Fifthly, I ask whether what is universal [and] univocal is something real existing subjectively somewhere.

[ The Principal Arguments ]

That it is: The universal primarily moves the intellect. But that which primarily moves the intellect is something real. Hence [the universal is something real].

For the opposite view: Everything real is singular. But the universal is not singular, as shown [in Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 7]. Hence [the universal is not something real].

[ Four Views ]

There could be diverse views regarding this question, many of which I hold to be simply false—yet I would place any of them before any view disproved in the preceding questions ([Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–7]).

[ The First View ]

The first view could be that the universal is a mental concept, and that this concept is really the intellection itself, such that then the universal would then be the confused act of understanding a thing. And this intellection, since it no more understands one singular than another, would be indifferent and common to all singulars; and thus, in that it would be more confused or less confused, it would be more universal or less universal.

[First Objection]: It can be argued against this view that something is understood in any act of understanding, and so something is understood by such an act of understanding; and it is not something singular outside the soul, since it is [of] one [singular] no more than another, nor [of] what exists any more than what doesn’t exist; hence either nothing such or anything such is understood in that act of understanding; and not anything, |# since then an infinite number would be understood by that act of understanding; #| therefore, nothing [is understood in that act of understanding].

[Second Objection]: Furthermore, what terminates an act of understanding is called a ‘mental concept’ by everyone; but such an act of understanding does not terminate itself primarily, since there is no more reason that one act of understanding terminate itself than another [act of understanding]; and so, since the act of understanding of Socrates does not terminate itself primarily, neither does this act of understanding terminate itself primarily. Therefore, the concept is not this act of understanding.

[The Second View]

The second view could be that the universal is some sort of appearance (species) that, since it is equally related to every singular, is called ‘universal’; and so it is universal in representing and yet singular in being (in essendo).

[First Objection]: But this view seems to be false, since, as will be stated in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], such an appearance is not necessary.

[Second Objection]: Secondly, the universal is held to be that which is understood through the intellect’s abstraction; but the appearance is not understood in this way, since either it is understood in itself, and then, as will be clarified in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], it is necessarily understood primarily intuitively, or it is understood in another, and, consequently, as will be clarified in [Ord. 2 qq. 14–15], that other [thing] is universal with respect to this one, and then I raise the same question of it as before; hence there will either be an infinite regress or the appearance will not be the universal.

[Third Objection]: Furthermore, the universal would then not be abstracted but would truly be generated, since it would be a genuine quality, generated in the intellect.

[The Third View]

There could be another view that [the universal] is some genuine thing, following upon the act of the intellect, which would be a likeness of the thing; in this way, it would be universal, since it would be equally related to all.

[Objection]: Yet this view does not seem true, since everything that is in the intellect is either an act or an attribute or a habit; but none of these can be held to be the thing [described] by this view.

[Concordan ce of these Three Views]

These views agree in the claim that the universal would be in itself a genuine singular thing and numerically one, though with respect to external things it would be universal and common and indifferent as regards singular things and, as it were, a natural likeness of these things, and, because of this, it could supposit for external things. And [external things] would be in some way related to that universal as a statue to [things] similar to it: it
would be in itself singular and numerically one, yet indifferent to the [things]
similar to it, nor would it lead more to the notion of one than of another. Similarly, according to these [views], those who would hold that aside from the act of understanding there would be an appearance or a habit in the soul would no more have to say that the act of understanding is really universal than the appearance or the habit, nor conversely, since any of these would be indifferent to all singulars.

These views cannot easily be disproved, nor are they as implausible or contain such obvious falsehoods as the views disproved in [Ord. 1 d. qq. 4–7].

[ The Fourth View ]

Fourth, there could be a view that nothing is universal of its nature but only by convention (institutio), in the way in which a word is universal, since no thing of its nature has to supposit for another thing, nor be truly predicated of another thing, just as no word does [of its nature] but only through a voluntary agreement; and so, just as words are universals, and predicable of things, by convention, so too are all universals.

[Objection]: But this view does not seem true, since then nothing would be a genus or species of its nature, nor conversely, and then God and substance outside the soul could equally be as universal as anything in the soul, which doesn’t seem true.

