

## WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: ORDINATIO 1 d. 2 q. 7\*

Fourthly, I ask whether that which is universal and common as univocal is in any way really *a parte rei* outside the soul.

### [ The Principal Arguments ]

That it is: According to the Commentator, *Met.* 7 com. 11 ([Iuntina 8 fol. 76r]):

The definition is the same as the substance of the thing.

Hence it is in some way outside the soul, and consequently all its parts are in some way outside the soul. But the definition is composed of universals. Hence [the universal is outside the soul].

That it isn't: Opposites cannot be appropriate to the same [thing]. But everything outside the soul is simply singular. Hence no [thing] is in any way universal.

### [ Statement of the Common View ]

All the [philosophers] whom I have seen are in harmony on the conclusion of this question, saying that the nature, which is in some way universal (at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, although (1) some [philosophers] say that [the nature] is really distinguished [from the individual]; (2) some [philosophers say] that [the nature] is only formally [distinguished from the individual]; (3) some [philosophers say] that [the nature is not distinguished from the individual] in any way in fact, but rather that [the nature is distinguished from the individual] only according to reason or through the consideration of the intellect.

#### [ First Way of Holding the Common View ]

Accordingly, some [philosophers] say that in the case of creatures there is a definite form that has absolutely no unity in fact and by its nature, but in itself it is naturally divided and has unity only according to reason's understanding, such that in the primacy of this unity, free from the positive adjunction of any form, it does not subsist in any individual; such is the form of the genus, which in fact only exists as divided by the forms of the

\* Translated from *Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica: Opera theologica* tom. II, cura Institutii Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, moderator S. Brown (editio Stephanus Brown, adlaborante Gedeone Gál), S. Bonaventure, N. Y.: impressa Ad Claras Aquas (Italia), 1970, 225–266. Ockham's later additions are enclosed within [# ... #].

species. There is another form that is one and individual and divided from all else in fact and by its nature, such that it subsists in suppositis with nothing formal added to it; such is the form of any most specific species, whose unity is only according to reason; ‘undivided,’ I say, although of itself [it has] subjective parts. Therefore, this view holds that the form of the genus is not simple and one of itself, but of itself is divided; yet the form of the species is one and simple of itself, and as such it is universal, but the form as designated in this supposit is particular, such that the view holds that the form of the genus as well as the form of the species subsists in singulars, although in one way and another in each [case].

[ Second Way of Holding the Common View ]

Other [philosophers], however, hold that the thing according to its being in the world (in effect) is singular, and the same thing according to its being in the intellect is universal, such that the same thing according to one being or according to one consideration is universal and according to the other being or according to the other consideration is singular.

[ Third Way of Holding the Common View ]

There are some modern [philosophers] who hold that the same thing is universal under one concept and singular under another concept. They [present their view] as follows:

Being higher or lower agrees to a thing only in comparison to the intellect, for, according to Avicenna in *Met.* 1, one and the same thing is singular under one understanding or concept and is universal under another. In this way, I say that every thing posited [to exist] outside the soul is, by that very fact, singular; and this singular thing is naturally apt to move the intellect [both] to conceiving it confusedly and to conceiving it distinctly. I call the concept ‘confused’ by which concept the intellect does not distinguish this thing from another; in this way Socrates moves the intellect to conceiving that he is a man, and by that concept the intellect does not distinguish, nor distinctly know, Socrates from Plato. Now I say that [something] higher with regard to Socrates, such as man or animal, does not signify any thing other than the thing that is Socrates, yet such that he is conceived confusedly, and such that he moves the intellect to conceiving himself (though in a confused way). So, I say that “Socrates is a man” is the predication of a higher of a lower, which is nothing else but that Socrates is Socrates, and Socrates is man absolutely (as confusedly conceived). Accordingly, the truth of the matter is that Socrates is man, animal, and body; all these are really one, nor do the higher and lower exist except according to the intellect’s

considering, in the way stated.

### [ Twenty-Three Arguments for the Common View ]

Therefore, all these views hold that the universal and the singular are really the same thing and differ only according to reason; and in this they differ from the three views described in [Ord. 1 d.2 qq.4–6]; still, they all agree in [claiming] that universals are in some way *a parte rei*, such that universals really are in singulars.

There are many arguments given to support this common view.

#### [ First Argument ]

That which is really divided into genuine things is a genuine thing; but the form of the genus, and, similarly, the form of the species, is really divided into genuine things insofar as [it is divided] into subjective parts, and in the same way every universal is divided into its real subjective parts; therefore, anything such is a genuine thing outside the soul.

#### [ Second Argument ]

Everything that is genuinely the essence of some thing and is included in the quidditative understanding of some thing outside the soul is a genuine thing outside the soul; but every genus, every species, and, in each case, every universal predicable *in quid* of a genuine thing outside the soul is of the essence of [what is] lower [than it] and is included essentially in the quidditative understanding of anything *per se* lower; therefore, [the universal is a genuine thing outside the soul].

This is confirmed [as follows]. Every thing outside the soul can be truly and perfectly and distinctly understood without that which is in some way a genuine thing or intrinsic to [a genuine thing]; but no individual can be truly or distinctly understood without understanding [something] higher *per se*, as for example Socrates cannot be understood without understanding man or animal or something higher; hence anything [which is] higher with regard to Socrates is of the essence of Socrates, and consequently a genuine thing outside the soul, since no being of reason is of the essence of a thing existing outside the soul.

#### [ Third Argument ]

There is something in the world [which is] communicable to many by identity, but only a universal is such; therefore, the universal is something really existing in the world.

## [ Fourth Argument ]

All [things] that are in a categorial line are genuine things and not merely beings of reason; but genera as well as species are posited in a categorial line; therefore, genera as well as species are genuine things outside the soul.

The major premiss is obvious [by the following three proofs].

[First Proof]: The genus is predicated univocally and *in quid* of everything contained *per se* under the genus, but nothing is predicated univocally of a real being and a being of reason; therefore, all [things] that are in a categorial genus either are real beings or are beings of reason—and it is certain that not all are beings of reason, and so they are all real beings.

[Second Proof]: Nothing contained *per se* under something [which] immediately divides something common is contained *per se* under something contained under some other division. For example, if substance is divided by corporeal [substance] and incorporeal substance, nothing contained *per se* under corporeal substance is contained *per se* under something contained under incorporeal substance. But being is divided by its first division into being outside the soul and being of reason; therefore, no being of reason can be contained under some category, since real being outside the soul is divided into the ten categories; hence, since genera and species are contained under substance, which is one category, they cannot be contained under being of reason, and consequently they are not beings of reason but real.

