

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: ORDINATIO 1 d. 2 q. 6*

Thirdly, I ask whether something that is universal and univocal is really outside the soul, distinct from the individual in virtue of the nature of the thing, although not really distinct [from the individual].

[The Principal Arguments]

It seems that it is: The nature **man** is a *this*. Yet it is not a this of itself, since then it could not be in another. Hence [it is a this] through something added to it. And it is not [a this] through [something] really distinct, since by the same reason the nature **whiteness** would be a *this* by something really distinct that is added [to it], and then this whiteness would be really composite, which seems false. Thus the nature is a *this* by something formally distinct that is added [to it].

For the opposite: No nature that is really individual is really universal. Hence if that nature really were that individual, it will not really be universal.

[Statement of Duns Scotus's View]

It is said, as regards this question, that in a thing outside the soul the nature is really the same as the differentia contracting it to a determinate individual, yet formally distinct [from it]. And this [nature] of itself is neither universal nor particular, but rather it is incompletely universal in the thing and completely [universal] according to its being in the understanding.

And since that view is, I believe, the view of the Subtle Doctor, who excelled other [philosophers] in the subtlety of his judgment, I thus wish to set forth distinctly here that whole view (which he put forward scattered in different passages), not changing his own words that he puts forward in different passages.

And it pertains to this Doctor's intent that ([*Ord.* 1 d. 3 q. 1 nn.29–34: Vat. 7 402.5–405.2.]):

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- (S1) Apart from numerical unity, there is a real unity that is less than numerical unity
- (S2) This [real unity that is less than numerical unity] agrees to the very nature that is in some way universal.

Hence the contractible nature can be compared to:

- (1) the singular itself
- (2) numerical unity
- (3) universal being
- (4) the unity that is less than numerical unity
[in each of the following sections].

[1. The Nature Compared to the Singular]

If [the nature] be compared to the singular itself, [Scotus's] view puts forward [the following theses].

- (S3) The nature is not of itself a *this* but [is only a *this*] through something added [to it].
- (S4) That added [factor] is not (*a*) a negation; (*b*) some accident; (*c*) actual existence; (*d*) matter.
- (S5) That added [factor] is in the genus Substance and intrinsic to the individual.
- (S6) The nature is naturally prior to that contracting [factor].

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 qq. 5–6 nn. 187–188, *Vat.* 7 483.9–484.9]):

Every {quidditative} beingness—whether it is partial or total—of some genus, is of itself indifferent {as quidditative beingness} to this beingness and that one, such that as quidditative beingness it is naturally prior to that beingness as it is a *this*; and as it is naturally prior, just as ‘being a *this*’ does not agree to it in virtue of itself, so too its opposite is not incompatible with it in virtue of its *ratio*; and just as the composite does not include its beingness {by which it is formally} this « composite ») insofar as it is the nature, so too neither does the matter insofar as it is the nature include its beingness (by which it is this matter), nor does the form {insofar as it is the nature include its [beingness (by which it is this form)]}. Hence the beingness [of the individual differentia] is neither matter nor form nor composite, inasmuch as any given one of these is the nature—but it is the ultimate reality of the being (*ens*) that is the matter or « the being » that is the form or « the being » that is the composite, such that anything common and yet determinable can still be distinguished, insofar as it is one thing, into many formally distinct realities, of which this one is formally not that one: the latter is formally the beingness of singularity, and the former is formally the

beingness of the nature. Nor can these two «beingnesses» [Scotus: *realitates*] be as thing and thing, in the way in which «these realities» can be: the reality whence the genus is taken and the reality whence the differentia is taken (from which the specific reality is «sometimes» taken); rather, always in the same [thing] (whether as a part or as the whole), they are formally distinct realities of the same thing.

From this [passage] it is clear that his view puts forward [the following theses] with regard to the contracting differentia.

- (S7) The individual differentia is not quidditative.
- (S6*) The nature is naturally prior to that contracting differentia.
- (S8) The opposite of that individual differentia, namely another individual differentia, is not incompatible with the nature in virtue of itself, just as that individual differentia does not agree to [the nature] of itself. (This is true in every case, in the whole as well as in its parts.)
- (S9) Likewise, the individual differentia and the nature are not distinguished as thing and thing.
- (S10) [The individual differentia and the nature] are only distinguished formally.
- (S11) The nature is different with different contracting differentiae. ([Scotus] puts this [thesis] forward elsewhere.)

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 41, *Vat.* 7 409.6–9]):

‘Every substance existing *per se* is proper to that of which it is [the substance]’ ([*Met.* 7.13 1038^b10–11]). That is, either it is of itself proper [to that of which it is the substance], or {it is} made proper by something contracting it—and assuming this contracting [factor], it cannot be in another, although being in another is not incompatible with it of itself.

Accordingly, on this account, he says that the Idea (which is attributed to Plato) is not the substance of Socrates. Accordingly, the same passage continues ([*Vat.* 7 409.11–13]):

The idea will not be the substance of Socrates, since it is not the nature of Socrates—for it is neither proper to Socrates of itself nor made proper to him such that it would be only in him, but, according to him («namely [according to] Plato»), is [equally] in another.

He puts forward similar views elsewhere in diverse passages.

[2. The Nature Compared to Numerical Unity]

However, if that nature be compared to numerical unity, [Duns Scotus] likewise puts forward [the following theses].

- (S12) The nature does not have numerical unity of itself
- (S13) [The nature] is not that which is immediately denominated by any

given real unity.

- (S14) [The nature] is, nevertheless, numerically one.
 (S15) [The nature] is not really something one in two individuals by any given real unity, but only in one [individual].

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 qq. 5–6 ns172–175, Vat. 7 476.15–478.2]):

I concede that there is no real unity of something existing in two individuals, but [there is a real unity of something existing] in one [individual]. And when you object ‘whatever is in numerically the same individual is numerically the same,’ I reply first by «another» more obvious example: whatever is in one species is one in species, hence color in whiteness is one in species; but it does not follow that ‘therefore it does not have a unity lesser than the unity of the species.’ For, it is noted elsewhere (namely in [*Ord.* 1 d. 8 n. 214]) that “something can be called ‘animate’ denominatively, as the body, or [it can be called ‘animate’ *per se primo modo*, as man” (and in this way a surface is called ‘white’ denominatively, and a white-surface is called ‘white’ *per se primo modo*, since the subject includes the predicate)—in this way I say that the potential, which is contracted by the actual, is informed by the actual, and through this it is informed by the unity consequent upon that actuality or that act; and so it is one by the unity proper to the actual, but in this way it is denominatively one (it is not of itself one in this way, neither *primo modo*, nor through an essential part). Thus color in whiteness is one in species, yet not of itself or primarily or *per se*, but only denominatively; however, the specific differentia is one primarily, since ‘being divided into specifically many [elements]’ is primarily incompatible with it; whiteness is one in species *per se*, but not primarily, since [it is one] through something intrinsic to it (namely through the differentia). I therefore concede that whatever is in this stone is numerically one, either primarily or *per se* or denominatively: ‘primarily,’ perhaps as that through which such unity agrees to the composite; ‘*per se*’ [as] this stone, of which that which is primarily one by this unity is *per se* a part; ‘denominatively’ only {as} that potential that is perfected by this actual, which is (as it were) denominatively with regard to its actuality «and its unity».

[3. The Nature Compared to Universal Being]

However, if the nature be compared to universal being, in the third way [of those listed above], then [Duns Scotus] puts forward [the following theses].

- (S16) [The nature] of itself is not completely universal.

- (S17) [The nature is only universal] in that it has being in the understanding.
 (S18) Commonness, not singularity, agrees to [the nature] of itself.

Accordingly, [Duns Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 37, *Vat.* 7 406.11–407.9]):

The universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity according to which «it» is in proximate potency to be said of any given supposit, since, according to the Philosopher in *Post. an.* 1.4 [73^b26–33], the universal is what is one in many and pertains to many. Indeed, nothing—according to any given unity—in the thing is such that according to that unity it is precisely [Scotus: *praecisam*] in proximate potency to any given supposit in the predication stating ‘this is this’. The reason for this is that although being in some singularity other than that in which it is is not incompatible with something existing in the thing, nevertheless it cannot be truly said of anything lower-level, «namely» that ‘any given one is it’. For this is only possible as regards numerically the same object actually considered by the intellect—which, indeed, as understood has also the numerical unity of the object, according to which the same thing is predicable of every singular, stating ‘this is this.’

And [Duns Scotus] adds ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 38, *Vat.* 7 407.20–408.3]):

{Therefore}, what is not of itself a *this* is common in the thing, and consequently not-this is not incompatible with it of itself. But such a common [thing] is not the universal in act, because it lacks that indifference by which a universal is completely universal, namely according to which the same (by some identity) is predicable of any given individual, such that ‘any given one is it’.

Again, in the same passage [Duns Scotus] adds ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 42, *Vat.* 7 410.4–14]):

Commonness and singularity are not related to the nature as being in the intellect and genuine being outside the soul, since commonness agrees to the nature outside the intellect, and «similarly» singularity; commonness agrees to the nature of itself, and singularity agrees to the nature through something in the thing contracting [the nature], but universality does not agree with the thing of itself. Hence I concede that a cause of the universality should be sought. Still, no cause of commonness other than the nature itself need be sought; and, positing commonness in the very nature according to its proper beingness and unity, one must necessarily seek a cause of singularity, which adds something more to the nature of which [the singularity] is.

[4. The Nature Compared to the Lesser Unity]

If, fourth, the nature be compared to the unity that is less than numerical unity, [Duns Scotus] puts forward [the following theses].

- (S19) The [lesser] unity is not beneath the quidditative *ratio* of the nature.
 (S20) The [lesser unity] is predicated of [the nature] *per se secundo modo*.

Accordingly, [Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 34, Vat. 7 404.17–22]): I understand ‘nature has a real unity less than numerical unity’ in this way: and although [the nature] does not have [that unity] of itself, such that it is intrinsic to the *ratio* of the nature (for “horseness is just horseness,” according to Avicenna in *Met.* 5.1 [fol.86va]), nevertheless that unity is a proper attribute of the nature according to its primary beingness.

[Six Arguments for Scotus’s View]

The principal conclusion of this view is argued for in many ways.

[First Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 3 (Vat. 7 392.10–12)]:

Whatever is present in something *per se* in virtue of its *ratio* is present in it in any given thing; hence if the nature **man** were of itself a *this*, in whatsoever there is the nature **man**, that would be this man.

[Second Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 4 (Vat. 7 393.1–3)]:

[If] one of [a pair of] opposites agrees with something of itself, the other opposite is incompatible with it of itself; hence if the nature is of itself numerically one, numerical multiplicity is incompatible with it << in virtue of itself >>.

[Third Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 7 (Vat. 7 394.4–10)]:

The object insofar as it is an object is naturally prior to its act, and the object is singular of itself in that “prior [condition]” since this always agrees with a nature not taken *secundum quid* or according to the being that it has in the soul; hence {the intellect} understanding that object under the *ratio* **universal** understands it under a *ratio* opposed to its *ratio*,

namely insofar as it is universal, “for as it precedes act it is determined of itself to the opposite of the *ratio*,” namely [the *ratio*] **universal**.

[Fourth Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 ns8–10 (Vat. 7 395.1–5)]:

The real, proper, and sufficient unity of anything [which] is less than numerical unity is not of itself one by a numerical unity (or is not of itself a *this*); but the proper, real, or sufficient unity of the nature existing in this stone is less than numerical unity; therefore, [it is not of itself one by a numerical unity].

[Proof of the Major]:

The major is clear of itself, since nothing is of itself one by a unity greater than the unity sufficient to it: if the proper unity that is due to something of itself were less than numerical unity, numerical unity would not agree to it in virtue of its nature and according to itself. Otherwise, precisely in virtue of its nature it would have greater and lesser unity, which are opposites with regard to the same [thing] in the same [respect], because a multiplicity [which is] opposed to a greater unity can obtain with a lesser unity without contradiction, [while] the multiplicity [itself] cannot [obtain] with a greater unity that is incompatible with it. Hence [they are opposites, and so the major is proved].