[ Ockham’s Old View ]

Hence [the question] can plausibly be answered in another way: that the universal is not something real having subjective being, neither in the soul nor outside the soul, but only has objective being in the soul, and is a certain fiction, having such being in objective being as an external thing has in subjective being. And this is so in the way that the intellect, seeing some thing outside the soul, fashions a consimilar thing in the mind, such that, if [the intellect] were to have productive power as it has fictive power, it would produce such a thing in subjective being outside [the soul], numerically distinct from the former [thing], and [that which is produced] would be proportionately similar [to that former thing], as it is for the architect. Just as the architect, seeing some external house or building, fashions in his soul a consimilar house and afterwards produces something consimilar [which is] external, and is only numerically distinct from the former [house], that fiction in the mind from the sight of some external thing would be an exemplar. Thus just as the fictitious house, if the fashioning were to have some real productive power, is an exemplar for the architect,
so too the fiction would be an exemplar for the one fashioning it. And that [fiction] can be called ‘universal,’ since it is an exemplar and indifferently related to all external singulars, and due to this likeness in objective being it can supposit for external things that have consimilar being outside the intellect. And so in this way the universal, which is only a certain fiction, does not exist through generation but rather through abstraction.

Therefore, I first give some arguments to prove that there is something in the soul having only objective being without subjective being.

[ Seven Arguments for the Existence of Objective Being ]

[First Argument]: This is clear, firstly, because according to philosophers ‘being’ is divided, in its primary division, into ‘being in the soul’ and ‘being outside the soul,’ and ‘being outside the soul’ is divided into the ten categories. Then I ask: how is ‘being in the soul’ taken here? Either for that which only has objective being, and so what was to proved is established; or for that which has subjective being, and this is not possible, since that which has true subjective being in the soul is that which is contained under the being that is precisely divided into the ten categories, since [it falls] under [the category of] Quality. The act of understanding—and, in every case, each accident informing the soul—is a genuine quality, just as heat or whiteness, and so it is not contained under that part of the division that is divided from [the kind of] being that is divided into the ten categories.

[Second Argument]: Furthermore, figments have being in the soul and not subjective [being], since otherwise they would be genuine things, and so a chimaera or a goat-stag and the like would be genuine [verae/vera] things; therefore, [figments] are something that only have objective being.

[Third Argument]: Similarly, propositions, syllogisms, and the like, which logic deals with, do not have subjective being; hence they only have objective being, such that their being is being known; therefore, there are such entities having only objective being.

[Fourth Argument]: Similarly, artifacts in the mind of the artificer do not seem to have subjective being, as neither do creatures in the divine mind before their creation.

[Fifth Argument]: Similarly, [as regards] the ‘respects of reason’ generally held by Doctors, I ask: either they only have subjective being, and then they are genuine things and real; or only objective being, and then what was to be proved is established.

[Sixth Argument]: Similarly, according to those holding other views, ‘being’ expresses a univocal concept, and yet no other thing.

[Seventh Argument]: Similarly, everybody (as it were) distinguishes first-level and second-level concepts, |# without calling second-level con-
cepts some real quality in the soul. Hence, since they are not really external [things], they could only have objective being in the soul. #|

[Seven Arguments for the Objective Being of the Universal]

[First Argument]: Secondly, this view would hold that the fiction is that which is primarily and immediately denominated by the concept of universality and has the ratio object, and it is that which immediately terminates an act of understanding when no singular is understood. Indeed, in objective being [the fiction] exists just as the singular exists in subjective being. For this reason it can of its nature supposit for those singulars of which it is in some way a likeness. Some predicates bringing in genuine things are verified of it, yet not for itself but for things. And it is that one that is predicated of many, such that it is not varied: otherwise no genus would be truly predicated of many species, but necessarily would be one [species] and another [species], and there would be as many genera as there are species; rather, the genus could differ from the species in no way, nor would the genus be in more than the species. For, if it were so, I ask how the genus differs from the species? [If it is said to differ] a parte rei, this was disproved [in Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 6]. Similarly, granted that it is distinguished a parte rei, then I ask: either the genus ([which is] not varied) is predicated of many species, or not. If it is, I have established what was to be proved, that something neither varied nor multiplied is predicated of many, and is not in the thing—except according to the view stated in [Ord. 1 d. 2 q. 4]—and so, is only in the mind. If, however, nothing [which is] neither varied nor multiplied is predicated of many, then the genus is not in more than the species or the individual, since certainly the species as varied is predicated of many, and the individual as varied and multiplied is truly predicated of many. If, however, the genus is distinguished from the species in a mental concept, either the same concept is predicated of many, or not, and only the same concept is varied and multiplied. If so, I have established what was to be proved, that the same concept, neither varied nor multiplied, is predicated of many, but not for itself, since then those ‘many’ [of which it is predicated] would be one and not varied, which is impossible. If not, then no distinction between the genus and the species can be given, and especially with regard to greater and lesser commonness. Therefore, something [which is] the same, neither varied nor multiplied, is predicated of many, and I call that concept a fiction, in the way described previously.