[Third Proof]: If genera and species were beings of reason, then, since beings of reason are varied with the variation of understandings, it follows that genera and species would be varied by the variation of understandings, and so there would be as many genera of substance as there are understandings.

## [ Fifth Argument ]

There is some distinction between the supposit and the nature, for otherwise [the proposition]:

Man is humanity

would be as true as [the proposition]:

Man is man

but the supposit is *a parte rei*, and so too is the nature, since otherwise there would be no distinction in things; hence the universal is in some way *a parte rei*.

## [ Sixth Argument ]

Boethius says that the species is the whole being of individuals; thus the species is the same thing as the individuals; thus it is *a parte rei*.

## [ Seventh Argument ]

The author of the *Liber de sex principiis* asks the question whether universals come about from nature or through art. He answers that they come about from nature, but nature operates in a hidden way in universals, for it produces universals by producing singulars; therefore, every commonness ‘proceeds from singularity’ (as he says). From this it may be argued as follows: that which comes about from nature has being outside the soul, and the universal comes about from nature; therefore, [the universal has being outside the soul].

## [ Eighth Argument ]

*Top.* 4.4 [124<sup>b</sup>11–12]: If the genus is destroyed the species and the individual are destroyed, but the destruction of a being outside the soul never follows upon the destruction of a being in the soul; therefore, the genus is outside the soul.

## [ Ninth Argument ]

The Philosopher, in *Post. an.* 1.8 [75<sup>b</sup>24–25] says that demonstrations are of the perpetual and the incorruptible. And Grosseteste, in the same place, says that “it is obvious that demonstration comes about from the universals discovered in singulars,” and so, universals are genuinely outside the soul.

## [ Tenth Argument ]

The Philosopher, in [*Post. an.* 1.31 87<sup>b</sup>32–33], says that the universal is always and everywhere. And Grosseteste, in the same place, says:

If we understand universals in Aristotle’s way, as forms discovered in the quiddities of singulars or particulars, by which the particular things are what they are, then that the universal is everywhere is nothing other than that it is in any given particular. To be everywhere is to be in every one of its places. And the places of these universals are the singulars in which the universals are.

## [ Eleventh Argument ]

The Philosopher, in *Phys.* 1.1 [184<sup>a</sup>21–23], says that the confused are better known to us, but beings in the soul are not better known to us; therefore, universals are not precisely beings in the soul.

## [ Twelfth Argument ]

The Commentator, *Phys.* 1 com.4 [Iuntina 4 fol. 3rb]:

By ‘universals’ [Aristotle] intends the most universal [things] that can be discovered in these things in the natural world.

Hence universals are in singulars.

## [ Thirteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator, *Phys.* 1] com. 13 [Iuntina 4 fol. 6vb]:  
 The concepts (*intentiones*) of which the name ‘being’ is said, namely [the concepts] ‘universal’ and ‘individual,’ differ greatly.  
 Hence the universal is genuinely a being.

## [ Fourteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator, *Phys.* 1] com. 15 [Iuntina 4 fol. 7rb]:  
 The name ‘being’ is said of the universal and particular concept, *i. e.* of the individual.

## [ Fifteenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], *Met.* 3.4 [999<sup>b</sup>34–1001<sup>a</sup>1]:  
 We call the singular numerically one, and the universal what is in [the singular].

## [ Sixteenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], *Met.* 4.9 [1018<sup>a</sup>3–4]:  
 Socrates is not in many, on which account ‘every Socrates’ is not said.

## [ Seventeenth Argument ]

[The Philosopher], *Met.* 7.1 [1028<sup>a</sup>13–15]:  
 [The term] ‘being’ signifies the essence (*quod quid est*) and the individual; hence each is a real being.

## [ Eighteenth Argument ]

The Commentator, *Met.* 7.2 [Iuntina 8 fol. 72va]:  
 It is clear that the first [thing] of which the name ‘being’ is said is simply and principally that which is said in response to [the question] ‘what is this individual?’ (indicating an [individual] existing *per se*); and the question is raised about [its] substance.  
 From this, it may be argued as follows: that which is a more principal being than some accident is a being outside the soul, and according to the Commentator the universal is of this kind; [therefore, the universal is a real being outside the soul].

Likewise, the response to the [question] ‘what is it?’, for substance, is not only a being in the soul, since [a being in the soul] is not of the quiddity of an external thing; but the response to ‘what is the individual?’ is not [given] through the individual but through a universal belonging to Substance; therefore, [universals have real being outside the soul].

Likewise, [the Commentator] says that “the question is raised about [its] substance”; but this question is about the universal, just as the response

is [given] through the universal; therefore, [universals have real being outside the soul].

[ Nineteenth Argument ]

[The Commentator], *Met.* 7 com. 3 [Iuntina 8 fol. 73ra]:

These (*i. e.* quiddities) are substances, since they are parts of substances that are in fact substances, that is, particulars.

[ Twentieth Argument ]

[The Commentator], *Met.* 7 com. 4 [c.iii Iuntina 8 fol. 73rb]:

The sign that substance is more obvious to us than accidents, that is, universal substances [are more obvious to us] than universal accidents, is that to know an individual of Substance through its substantial universals is more perfect than to know it through its universal accidents.

[ Twenty-First Argument ]

[The Commentator], *Met.* 7 com. 10 [Iuntina 8 fol. 75rb]:

Let us consider substance, which the definition signifies.

Hence the metaphysician considers substance, which the definition signifies, and does not consider some individual; therefore, [the metaphysician considers the universal].

[ Twenty-Second Argument ]

[The Commentator], *Met.* 7 com. 11 [Iuntina 8 fol. 76rb]:

The substance of a thing is that which is given in response to the [question] ‘what is this individual of Substance?’ Hence we describe that substance by a dialectical description, which is that which the word that gives the essence of the thing, which is the definition, signifies. And it is that which is said *per se*, *i. e.* what is predicated essentially; and [Aristotle] suggests that [what is predicated essentially] is the first kind of essential predicable, namely the definition.

From this passage it is clear that the definition signifies substance, which is predicated essentially and *primo modo*; but such a predicate is only predicated of many; therefore, [it is universal].