[Proof of the Minor]:¹

If there is no real unity of the nature less than [its] singularity, and every unity other than the unity of singularity and [the unity] of the specific nature is less than real unity, then there will be no real unity less than numerical unity. But the consequent is false, as I shall prove in [seven] ways; therefore, [the antecedent is false, and so the minor is proved].

[First Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

The first way [to prove that there is a real unity that is less than numerical unity] is as follows. According to the Philosopher in *Met.* 10.1 [1052^b18], “In every genus there is a first ‘one’ that is the standard and measure of all those [items] that belong to that genus.” This unity of the first measurer is real, since the Philosopher proves that the primary *ratio* of measure agrees to *one*, and in turn states how that to which the *ratio* **measure** agrees in every genus is one [1052^b19–1054^a19]. This unity [of the first measurer] is of something insofar as [the first measurer] is first in the genus; {therefore, it is real}, since the things measured are real and really measured. Real being (*ens reale*), however, cannot be really measured by a [mere] being of reason (*ens rationis*); hence [the unity] is real. {Furthermore}, this \ll real \gg ² unity is not \ll of singularity \gg ³,

¹ Proofs of the minor premise from Scotus, *Ord.* II d.3 1 q.1 nn.11–28 (Vat.7 396.1–402.3).

² Scotus: *autem*.

³ Scotus: *numeralis*.

since there is nothing singular in a genus that is the measure of all those [items] that are in that genus—|# for, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* 3.3 [999^a12–13], in individuals belonging to the same species it is not the case that this [individual] is prior and that [individual] posterior. Although the Commentator talks about the prior constituting the posterior [*Met.* 3 com. 11], nevertheless [this has nothing to do with the claim that the unity of the first measurer is less than numerical], since «...» the Philosopher's intent here is to agree with Plato that in individuals of the same species there is no essential order, «and so on». Hence no individual is the *per se* measure of those that are in its species—and therefore, [this kind of unity is] neither numerical nor individual unity.

[Second Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

Besides, secondly, I prove that the same consequent [in the proof of the minor premiss in the fourth argument], [that there is no real unity less than numerical unity], is false, since according to the Philosopher in *Phys.* 7.4 [249^a3–8] comparison comes about in the atomic species because there is one nature—not, however, in the genus, since the genus does not have such unity. This difference [between generic unity and specific unity] is not [a difference] of unity according to reason, since the concept of the genus is {as} numerically one in the intellect as the concept of the species; otherwise no concept would be said *in quid* of many species (and thus no concept would be a genus), but there would be as many concepts said of species as there are concepts of species, and then in each of the predications the same [thing] would be predicated of itself. Similarly, the unity or disunity of a concept is not relevant to the Philosopher's intent here, namely [whether there is] a comparison or not. Hence {the Philosopher} means here that the specific nature is one by the unity of the specific nature; he does not, however, mean that it is one in this way by a numerical unity, since in numerical unity no comparison comes about. Therefore, [specific unity must be real and less than numerical unity].

[Third Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

Thirdly, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* 5.15 [1021^a9–12], 'the same', 'similar', and 'equal' are all founded on 'one', {such that although similarity has as a foundation a thing of the genus Quality}, still, such a relation [of similarity] is not real unless it has a real foundation and a {proximate} *ratio* of being founded on the real. Therefore, the unity that is required as the foundation of a relation of similarity is real.

However, it is not a numerical unity, since nothing which is one and the same is similar or equal to itself.

[Fourth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

Fourthly, in one real opposition there are two primary real extremes [of the opposition]. Now contrareity is a real opposition, which is apparent because, putting aside any operation of the intellect, one [opposite] really corrupts or destroys the other, and [it does so] only because they are contraries; hence each primary extreme of this opposition is real {and [is] one by some real unity}. However, {each [primary] extreme} [of this real opposition] \ll is one by some real unity [which is] not \gg numerical unity, since then precisely this white or precisely that white would be a primary contrary of this black, which is unacceptable, since then there would be as many primary contraries as there are contrary individuals. Therefore, [the unity of each primary extreme of a real opposition is less than numerical].

[Fifth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

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Fifthly, for any one action of sense there is one object, according to some real unity; but not a numerical [unity]; hence there is some real unity other {than numerical unity}.

Proof of the Minor:⁴ A potency cognizing an object in this fashion, namely insofar as it is one by this unity, cognizes it insofar as it is distinct from anything that is not one by this unity. But sense does not cognize an object insofar as it is distinct from any given thing that is not one by that numerical unity—{which is apparent} because no sense distinguishes this ray of sunlight to numerically differ from another ray, though nevertheless they are diverse due to the proper motion of the Sun. If all the common sensibles, for instance diversity in place or site, were put aside, and if two amounts (*quanta*) that are completely similar and equal in whiteness were posited to be together by divine power, sight would not there distinguish two white [things]. If, nevertheless, it were to cognize one of them insofar as it is one by a numerical unity, it would cognize it insofar as it is one and distinct by numerical unity!

[Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor]:

According to this, it could be argued that the primary object of sense is one in itself by some real unity, \ll at least of the object of one act of sensing \gg , since just as the object of this power, inasmuch as it is

⁴ Reading *minor* for *maior*.

an object, precedes [any action of] the intellect, so too it precedes any action of the intellect with regard to its real unity.

[Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

Sixthly, if every real unity is numerical then every real diversity is numerical. But the consequent is false, since every numerical diversity insofar as it is numerical is equal, and so all things would be equally distinct—and then {it would follow that} the intellect could abstract something no more common from Plato and Socrates than from Socrates and a line, and any given universal would be a pure fiction of the intellect.

The first consequence, [namely ‘if every real unity is numerical then every real diversity is numerical’], is proved in two ways [as follows].

First, since one and many, and same and diverse, are opposites (from *Met.* 10.3 [1054^a20–21 and 1054^b22–23]), in however many [ways] one of the opposites is said so too is the other one said (from *Top.* 1.15 [106^b14–15]); therefore, to any given unity there corresponds its proper [kind of] diversity.

Second, the [first consequence] is proved as follows: each of the extremes of any given diversity is one in itself, and in the same way in which it is one in itself it seems to be diverse from the other extreme, such that the unity of one extreme seems to be *per se* the *ratio* of the diversity of the other extreme.

[First Confirmation of Scotus’s Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]: This is also confirmed in another way, since if the only real unity in this thing is numerical, whatever unity there is in that thing, it is numerically one in virtue of itself; hence this [thing] and that [thing] are primarily diverse according to every beingness in them, for diverse [things] agree in no one at all.

[Second Confirmation of Scotus’s Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]: This is also confirmed in that numerical diversity is for this singular not to be that singular, assuming the beingness of each extreme. But such unity is necessarily [possessed] by each extreme.

[Seventh Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

Furthermore, even were no intellect to exist, fire would generate fire and destroy water, and there would be some real unity in form of the generator to the generated, according to which the generation is univocal. The generation is not made to be univocal by the intellect considering it; {rather, [the intellect] cognizes it to be univocal}.

[Fifth Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 31 (Vat. 7 402.18–403.2)]:
 {Besides}, Avicenna says in *Met.* 5.1 [fol.86va] that ‘horseness is just horseness—it is of itself neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular’; << therefore, [there is some real unity less than numerical unity] >>.

[Sixth Argument]

[Scotus, *Ord.* 1 d. 2 2 qq. 1–4 n. 398 (Vat. 2 354)]:
 {Besides}, it is impossible for the same [thing] to completely differ *a parte rei* from something and to really agree with it; but Socrates really differs from Plato and really is the same as him; therefore [there is some real unity less than numerical unity]. #|

[Ockham’s Argument Against the Formal Distinction]

The position [of Scotus] can be argued against in two ways.

[Argument Against the Formal Distinction]

It is impossible in the case of creatures for some [items] to differ formally unless they be really distinguished. Hence if the nature is in some way distinguished from that contracting differentia, they must be distinguished either: (*i*) as thing and thing; (*ii*) as being of reason (*ens rationis*) and being of reason; (*iii*) as real being and being of reason. But (*i*) is denied by [Scotus], and likewise (*ii*). Hence (*iii*) must be granted. Hence a nature that is in any way distinguished from the individual is only a being of reason.

[Proof of the Antecedent]: The antecedent is clear [as follows]. If the nature and that contracting differentia were not the same in all ways, then something can be truly affirmed of one and denied of the other. But the same cannot be truly affirmed and truly denied of the same thing in the case of creatures. Hence [the nature and the contracting differentia] are not one thing.

[Proof of the Minor in the Proof of the Antecedent]: The minor premiss is clear [as follows]. If [it were not the case], every way of establishing a distinction among things in the case of creatures disappears, for contradiction is the most powerful way of establishing a distinction among things. Hence if in the case of creatures exactly the same can be truly affirmed and truly denied of the same thing (|# or something [suppositing] for the same thing #|), no real distinction can be established among them.

[Confirmation]: This point is confirmed [as follows]. All contradictories possess equal incompatibility. But the incompatibility between being

and non-being is such that if *A* exists and *B* does not exist, it follows that *B* is not *A*, and so too for any given contradictories.

[Objections and Replies]

[First Objection]: If it were said that it is true for primary contradictories that it happens that real non-identity is established through them [in this way], yet this does not happen through other contradictories—

[Reply]: On the contrary, the syllogistic form holds equally in any subject-matter. Hence this is a good syllogism:

Every *A* is *B*, and *C* is not *B*; hence *C* is not *A*.

Consequently, it is true regarding *A* and non-*A* that, if this is *A* and this is not *A*, that this is not this, just as [it is true that] if this exists and this does not exist, this is not this. Hence it is likewise in the case at hand: if every individual differentia is of itself proper to some individual, and the nature is not of itself proper to some individual, it follows that the nature is not the individual differentia, and this really.

[Second Objection]: If it were said that this argument does not hold, because the divine essence is the Son, and the Father is not the Son, and yet the Father is the essence—

[Reply]: This answer is not sufficient. For just as it is unique in God that three things are numerically one thing, and hence that numerically one thing is any given one of the three things, and yet [any given] one of those three things is not the others, so too it is unique and exceeding all understanding that [the consequence]:

The Son is numerically one essence, and the Father is not the Son; hence the Father is not the essence

does not follow. And so that uniqueness should be postulated only where the authority of Sacred Scripture compels it. Hence such a consequence [as that given in the reply to the first objection] ought never to be denied in the case of creatures, since no authority of Sacred Scripture compels it there (|# since in the case of creatures no one thing is many things and any given [one] of them #|).

[Third Objection]: If it were said that a consequence of this kind is acceptable if the pair of the premisses were taken without any determination, and so

Every individual differentia is proper to some individual, and the nature is not proper [to some individual]; hence the nature is not really the individual differentia

follows correctly. But then the minor premiss is false. Furthermore, [the consequence] does not hold in all cases if [the premisses] were taken under a certain syncategorematic determination, such as 'of itself' or '*per se*'—

[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For just as there is syllogistic form in uniformly modal [premisses] as well as in [uniformly] assertoric [premisses] (and likewise there is syllogistic form that is mixed out of these [kinds of premisses]), so too there is syllogistic form, mixed as well as uniform, in other propositions taken with other syncategorematic determinations, such as '*per se*,' 'insofar as,' and the like. Consequently, there is syllogistic form in this case:

Every man *per se* is an animal, and no stone *per se* is an animal; hence no stone is *per se* a man (and consequently in all cases no stone is a man)

just as much as [there is syllogistic form] in this case:

Every animal of necessity is a substance, and no accident of necessity is a substance; hence no accident of necessity is an animal.

Likewise, this is an acceptable mixed syllogism:

Every man *per se* is an animal, and nothing white is an animal; hence nothing white is a man.