[Second Argument]: Similarly, the subject is the same in a universal proposition and a particular [proposition], not only in spoken propositions but also in mental propositions (which are of no [spoken] language). In the latter, no thing is put as subject, only a certain concept. Thus it can be
said that a word is the universal, and genus and species, but only by an agreement, so a concept [which is] a fiction in this way, abstracted from singular things already known, is universal of its nature.

[Third Argument]: Someone can employ this manner of speaking, calling the concept and the universal such a fiction, for this seems to be the way Augustine speaks, and his account may seem to some the best dealing with these matters. This is clear in his *The Trinity* 8.4.7, where he says:

It is necessary that when we believe in some bodily things that we do not see but have read of or heard of, the mind fashions to itself something in the lineaments and forms of bodies just as it occurs to our thinking, which is either not true or, if it is true, can happen only in the rarest of cases.

And he adds:

Who indeed, reading or hearing what the Apostle Paul wrote or what is written about him, does not fashion in his soul an appearance of the Apostle and all those whose names he recounts?

And afterwards:

The appearance of the Lord Himself in the flesh, which is one, is nevertheless fashioned and varied by the diversity of innumerable thoughts. It is possible to argue, on the basis of this authority, as follows: the intellect can fashion something entirely consimilar to something seen no less than from things seen something consimilar to something not previously seen; but, from many appearances [which he has] seen, someone can fashion something consimilar to the appearance of the Apostle or of Christ or of someone else whom he has never seen; therefore, it is not inappropriate that the soul can fashion something consimilar to some individual [which is] seen or intuitively known, and so that fiction will not be a real being but merely cognized. Just as according to Augustine something else is suggested by such a fiction, so too by the fiction [fashioned] from something seen, all things consimilar to what was previously seen are (as it were), suggested and signified. This is nothing else than to affirm or deny something of such a fiction, not for itself but for the thing from which it is fashioned or can be fashioned. For example, someone seeing a singular whiteness fashions [something] consimilar in his soul, just as the architect fashions [something] consimilar in his soul from a house [which he has] seen [directly] or as depicted, and he predicates such attributes of that whiteness:

Whiteness is a color

Whiteness is discernible by sight

and so on. He does not intend that the fiction is a color or discernible by sight, but that any given whiteness from which [such a fiction] can be fash-
ioned is a color or discernible by sight. Accordingly, since he cannot know every whiteness outside [the soul], he uses that fiction for every whiteness.

[Fourth Argument]: Furthermore, Augustine says in The Trinity 8.4.7: Nor do we have as part of our faith in the Lord Jesus Christ that what the soul fashions to itself, perhaps far different than what is the case and that which we think according to the appearance of man, is the Saviour. Indeed, we have, as it were a rule, an implanted idea of human nature, according to which whatever we see as such we immediately think to be a man.

From this it is clear that, although due to the diversity in shape and color and other accidents in diverse men we can fashion diverse [fictions] that are not similar to every man (or perhaps [are similar to] no man), nevertheless, we can have a notion of some fiction that is equally related to all men, according to which we are able to judge of anything whether it is a man or not.

[Fifth Argument]: That I might fashion something consimilar to [something] previously seen, such that if I were to have productive power and not merely fictive power I might really produce such [a consimilar thing], is clear from Augustine, The Trinity 8.6.9, where he says:

Since I had heard from many people and believed that it is a great city, as it was described to me I fashioned an image in my soul of it as I was able.