[ Twenty-Third Argument ]

[The Commentator], *Met.* 7 com. 40 [Iuntina 8 fol. 90vb]:

Here [in Aristotle’s text] it is stated what the substance that is quiddity is, and how this substance is predicable of that which is substance, and that which [characterizes] it in that it is universal.

Therefore, some substance is predicable in that it is universal.

### [ Ockham's Arguments Against the Common View ]

I argue against this view, and, first of all, against its main thesis: it does not seem that there is some thing outside the soul that is universal, except perhaps through voluntary agreement.

[First Argument]: Those [things] that are opposites require distinct [things] to which they primarily agree, but universality and singularity are [opposites] of this sort (according to all those [holding the common view]); hence those [things] that are immediately and primarily denominated by these [opposites] are distinguished. Thus they are either distinguished formally, which was disproved in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 6]; or they are distinguished as thing and thing, and consequently we are back to the first or second view disproved in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 qq. 4–5]; or they are distinguished either as being of reason and being of reason or as real being and being of reason. It is certain that that which is singular primarily and immediately is not a being of reason; hence that which is primarily and immediately denominated ‘universal’ is only a being in the soul, and consequently is not in a thing.

[Second Argument]: Either the same thing is really and formally singular and universal, or not; it cannot be said that it is not, as proved in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6]. But if it is, I argue against this: that thing that is singular is not predicable of many, and that which is universal is predicable of many; therefore, they are not the same. And this is to argue as follows: it is impossible for contradictories to be primarily verified of the same [thing], and ‘predicable of many’ and ‘not predicable of many’ are verified of the singular and the universal [respectively]; hence they are not the same.

[Objection]: If it were objected that the universal is predicated of many only by an act of the intellect constructing [the predication], and so a thing that of itself is not predicated of many can be predicated of many by an act of the intellect constructing [the predication]—

[Reply to the Objection]: This objection does not work, because not only do ‘predicated of many’ and ‘not predicated of many’ contradict each other, but ‘predicable of many’ and ‘not predicable of many’ contradict each other. Similarly, ‘being able to be predicated of many’ and ‘not being able to be predicated of many’ contradict each other, and prior to any act of the intellect the universal can be predicated of many and the singular cannot be predicated of many; therefore, without any act of the intellect, the universal is not the singular.

[Second Reply to the Objection]: Furthermore, I appeal to the arguments of the Philosopher [in *Met.* 7.13 1038<sup>b</sup>10–11] through which he proves the conclusion that no universal is substance, as follows: the substance of

a thing is proper to that of which it is the substance, and the universal is proper to nothing, but rather [only] common; therefore, the universal is not substance.

[Objection to the Second Reply to the Objection]: If it were objected that the Philosopher intends to prove that the universal is not substance primarily or strictly —as the Commentator argues in *Met.* 7 com. 45 [Iuntina 8 fol. 93r]:

The substance of any given thing picked out is proper to it, but the universal is common to many, and so the universal is not strictly substance.

Hence it is not proved absolutely that [the universal] is not substance, but only that it is not strictly substance—

[Reply to the Objection to the Second Reply to the Objection]: This reply does not work, since the Philosopher's intent is to argue against those who hold universals to be substances, as did the platonists. As [the Philosopher] describes it, [the platonists] held that universals are proper substances and common substances. Accordingly, they said that certain substances are particular and certain ones common. Hence it is not sufficient for [the Philosopher] to prove against them that they are not proper substances unless he were to prove that they are not substances. Thus he argues as follows:

[1038<sup>b</sup>12–15]: If the universal that is common to many [is substance], it is either [the substance] of all or of one. It is not possible that it is [the substance] of all; hence it will be the substance of one, and consequently all to which it is common will be that one, which is impossible.

Secondly, [the Philosopher] argues as follows [1038<sup>b</sup>15–16]: the universal is what is predicated of some subject; but substance, in fact, is not predicated of any subject; hence the universal is not substance.

Thirdly, [the Philosopher] argues as follows [ibidem. 1038<sup>b</sup>23–27]: just as it is impossible that the individual be composed out of qualities, since then quality would be prior to an individual of Substance, so too it is impossible that the individual be composed out of [anything that is] not concrete (*hoc aliquid*). Thus no universal is part of substance, and, consequently, since [the universal] does not exist *per se*, it will not be substance in any way.

Fourthly, [the Philosopher] argues as follows (1039<sup>a</sup>3–11): nothing comes to be from two [things] in act; hence when some [things] are distinguished |# and produce [something] one *per se*, #| one must be potency and the other act. And, in consequence, if the universal were substance and something were added to it, it would be necessary that they be related as

act and potency, which is inadmissible.

Fifthly, [as the Philosopher notes (1039<sup>a</sup>2–3)]: then there would be a third man.

Again, in *Met.* 10.2 [1053<sup>b</sup>16–17], the Philosopher says that it is impossible for something universal to be substance. With regard to this, the Commentator says in com. 7 [Iuntina 8 fol. 120rb]):

Since it is stated in the treatise on substance and the genera of being that it is impossible for something universal to be substance, it is clear that a universal is not substance.

And later:

Since universals are not substances, it is clear that ‘common being’ is not a substance existing outside the soul, just as any common ‘one’ is not substance.

Furthermore:

‘One’ and ‘being’ are predicated as universals, which have being only in the soul.

Again:

Since universals are not substances, hence neither are genera substances.

Again:

Nor are genera substances, since genera are universals.

From these citations it is clear that universals only have being in the soul; hence they are not in an external thing.

Similarly, by the fact that ‘being’ and ‘one’ are universals, [the Philosopher] proves that they are not substances [in *Met.* 12.4 1070<sup>b</sup>7–9], and so no universal is substance.

The Commentator says in *Met.* 12 com. 21 [Iuntina 8 fol. 144va]:

‘One’ and ‘being’ are among universal things, which do not have being outside the soul.

Hence, the universal is not outside [the soul].

Again (ibidem. com. 27 [Iuntina 8 fol. 146va]):

The universal principle does not exist outside the soul, but only individuals [exist outside the soul].

Just after this:

No universal generates or is generated.

Hence the universal is not in the thing.

Again (ibidem. com. 28 [Iuntina 8 fol. 146vb]):

There is no demonstration with regard to the particular, although in fact [the particular] alone is a being.

Thus in fact the universal is neither substance nor outside the soul. He holds the same in *Met.* 7 com. 2, com. 20, com. 21, com. 30, and in nearly an

infinite number of other places.