Thus, in the same way, this will be an acceptable syllogism:

Every individual differentia is of itself proper to some individual, and the nature is not of itself proper [to some individual]; hence the nature is not the individual differentia.

Likewise, this will be an acceptable syllogism:

No individual differentia is really common, and the nature is really common; hence the nature is not really the individual differentia and the premisses are true. Hence the conclusion is too.

[Confirmation of the Reply]: This point is confirmed [as follows]. Just as an assertoric conclusion always follows from necessary propositions, so too an assertoric conclusion follows from premisses with the mark of *per se*, and this because the *per se* is necessary. Hence just as [this consequence]:

The nature necessarily is communicable, and the contracting differentia necessarily is not communicable; hence the contracting differentia is not the nature

follows syllogistically and formally, so too [the consequence]:

The nature *per se* is communicable to many, and the contracting differentia of itself is not communicable to many; hence the contracting differentia is not the nature

follows [syllogistically and formally].

Nor does it avail to say that the conclusion [of this consequence] is true, *e. g.* that the contracting differentia is not the nature even though it is not really distinguished from [the nature]. For [the consequence]:

[The nature and the contracting differentia] are not really distinguished,

and each is a thing; hence they are really the same; hence the one is really the other

follows. And, in addition, “hence the one is the other” [follows]. Consequently, the predication of the one of the other is true.

The next-to-last consequence, [namely “hence the one is the other”], is clear. For ‘really’ is not a determination that distracts or diminishes [the supposition], just as ‘formally’ does not. Consequently, there is a formal consequence from something taken with such a determination to it taken *per se*, according to the rule [laid down by] the Philosopher in *De int.* 13 [22^a14–23^a27].

[General Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: [# The entire preceding argument is confirmed. For just as this syllogism:

No differentia is common, and the nature is common; hence the nature is not the differentia

is governed by the dictum de omni et nullo, so too this [syllogism]:

No differentia is of itself common, and the nature is of itself common; therefore, the nature is not the differentia

is governed by the dictum de omni et nullo. #]

[Seven Arguments Against Scotus’s View]

In the second way, it can be argued against [Scotus’s] view that it is not true even assuming that there were such a [formal] distinction.

[First Argument Against Scotus’s View]

Whenever one of [a pair of] opposites really agrees with something, such that it is genuinely and really denominated by [that opposite], whether they agree with it in virtue of itself or through something else, [then], with this obtaining and not changed, the other of the [pair of] opposites will not really agree with it; instead, it will simply be denied of it. Yet according to [Scotus], every thing outside the soul is really singular and numerically one, even though one is singular of itself and another [is singular] only through something that has been added [to it]. Hence no thing outside the soul is really common, nor one by means of a unity that is opposed to the unity of singularity. Hence there really is no unity except the unity of singularity.

[Objections and Replies]

[Objection]: If it were said that these two unities are not really opposites, and that in the same way singularity and commonness are not really opposed—

[First Reply to the Objection]: On the contrary, if they are not really opposed, then it cannot be inferred from any opposition that they primarily

agree to the same *a parte rei*. Hence it cannot adequately be inferred (*a*) that what is the same and through the same in all ways be one by this unity, [which is numerical], and by that [unity, which is less than numerical], and (*b*) that what is the same and through the same in all ways be singular and common.

[Second Reply to the Objection]: Besides, whenever the consequents are incompatible the antecedents will also be incompatible. But this [consequence] follows:

A is common or one by a lesser unity; hence a multiplicity that is opposed to a greater unity (*i. e.* numerical multiplicity) obtains along with *A*

And [this consequence] follows:

A is one by a greater unity; hence a multiplicity that is opposed [to a greater unity] (*i. e.* numerical multiplicity) does not obtain along with *A*

But ‘numerical multiplicity obtains along with *a*’ and ‘numerical multiplicity does not obtain along with *a*’ are incompatible. Hence ‘*a* is one by a lesser unity’ and ‘*a* is one by a greater unity’ are incompatible. Yet according to [Scotus], the [proposition]:

A is one by a greater unity

is true, since he says that the nature is numerically one. Hence the [proposition]:

A is one by a lesser unity

is false (always taking ‘*A*’ for the very nature that he always calls one by a lesser unity). And if the nature were not one by a lesser unity, so much the less would anything else be.

[Proof of the Assumption in the Second Reply]: The assumption is clear according to [Scotus], since he says ([*Ord.* 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 9, Vat. 7 395.11–13]):

Whenever a multiplicity [which is] opposed to a greater unity can obtain along with a lesser unity without contradiction, the multiplicity cannot obtain along with a greater unity that is incompatible with it.

[Objection to the Second Reply]: If it were said that this form of arguing does not hold, since blackness obtains along with a man and blackness does not obtain along with something white, and yet a man is white, and ‘*a*’ is a man and he is white—

[First Reply]: This [objection] doesn’t work; taking ‘obtaining’ uniformly, one or the other of those [propositions] is false. Taking ‘obtaining’ actually, then this [proposition]:

Blackness obtains along with Socrates

is false, if Socrates were white. However, taking [‘obtaining’] potentially, then this [proposition]:

Blackness does not obtain along with something white

is false, for blackness can obtain along with something white, *e. g.* something white can be black or have blackness. Accordingly, although blackness is incompatible with whiteness, nevertheless it is not incompatible with that which is white. Consequently, [blackness] is not incompatible with something white (since these two terms ‘something white’ and ‘that which is white’ convert).

[Second Reply]: Besides, what [Scotus] says—that a multiplicity that is opposed to a greater unity can obtain along with a lesser unity, without contradiction—seems incompatible with another remark, in which he says that the nature and the individual differentia do not really differ. For when any two [items] are really the same, whatever can through divine power really be one of them, can be the other. But that individual differentia cannot be numerically many really distinct [items]. Hence the nature, which is really the same as that contracting differentia, cannot really be many. Nor, consequently, can [the nature] be some thing other than that contracting differentia. And thus the nature is not compatible with numerical multiplicity, without contradiction.

[First Confirmation of the Second Reply]: This argument is confirmed [as follows]. Anything that is really universal, whether it be completely universal or not, is really common to many (|# or at least can be really common to many #|). But no thing is really common to many. Hence no thing is universal in any way.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is obvious. For the universal is distinguished from the singular through this feature: that the singular is determined to one, whereas the universal is indifferent to many (in that way in which it is universal).

[First Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss is obvious. For no thing that is really singular is common to many. But every thing, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], is really singular. Hence [no thing is common to many].

[Second Proof of the Minor]: Likewise, if some thing brought in by ‘man’ is common to many, it is either (*i*) the nature that is in Socrates, or (*ii*) the nature that is in Plato, or (*iii*) some third [nature that is different] from them. [With regard to (*i*): it is not the nature of Socrates, since that in virtue of which he is really a singular cannot be in Plato. [With regard to (*ii*): it is not the nature of Plato, on account of the the same [reason]. [With regard to (*iii*): it is not a third nature, since there is no such [nature]

outside the soul—for, according to these [philosophers who hold this view], every thing outside the soul is really singular.

[Second Confirmation of the Second Reply]: It is confirmed, secondly, [as follows]. That which cannot be communicated to many even through divine power is not really common. But, for any given thing that is picked out, that [thing] cannot be communicated to many by divine power, because it is really singular. Hence no thing is really and positively common.

[Objection]: If it were said that although being in many is incompatible with the nature, nevertheless it is not incompatible with it of itself but on account of what has been added [to it], and along with this [addition] it is one through real identity—

[Reply]: On the contrary, that ‘non-incompatibility’ of itself is not positive. Consequently, that commonness (such that something would be common) is not positive, but rather it is only negative. Consequently, there is no positive unity, except only numerical unity.

Besides, I can attribute such negative lesser unity to that individual degree, since it is certainly not numerically one in virtue of itself and *per se primo modo*. And taking ‘non-incompatibility in virtue of itself or *per se*’ in this way, namely in that it is opposed to ‘agreeing to something *per se primo modo*’, this [proposition] will be true:

Being in many is not incompatible with that individual differentia in virtue of itself

or

Being one by a unity less than numerical unity is not incompatible with [that individual differentia] in virtue of itself

since its opposite is false, namely that the individual differentia *per se primo modo* is numerically one (according to those [philosophers who hold this view]).

[Second Argument Against Scotus's View]

Secondly, mainly in line with this [second] way [of arguing against Scotus's view], I argue as follows. If the nature were common in this fashion, it would follow that there would be as many species and genera as there are individuals, since the nature of Socrates is a species, and the nature of Plato [is also a species] for the same reason. Then I argue: whenever some [items] are really many, each of which can be called a species, then there are many species. But so it is in the case at hand. Hence [there are as many species and genera as there are individuals].

This [second argument] is confirmed [as follows]. The multiplication of an attribute (*passio*) follows upon the multiplication of [its] proximate subject. Yet according to [Scotus], that lesser unity is an attribute of the

nature. Hence just as the nature is multiplied, so too will the attribute (since it is real) be multiplied. And consequently, just as there really are two natures in Socrates and Plato, so there will really be two lesser unities. But that lesser unity either is commonness or is inseparable from commonness, and consequently inseparable from what is common. Hence there are two common [items] in Socrates and Plato, and consequently two species. And consequently Socrates would fall under one common [item] and Plato under another, and thus there would be as many common [items]—even generalissima—as there are individuals. And these [results] seem absurd.

[Objections and Replies]

[First Objection]: If it were said that a thing is not completely universal, but rather only [is completely universal] in that it is considered by an intellect—

[First Reply]: On the contrary, I raise a question about that which is immediately denominated as universal: either (*i*) it is precisely a genuine thing outside the soul, or (*ii*) it is precisely a being of reason, or (*iii*) it is the aggregate of a real being and a being of reason. [With regard to (*i*): if (*i*) were granted, what was to be proved—that a singular thing is simply and completely universal—is established, contrary to their own claim, since according to those [philosophers who hold this view] nothing outside the soul is a thing unless it be really singular. Consequently, the same thing that is really singular is common, and it is no more the one than the other. Hence there are as many completely universal [items] as there are singulars. [With regard to (*ii*): if (*ii*) were granted, it follows that no thing is universal, neither completely nor inchoately, neither in act nor in potency. For that which cannot be reduced to completion and act by divine power that it somehow exist, is not such, neither in potency nor inchoately. This is true where what is reduced to one act does not in virtue of this fact remain in potency to another act, as is the case in the division of the continuum ad infinitum and when something is in potency to contradictories—as is not so in the case at hand. Hence if precisely a being of reason is completely universal and in act, and in no way a thing outside the soul, it follows that a thing outside the soul is in no way universal, one no more than another. [With regard to (*iii*): if (*iii*) were granted, what was to be proved is established. For the multiplication of the whole or the aggregate always follows upon the multiplication of any given part. Hence if what is completely universal is an aggregate of a thing and a being of reason, there will be as many such aggregates as there are things outside the soul any given one of which is a part of the whole aggregate. And thus it will hold that there will be as many generalissima as there are individuals.

[Second Reply]: Besides, just as the nature is one in many and pertains to many and is predicable of them, so too what is common is one in many and pertains to many and is predicable of them. But this is sufficient for something to be completely universal, according to those [philosophers who hold this view]. Hence anything common has whatever is required for something to be completely universal. Consequently, [anything common has whatever is required] for something to be completely a species or a genus. Yet according to those [philosophers who hold this view], as recounted [in Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 42 (Vat. 7 410.4–14)] ([cited above]), commonness agrees to the nature in virtue of itself outside the intellect. Hence so does being completely universal. Consequently, from the fact that there are as many common [items] as individuals, as proved [in the preceding paragraph], it follows in point of fact (*ex natura rei*) that there are as many generalissima as there are individuals.