And afterwards:

If I could bring forth that image from my soul [and put it] before the eyes of men who were familiar with Alexandria, surely they would all say either “That is not it!” or, if they were to say “That is it!” I would be extremely surprised, and regarding it in my soul (i.e. [regarding] the image as a quasi-picture of [Alexandria]) I still would not know it.

From this authority is clear (i) that such [fictions] can be fashioned, and, as he states immediately before the cited passage, all the more so from what is seen in itself than from what is not seen in itself but seen imperfectly in other consimilar sights; (ii) that this fiction is called a ‘likeness’ or an ‘image’ or a ‘picture’ of a thing, and, as he says in the same place, it is called the ‘word’ of a thing; (iii) it is clear that the fiction is an object known by the intellect. And according to (i)–(iii), [such a fiction] can be a term in a proposition, and supposit for all those of which it is the image or likeness; and this is to be universal and common to them.

[Sixth Argument]: Again, in The Trinity 9.6.11, treating there how from things [which are] seen diverse [fictions] are fashioned, and how according to that diversity of those bodies some fictions are similar to those
from which they are fashioned, and for making which the fictions are used, he concludes at the end of the chapter:

Therefore, we judge of these [bodies] according to the [fiction] and that we discern by the regard of our mind’s reason; and they are either present, which we touch with our bodily senses, or absent, which we recall by images fixed in our memory, or we fashion from it such a likeness as we ourselves, if we wanted to and were able, would construct. From this, it is clear that such fictions are in objective being as others are in subjective being, and if the intellect were to have productive power, it would make them to be similar in subjective being.

[Seventh Argument]: Augustine explicitly states that the mind fashions such [fictions] from what is previously known, and that as known they are that according to which the intellect can judge others, in The Trin-

ity 10.2.4 when he says:

He fashions an imaginary form in the soul by which he is aroused to love. However, from what does he fashion it, except from those things that he already knew? Yet if he were to find what is praised to be dissimilar to the form fashioned in his soul and most familiar in his thoughts, perhaps he will not love it.

And he immediately states how according to such a likeness those singulars are known in it and are loved in it in some way, none of which would be true unless such fictions were to have a certain commonness as regards those [singulars] and to be consimilar to those [singulars] from which they are fashioned. And I call such commonness ‘universality’ |# according to one view, #| nor does |# this view #| posit any other [commonness] except perhaps through an agreement, as a word or some sign conventionally imposed is called ‘universal.’

[Objection]: If it were objected to all this that it is not possible to fashion such [fictions] except from composite bodies, namely in that their parts are conjoined in different ways by the intellect; however, this is not possible for spiritual or simple [things] not having such a diversity of parts—

[Reply]: But [Augustine] himself opposes this [objection], in The Trin-

ity 10.3.5, where he holds that the soul can fashion [something] consimilar to itself, and this figment will not be the soul itself but will truly be known by the intellect. Accordingly, he says that the mind perhaps does not love itself, but it loves that which it fashions of itself, perhaps quite different from [the way] it is; or, if the mind fashions [something] similar to itself, then when it loves this figment [the mind] loves itself before it knows it, since it regards that which is similar to it; therefore, it knows other minds from which it fashions [a fiction] for
itself, and so is known to itself generically.

From this, it is clear that such a fiction can even be had of the soul, which is simple, and this fiction is known as a genus, which is common; and this is what was to be proved.

Therefore, according to this view, it should be noted that the fiction is called by Augustine the ‘image’, ‘likeness’, ‘phantasm’, and ‘appearance’; and these fictions are said by Augustine to remain in memory in the absence of sensibles, according to a habit immediately inclining to their being understood. Thus they are there in proximate potency (as it were), inasmuch as the intellect can produce them in the being appropriate to them as a means to those absent [things]. However, [the intellect] cannot, by such a habit as a means, produce external bodies in the being appropriate to them, since the being suitable to [external bodies] is real being.

[Seven Doubts About Ockham’s Old View]

But there are some doubts about the aforesaid [view].

[First Doubt]: It does not seem that something can have objective being unless it has subjective being somewhere; hence such fictions genuinely have subjective being, at least in the mind. This is confirmed: anything that is, is either substance or accident.

[Second Doubt]: It seems that such [fictions] are not similar to things, since no accident can be assimilated to substance, and the fiction is more distant from substance than any accident; therefore, [the fiction] cannot be a likeness of a thing outside the soul.