### [ Ockham's Arguments Against the Ways of Holding the Common View ]

#### [ Argument Against the First Way ]

I ask: how are the nature and the designation of the nature distinguished? If in no way, then the nature is no more universal than the designated nature. If in some way, then it is either according to the thing or according to reason. If the former, this was disproved earlier, in [Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6]. If the latter, it follows that one of them, [*i. e.* either the nature or the designated nature], is only [a being] of reason, as was stated in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 2]; and that there is no mediate [kind of] difference [in the case of] creatures is also clear from that [earlier] discussion.

#### [ Argument Against the Second Way ]

I argue as follows. When something precisely denominates another according to something extrinsic, to whatever that extrinsic [factor] agrees, that denominating it can proportionately agree to it. Thus if that thing, which really is singular, is universal according to its being in the intellect, this is possible only according to intellection, and so, any given thing that can be understood can, similarly, be universal in the same way. Thus Socrates can be universal and common to Plato according to his being in the intellect. Similarly, the divine essence, according to its being in the intellect, could be universal, although in its real being in the world it is the most singular of all—all of which are absurd.

This is confirmed [as follows]. When something is incompatible of its nature with another thing, it cannot agree with it through anything extrinsic. But, for any given thing, it is incompatible with it of itself that it be common to another thing; hence commonness cannot agree with any thing through something extrinsic. And so, whether that thing that is singular is understood or is not understood, it cannot be common or universal according to any being it has.

#### [ Argument Against the Third Way ]

For the same [reasons] it is clear that the third way [of holding the common view] is simply false and not intelligible, since it holds that the same thing confusedly conceived is universal. For, if the thing confusedly conceived is universal, I ask: what is that thing? Let it be *A*. Then *A* confusedly conceived is universal, and consequently *A* confusedly conceived is common to *B*. Then “*B* is *A* confusedly conceived” is a predication of a higher of a lower, and so Socrates is Plato confusedly conceived, and God is a creature confusedly conceived.

## [ Objections and Replies ]

[First Objection]: It is objected to this argument that it does not follow, since the consequence:

Animal is Socrates confusedly conceived, and Plato is an animal; therefore, Plato is Socrates confusedly conceived

is invalid, on account of a varied middle [term]: the word ‘animal’ is taken for one thing in the major and another in the minor, since in fact nothing is common to them; just as ‘animal’ signifies Socrates confusedly conceived, so too [‘animal’] signifies Plato confusedly conceived—

[Reply]: But this [objection] is neither true nor logical. For when one says:

Animal is Socrates confusedly conceived

the [term] ‘animal’ supposit either simply or personally. If personally, then ‘animal’ is not only Socrates confusedly conceived, but also ‘animal’ is Socrates distinctly conceived, since then there is one indefinite [term, namely ‘animal’], having one true singular [version], namely:

This animal is Socrates distinctly conceived

indicating Socrates. However, if ‘animal’ supposit simply, then it either supposit for some genuine thing, or only for a being in the soul, or for an aggregate. If for a thing, then some genuine thing is common, and consequently a genuine thing is predicated truly of another thing. And so, just as:

Socrates is an animal

or:

An ass is an animal

is simply true, so too:

An ass is Socrates as conceived

will be true, since according to you [who hold this view] what is common, for which ‘animal’ supposit in [the proposition]:

An animal is Socrates confusedly conceived

is Socrates as conceived, and is in no way distinguished from Socrates as conceived; hence whatever is predicated of one is also [predicated of] the other. If each were to supposit personally, then just as [the proposition]:

An ass is an animal

is true in that ‘animal’ supposit personally, so too [the proposition]:

An ass is Socrates as conceived

will be true in that the predicate supposit personally.

[Second Objection]: Furthermore, [Henry of Harclay] says that ... being higher or being lower agree to a thing in comparison to the intellect

[Reply]: This is simply false, since no thing, howsoever considered [by the intellect], is higher, just as no thing, howsoever considered [by the intellect], is indifferent.

This reply is confirmed [as follows]. If something extrinsic were to make Socrates be white, something genuinely in the thing is white, although not from itself but from an extrinsic cause; hence, if in the same way the intellect were to make a thing higher, the thing will genuinely be higher and indifferent, though not from itself but only by the intellect confusedly conceiving the thing; and so contradictories are asserted in saying that the same thing is both higher and lower, and that nothing in the thing is common or indifferent.

[Third Objection]: Furthermore, [Henry of Harclay] says that a thing under one concept is singular and under another is universal—

[Reply]: This is false, since a thing [which is] singular of itself is not universal in any way or under any concept. And the reason is that there is always a formal consequence from a determinable taken with some non-distracting and non-diminishing determination to the [determinable] taken absolutely. And thus “a thing under such a concept is universal; hence a thing is universal” follows formally; the consequent is false, just as “a thing is indifferent” is false according to those [who hold this view]; therefore, the antecedent is simply false.

[First Objection to the Reply]: If it were said that this is a distracting or diminishing determination, since ‘being understood,’ ‘being conceived,’ and the like are distracting or diminishing determinations, and so just as [the consequence]:

Caesar as imagined is, and so Caesar is  
does not follow, so too

A thing under such a concept is universal or indifferent, and so a thing  
is universal or indifferent  
does not follow—

[Second Objection to the Reply]: Likewise, [if it were said that] according to you, [William of Ockham], [the consequence]:

Man in common, or the common man, is a mental concept, and so man  
is a mental concept  
does not follow—

[Reply to the First Objection] Now [the first objection] does not hold, since these are neither distracting nor diminishing determinations. The reason for this is that a determination is ‘diminishing’ when a denominated part of some whole is expressed by that determination, as is clear in saying:

An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth

For here the denominated part is expressed, and if the denomination of such a part does not suffice for the denomination of the whole, then it is a ‘diminishing determination.’ And then there is the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, not by arguing to the determinable taken absolutely but by arguing to the determination taken absolutely, as for example in arguing as follows:

An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth, *i. e.* has white teeth; therefore, an Ethiopian is white

This is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Still, there is no fallacy in inferring the determinable taken absolutely, as in

[An Ethiopian is white in respect of his teeth, *i. e.* has white teeth]; therefore, an Ethiopian has teeth

But such a [denominated] part is not expressed in the proposition:

The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived

and so here there is no diminishing determination. Similarly, if there were a diminishing determination, one could infer the determinable taken absolutely, inferring:

[The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived]; therefore, the universal is Socrates

Yet there would be a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* in inferring the absolute determination, for example inferring:

[The universal is Socrates confusedly conceived]; therefore, the universal is confusedly conceived

and so, what was to be proved is established.