[Confirmation of the Second Reply]: This is confirmed [as follows]. If the nature that is in Socrates is genuinely common, then, since when Socrates is destroyed anything essential to him is destroyed, it follows that something common would be genuinely destroyed and annihilated. But it is certain that something common continues to exist, in virtue of which an individual [such as Plato] continues to exist. And from such a contradiction a real distinction can be inferred, according to those [philosophers who hold this view]. Hence one of those common [items] is not really the other. Consequently, when they exist, they are many [and not one].

[Second Objection]: If it were said that the nature is not common in virtue of the fact that it has been made appropriate to Socrates through the contracting differentia—

[Reply]: On the contrary, according to [Scotus], this commonness agrees to the nature outside the intellect ([Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 2 d. 3 1 q. 1 n. 42, Vat. 7 410.4–14; cited in 166.10–11 above]). Hence I ask what ‘nature’ supposits for in this case: either for (*i*) a real being, or (*ii*) a being of reason. Now (*ii*) cannot be granted, since this would include a contradiction. If [‘nature’] supposits for a real being, then [it supposits] either (*a*) for a real being that is singular, or (*b*) for some real being that is not really singular. If (*a*) [were granted], then it is not common, and consequently is not common in virtue of itself. If (*b*) were granted, then it is some thing outside the soul that is not really singular, which the [philosophers who hold this view] nevertheless deny, since they say that the nature is really numerically one and singular.

[Third Argument Against Scotus's View]

Thirdly, I argue as follows. The humanity in Socrates and the human-

ity in Plato are really distinguished. Hence each of those [humanities] is really numerically one. Consequently, neither is common.

[Objections and Replies]

[First Objection]: If it were said that these natures are only distinct through those added differentiae, just as each of them is numerically one only through the added differentia, and hence neither is of itself singular but rather is of itself common—

[First Reply to the First Objection]: On the contrary, every thing is essentially distinguished either of itself or through something intrinsic to it from any other thing from which it is essentially distinguished. But the humanity that is in Socrates is essentially distinguished from the humanity that is in Plato. Hence [the humanity of Socrates] is distinguished either of itself or by something intrinsic to it from the [the humanity of Plato]. Hence it is not [distinguished] by something extrinsic that is added to it.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is clear [for the following four reasons].

- (1) It is nothing at all to say that Socrates is distinguished from this ass through Plato essentially.
- (2) Likewise, being the same and [being] diverse immediately follow upon being. Hence nothing is the same or diverse from anything through something extrinsic.
- (3) Likewise, according to the Philosopher and the Commentator, *Met.* 4.2 [1003^b24 and Averroes, *Iuntina* tom.8 fol.32r], every being is one through its essence and not through what is added [to it]. Hence nothing is numerically one by something added. Hence the nature that is in Socrates, if it be numerically one, will be numerically one either of itself or by something essential to it.
- (4) Likewise, if the nature were numerically one, then it is not common. Consequently, it is not common of itself. For the determination ‘of itself’ is not a distracting or a diminishing determination; hence there is an acceptable consequence from an absolute determinable negation to a negation determinable with this determination. Hence just as [the consequence] “Socrates is not a man; hence he is not necessarily a man” follows, so too does “The humanity that is in Socrates is not common, and so it is not common of itself.”

[Confirmation of the First Reply]: This is confirmed. Whenever something is said “to agree to another of itself” not positively but negatively, as it is said that the creature is of itself a non-being and that matter is of itself a privation—which [examples], and similar ones, are literally false, but are true in that they are equipollent to certain negative [propositions], such as:

Matter is not of itself formed
and

The creature is not of itself such a being
—although it is not necessary that it actually be present in that to which it is said to agree in virtue of itself, still, at least by divine power, it can simply be present in it, just as the creature can be a non-being or matter can be deprived or be a privation. Hence, likewise, the humanity that is in Socrates can be common to many men. The consequent is impossible; hence the antecedent is too.

Proof of the falsity of the consequent: when some [items] are really the same, it is impossible that one be really the same as the other unless the other be really the same as it. Now this is true in the case of creatures, and it is even true in God in some way, since although it is not true to say that the Father is the Son, notwithstanding the identity of the Father as well as of the Son with the divine essence, nevertheless it is true to say that the Father is that thing that is the Son. Hence, because the humanity that is in Socrates is really the same as the contracting differentia, if the humanity that is in Socrates can really be the same as the contracting differentia in Plato, it follows that this contracting differentia and that contracting [differentia] could be one thing. Consequently, some one thing could be Socrates and Plato. And this includes a contradiction.

[Second Reply to the First Objection]: Besides, whatever is distinguished *a parte rei* from something that does not pertain to its formal understanding can be intuitively seen without it, according to that Doctor. And he also puts it forward that the divine essence can be intuitively seen without a Person. Hence the humanity that is in Socrates can be intuitively seen without the contracting differentia, and, in the same way, the humanity that is in Plato can be intuitively seen without any contracting differentia. Consequently, since those humanities are distinguished in place and subject, such an intellect—[one that intuitively sees the humanities in this way]—can distinguish the one from the other without any contracting differentia. And this would not be possible if they were precisely distinguished by their respective contracting differentiae. Hence of themselves they are distinguished numerically.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. Such an intellect can formulate a negative proposition of this kind, by stating:

This is not this
and it can know this [proposition] to be true. Hence that thing of itself is not the other thing.

This is confirmed [as follows]. According to that Doctor, [items] that

are formally compossible or incompatible are compossible or incompatible by their formal *rationes*. Hence, for the same reason, whatever [items] are distinguished or are the same by their formal *rationes* are distinguished or are the same. Hence if these humanities (*e.g.* [the humanities] of Socrates and Plato) are really distinguished, they will be distinguished by their proper formal *rationes* and through no added [elements]. Consequently, any given one of them of itself, without anything added, is really distinguished from the other.

[Proof of the Assumption]: The assumption is clear, since [Duns Scotus] says ([*Ord.* 1 d. 2 1 qq. 1–4 n. 377, Vat. 2 377.10–13]):

It should be noted that just as incompatibles are incompatible in virtue of their proper *rationes*, so too there is non-incompatibility or compossibility in virtue of the proper *rationes* of the compossibles.

[Objection]: If it were said that from the fact that you, [William of Ockham], say ‘those humanities’ when you say “those humanities are really distinguished,” you include those contracting differentiae, since the [humanities] are ‘those’ only through those contracting differentiae, and so are distinguished by their formal *rationes*, since those [contracting] differentiae pertain to the formal *ratio* of those humanities such that, putting aside those differentiae, only an indistinct humanity remains—

[Reply]: On the contrary, whenever any [items] are distinguished *a parte rei* in any given way, a term that would precisely stand for one and not for the other can be imposed. (Indeed, otherwise there could not be any true proposition denoting the distinctness of the one from the other.) Hence I impose this term ‘A’, which would precisely stand for that which in Socrates is formally (and not really) distinguished from the contracting differentia. For, according to [Scotus], there is something in Socrates that is formally distinguished from the contracting differentia, which nevertheless is really the same as that [contracting] differentia, and so is really singular. I also impose this term ‘B’, which would precisely stand for that which is formally distinguished from the contracting differentia in Plato, and yet is really the same as that contracting differentia. Then I raise the question whether *A* and *B* are (*i*) really the same, or (*ii*) not [really the same]. [With regard to (*i*): if [*A* and *B*] are [really the same], then, without varying them in any way, they are really distinguished. Consequently, there is something that is really indistinct in Socrates and in Plato, which those [philosophers who hold this view] deny, since they claim that nothing really indistinct is the same in Socrates and in Plato. [With regard to (*ii*): if [*A* and *B*] are not really the same, then they are really distinguished, and so [they are distinguished] through their proper formal *rationes*. But these

[proper formal *rationes*] do not include those contracting differentiae, by assumption. Thus what was to be proved—that they are distinguished of themselves—is established.

Besides, according to [Scotus] this [proposition]:

A is really incompatible with the contracting differentia of Plato is true. Hence it is incompatible with it through its formal *ratio*. Hence it is really distinguished from it through its proper *ratio*. Hence it is really distinguished of itself, and this only numerically, since it is distinguished neither in species nor in genus. Hence of itself it is numerically one.

If it were said that whatever [items] are incompatible or compossible are incompatible or compossible by their proper *rationes* or through some [elements] really the same as them—

This [objection] doesn't work. For it is clear that just as, according to that Doctor, in that passage he is speaking not only of the incompatibility and compossibility of things that are really distinct but also of the incompatibility and compossibility of those [items] that are only formally distinct or are compossible, so too it is clear as regards the case of the divine essence and divine relation. Hence *a* and *b* of themselves will be distinguished or will be really the same, even putting aside those [contracting] differentiae. And they are not really the same, since if they were they could never be really distinguished. Hence they are really distinguished of themselves.

[Fourth Argument Against Scotus's View]

Fourthly, I argue as follows. If the contracted nature were really distinct from every contracting degree, the nature would be numerically one in virtue of itself, as proved above in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]. Hence, since that nature is no less one due to its real identity with the contracting differentia, it follows that it will be numerically one in virtue of itself.

This is confirmed [as follows]. The nature loses nothing of its unity through the fact that it is really the same as that which is fully one. Hence [the nature] will be of itself one through the fact that it is really the same as the individual differentia no less than if it were really distinguished from the individual differentia.

This [confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. According to that Doctor, whatever order any [items] have if they be really distinct, they have the same order in the case in which they are distinguished in some way (yet not really [distinguished]). But if the contracting differentia and the nature were really distinguished, they would have an order as two [items] of which either would be numerically one in virtue of itself, and one would be in virtue of itself potency and the other act. Hence they will have a consimilar order in the case in which they are distinguished formally.

This confirmation is more obvious as regards the nature of the genus with respect to the specific differentiae. For if (a) the nature **color** were not really the same as the specific differentia of whiteness, and (b) the nature **color** were not really the same as the [specific] differentia of blackness, and, nevertheless, (c) those natures were distinguished of themselves—[then] they would have the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect. Hence in the case in which they are now not really distinguished from the specific differentiae but are really distinguished among themselves, they will have the same order of themselves. And this would only be possible were they distinguished of themselves, since it is a contradiction that some [items] be related as the more perfect and the more imperfect unless they be distinguished of themselves, since the perfect and the imperfect are necessarily distinguished. Hence if now those specific natures of themselves were to have the order of the more perfect and the more imperfect, they would be distinguished of themselves.

[Fifth Argument Against Scotus's View]

Fifthly, it would follow that the degree [of the individual differentia] would be as equally communicable as the nature—rather, it is in fact communicated to many universals. And this is incompatible with the nature in respect of individual differentiae. Hence the individual degree is no less communicable than the nature.

[Sixth Argument Against Scotus's View]

That [individual] differentia and that nature are either of the same *ratio* or of different [*rationes*]. If they are of the same *ratio*, then the one is no more singular of itself than the other. If they are of different [*rationes*]

Against this: those [items] that are one thing in the case of creatures are not of different *rationes*; but the individual differentia and the contracted nature are one thing; hence [they are not of different *rationes*].

Likewise, there is a greater or equal likeness and agreement among those [items] that are one thing than among those [items] that are really distinguished. Hence they are able to agree in their properties and attributes more or equally, while they are all yet equally simple or composite. Hence if the individual degree contracting the nature **man** and the individual degree contracting the nature **ass** agree in this attribute, that each is of itself a *this*, the individual degree and the nature (which is really the same as that [individual] degree) will be able to agree equally in that same attribute.

Likewise, *A* and *B*, which are really the same, are no less of the same *ratio* than *A* and *D*, if they be really distinguished. But the nature that is in Socrates and the nature that is in Plato, which are really distinguished,

are of the same *ratio*. Hence so much the more will the nature of Socrates and the contracting differentia be of the same *ratio*.

|# Likewise, then Socrates would include something of a *ratio* that differs from all that which is in Plato. And this is false, since then Socrates and Plato would not simply be of the same *ratio*. #|

[Seventh Argument Against Scotus's View]

Seventhly, if the nature were contracted in this way precisely by the contracting differentia [from which it is] only formally distinct, real univocation could equally be postulated, *i. e.* of something real *a parte rei* that is univocal to God and creatures, just as such a univocation can be postulated with respect to any given individuals in the case of creatures. The consequent goes against these [philosophers], who hold precisely that there is some concept that is univocal to God and to the creature and not something *a parte rei*, just as they hold *ex parte alia*.