[Third Doubt]: It does not seem that such fictions are universals, since it was said that if the intellect were to have productive power and not merely fictive power, it would produce consimilar external [things]; but if external consimilar [things] were produced, those that are produced would no more be universals than anything else, all of which, for the same reason, would be numerically distinct, as is clear with regard to the house produced from such a likeness and the house previously known from which the similar [house] was fashioned; therefore, in the same way, these fictions are not universals in being fashioned.

[Fourth Doubt]: The fourth doubt is about syncategorematic, connotative, and negative concepts: from where can they be obtained or abstracted? For if [they are said to be obtained or abstracted] precisely from things, it is not clear how they could be distinguished from other concepts. Moreover, that there are such concepts is clear, since to every spoken proposition there can correspond a consimilar one in the mind, and so to the propositions “Every man is an animal” and “Some man is an animal” there correspond

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distinct mental propositions; therefore, something corresponds to the sign of quantity in one proposition that does not correspond to the other.

[Fifth Doubt]: The fifth doubt is about the claim that the spoken word is universal. This seems false, since then a word would be a genus or species, and consequently one entire categorial ordering would be in one subalternate genus of Quality.

[Sixth Doubt]: Similarly, then numerically one accident would be a genus as regards many substances, since numerically one word [would be such a genus].

[Seventh Doubt]: Similarly, then there would be innumerable most generic genera, just as there are innumerable words [which are generic].

All of these seem absurd, and many other absurdities seem to follow.

[ Replies to the Doubts About Ockham’s Old View ]

[Reply to the First Doubt]: Those holding this view would say that there are some beings of reason that do not have, nor could they have, any subjective being. Just as before the Creation creatures had no subjective being and yet were known by God, so too something can be fashioned by the created intellect that has no subjective being. And when it is claimed that “whatever is, is either substance or accident,” it is true that whatever is outside the soul is substance or accident, yet it is not [the case] that whatever is objectively in the soul is either substance or accident.

[Reply to the Second Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view] would say that such fictions are not really similar, but are more dissimilar and distant from substance than accidents; nevertheless, they are in objective being as others are in subjective being; and the intellect, from its nature, has the ability to fashion such [fictions] of what it knows to be external. Therefore, just as [the intellect] can fashion [fictions of] what it does not know, and yet it knows many things according to which it can fashion such [fictions], so too it can fashion [fictions of] what it knows.

[Reply to the Third Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view] would say that such fictions are universals. Still, if these [fictions] were produced in real being, they would not be universals, for then they would simply be of the same ratio as other things [which have real being], nor would there be a reason for one to be universal any more than the rest. But since, in fact, they are not of the same ratio, since the fiction is simply not an animal or a man, thus it may be said that one is more universal than the rest.

[First Objection to the Reply to the Third Doubt]: If it were said that according to Grosseteste the universal is not a figment—

[Second Objection to the Reply to the Third Doubt]: Likewise, [if
it were said] that then there would be as many universals as there are intellects—

[Reply to the First Objection]: The universal is not a figment of the sort to which there does not correspond something in subjective being consimilar to that which is fashioned in objective being, as is the case for the chimu'ra. The chimu'ra is fashioned as something composed out of diverse animals, and, as such, cannot be something in the world. [However], the universal is a figment of the sort to which there corresponds something consimilar in the world: for example, when there is fashioned something composed out of soul and body, that fiction is universal. Similarly, if a house were fashioned in the mind before it were produced, that fiction is not a figment like the chimæra or something of the sort.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: At present I don’t care whether the figment or the concept is varied with the variation of intellects or not. The [philosophers holding this view] would say that the most generic genus of Substance either is simply one and not varied or is one by equivalence, in which manner others say that the same is predicated in these spoken propositions:

Socrates is a man

and

Plato is a man

For [the word ‘man’ in each spoken proposition] is really different, but nevertheless [the word ‘man’] is the same by equivalence, as they (correctly) say, since it would have the same force if in all such propositions numerically the same word that was spoken in one proposition were spoken in place of the other in the other proposition and conversely. And it is so in the case at hand: there are only ten most generic genera by equivalence, whether there are simply only ten or not, whether what is predicated is varied [# or the genus is varied #] or not.

