

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: ORDINATIO 1 d. 2 q. 5*

Secondly, I ask whether what is universal and univocal is a genuine thing outside the soul that is really distinct from the individual, yet really existing in it, really multiplied and varied.

[The Principal Arguments]

That it is so: It is a thing outside the soul that is really distinct from the individual. For, according to the Commentator in his remarks on *Met.* 7 com. 46 [Iuntina 8 fol. 93rb]:

‘Universal’ does not signify substance, unless [it signifies] the substance that ‘part’ signifies.

Hence the thing signified by the universal is a part. But the part is really distinguished from the whole. Hence [the universal is really distinct from and existing in the individual]. Moreover, the fact that [the universal] is multiplied and varied is clear by the same point, since the part is varied in relation to the variation of the whole of which it is a part, and this even if it be a part of many wholes at once.

For the opposite position: Every thing outside the soul that is really distinct from the individual, yet really existing in it and really multiplied and varied, is an essential part of it or an accident of it. But between the whole and the part (likewise between the subject and the accident) there is a proportion such that if one were singular the other will be singular. Hence every such thing is genuinely singular, and, consequently, is not universal.

[William of Alnwick’s View]

There is one view regarding this question that is attributed to the Subtle Doctor by some people, just as the view recited and disproved in the preceding question is also attributed to him by others. And it is the view that the universal is a genuine thing outside the soul that is really distinct [from other things] by means of one contracting differentia, yet really is multiplied and varied through a contracting differentia of this kind.

* Translated from *Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica: Opera theologica* tom. II, cura Institutii Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, moderator S. Brown (edidit Stephanus Brown, adlaborante Gedeone Gál), S. Bonaventure, N. Y.: impressa Ad Claras Aquas (Italia), 1970, 153–160. Ockham’s later additions are enclosed within [# ... #].

[Four Arguments Against Alnwick's View]

But, on the contrary, this view seems to be simply false.

[First Argument]

Every thing that is really distinct from another thing is distinguished from that other thing either of itself or through something intrinsic to it. But the humanity that is in Socrates, according to this view, is really distinguished from the humanity that is in Plato. Hence [the humanity that is in Socrates] is distinguished from [the humanity that is in Plato] either of itself or through something intrinsic [to it]. Hence, putting aside all contracting differentiae, these humanities are distinguished. But they are not distinguished in species. Hence [they are distinguished] numerically. Hence each of them is numerically one and singular of itself, without the contracting differentia.

[Objections and Replies]

[First Objection]: If you were to claim that these humanities are not *per se* in the species, since precisely individuals are *per se* in the species, and so [these humanities] are not of themselves distinguished numerically—

[Reply]: This [objection] is worthless. For although forms are not *per se* in the species, but rather only composites [are *per se* in the species], nevertheless two forms, even putting aside the matters, are genuinely distinguished numerically—whence two separated souls are numerically distinguished. Hence notwithstanding the fact that the humanities of Socrates and Plato are not *per se* in a species, they are, nevertheless, numerically distinguished, putting aside any real differentiae whatsoever.

[Second Objection]: If you were to claim that these humanities are only distinguished through their contracting differentiae—

[First Reply]: The humanity of Socrates, according to you [who hold this view], is really distinguished from the differentia contracting that humanity. Hence it is really distinguished either (*i*) of itself, or (*ii*) through that contracting [element]. Not through that contracting [element], since nothing is distinguished from a through a itself, but rather is especially the same as a itself through a. Hence this humanity is of itself distinguished from the contracting differentia. Hence there are two things that are really distinct of themselves in this case. But this is not possible unless each were numerically one. Hence that humanity, which is really distinct from that contracting difference, is numerically one. Hence it is of itself numerically one and numerically distinct. Hence it is neither a *this* nor numerically one through the contracting differentia, but rather through itself.

[Second Reply]: Likewise, when anything is really distinguished of itself through something that is extrinsic to it, it is distinguished of itself from anything else that is extrinsic to it for the same reason. Hence if the humanity of Socrates is really distinguished of itself from the contracting differentia, by the same reason it is really distinguished of itself from the humanity of Plato.

[First Confirmation of the Replies to the Second Objection]: This point is confirmed [as follows]. It does not seem to be a contradiction that the humanity of Socrates be separated from the contracted differentia, and likewise for the humanity of Plato. Then I ask: that humanity, not varied, that belonged to Socrates, either (*i*) is really distinguished from the humanity that belonged to Plato, or (*ii*) is not [really distinguished from the humanity that belonged to Plato]. [With regard to (*i*): if it is [really distinguished from the humanity that belonged to Plato], what was to be proved—that they are really distinguished of themselves—has been established, since they are not distinguished through the contracting differentiae, since they are not these [contracting differentiae]. [With regard to (*ii*): if they are not really distinguished—on the contrary, it is impossible for two things not making [something] one *per se* to make or to be one *per se* except through a real composition. Hence those humanities are really compounded. Consequently, what was to be proved—that they are really distinguished of themselves—has been established, since parts belonging to the same composite are always really distinguished of themselves or through some [elements] intrinsic to them.