[Proof of the Consequence]: The consequence is clear [as follows]. Such univocation should only be denied because there would follow in God a composition out of something that is contracted and something that contracts. But, assuming a formal distinction, no composition follows, since those [items] that are only formally distinct do not produce composition, as is clear in the case of the divine essence and [divine] relation. Hence such univocation is not incompatible with the divine simplicity.

[Confirmation]: The [proof of the consequence] is confirmed [as follows]. There is no more reason that those formally distinct [items] produce composition than do others, although they are more distinguished than the others. For by whatever reason degrees in the formal distinction are postulated, by the same reason degrees in a composition out of formally distinct [items] will be postulated.

This [confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. Just as when some [items] are really distinguished, whether they are more or less [distinguished], if they were to make [something] that is *per se* one, there is no greater reason that these produce composition than those, although these less than those, so too if some [items] were formally distinguished and make [something] that is *per se* one, there is no greater reason that these produce composition than those. Hence either all formally distinct [items] making or constituting [something] that is *per se* one produce composition, or none do.

[Six Incorrect Statements in the Formulation of Scotus's View]

Again, running through [Scotus's] remarks—many points seem to be stated incorrectly in his manner of putting them forward.

[First Incorrect Statement]

First, [Scotus] says:

The nature is naturally prior to this beingness as it is a *this*.

This is not true [for the following reasons].

- (i) For the same reason, since there is a formal distinction between the essence and relation, the essence would be naturally prior to the relation. And this is false.
- (ii) According to [Scotus's] own remarks elsewhere, anything that is prior in nature to something else can, through divine power, come to be without the posterior. But this is impossible for the nature, since it is really the same as the contracting differentia.

The assumption is clear, because [Scotus] holds that it is this to be prior to another: to be able to be without it and not conversely.

[Second Incorrect Statement]

Second, [the thesis (S5)]:

The individual differentia is not quidditative seems to be stated incorrectly. For anything that pertains to the essence of something that is *per se* in a genus pertains to its quiddity, and consequently is a quidditative beingness. But this individual differentia pertains to the essence of an individual that is *per se* in a genus. Hence [the individual differentia is quidditative].

[Objection]: If it were said that it is required that [the individual differentia] be a communicable beingness, since every quiddity is communicable—

[Reply]: This seems to be a senseless remark. For just as you, [Scotus], hold that every quiddity is communicable, so too might I with the same ease hold that every real quiddity is communicable to [items] that are distinct in species, and so specific beingness will not be quidditative beingness. It seems, then, that one ought to say that every beingness that pertains to the essence of some thing that is *per se* one and existing *per se* in a genus is a quidditative beingness, such that whether it be communicable or incommunicable is irrelevant. More exactly, one ought to say (as will be clear [later]) that no real quidditative beingness is communicable except as form is communicated to matter or in the sort of way in which a distinct thing is communicated to a distinct thing.

[Third Incorrect Statement]

Third, [the thesis (S8)]:

The nature is indifferent of itself, and yet really is the contracting differentia

seems to be stated incorrectly. For, as has been argued, that which is of

itself indifferent is indifferent. But what is indifferent is not really the same as what is really non-indifferent. Hence the nature and the contracting differentia are not really the same.

This point is confirmed [as follows]. If [the nature] were of itself indifferent, it is either (i) really indifferent of itself, or (ii) not. If (ii), then it does nothing for the case at hand. If (i), then it can really be communicated, which was disproved before [in the discussion of the second incorrect statement in the formulation of Scotus's view]. [Now] it follows from this point that [the thesis] that the nature is of itself indifferent and yet made proper through identity [with the contracting differentia] seems to be stated incorrectly. For if [the nature] were really [of itself indifferent], being in another is incompatible with it in this regard. Hence it is not of itself common (except perhaps negatively).

[Fourth Incorrect Statement]

Fourth, [the theses (S12) and (S16)]:

The nature really is numerically one, although it is of itself common and it is numerically one only denominatively seems to be stated incorrectly. When some [items] make or constitute [something] that is one *per se*, for whatever reason an attribute or property of the one denominates the other, the converse [holds] by the same reason. For example: for whatever reason a property of the matter is predicated denominatively of the form, a property or an attribute of the form will be predicated denominatively of the matter by the same reason. Hence, since the nature and the contracting differentia make [something] that is one *per se*, for whatever reason 'numerical unity' is predicated denominatively of the nature such that the nature really is numerically one, by the same reason 'lesser unity,' which is an attribute of the nature itself, will be predicated denominatively of the individual differentia such that the individual differentia will really be common and one by a lesser unity. Consequently, the singular as a whole, by the same reason, will be denominated by each unity. Thus the singular will be no more numerically one than common, or it will be one by a lesser unity.

From this point, it is clear that [Scotus's] analogy [with color and whiteness] supports the opposite [position]. For just as the specific differentia cannot be called one by a unity lesser than specific unity would be, so too the unity of the genus cannot be called one by a unity greater than the unity of the genus would be.

[Fifth Incorrect Statement]

Fifth:

The universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity, [according to which \ll it \gg is in proximate potency to be said of any given supposit] seems to be stated incorrectly. For then it would be necessary that the universal in act would be one in many and [said] of many. But I raise the question whether that universal is a being of reason, and consequently is only one in many singulars outside the soul through predication (which is being said of many). Hence, distinguishing being in many from being said of many, [the thesis] is not true. If, however, that universal were outside the soul, then it is in the thing according to some unity.

[Sixth Incorrect Statement]

Sixth:

Commonness, and likewise singularity, agree to the nature outside the intellect

seems to be stated incorrectly. For nothing outside the intellect is common, since outside the intellect everything is really singular.

[Ockham's Reply to the Initial Question]

Therefore, I answer the question in another way.

[Two Theorems]

First, I prove this theorem:

[Theorem 1]: Any given singular thing is singular of itself.

I argue persuasively for it as follows.

[First Argument for Theorem 1]: Singularity immediately agrees to that of which it is. Hence it cannot agree to itself through something else. Hence if something be singular, it is singular of itself.

[Second Argument for Theorem 1]: Besides, that which is singular is related to being singular just as that which is universal is related to being universal. Hence that which is singular cannot become universal or common through something added to it, just as that which is common cannot become singular through something added to it. Hence whatever is singular is singular through nothing added [to it], but rather of itself.

The second theorem:

[Theorem 2]: Every thing outside the soul is really singular and numerically one.

[First Argument for Theorem 2]: Every thing outside the soul is either (*i*) simple, or (*ii*) composite. [With regard to (*i*): if it be simple, then it does not include many things. But every thing that does not include many things is numerically one, for any such thing and one other consimilar thing are precisely two things. Hence each of them is numerically one. Hence every

simple thing is numerically one. [With regard to (ii)]: if it be composite, one must eventually arrive at a definite number of parts. Consequently, any of those parts will be numerically one. Consequently, the whole that is composed out of these [parts] will be numerically one or will be one by aggregation.

[Second Argument for Theorem 2]: This [second conclusion] can also be argued for in this fashion. I take that thing that you do not hold to be a singular thing, and I raise the question whether it includes (i) many things, or (ii) not. [With regard to (ii)]: if not, I take some really distinct consimilar [thing], and I argue as follows. These things are really distinct and are not infinite in number; hence they are finite in number—and only in a duality, as is clear. Hence there are precisely two in this case. Consequently, each of them will be numerically one. [With regard to (i)]: if, however, it includes many things and not an infinite [number], then [it includes] a finite [number]. Consequently, there is a [finite] number of things in this case. Thus any of those included [things] will be numerically one and singular. It follows from these points that any given thing outside the soul is singular of itself, such that it itself, without anything added [to it], is that which is immediately denominated by the concept (*intentio*) of singularity. Nor are there any given possible [things] *a parte rei*, however distinct, of which one would be more indifferent than the other, or of which one would be more numerically one than the other—unless perhaps one were more perfect than the other, as this angel is more perfect than this ass. Thus any given thing outside the soul will of itself be a this. Nor is there any cause of individuation to be sought (except perhaps intrinsic and extrinsic causes when the individual is composite). Rather, there would more be a cause to be sought how it is possible for something to be common and universal.

[Response to the Initial Question]

Hence I respond to the formulation of the [initial] question [as follows]. That which is universal and univocal is not really something *ex parte rei* formally distinct from the individual. That it is not only formally distinct is clear, since then, whenever a superior were predicated of an inferior, the same would be predicated of itself, since the superior and the inferior would be the same thing. The consequent is false, since then the same genus would never be predicated of diverse species, but now this would be predicated and now that, which seems unacceptable.

[Replies to the Arguments for Scotus's View]

[Reply to the First Argument]

I state that ‘being present in something’ can be taken in two ways.
Either:

(a) really

or:

(b) according to predication

(as the predicate is said ‘to be present’ in the subject of which it is said)

Now according to (a), it is true that, for whatever something is present in, it is present in it in whatsoever. This is not necessary according to (b), if the subject were a common term; hence [the consequence]:

If the nature **man** were of itself a *this*, that in whatsoever there is the nature **man**, that is this man
does not follow.

Nevertheless, the proposition:

The nature **man** is of itself a *this*

should be distinguished—though perhaps not literally—in that ‘the nature **man**’ can supposit simply or personally, *i. e.* in that [‘the nature **man**’] can stand for [either]: (i) a thing outside the soul, or (ii) for itself. [With regard to (ii)]: if (ii), this [proposition]:

The nature **stone** is of itself a *this*

is false, for then it is denoted that the mental concept, which is the universal, is of itself this stone. And this is false, since that concept cannot be this stone either of itself or through any given power, although [the concept] could be truly predicated of it, not for itself but for an external thing. [With regard to (i)]: if (i) were accepted, then this [proposition]:

The nature **man** is of itself this man

is true. Nevertheless, there obtains along with this that the nature **man** is of itself that man—rather, that the nature **man** is not of itself this man. For, because ‘the nature **man**’ is a common term, they will be able to be true as two subcontraries, each of which is verified of now one and now another singular. For then they are equipollent to these particular [propositions]:

Some nature is of itself this [man]

which is verified for this nature, and:

Some nature is not of itself this man

which is verified for another nature that is not this nature. And in the same way, just as these [propositions]:

A man is Socrates

and:

A man is Plato

obtain together, so too these [propositions]:

The nature **man** is of itself this man
and:

The nature **man** is of itself that man
obtain together.

When [Scotus] says:

If the nature **man** were of itself this man, then in whatsoever there is the
nature **man**, that is this man

I reply that, literally, [the consequence] does not follow formally. Rather,
it is the fallacy of ‘figure of speech,’ in that one mode of suppositing is
exchanged for another. For in the [antecedent]:

The nature **man** is of itself this man

‘the nature **man**’ supposits determinately there, whereas in the consequent,
it rather supposits merely confusedly.

Nevertheless, whatever may be the case regarding this matter, this
[proposition]:

In whatsoever there is the nature **man**, that is this man

will be true, since it has one true singular, namely [the singular proposition]:

In whatsoever there is this nature **man**, that is this man

And then, by arguing as follows:

In whatsoever there is the nature **man**, that is this man; the nature **man**
is in that man; hence that man is this man

there is a fallacy of the consequent, since [the conclusion] is argued for on
the basis of [premisses] which are all indefinite. But one should uniformly
say as regards the diversity of these propositions, of which one is denied and
the other conceded, just as [one says] regarding these [propositions]:

Of any man the ass is running

[and]:

The ass of any man is running.