[Reply to the Fourth Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view] would say that syncategorematic and connotative and negative concepts are not concepts abstracted from things, suppositing of their nature for things, or signifying them in a way distinct from other concepts. Hence they would say that no syncategorematic or connotative or negative concept—except only by agreement, in which manner all such [things] by agreement are predicated of a word or of other signs—and, in every case, neither grammatical nor logical modes can be more suitable to these concepts of themselves than [any other] concepts, but are only used conventionally. Moreover, such concepts can be imposed or can be abstracted from words, and this is in fact the way it happens, either always or commonly. For example, the grammatical
mode that is singular in number, nominative in case, masculine in gender, and so on, is suitable to the word ‘man’; and other grammatical modes are suitable to the word “man’s.” Similarly, it is suitable to the word ‘man’ that it determinately signify a thing \( \text{per se} \). This is not suitable to the word ‘every,’ but rather that [the word ‘every’] only signify [in combination] with another [word]. It is similar for the word ‘not,’ and for ‘\( \text{per se} \),’ ‘insofar as,’ ‘if,’ and syncategorematic [words] of this sort. Then, from these words [which] signify in this way, the intellect abstracts common concepts predicable of them, and imposes those concepts to signify the same as what those external words signify. And, in the same way, [the intellect] forms from such [concepts] propositions [which are] consimilar to [spoken propositions] and have the same properties spoken propositions have. Just as [the intellect] can agree that such concepts signify in this way, so too it can agree that those concepts abstracted from things signify under the same grammatical modes under which the [corresponding] spoken words signify. Still, this is more appropriate to abstract concepts than spoken words, in order to avoid equivocation, since those concepts are distinct just as the spoken words are, although they are not all distinct; other concepts are not distinct. Thus any such proposition should be distinguished, for example the proposition corresponding to the [spoken] proposition “Man is men,” “Man is man’s,” and so forth. As it is laid down for these [cases], it should be laid down analogously for all connotatives, negatives, and syncategorematics, as are verbs like ‘is’, ‘runs’, and so on.

[Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: The [philosophers holding this view would say] that a word itself is genuinely universal, although it is not [universal] of its nature but only by a conventional agreement. Similarly, they would grant that a word is a genus, a species, a most generic genus, and so forth. Nor is it any more inappropriate to attribute such [characteristics] to a word by a conventional agreement than to attribute to complex spoken words that they are true and false, necessary and impossible. It is truly said that these words are true and that those words are false, for none but a madman can deny that many falsehoods and lies are told, and similarly that many truths and necessities are spoken. In the same way, the [spoken proposition]:

Man is an animal

is true \( \text{per se primo modo} \), and the spoken [proposition]:

Man is risible

is true \( \text{per se secundo modo} \), and the spoken proposition:

A man is an ass

is impossible. Similarly, in [the proposition]:

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Man is an animal
a common term is put as the subject and [a common term] is put as the
predicate, and the genus is similarly predicated of the species.

[First Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: If it were said that
a spoken proposition is true or false only because it is the sign of a true or
false proposition in the mind, and so, similarly, some spoken word will be a
genus or a species only because it is the sign of a genus or a species [in the
mind]

[Second Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: Likewise, [if it
were said] that then the same term could be a genus and a species, since
one man can impose a word to signify all individuals [which are] such and
another man [can impose] the same [word] to signify all those [individuals
that are] such—

[Reply to the First Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: It can
be granted that some spoken proposition is true although it is not the sign
of some proposition in the mind; still, in fact, any [such proposition] can be
the sign of a proposition in the mind. In the same way, it can be granted
that any word that is a genus or a species can be the sign of a genus or
a species in the mind, and in fact is a sign ordered to any such [genus or
species in the mind].

[Reply to the Second Objection to the Reply to the Fifth Doubt]: The
[second objection] is puerile. Still, it should literally be granted that
numerically the same word, according to different impositions, is genus and
species. Nor is this more inappropriate than to grant that numerically
the same word is univocal and equivocal, and that numerically the same
proposition is necessary and impossible. (|| Everyone should grant these
[claims] unless a proposition [were to be] called `true` precisely in that it
signifies the true and not the false, and so forth for the others. ||) For the
word `man` among the Latins is simply univocal, and the same word among
the Greeks or others could be imposed to signify many [things] equally
primarily, and so among them it would be simply equivocal. In the same
way, [the proposition]:
Every dog is an animal
is simply true, and it is also simply false, since it has one true sense and
one false [sense], i. e. the same proposition is true and false.