Similarly, these determinations are not distracting, since a determination is ‘distracting’ when it is absolutely incompatible with the thing, or at least with the existence [of the thing] to which [the determination] is added; yet [the determination] denominates it, since it strictly and correctly denominates something that was part of it, as is clear for ‘dead’ in the phrase “dead man,” since it is impossible that a man exist and nevertheless that he be dead. Still, the phrase “dead man” is taken according to common usage, since the body that was part of him is truly dead. But it is clear that this cannot be said for the case at hand; hence these determinations are not distracting.

This clarifies the [purported] counterexample [in the first objection above], since in ‘Caesar as understood’ there is no distracting determination nor diminishing [determination]. Hence [the consequence]:

Caesar as understood is; therefore, Caesar is

follows absolutely, and similarly

Caesar as imagined is; therefore, Caesar is

also follows.

[Objection]: If it were objected that, according to the Philosopher in his *Sophistical Refutations* 1.5 [166<sup>b</sup>37–167<sup>a</sup>20], this is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, since there is always such a fallacy when arguing from something taken *secundum quid* to something taken *simpliciter* (or conversely)—

[Reply]: I say that there is no fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* here in

Caesar as imagined is; therefore, Caesar is  
but rather there is a formal consequence. But according to Aristotle there is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* here:

Caesar is imagined; therefore, Caesar is

Nor is there always a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* in arguing from a determinable taken with a diminishing determination to [the determinable] taken absolutely, but this manner of arguing is only one mode of that fallacy. There is another mode when one argues from some proposition having a predicate to [a version of the proposition] *secundum adiacens*, e. g. in arguing

Socrates is imagined; therefore, Socrates is

Similarly

When no rose exists, a rose is understood; therefore, a rose is

Similarly, according to the Philosopher,

White is not man; therefore, white is not

It is obvious that there is a fallacy here, since the consequence is invalid, and so is in error due to some fallacy. But it is clear inductively that [the invalidity] is due to no other [fallacy], for it seems especially to be in error due to a fallacy of the consequent, which yet is not so, since it neither follows in this way nor conversely; just as

Caesar is imagined; therefore, Caesar is

does not follow, so too the converse [does not follow].

The same [reply] holds for the second example. Hence, whenever something is predicated that is equally suited to being or to non-being, whether one argues affirmatively or negatively, there is always a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. And this is what the Philosopher says, that being *quid* and being *simpliciter* are not the same, just as being imagined and being are not the same; similarly, not being *quid* and not being *simpliciter* are not the same, just as not being man and not being are not the same. Nevertheless, ‘being imagined’ is neither a diminishing nor a distracting determination, as ‘not being man’ or ‘being man’ [are neither diminishing nor distracting determinations]. Therefore, when there is an argument from a determinable taken with a determination [which is] neither diminishing nor distracting to

the determinable taken absolutely (in the aforementioned way), the rule holds; and this is so if the determination is affirmative, not negative, as for example:

Socrates is a white man; therefore, Socrates is a man follows. Nevertheless, it does not follow negatively: “Socrates is not a white man; therefore, Socrates is not a man” [does not follow]. In all cases, it does not formally follow negatively, but affirmatively.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: I say that the [second objection] does not work, since in the consequent ‘man is a mental concept’ the subject can have simple or personal supposition. If simple, it is then an acceptable consequence. If personal, the consequence fails according to the variation of the supposition, since in the first [part of the consequence] it supposits simply and in the second [part of the consequence it supposits] personally; hence there is a fallacy of equivocation in the third mode. And so, just as [the proposition]:

Some man is a species or a universal should simply be denied, since in the proposition the [term] ‘man’ can only have personal supposition due to the added particular sign [‘some’], so too in the same way [the proposition]:

Some thing confusedly conceived is universal should simply be denied. Thus it is impossible for the same thing to be universal under one concept and singular under another.

From these [remarks] it is clear that what is commonly said is incorrect: that the same thing under one intention is universal and under another singular, or that according to such being it is a man and according to another being it is not a man but something else, and many such similar [statements]—such as if a thing were considered in one way then it is this and if it were considered another way or under another consideration it is something else. For such propositions involving such determinations entail propositions [which are taken] absolutely without those determinations. Otherwise, with equal ease I might claim that a man, according to one being or under one consideration or concept, is an ass, and under another is a cow [# and under another is a lion, #] which is absurd. Thus such [assertions] are extremely inappropriate ways of speaking, removed from any kind of scientific discourse.

### [ Ockham’s Response to the Initial Question ]

Therefore, I answer the question in another way, saying that no thing outside the soul, neither *per se* nor by something added [to it], real or [only] of reason, nor howsoever it may be considered or understood, is univer-

sal; such that it is as impossible for some thing outside the soul to be in any way universal (except perhaps by a voluntary agreement, as the word ‘man,’ which is a singular word, is universal) as it is for a man, by whatever consideration or whatever being, to be an ass. For when something is suitable to another only denominatively, whether by something informing [it] or by something simply extrinsic [to it], the denominating [factor] equally agrees to all to which the informing or extrinsic [thing] is related uniformly. For example, if something were completely discernible by the sense of sight precisely due to the whiteness informing it, whatever is equally white will equally be discernible [by the sense of sight]; therefore, if a thing, by the consideration of the intellect (which is something totally extrinsic to the thing), is universal, whatever is equally understood will be universal, and so everything understood will be universal.

[Objection]: If it were said that a thing is not universal as understood in any way at all, but only as understood confusedly, and so not every thing is universal (this is the third [way of holding the common] view, recounted above)—

This response does not work [for the following four reasons].

[First Reply]: Firstly, because with a thing precisely understood distinctly, a proposition can be formed in which the higher is predicated of the lower, just as if Socrates were intuitively seen and whatever is in Socrates were intuitively seen (at least by divine power), such an intellect [seeing Socrates] can know that Socrates is a man, which is an animal; therefore, without any confused understanding proper to something, the higher is obtained, and consequently the universal or the common [is obtained].

[Second Reply]: Besides, then God would genuinely be a universal, since God, according to you [who hold this view], can be understood confusedly; hence, if a universal is a thing understood confusedly, God will genuinely be a universal, or God as understood confusedly will genuinely be a universal.

[Third Reply]: What is more, sight can see something confusedly, and so, by whatever reason a thing as understood confusedly is held to be a universal, for the same reason a thing as seen confusedly will be held to be universal; which is absurd.