[# Still, it should be noted that when [the proposition]:

The nature **man** is of itself this man

is stated, it ought to be understood such that the [grammatical] construction
is intransitive, that is, as:

The nature that is (*a*) man is of itself this man #|

[Replies to the Second Argument]

[First Reply]: I concede that, to whatever one [of a pair] of opposites
agrees of itself, the other opposite is incompatible with it of itself. And
hence, since the nature is of itself a *this*, in that ‘nature’ supposits person-
ally, I then concede uniformly that numerical multiplicity is incompatible
with the nature—that is:

(*i*) Being in another is incompatible with the nature

and:

(ii) Being in many is incompatible with the nature

[With regard to (i)]: now (i) is verified for one singular, because being in another is incompatible with this nature. Nevertheless, there obtains along with this that being in another is not incompatible with the nature. Instead, being in another agrees to the nature of itself (|# *i. e.* being another agrees to the nature #|), and this is verified for another singular. For, as stated [in the reply to the first argument for Scotus's view], they are two indefinite [propositions]. Consequently, since the subject supposits personally in them, they are equipollent to two particular [propositions], each of which has some true singular. Consequently, each is simply true. [With regard to (ii)]: that [proposition] is true for any given singular, since being in many is incompatible with any given nature.

[First Objection to the First Reply]: If it were said that being predicated of many is not incompatible with the nature, and so neither is being in many incompatible with it—

[Reply to the First Objection]: I reply that the antecedent, [namely 'being predicated of many is not incompatible with the nature'], should be distinguished [as follows]. [First], in that:

(a) the subject can supposit personally

According to (a) [the antecedent] is simply false, since it is false for any given singular, namely:

[Being predicated of many] is not incompatible with this nature

and:

[Being predicated of many] is not incompatible with that nature and so on for each [nature]. Alternatively:

(b) the subject can supposit simply

According to (b) the antecedent is true. For then it is denoted that the common [term] 'nature,' which is not in the thing but only in the mind, can be predicated of many—not for itself but for things. Now according to (a), the consequence is acceptable, since the subject supposits personally in the antecedent as well as in the consequent. According to (b), [the consequence] is not valid, since then the subject supposits simply in the antecedent and [the subject supposits] personally in the consequent, and so there is a fallacy of equivocation in the third mode. Yet if the subject of the consequent could have simple supposition, the consequent would have to be denied and the consequence would have to be denied, taking 'being in' for 'being in something really and subjectively'—for the nature is not in any singular in this way, that is to say, what is common is not subjectively in any singular.

[Second Objection to the First Reply]: If it were said that the same

thing is a this-something (*hoc aliquid*) and is distinguished from every other this-something, but the nature of itself is not distinguished from another this-something, for then it would not be this stone; hence stone of itself is not this stone—

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I reply that, as before, the claim:

The nature **stone** is itself distinguished from every other this-something is true for one singular, in that the subject suppositis personally. Likewise, the claim:

The nature **stone** is of itself another stone than that [stone] is true for another singular. And then it does not follow that another stone would not be a stone, just as [the consequence]:

Man is distinguished from Socrates or man is not Socrates; and man is

Socrates; thus Socrates is not Socrates or is distinguished from Socrates does not follow.

[Second Reply to the Second Argument for Scotus's View]: The [second] principal argument [for Scotus's view] also supports the opposite [position]. For just as when to whatever one [of a pair] of opposites agrees of itself, the other opposite is incompatible with it of itself, so too when to whatever one [of a pair of] opposites agrees, to the same [thing], so long as the [first] opposite agrees to it, the other opposite is incompatible with it. For example, if being white agrees to Socrates, so long as Socrates is white the other opposite, namely that he be black, cannot agree to him. Hence if the nature stone is this, the nature **stone**, so long as it is this, cannot be in another. Thus so long as [the nature **stone**] is this stone it cannot be any stone but the one it is. Hence it is clear that the argument works against itself. And so, for [Scotus] and for me, [the argument] should be answered as stated [here].

[Reply to the Third Argument]

It should be stated that one object is naturally prior to the act itself and another not. And so the universal is never naturally prior to the act itself. Nor is it—namely the universal in act—the proper *ratio* of the object of the intellect, since, as will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 6], the primary object of the intellect (by the primacy of generation) is the singular itself, and this under its proper *ratio* and not under the *ratio universal*.

[Reply to the Fourth Argument]

I state that the unity of the nature existing in that stone is nothing that does not equally primary belong to that stone. Nevertheless, I distinguish [senses] of 'unity' [as follows].

(i) 'Unity' is said in that it precisely denominates something that is one

and not many, not one in comparison to something else that is really distinct from it

According to (i), I state that every real unity is numerical unity. Alternatively:

(ii) ‘Unity’ is said in that it denominates many, or one in comparison to something that is really distinct [from it]

According to (ii), specific unity denominates Socrates and Plato, and generic unity denominates this man and this ass. It is not something in any way distinct from the individuals themselves, but immediately denominates the individuals themselves. Accordingly, just as it is truly said that Socrates and Plato are one or are the same in species, and Socrates is the same in species as Plato, so too it is truly said that this man and this ass are the same in genus, and that this man is one or is the same in genus as this ass—that is to say, that they are contained under the same species or under the same genus. The Philosopher explicitly holds this analysis in *Top.* 1.7 [103^a6–14], as noted in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 4]. And according to (ii), I concede that not every real unity or identity is numerical. But this unity does not agree to the nature as distinct from individuals in any way. Instead, it immediately agrees to the individuals themselves (or to one in comparison with the rest, which is the same).

But since the [seven] arguments [Scotus gives for lesser unity] go against (i), I therefore respond to them [one by one].

[Reply to Scotus’s First Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

When it is said [in Scotus’s first proof] that, according to the Philosopher [*Met.* 10.1 1052^b18]:

In every genus there is a first ‘one’ that is the standard and measure of all those [items] that belong to that genus

I state that, as will be clear in [*Ord.* 2 q. 11 (REF)], that the measure is sometimes a genuine thing outside the soul, eg cloth is measured by the wrist, and at other times the measure is only a certain concept in the mind. The first measure ought to be one by a numerical unity. But this [claim]—that in every genus there is only one that is the measure of all else—is false. But if it were to have some truth, it ought to be understood such that in every genus there is something that is the measure of all else distinct in species. However, it is not necessary that it be the measure of all else, whether they are distinguished in species or not. And in this fashion there are many [items] of which any is a measure of all else distinct in species, and any of them is one by numerical unity.

When it is said that:

The unity of the first measurer is real

I state that if ‘first’ were taken positively, this [proposition] is false due to a false implication, since nothing is a first measurer in this way. However, if [‘first’] were taken negatively, I concede this [proposition], since there are many such first [measurers], namely any given individual belonging to that species (especially if each were equally simple).

When it is said that:

No singular is the measure of all those [items] that are in that genus I concede that [no singular is the measure] of individuals belonging to the same species [as it]. But [that singular] is the measure of all [items] that are distinct in species; and this suffices for the case at hand. |# Yet nevertheless, it should be noted that the Philosopher is speaking either principally or solely of those [items] that belong to the same species, as is clear by his examples in [*Met.* 3.3 999^a12–13 (cited in Scotus’s first proof of a real lesser unity)], and [he is speaking] of those [species] that have individuals of which some are greater and others are lesser. And he holds that something that is less than the others would be the measure of the others, yet not [the measure] of all individuals belonging to that species, but only [the measure] of those [individuals] that are not so small. #|

[Reply to Scotus’s Second Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I state that “comparison comes about in the atomic species” neither according to the unity of the concept, nor precisely according to numerical unity, nor precisely according to specific unity—whether it be put forward as it was put forward in the beginning of the resolution of this argument or it be put forward in the false manner of imagining of some [philosophers]—since then there would be a comparison in every atomic species. But there is a comparison on this account, since many individuals belonging to the same species can make one individual, and so where many [items] |# that are not distinct in place and subject #| can make one [individual], there such a comparison should be put forward, and not elsewhere. And since this is possible for individuals belonging to the same species and not for individuals belonging to diverse species, a comparison is then put forward in the atomic species and not in the genus. For example, this white is called whiter than another white, since it has many parts of whiteness (|# in the same primary subject #|), and if in this way many parts of whiteness and blackness were to occur together in order to make *per se* one color, that could be called more colored than the other.

When it is said that:

The comparison does not come about according to numerical unity [this proposition] is true in the first way of speaking about numerical unity. And then [the comparison] comes about according to specific unity, since it

comes about according to two [items] each of which is numerically one. Nor is any third [item] that is distinct from those two in any way required.

[Reply to Scotus's Third Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I state that, postulating similarity to be a relation that is really distinct from its extremes, it should then be said that in this case there are two similarities having two real foundations, of which each is numerically one. And so that 'one' is not the *ratio* of founding the similarity of the same to itself, but rather is the *ratio* of founding the similarity of itself to the other.

Furthermore, *what* the Philosopher understands with regard to 'numerically one' is clear, for as soon as he described how 'similar', 'same', and 'equal' are said according to one, he afterwards adds ([*Met.* 5.15 1021^a12–13]):

One is the principle and measure of number

Hence [Aristotle] does not understand, with regard to any unity of anything, that it is not numerically one.

But should it never be conceded that this unity is the *ratio* of founding this relation?

It should be said that, according to those [philosophers] who maintain these relations to be really distinct, it should no more be maintained that unity is the proximate *ratio* of founding similarity than relations of another mode. But there is a difference in the fact that, for these relations, some real unity according to (*ii*)—described at the beginning of the resolution of this [fourth] argument [for Scotus's view]—is required, which is not required for relations of another mode. For at least specific unity is required for these [relations], which is not necessarily required for the other [relations of a another mode] (although sometimes there is unity of this sort there).

[Reply to Scotus's Fourth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I state that for some things to be the 'primary extremes of a real opposition' can be understood in two ways. Either:

(*i*) They are those [items] of which being really opposed is primarily predicated positively. Yet it is not predicated of them for themselves, in that they have simple supposition, but rather [it is predicated of them] for singular things, in that they have personal supposition

or:

(*ii*) They are really contraries in the thing

Now according to (*i*), the extremes of a real opposition are not real, since this term 'being really opposed' is not predicated primarily and adequately of any given things. Rather, [it is predicated] of concepts for things, if the predication be in the mind; or [it is predicated] of [spoken] words for

things, if the predication be spoken; and so forth. Nevertheless, it ought not to be conceded that [the extremes of a real opposition] are literally contraries. Instead, it should be stated uniformly as it was previously stated for the case of the primary adequate object of a sensitive potency and the primary subject of a real attribute ([*Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 4]). According to (*ii*), there are not only two extremes of a real opposition, but there are many—as there are many real oppositions. And accordingly, this whiteness and this blackness are really opposed. Likewise, that whiteness and that blackness are really opposed. And regarding these cases, it is precisely true that one of the contraries corrupts the other, and that each of them is numerically one, since nothing corrupts another except as numerically one.

When it is said that:

... then [precisely] this white [or precisely that white] would be a primary contrary of [this] black

I state that, strictly, white is not contrary to black but whiteness [is contrary] to blackness. And I concede that this whiteness is primarily contrary to blackness in that the ‘primarily’ is taken negatively, since it is contrary to blackness and nothing prior to it is contrary to blackness. However, in that the ‘primarily’ is taken positively, nothing is primarily contrary to blackness in this way.

[First Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: If it were said that:

One is contrary to one

and so many are not contrary to blackness—

[Second Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that]:

Contraries can be in the same

[but] not two individuals—

[Third Objection to Ockham’s Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that]:

Contraries are maximally distant

but two individuals are not maximally distant—

[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the Philosopher is speaking of what is one in species, not [what is one] in number. And it has been stated how specific unity is real and *a parte rei* ([at the beginning of the resolution of this fourth argument for Scotus’s view]). For this is nothing other than *a parte rei* being some [group of] many [items] that are contained under the same species, according to the Philosopher in *Top.* 1.7 [103^a10–12].