[Second Confirmation of the Replies to the Second Objection]: Besides, it is not unacceptable that—at least by divine power—any given absolute thing be intuitively seen without the sight of another absolute thing. Hence the humanity that is in Socrates can be intuitively seen without the contracting differentia, and, in the same way, the humanity that is in Plato [can be intuitively seen without the contracting differentia]. But such a person will see these [humanities] to be distinguished in place and position—I do not care whether [they are distinguished] by quantity or not, since it is not relevant at all—and so he will see them to be distinguished. But nobody knows any [things] distinctly and in particular to be essentially distinguished unless he were to know in particular the intrinsic distinctive principle. Hence these humanities are distinguished of themselves, and consequently they are [each] of themselves a *this*.

[Second Argument]

Secondly, I argue [as follows]. If humanity were one in one case and another in another case, there will be as many specialissimae as there are

individuals. The consequent is false, since then there would be as many generalissima as individuals, which seems absurd.

[Proof of the Consequence]: The consequence is clear, since if ‘humanity’ were to express the specialissima, [then] either (*i*) the humanity belonging to Socrates or [the humanity] belonging to Plato, or (*ii*) something that is neither the former nor the latter. [With regard to (*i*): if (*i*) [be granted], then [it expresses] no more the one [humanity] rather than the other. Hence there are two humanities in this case, each of which is a specialissima. Consequently, there are two specialissimae. [With regard to (*ii*): if (*ii*) be granted, I raise a question about that humanity that is neither [the humanity of Socrates] nor [the humanity of Plato]. Either it is a genuine thing outside the soul (and the view disproved in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4] reappears), or is only in the soul (and then no universal is outside the soul).

[Alternative Version of the Second Argument]: In the same way, it can be argued [as follows]. If man be a species, I raise the question for what the [term] ‘man’ supposit: either (*i*) for a thing outside the soul, or (*ii*) for a thing in the soul. [With regard to (*ii*): if (*ii*) [be granted], what was to be proved has been established. [With regard to (*i*): if (*i*) [be granted], [then] either (*a*) that thing is Socrates, or it is neither varied nor multiplied in Socrates and Plato, and then the first view, [refuted] in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4], reappears, or (*b*) it is varied and multiplied, and what was to be proved has been established, [namely] that there are as many specialissimae as individuals. And it follows from this that no thing is a species, since then no thing is common, since neither that which is in Socrates nor that which is in Plato [is common], and there is nothing—by hypothesis—besides them. Hence [no thing is a species].

[Third Argument]

Besides, thirdly as follows. That thing that is determined to one and is not indifferent to many is not a universal. But the humanity that is in Socrates, according to you [who hold this view], is determined to one, nor can it be found in another. And, according to this view, there is no humanity save that which belongs to Socrates or Plato. Hence no thing outside the soul is universal.

[Objection]: If it were objected that it is not incompatible of itself for the humanity that is in Socrates to exist along with another contracting differentia, but rather it is determined through something extrinsic to this individual—

[Reply]: On the contrary, that which through no potency can agree with many is not really and positively common. Hence if that thing that

is in Socrates through no potency can be in another, it is not really and positively common. Instead, it will be less common than this form or this matter, since each of these can, through divine power, be in many (at least successively).

[Fourth Argument]

Besides, just as it is not incompatible with the nature of itself that it exist with another degree, so too it is not incompatible with the degree of itself to exist along with another nature. Hence there will be just as much commonness in that contracting individual degree as there is in the contracted nature.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. According to this view, the contracting individual degree really exists along with many contracted natures, namely along with the nature of all genera and species that are predicable of the individual. Hence that degree will really be more common to diverse universal natures than any given nature [is common to] diverse individuals.

[Objection]: If you [who hold this view] were to say that in this case there is no commonness through predication, but rather the commonness belonging to coexistence—

[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For there can precisely be a commonness of the common nature with respect to individuals, since according to this view that universal nature is really distinct from the individual. Hence there is no commonness through predication, but rather only through a certain coexistence, or just as a part is common to the whole.

[Reply to the Question]

Therefore, I say to the [initial] question that in the individual there is not any universal nature that is really distinct from the contracting differentia, [for the following reasons].

[First Argument]: Such a nature could only be postulated [in the individual] if it were an essential part of the individual itself. But there is always a proportion between the whole and the part, such that if the whole be singular and not common, any given part is proportionately singular in the same way, since one part cannot be more singular than another. Hence either no part or any given [part] of an individual is singular. But not no [part]. Hence any given [part].

[Second Argument]: Likewise, if there were two such really distinct [items] in the individual, it does not seem to include a contradiction that one could exist without the other. And then the individual degree could

exist without the contracted nature, or conversely—each of which is absurd.

[Third Argument]: Likewise, almost all the arguments put forward in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4] against the view disproved there show that there would be no such nature.

[Reply to the Positive Principal Argument]

With regard to the [positive] principal argument, I declare that ‘universal’ in some way signifies a part when that universal is the genus with respect to many composites that are distinct by means of [their] specific forms. The reason for this is that in any given significatum of [‘universal’] there must be found one part of the same *ratio*, but not another part that is so. Hence [‘universal’] is said to signify that part more than another. How this should be understood will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 8 q. 2]. Hence the universal is not really a part, and hence it need not really be multiplied.

[End of the Question]