[Fourth Reply]: Furthermore, as will be stated in [*Ord.* 1 d. 3 q. 5], no simple thing can be understood confusedly if it be understood, and yet, with respect to simples, it is genuinely universal.

I say, therefore, that by no consideration or concept can something be suitable to a thing except as only an extrinsic denomination, and these are precisely such that they are primarily suitable to the act of understanding

(intellectio) or the consideration, and so a thing can be called ‘understood.’ A thing can also be called ‘conceived,’ and a thing is subject and a thing is predicate, |# according to one view, #| since this is nothing other than that a thing is understood by this act of understanding. So, whatever can be understood by an act of understanding can correctly be called ‘subject’ or ‘predicate’ or ‘part of a proposition,’ |# according to this view, #| and so on for the rest: all of which can thus be predicated of the divine essence as well as of creatures. And hence, if some things were universal and others not, this is not due to the understanding, which is related to everything uniformly, but will be from the nature of the thing and due to some diversity in the world, such that one [thing] in the world is related to universal being differently from another; consequently, there is in the world some distinction or non-identity between that which is denominated by the concept of universality and that which is denominated by the concept of singularity—the opposite of which was established in *Ord.* 1 d. 2 qq. 4–6.

Furthermore, I argue as follows: Socrates is not universal according to any being or consideration; neither is Plato, nor this ass, nor that ass, and so on, picking out all singular things; hence no thing is universal according to any being or concept or consideration. The consequence is clear, arguing from all singular [claims] to the universal [claim]. The antecedent is clear, since there is no more reason why any one singular [claim] should be true than another; but “Socrates is not universal according to any being or consideration or concept or mode” is true, since if he were I might for the same reason claim that Socrates is Plato in some mode, and a man under some mode is an ass and a stone and whiteness—which are all absurd.

Similarly, if the same thing were really universal and singular, in every predication of a higher of a lower there would be a predication of the same thing of itself, since the universal would be predicated of the particular, which are the same thing, according to you [who hold this view]—which is absurd.

Therefore, I say that the universal is neither really nor subjectively in the thing itself of which it is the universal, no more than the word ‘man,’ which is a genuine quality, is in Socrates or is in that which it signifies. Nor is the universal a part of the singular in respect of which [the singular] is universal, no more than the word is part of its significate. Still, just as the word is truly and without any distinction predicated of its significate, not for itself but for its significate, so too the universal is truly predicated of its singular, not for itself but for its singular.

And this is the intent of the Philosopher and the Commentator; indeed, [this is the intent] of all philosophers correctly investigating universals.

Whence the Commentator says in *Met.* 7 com. 44 [Iuntina 8 fol. 92vb]:

When [Aristotle] states that what definitions signify are the substances of things, and definitions are composed of universals that are predicated of particulars, he begins to carefully examine whether universals are the substances of things or not, but only as they are the substances of the particulars of which those universals are predicated. And this is necessary in showing that the forms of individual substances are substances, and that in the individual there is no substance except the particular matter and form out of which [the individual] is composed.

Some citations in this question and the preceding ones come from this authority. First, that definitions are not the substances of things, but that they signify the substances of things, since he says “what definitions signify are the substances of things,” such that definitions are signs, and the substances of things are signified, and the sign is not the significate. Secondly, that definitions do not signify universals, and thus when they signify the substances of singular things, they signify some singulars, since he says that “definitions are composed of universals”; hence those universals are not signified by the definition but are signs and parts of the definition signifying those particulars, since there is no middle between the universal and the particular. Thirdly, it is held that universals are truly predicated of particulars, since in a particular individual there is only particular matter and form.

[Objection] And if it were objected that primary substance is only [made up of] particular matter and form, and yet in the individual there is secondary substance that is neither the particular matter or form—

This is against the intent of the Philosopher and the Commentator, since by the same reason it should be said that in the individual there is nothing not universal, for the secondary substance there is only universal.

Similarly, if the Philosopher and the Commentator only prove that primary substances are not universals, and thereby prove that [universals] are not substances, by the same reason they should prove that particulars are not substances, since [particulars] are not secondary substances. If animal is divided by man and ass, it should be equally proved that a man is not an animal because [he is] not an ass for the same reason it was proved that an ass is not an animal because [it is] not a man.

Fourthly, it is held that universals are not substances, nor are particulars composed of them.

Again, [the Commentator, in *Met.* 7] com. 45 [Iuntina 8 fol. 93r]:

Therefore, let us say that it is impossible for anything that is called ‘universal’ to be the substance of some thing, although they express the

substances of things.

Hence universals are not substances, nor are they of the substance of some thing, but only express the substances of things, like signs.

Again, [the Commentator, in *Met.* 7] com. 47 [Iuntina 8 fol.93va]:

Since it is stated that universals as understood are the dispositions of substances...

(he calls [what is] predicable of substances ‘dispositions of substances,’ as in the preceding comment)—

it is impossible that they be parts of substances existing per se.

If it is objected that the Philosopher and the Commentator do not prove that universals are not substances absolutely but that they are not substances [which are] separated from individuals, as Plato held—

The Philosopher’s progress is contrary to this [objection], since he firstly shows that universals are not substances, and secondly that they are not exemplars such as Plato held.

The Commentator, in *Met.* 8 com. 2 [Iuntina 8 fol. 99ra], says:

It is settled that the form and its parts are substances, and that the universal is neither substance nor genus since it is something universal. Thence [Aristotle] says ‘but with regard to exemplars’ etc., and he intends that these [exemplars] were not examined in the preceding discussion and that they will be examined later, since some say that there are separated substances other than sensible substances.

Hence the Commentator’s intent is that the Philosopher, in *Met.* 7, proves simply that universals are not substances, and afterwards shows that there are not such separated substances.

### [ Replies to the Arguments for the Common View ]

#### [ Reply to the First Argument ]

I say that that which is divided into genuine things, as a genuine composite [is divided] into its parts essentially included in it, is a genuine thing; in this way a body is divided into its integral parts and a whole into its essential parts; and such a division occurs really, outside the soul. But when something is divided into genuine things as a sign [is divided] into its significates, [the division] is not necessary, no more than [it is necessary] that that which is divided into substances be a substance, as some word is divided into substances as into its significates. The species, and likewise the genus, is divided in this second way, since the species or the genus or any given universal is completely unaltered by such a division, nor are those [things] into which it is divided really parts, any more than many significates

are parts of the word signifying [them].