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I concede that “contraries can be in the same,” at least successively. And so I state that it is not a contradiction that water be hot, and [hot] to the fullest [extent], just as there is no contradiction that [water] be most fully cold (if there be any stopping-point in such forms [of heat and cold]).

[Reply to the Third Objection]: I state that “contraries are maximally distant” by the distance that can exist between individuals belonging to diverse species. Still, of which a maximal specific distance is required for contrareity, and of which not, will be stated elsewhere.

[Reply to Scotus’s Fifth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I state that the object of one sensation is one by a numerical unity.

When it is said [in Scotus’s proof of the minor premiss] that:

A potency cognizing an object in this fashion, namely insofar as it is one by this unity, cognizes it insofar as it is distinct from all else

I state that [the potency] cognizes that which is distinct from all else. And [I state that the potency] cognizes it under that *ratio* through which it is distinguished from all else, since that *ratio* (which is the very thing itself) immediately terminates the act of cognizing. Yet it is not necessary on this account that [the power] can discern it or distinguish it from all else. The reason is that more is required for discrete cognition than for apprehensive cognition, since discrete cognition is never in act except with respect to distinct [objects]. Nor yet is it sufficient that distinct [objects] be apprehended, unless they of themselves be dissimilar or be distinguished in place or position. And this is true when all such apprehended [objects] are apt to make [something] one *per se*, as is the case for sensible qualities, and not for any given intellections or loves of the will, neither for intelligences nor for souls. And so no matter how much such [objects] be apprehended, it is not necessary that they be able to be discerned, due to the greatest similarity among them. Nevertheless, if [the potency in question] is an intellectual potency, it can cognize the [object] to be distinct from all else. Yet if some definite [object] were singled out, it is not necessary that [the intellectual potency] be able to cognize it as distinct from this one, for some universal can be known and yet many singulars [can] fail to be known. But sense, strictly, cannot cognize it to be distinct from anything, since this pertains to the complex notion by which it is known that this is not this. Yet sense can discern this from one [thing] and not from another, and sometimes it can discern this from this and sometimes not, due to some variation *a parte rei*.

This argument is confirmed [as follows]. Sense discerns the more white from the less white. Then I raise the question: does it apprehend one of these precisely (*i*) under the *ratio common*, or (*ii*) under the *ratio singularity*? [With regard to (*i*): if (*i*), and they agree in that [*ratio common*], then [sense] does not discern [them] through it. If (*ii*), what was to be proved, that it is apprehended under the *ratio singularity*, is established—not that the concept (*intentio*) singularity would be the terminating *ratio*, but that that

which is immediately denominated by this concept would be immediately terminating.

[Reply to Scotus's Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor]: I state that the primary object of the intellect in the primacy of generation is one by a numerical unity, and it precedes [the action of the intellect]. But the primary object [of the intellect] in the primacy of adequation, if however there be any such, is not one by a numerical unity, nor does it precede [the action of the intellect], as will be stated later ([*Ord.* 1 d. 3 q. 1]).

[Reply to Scotus's Sixth Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I concede that, in the way in which every real unity is numerical, that every real diversity is also numerical in that way. For even specific diversity is numerical, since, according to the Philosopher ([*Met.* 5.9 1018^a6–19]), whatever [items] are diverse in genera are diverse in species, and whatever [items] are diverse in species are numerically diverse. Accordingly, numerical diversity is more in the genus as regards specific diversity, since [the consequence]:

They are diverse in genera or species; hence they are numerically diverse follows, but not conversely.

When it is said [in Scotus's sixth proof of a real lesser unity] that:

Every numerical diversity insofar as it is numerical is equal

I state that this [proposition] is simply false. For then it would follow that every diversity would be equal, since 'insofar as' is not a distracting determination. Nevertheless, if the consequent [of Scotus's proof] be understood such that all those [items] that only differ numerically are equally diverse, [this proposition] can be conceded in the case of these [items] that are not susceptible to greater and lesser nor [susceptible to] more and less.

[Objection]: If it were objected that every numerical unity is equal, and so every numerical diversity is equal—

[Reply]: I state that it does not follow under the understanding in which the antecedent is true, just as [the consequence]:

Whatever [items] are equal are equally equal (since equality is not susceptible to more and less), and so whatever [items] are unequal are equally unequal

does not follow. It is the case for such [items] when one [of a pair] of opposites is susceptible to more and less and not the other, and it is so in the case at hand.

[Implications]: As for what is suggested in this [sixth] argument [for a real lesser unity], [namely] that (*i*) if every diversity were numerical the intellect could no more abstract something common from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and a line; and that (*ii*) any given universal would be a

pure figment of the intellect—

[Reply to the First Implication]: As regards (*i*), I state that from the fact that Socrates and Plato of themselves differ only numerically, and Socrates is most similar to Plato in substance, putting all else aside, the intellect can abstract something common to Socrates and Plato that will not be common to Socrates and whiteness. Nor should another cause be sought, except because Socrates is Socrates and Plato is Plato, and each is a man.

[Objection]: If it were objected that Socrates and Plato really agree more than Socrates and an ass, and so Socrates and Plato agree in something real in which Socrates and an ass do not really agree, but not in Socrates nor in Plato; hence [they agree] in something in some other way distinct, and that [in which they agree] is common to each—

[Reply]: I reply that literally it ought not to be conceded that Socrates and Plato agree in something or in some [things], but rather that (*a*) they agree with respect to ‘somethings,’ since [they agree] of themselves, and that (*b*) Socrates agrees with Plato not ‘in something’ but ‘with respect to something,’ since [he agrees with Plato] of himself.

[Objection to the Reply]: If it were said that Socrates and Plato agree in man—

[Reply]: I state that the ‘man’ [in this proposition] can supposit [either] (*i*) simply, or (*ii*) personally. According to (*i*), [the proposition] can be conceded, since this is nothing other than to say that ‘man’ is one common [term] that is predicable of Socrates and Plato. Yet [according to to (*ii*)]—if the ‘man’ were to supposit personally for some thing—[the proposition] is simply false, since they agree in no man, nor do they agree in some thing, but they agree with respect to things, since [they agree] with respect to men, since of themselves [they are men]. |# Therefore, I respond to the formulation [of the question] that Socrates and Plato of themselves really agree more than Socrates and an ass, yet not in something that is real. #|

[Reply to the Second Implication]: As for the [second implication] about the figment, it is clear how the universal is a figment and how not.

[Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: I state that for some [items] to be ‘primarily diverse’ can be understood in two ways:

- (*i*) [Some items are said to be ‘primarily diverse’] because nothing is one and the same in each, but whatever is in one simply and absolutely of itself is not something that is in the other.

According to (*i*), I concede that all individuals are of themselves primarily diverse, unless perhaps the case were otherwise for individuals from one of which another is generated according to the numerical identity of the

matter in each.

(ii) Some [items] are said to be ‘primarily diverse’ when one is immediately and primarily denied of the other, and so when one is not immediately denied of the other, such that a negative [proposition] composed out of them is not immediate, then they are different and not only diverse.

According to (ii), all individuals belonging to the same species are primarily diverse, since an immediate negative proposition is composed out of them. Likewise, all species contained immediately under some genus are primarily diverse, since an immediate [negative] proposition is composed out of them. And so Socrates and Plato are primarily diverse according to (ii). But Socrates and this ass are not primarily diverse, since this [proposition]:

Socrates is not Plato

is immediate, whereas this [proposition]:

Socrates is not this ass

is not immediate, because this [proposition]:

No man is this ass

is more immediate. Hence what is generally said is not said well, [namely] that “those [items] are primarily diverse that agree in nothing, and those [items] are different that agree in something.” Rather, those [items] are primarily diverse of which neither differs from another by something more common of which the other is first denied, whereas those [items] are different of which one is denied of the other, since something more common than it is first denied of the same. |# That is, those [items] are primarily diverse when nothing more common to another one of them is the middle [term] for inferring a negative [proposition in which] one [is denied] of the other. Those [items] are different when something more common to another one is the middle [term] for inferring a negative [proposition] in which one is denied of the other. For example, this man and this ass differ, since ‘man’ is such a middle [term], and likewise ‘ass’ [is such a middle term]. For this syllogism:

No man is an ass, and this man is a man; hence this man is not this ass is acceptable. #|

And that this would be the Philosopher’s intent is clear from *Met.* 10.3 [1054^b23–25], where he says:

Difference and diversity are not the same. For it is not necessary that the diverse be diverse from what it is diverse in something.

That is, it is not necessary that there be something more common to that which is diverse, of which that from which it is diverse is first and immediately denied—just as for Socrates to be diverse from Plato it is not necessary that there be something more common to Socrates, of which Plato

is immediately denied, and [denied] of Socrates only mediately. But that [proposition]:

Socrates is not Plato

is immediate. The Philosopher puts forward as the reason ([*Met.* 10.3 1054^b25–26]):

Every being is either diverse or the same.

That is, every being—whether it have what is more common of which something else is first denied or not—this being is the same or diverse from any other being, however picked out. [The passage continues (*Met.* 10.3 1054^b26–27)]:

But what differs from something, differs in something.

That is, everything differing from something differs through something that is first and more common, of which the other is immediately denied, and denied of it only mediately. For example, this man differs from an ass through ‘man,’ of which ‘ass’ is immediately denied, and [‘ass’ is denied] of that man only mediately. (|# It should be noted that when I say that man to differ from an ass through ‘man,’ I take ‘to differ through something’ as I explain in [*Ord.* 1 d. 8 q. 4], when I explain how something differs from another through an essential differentia. And so ‘to differ through something’ is taken equivocally in different places. #) And this is what [the Philosopher] adds afterwards ([*Met.* 10.3 1054^b27–28]):

Accordingly, it is necessary for there to be the same something, by which it differs.

This ought not to be understood as: “there is the same something by which each differs from the other,” since this is impossible, for then they would more agree rather than differ in that [something]. Instead, the [passage] should be understood as: “there is the same something by which, as if it were a middle [term], this differing [thing] is shown to differ from that [one].” For example, that man is not a quantity is shown through ‘substance’ as if it were a middle [term], by speaking as follows:

No substance is quantity, and man is a substance; therefore, no man is a quantity.

And so that middle [term] is more common than it is different, for it always is a genus or species of it. And this is what the Philosopher says ([*Met.* 10.3 1054^b27–29]):

Furthermore, this very same [something]—

supply: “by which what is different differs from another”—

—[is] the genus or the species—

supply: “is the genus or species with respect to that which is different, and is not the differentia of it—

—for surely that which is different differs in genus or in species.

And thus it is empty to claim that those [items] that are different differ in their differentiae and agree in the genus, if they be in a genus. Instead, it ought be said that they differ in their genera, or in species, or in their [several] species, not *a parte rei* but in the denial—mediate or immediate—of one of the other. And the Philosopher puts forward examples, saying ([*Met.* 10.3 1054^b29–30]):

[Some things are different] in genus, of which there is no common matter, nor mutual generation. For example, [those things differ in genus] of whichsoever there is a different categorial form (*figura*).

Notice that those [items] that are in distinct categories differ in genus, and consequently differ in species. [The passage continues (*Met.* 10.3 1054^b30)]:

[But those things differ] in species, of which the genus is the same.

Nevertheless, the species are diverse.

Accordingly, I state that man and whiteness differ in their genera, since each has a higher-level genus through which the denial of one of the other can be framed, according to the technique that the Philosopher treats in *Post. an.* 1.15 [79^a34–^b23]. Furthermore, whiteness and substance differ in genus, since although whiteness has a genus through which a negative [proposition] in which whiteness is denied of substance (or conversely) can be proved, even though substance does not have such a genus. But these common [items], substance and quality, do not differ in genus or in species. And thus, since the Philosopher says that all different [things] (in that ‘different’ is distinguished from ‘diverse’) differ in genus or in species, and Socrates and Plato differ neither in genus nor in species, it is clear that they do not differ. But Socrates and this ass do differ, since they differ in species.

