sup> Scotus's theory here is more complicated, to accommodate his account of the virtues. According to Scotus, the virtues are neither necessary nor sufficient for morally right action. But free action with respect to right reason, whether conforming to it or not, is a partial cause of a disposition [*habitus*] to choose in such ways in such circumstances; these acquired dispositions can motivate the agent to act in certain ways, at least in part: *Ord.* 3 d. 33 q. un. [ed. Vat. 10, 141–175].

mands that agents recognize that they are subject to norms while also being motivated to act otherwise. Scotus recognizes the storm and strife of moral conflict too, but his theory of self-regulating will (in part possible because the will is a self-mover) does not try to exploit Anselm's insight, recasting it instead into an account of the nature of free will, which, like free will itself, is ultimately mysterious.

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