[ Reply to the Second Argument ]

I say that in all cases a higher is never of the essence of a lower, nor is included essentially in the lower, nor in its quidditative understanding; nevertheless, [the higher] is predicated essentially of the lower, since it expresses (declarat) the essence of the lower or expresses itself of the lower |# or the thing imported by the lower, #| and this is [what it is] to be predicated *in quid* or *per se primo modo* and essentially. Whence, just as according to some, ‘being’ expresses some one concept that is not of the essence of God nor his essential part, since then something real would be univocal to God and creatures, which they deny, and yet it is predicated *in quid* and *per se primo modo* of God and of creatures,—thus I say in the case at hand that nothing *a parte rei* is univocal to any given individuals, and yet there is something predicable *in quid* of individuals. Similarly, just as some say that the universal, which is numerically one object and predicable of any given supposit by a predication stating ‘this is this,’ does not exist in the world, because nothing in the world is predicable in this way, and yet the predication is called ‘essential’ and ‘in quid’ and ‘*per se primo modo*’—thus I say that in every case the predication of a higher of a lower is not the predication of something that is outside the soul in the world in any way, and consequently that which is predicated is not part of the thing nor of the essence of the thing, and yet is predicated *in quid* of things. The reason for this is that it is not predicated for itself but for those things of which it is predicated.

[Objection]: If it were said that then it would be the same to say “Socrates is a man” as [to say] “Socrates is Socrates”—

[Reply]: I reply that this does not follow, since although ‘man’ in the first [proposition] supposits for Socrates and can only be verified of Socrates, still, that which is predicated is something else; and hence, although there is something the same for which the predication in each is made, still, since it is something else that is predicated, it is not the same proposition. Similarly, although in [the proposition]:

Socrates is a man

the [term] ‘man’ supposits for Socrates, yet not precisely for Socrates, since potentially—in the logician’s way of speaking—it supposits for any given man, since it is deducible from any [man], and the term in such cases always supposits for the same [things], since [it supposits] for all of which it is verified. Nevertheless, [the proposition]:

Socrates is a man

is only verified of Socrates. Hence [the two propositions]:

Socrates is a man  
Socrates is Socrates

do not say the same.

[Reply to the Confirmation of the Second Argument]: I say and allow (as will be made clear later) that a thing can be understood not only confusedly but also perfectly and distinctly, without understanding [anything] higher. And when

Socrates cannot be understood without understanding animal is said, I say that this [claim] can be distinguished (whether literally or not, I don't care), since 'animal' can supposit simply, and then [the proposition] is false, because then it states that Socrates cannot be understood without understanding this common animal, and this is simply false; or it can supposit personally for a thing, and I grant this. In this [latter] way Socrates cannot run unless an animal is running, for [the consequence]:

Socrates is running; therefore, an animal is running necessarily follows; yet it is not necessary that the common animal is running. In this way, man cannot be understood without also understanding being, and yet man can be understood without this common being being understood, according to those [who hold this view], especially if what is common is not something real, as they say.

[ Reply to the Third Argument ]

I say that nothing is communicable to things by identity except for the divine essence to the three suppositis (with which it is really the same); and hence it should not strictly be granted that the nature is communicated to the supposit, unless perhaps it is said that human nature is communicated to the Word, and then it is not communicated to it by identity but should be said more correctly that the nature is the supposit, as will be shown in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 11]. Hence, just as those [holding this view] have to say that being, which is univocally common to God and creatures, is not communicable to anything by identity, since then something real would be univocal to God and creatures, (as according to those [holding this view] something real is univocal to Socrates and Plato), so too I say that in every case nothing univocal is communicable to its univocates by identity.

[ Reply to the Fourth Argument ]

I say that not everything that is in a categorial line, containing *per se* [elements] ordered as higher and lower, is a genuine thing outside the soul, but some such are only beings in the soul.

[Reply to the First Proof of the Major]: I concede that the genus is predicated *in quid* and univocally of everything lesser than it. And I

further concede that something is predicated univocally and *in quid* and *per se primo modo* of a real being |# or of a pronoun picking out a real being #| and of a being of reason, yet not for a being of reason but for a thing, since that being of reason will not have simple supposition but rather personal [supposition]. hence the genus is predicated of the species, not for the species, since the act to be exercised is not ‘the species is the genus,’ but [the genus] is predicated of the species for a thing, and so the designated act to be exercised is ‘man is an animal,’ such that each term stands for a thing personally. Thus the others have to say that being, and similarly real being, is predicated *per se primo modo* of knowledge in general, and yet knowledge in general is not something real |# outside the soul, #| since then something real would be univocally common to God and creatures. Hence ‘being,’ which is precisely univocal to real beings, is predicated univocally and *in quid* of real being and of being of reason, but then that ‘being of reason’ does not supposit for itself but for a thing. Accordingly, when

All knowledge is a real being

is said, this is a predication *in quid*, and for this it is only required that this knowledge, which is God, is a real being, and it is not required that there be a common and univocal real being. Thus, I say that for the truth of

Every man is an animal

it is sufficient that this man is an animal, and that that man is an animal, and so on for all the other singular things, and it is not required that what is univocal to these men is an animal. And so for these [propositions]:

Every animal is a substance

Every body is a substance

Every color is a quality

Every concept is a quality

and so forth.

[Reply to the Second Proof of the Major]: This [proof] proceeds from dividings, [where] what is divided is verified of each of them for a thing; but when what is divided does not stand for a thing but for something else, [the division] is not necessary. Hence if genera and species were substances, they could not be beings of reason in any way; but the truth of the matter is they are not substances. Therefore, I say that for something “to be (or to be contained) under some genus” can be understood in two ways [as follows].

(i) [Something is “in a genus”] because it is that of which for itself |# or of the pronoun picking it out #| the genus is verified

According to (i), only singulars are contained in a genus, since only singulars are substances and only singulars are qualities, and neither species nor genera are contained in this way under the genus Substance.

(ii) Something is “in a genus” because it is that of which the genus is truly predicated, not for itself [but for things]

According to (ii), genera and species are in a genus. The claim [put forward in the second proof of the major premiss of the fourth argument for the common view] taken for what is contained according to (i) is true, but not [taken] for what is contained according to (ii).

[Reply to the Third Proof of the Major]: The reply will be clear in *Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 8.