[First Objection to the Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: If it were said that this is against the Philosopher’s intent, since in the same passage he immediately adds afterwards ([*Met.* 10.3 1054^b30–31]):

But ‘genus’ is said as both are called the same, differing according to substance.⁵

Hence it seems, according to [the Philosopher], that those [items] that are immediately contained under a genus are different.

[Second Objection to the Reply to Scotus’s First Confirmation]: Likewise, the Commentator, discussing the same passage, [says] ([*Iuntina* 8 fol. 122rb]):

⁵ The sense of the passage as translated here is correct for the Latin, but that is an artifact of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle’s Greek text. Aristotle’s Greek would properly be translated into English as: “What each of the different [things] are called the same as, is called the genus.”

Those [things] that differ through formal differentiae are those of which the genus is one.

[Third Objection to the Reply to Scotus's First Confirmation]: Again, [the Philosopher says] (*Met.* 5.9 [1018^a12–15]):

All those [things] that are diverse, being the same something, are called 'different': and not only in number, but in species, or in genus, or in proportion. Further, [things are called 'different'] of which the genus is diverse—both contraries and whatever [things] have diversity in substance.

[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the genus is that which, as the same, is predicated of any [things] differing in substance, since every genus is predicated of many differing in species. Nevertheless, not all those [things] of which it is predicated differ. For an immediate proposition is composed out of [only] some [things] of which [the genus] is predicated, and not out of other [things of which the genus is predicated].

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I state that some [things] that differ through formal differentiae have the same genus, and, in every case, all things outside the soul that really differ through formal differentiae have the same genus, since only individuals belonging to diverse species are such [as to differ through formal differentiae]. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that all [things] that have the same genus differ through formal differentiae, as will be made clear in [*Ord.* 1 d. 8 q. 3].

[Reply to the Third Objection]: I say that the Philosopher takes 'different' in this passage insofar as it precisely agrees to things. And then all things whatsoever are diverse and are being the same something, not by identity but by essential predication—*i. e.* the same something is predicated of them truly and *in quid*. And not only in number, *i. e.* and those things are not only diverse according to number, as are individuals belonging to the same species, but (supply: they are diverse) either in species, in genus, or in proportion. Such diverse [things], I say, are different. Nevertheless, not all diverse [things] are different. For a real being and a being of reason are diverse, yet they are not different, since nothing that is the same is predicated of them *in quid*—|# according to the view that holds that a being of reason has only objective being (*esse obiectivum*); according to another [view], something is predicated of them *in quid*. #| Afterwards, [Aristotle] puts forward other modes of difference ([*Met.* 5.10 1018^a20–1018^b8]).

[Objection]: If it were said that those [things] that differ agree more than those that are only diverse, and so this man and this ass would agree more than this man and that man—

[Reply]: I state that, taking 'difference' as the Philosopher takes it

(*Met.* 10.3 [1054^b25–28]), different [things] do not always agree more than precisely diverse [things]. But it is sufficient that they differ with respect to more [things]—*i. e.* that of more [things] that are truly said of one of them the other would be truly denied. For example, of more [things] that are said of that man, this stone is truly denied than this man [is truly denied]. And so that man and this stone differ, but not as do this man and that man.

[Reply to Scotus's Second Confirmation]: [This confirmation is answered] by the same [remarks].

[Reply to Scotus's Seventh Proof of a Real Lesser Unity]

I state that were no intellect to exist there would be some real unity of the generating fire with respect to the engendered fire, according to which the generation would be called univocal. But that unity would not be said of something that is one, but rather it would be said of many really distinct [things], as stated. And so [there need be no lesser unity].

[Reply to the Fifth Argument]

As regards the citation from Avicenna, I state that [the proposition]:

Horseness is just horseness

ought not to be understood such that horseness would be neither one nor many, neither in the intellect nor in the world (*in effectu*), since horseness really exists in the world and really is singular. For just as horseness really is created by God, and likewise horseness is really distinct from God, so too horseness is really and truly singular. But Avicenna understands that these [features] do not agree to horseness *per se primo modo*, nor is any of them put into the definition [of 'horseness'], as he himself explicitly states ([*Met.* 5.1 fol. 86v]).

[Objection]: Suppose it were said that, according to Avicenna and according to other philosophers, horseness is of itself indifferent that it be singular and that it be universal. I [who raise this objection] ask: how is this [claim] true? Either in that 'horseness' supposit (*i*) simply, or (*ii*) personally.

[With regard to (*i*): if ['horseness' were to supposit] simply, then that concept is not indifferent, since in no way can [the concept] be a singular. Hence the supposition is not simple when the term supposit for the concept, which is contrary to [the hypothesis].

[With regard to (*ii*): if ['horseness'] were to supposit personally, then [the claim] is false, since then ['horseness'] supposit for singulars, and nothing singular is indifferent in this fashion.

Hence it seems that apart from the supposition for the concept and for the singular thing itself it is necessary to postulate a third [alternative],

when the term supposit for the very quiddity that is absolutely indifferent to either [being singular or being universal] –

[Reply]: I reply—uniformly to some of the previous remarks—that this [proposition]:

Horseness is not of itself universal, nor particular, but indifferent to being universal and [to being] singular

is only true in that one designated act is understood through it, which is this:

That being universal and being singular can be indifferently predicated of horseness.

And in that designated act, ‘horseness’ has simple supposition. But in the two true corresponding exercised acts, ‘horseness’ will have diverse supposition. For in one [exercised act], namely in this one:

Horseness is universal

[‘horseness’] will have simple supposition. And in the other [exercised act], namely in this one:

Horseness is singular

[‘horseness’ will have] personal supposition. For example, this [proposition]:

Of man, there is predicated both word and running

is true, and in it ‘man’ has material supposition, since each is predicated of the word ‘man.’ And two true exercised acts correspond to this designated act, namely this one:

Man is a word

in which ‘man’ supposit materially, and this one:

A man runs

in which ‘man’ supposit personally.

[Reply to the Sixth Argument]

I state that when agreement and difference occur together, it is not unacceptable for them to agree to the same [thing] in the same [respect]. And so it is not unacceptable that some [things] agree specifically but differ numerically. This is clear through an appropriate example. For it is certain that the contracted nature really agrees with the individual differentia, since it is really the same thing, and yet the nature is distinguished in some way from the contracting differentia. I then raise the question: (*i*) does it agree and differ in the same [respect], or (*ii*) does it agree in one [respect] and differ in another? [With regard to (*i*): if in the same [respect], I have what was to be shown, [namely] that the same [thing] really agrees with the same in the same indistinct [respect] and is distinguished formally. And I might with the same ease say that Socrates agrees with Plato in the same species and is distinguished numerically, and so in every case for all such. [With

regard to *(ii)*): if, however, it agrees in one [respect] and differs in another, I raise a question regarding those [items]—since they are distinguished in some way, and yet they agree (since they are one thing)—do they agree and are they distinguished in the same [respect], or do they agree in one [respect] and are distinguished in another? And so either there will be an infinite regress, or it will come to a halt where the same thing agrees with something in the same [respect] and in the same way also is distinguished [from it] in the same [respect]. And I might with the same ease say that the same [thing] agrees with something in the same species, and is numerically distinguished from the same [thing with which it agrees].

[First Objection]: If it were said that, putting every intellect aside, there is a greater agreement in fact between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass; hence in fact Socrates and Plato agree in some nature in which Socrates and this ass do not agree—

[Second Objection]: Unless there were a greater agreement between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass, a specific concept could no more be abstracted from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and this ass—

[Reply to the First Objection]: I state that the consequence framed [in this first objection] is not valid, just as [the consequence]:

Intellectual nature really agrees to God (in virtue of the fact that it is an image of God) more than insensible nature (which is not an image [of God])

does not follow. Nevertheless, they do not agree in anything real that would be distinct from them in some way, even according to those [philosophers who hold this view], but certainly of themselves they agree the more. And it is so in the case at hand: Socrates and Plato of themselves agree more than Socrates and this ass, putting all else aside. Likewise, a real being agrees with God more than a being of reason, and yet God does not agree with the creature in anything (except perhaps in a concept).

[Reply to the Second Objection]: [The solution] is clear from this [reply to the first objection]. There is a greater agreement between Socrates and Plato than between Socrates and this ass—not due to something that is distinct in some way, but of themselves they agree the more.

[Confirmation]: This reply is confirmed by their remarks. For I take two individual differentiae contracting the nature **man**: these differentiae agree more than one individual differentia contracting the nature **man** and one individual differentia contracting the nature **whiteness**.

Proof of this [claim]: the individual differentia contracting the nature **man** agrees with the contracted nature, since it is really the same thing as

it. But that contracted nature, *e. g.* the nature of Socrates, agrees with the nature of Plato more than [it agrees] with the nature **whiteness**. Hence it agrees more with the individual contracting differentia. Consequently, from first to last, the individual differentia of Socrates agrees with the individual differentia of Plato more than [it agrees] with the individual differentia of this whiteness, and it is certain that it is really distinguished from it. Hence either (*a*) it agrees with one more than with the other in the same respect, or (*b*) it agrees with one in one [respect] and with the other in another [respect]; [+ et alio D: cfr. Ockham 223.5]. [With regard to (*a*): if in the same [respect], and it agrees with one and is really distinguished from the other in the same respect, then what was to be shown is established—[namely] that something can agree with another and be distinguished from it in the same [respect]. [With regard to (*b*): if it agrees with one in one [respect] and with the other in another [respect], then the individual differentia would include many [things] and there would be an infinite regress, each of which is unacceptable.

[First Objection to the Confirmation]: If it were said that the individual differentia of *e. g.* Socrates agrees with the nature of Plato and with the individual differentia of Plato not *per se* or in virtue of itself but through the contracted nature more than with the nature of this whiteness—

[Reply]: On the contrary, just as the individual differentia of Socrates agrees more with the nature of Plato, so too conversely the nature of Plato agrees with the individual differentia of Socrates more than [it agrees] with the individual differentia of this whiteness. Hence it agrees more either (*a*) in virtue of itself; (*b*) through the contracting individual differentia; (*c*) through the nature of Socrates. [With regard to (*a*): if (*a*), then it is certain that it is distinguished in virtue of itself; hence the same thing is distinguished from and agrees with something in the same [respect]. [With regard to (*b*): [yet] (*b*) cannot be granted, since then that individual differentia would agree with one individual differentia more than with another. [With regard to (*c*): nor can (*c*) be granted, since something is never really the same as another through something extrinsic to it and really distinct from it.

[Second Objection to the Confirmation]: If it were said that although it agrees with the individual differentia in virtue of itself, nevertheless it is only distinguished from it through another individual differentia—

[Reply]: On the contrary, the nature of itself is distinguished from every individual differentia in virtue of itself. For, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], it is not incompatible with it in virtue of itself that it be without any individual differentia. Besides, two individual dif-

ferentiae, in virtue of the fact that each is a creature, agree more than the creature and God, and it is certain that they are distinguished. Hence it is necessary to postulate that the same [thing] is distinguished and agrees in the same [respect], or one must postulate an infinite regress.

[Reply to the Positive Principal Argument]

It is clear that the nature **stone** of itself is a *this*, and so the nature **stone** cannot be in another. Nevertheless, there obtains along with this that the nature **stone** of itself is not a *this*, but also in another, since they are two indefinite [propositions], verified by different singulars.

[# Nevertheless, it should be noted that this [proposition]:

The nature **stone** is in a stone

is literally false. But it ought to be granted that the nature **stone** is a stone—yet of Christ it can be allowed that human nature is in Christ—nevertheless, [this claim] is generally conceded. But if it were understood that the nature **stone** were genuinely in the stone as if [the nature] were in some way distinct, it is simply false. However, if it were understood that the nature is the stone, it is true. #]

[End of the Question]