[ Reply to the Fifth Argument ]

I say that sometimes there is even a real distinction between the nature and the supposit, as for example between the supposit of the Word and the assumed nature; but at other times there is absolutely no distinction *a parte rei*. Still, these concepts, namely ‘supposit’ and ‘nature,’ are distinguished; and hence that something is a nature and yet not a supposit, which still was previously a supposit, can be verified, but this is only possible through corruption or through real assumption, as discussed in [*Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 11 and 3 q. 1]. And when it is claimed that [the proposition]:

Man is humanity

would then be true, I say that unless some imported syncategorematic mode in the name ‘humanity’ in common usage prevents it, that this [claim] should literally be granted. Nevertheless, [the proposition]:

Man is humanity

is contingent, even without the corruption of humanity.

[ Reply to the Sixth Argument ]

I say that it is not Boethius’s intent that the species is the whole being of individuals, but that [the species] expresses the whole being of individuals, as in a certain way a sign that is not signified. This is true of the most specific species in every case, though it is not true of the genus in every case. Still, how this should be understood will be clear in [*Ord.* 1 d. 8 q. 3].

[ Reply to the Seventh Argument ]

I say that nature operates in a hidden way in universals, not that it produces those universals as something real outside the soul as something real, but because in producing the knowledge of them in the soul, as it were in a hidden way—at least |# immediately or #| mediately—[nature] produces those universals, in the way in which they are apt to be produced. And hence every commonness is natural in this way, and proceeds from singularity; nor need that which comes about from nature in this way be outside the soul, but can be in the soul.

## [ Reply to the Eighth Argument ]

I say that ‘if the genus is destroyed’ should be understood as that whatever the genus is truly denied of, the species and the individual are also truly denied of. For example, if a stone is not an animal, it is not a man, it is not an ass, it is not Socrates. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that if that which is the genus did not exist (whether this is possible or impossible) that the individual would not exist.

## [ Reply to the Ninth Argument ]

I say that the Philosopher holds that demonstration is of the perpetual and the incorruptible, *i. e.* of necessary propositions. With regard to Grosseteste, who wants to rescue [Aristotle], one can say that [Grosseteste] understands that demonstration is of universals discovered in singulars, since those universals are truly predicable of singulars, such that [those universals] are in singulars by predication.

## [ Reply to the Tenth Argument ]

The universal is not always and everywhere, unless because ‘to be somewhere’ is predicated of the universal not for itself but for a thing whenever it is predicated of a singular. In every case, whatever is predicated of a singular or of a pronoun picking out a singular is also predicated of the universal taken particularly. With regard to Grosseteste, [I say] that he intends the same here, if he is not to deviate from the Philosopher and from the truth.

## [ Reply to the Eleventh Argument ]

Universals are called ‘better known’ not because they are known before singular incomplex notions, but because they are more common and in many, and common characteristics are known from many and of many, suppositing not for themselves but for things, as specific characteristics are known of specific [things], as will be clear in [*Ord.* 1 d. 3 q. 6].

## [ Reply to the Twelfth Argument ]

According to Damascene ‘being in’ is in one way the same as ‘being said of’; and understand the Commentator in this way [when he says] here that “they are in things,” since they are said of particular things.

## [ Reply to the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Arguments ]

I say that ‘real being’ is said of the individual and of the universal, not in that the universal stands for or supposits for itself, but for particulars.

## [ Reply to the Fifteenth Argument ]

We say the universal is in these [things] by predication.

## [ Reply to the Sixteenth Argument ]

The same point holds, that Socrates is not in many, *i. e.* is not said of many.

## [ Reply to the Seventeenth Argument ]

[I say that the term ‘being’] signifies the essence [*quod quid est*], in that the essence is called universal, as the higher signifies everything lower than it, however low they may be, whether *primo modo* or *secundo modo*,# and in this certain order,#| as was said [in the reply to the second argument for the common view] above.

## [ Reply to the Eighteenth Argument ]

[I say] that these universals are more principally called ‘being,’ since the more noble and worthy and prior being is verified of them, not in that they supposit simply but in that they supposit personally; and so, the designated acts are understood by such propositions. I answer all those citations in the same way.

[Objection]: If it were said that what he declares the quiddity of the individual substance to be is substance, and that is universal; therefore, [the universal is substance]—

[Reply]: I reply that that here he understands one designated act by that claim, namely that substance is predicated of such just as the genus is predicated of the species, and yet the species is not the genus. Elsewhere, where he says that such are not substances, one understands [him] literally. And so here he does not contradict himself, since he explains how he earlier understands propositions which seem to contradict each other.

## [ Reply to the Nineteenth Argument ]

As we have said repeatedly, the Philosopher and the Commentator understand by ‘the quiddities of substances’ the form that is one part of the composite, as is clear in com. 7, com. 9, com. 21, com. 44, and many other places. Thus I concede that the quiddities of substances are substances, since these quiddities are particular parts of substances.

## [ Reply to the Twentieth Argument ]

It is more perfect to know through the substantial universals, and so on, because these are predicable *in quid*, and others are not.

## [ Reply to the Twenty-First Argument ]

The metaphysician considers the substance that the definition signifies, since that substance is that for which many propositions are verified.

## [ Reply to the Twenty-Second Argument ]

The definition signifies the substance that is predicated, not that it itself is thus predicated in itself, but that the sign of it is predicated, and that is the very definition itself.

## [ Reply to the Twenty-Third Argument ]

The real quiddity is not predicated in itself but only in that it is universal, *i. e.* its universal is predicated; and this is how the Commentator speaks, which is not literally true, although the sense [of his claims], which he explains in other places, is true.

## [ Reply to the Positive Principal Argument ]

With respect to the principal argument, I say that it should literally be conceded that the definition is neither really nor formally the same as the substance of the thing, but that by this [claim] one understands a designated act, which is predicated of the definition to be really and in all ways the same as what is defined; and thus it should be exercised as:

‘Rational animal’ is the same as ‘man’ in all ways and this is true.

[Objection]: If it were said that in this way

The genus is the same as the species in all ways would be true, and that

An attribute is the same as its subject in all ways since

Animal is the same as man in all ways and

The risible is the same as man in all ways [are true]—

[Reply]: I reply that the Commentator understands still more by that claim, namely [he understands] such a designated act, which should be exercised in the way described, and further [he understands] the claim that nothing is signified by the definition that is not signified by what is defined, and conversely, although in one way and another; and the second [clause] fails in the [purported] counterexamples adduced.

## [ End of the Question ]