[Reply to the Sixth Doubt]: I say that, with regard to anything com-
mon it is not inadmissible for one entire categorial ordering, which contains
[elements] predicable per se primo modo, to be in one subalternate genus
such that they are things of this category, just as was said previously with
regard to beings of reason; nor is this inadmissible, except as thought to be

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by those not understanding it.

[Reply to the Seventh Doubt]: [I say] by the same [remarks] that it is not inadmissible for one word to be a genus conventionally, just as it is not inadmissible for some word to be predicated of another [word] per se primo modo. Accordingly, those holding (7) and similar falsehoods should grant in consequence that no one can say anything true or false, nor would anyone ever hear lies or truths, and, in the same way, that neither truths nor falsehoods can be written, and other absurdities that would horrify any human community.

[Ockham’s New View]

| # Those who are displeased by the view of fictions of this sort in objective being can hold that the concept and anything universal is some quality existing subjectively in the mind, which of its nature is a sign of an external thing—just as a word is a sign of a thing by a conventional agreement. Hence it can be said that for every [logical or grammatical mode]: just as there are some words and signs that are categorematic, signifying external things by a voluntary agreement properly and per se, and there are some [words] that are syncategorematic, which do not signify but only consignify [in combination] with others, and there are some [words] signifying in one way and some in another way due to their different grammatical characteristics, so too there are some qualities existing in the mind subjectively to which such [characteristics] are analogously suitable of their nature, as they are suitable to words through a voluntary agreement. Nor does the fact that the intellect is able to elicit some qualities that are naturally signs of things seem any more inappropriate than that brute animals and men naturally give forth some noises by which it is naturally suitable that they signify some other [thing]. Nevertheless, there is this difference: brute [animals] and men do not give forth such sounds except to signify some attributes or some accidents existing in themselves; the intellect, however, since it is a greater power with regard to this, can elicit qualities to naturally signify anything.

According to this view, it should be said that every universal and most generic genus is a genuine singular thing existing as a thing of a determinate genus, [namely, a thing of the genus Quality]; nevertheless, [such a quality] is universal by predication, not for itself but for the things that it signifies. Thus the categorial order of Substance is a composite or aggregate of many qualities naturally related as higher and lower, i.e. that one [element] in the [categorial] order [of Substance] is of its nature a sign of more and another [element in the categorial order of Substance is of its nature a sign]
of fewer, just as if such an ordering were to come about from words. Still, there would be this difference: words ordered as higher and lower do not signify that which they signify except by a voluntary agreement, but [such qualities] signify naturally and are of their nature genera and species. Nor do such arguments as that quality is not predicated of substance, or that one category is denied of anything contained under another category, work against this view; for such claims, and many others that could be adduced, are true when the terms supposit personally. For example, [the proposition]:

Substance is not quality

is true if the terms were to supposit personally; nevertheless, if the subject were to supposit simply and the predicate personally, [the proposition] would be granted according to this view. Therefore, many such [objections] to this view do not work.

Nevertheless, this view can be held in different ways. In one way, [it could be held] that the quality existing subjectively in the soul would be the act of understanding itself; and this view can be stated, and arguments against it can be resolved, as I have said elsewhere. In another way, it could be held that the quality would be something other than the act of understanding and posterior to that act of understanding; and then [this view] could accommodate the motives for the view of the fiction in objective being as is touched on elsewhere, where I have more fully expressed the view about the concept or intention of the soul, holding that it is a quality of the mind.

[ Ockham's Response to the Initial Question ]

I take any of these three views to be plausible, and which of them is more true I leave to the judgement of others.

Nevertheless, I do hold this, that no universal, unless perhaps it is universal by a voluntary agreement, is something existing outside the soul in any way, but all that which is of its nature universally predicable of many is in the mind either subjectively or objectively, and that no universal is of the essence or quiddity of any given substance, and so too for the other negative conclusions that I have stated in [Ord. 1 d. 2 qq. 4–7], #]

[ Reply to the Positive Principal Argument ]

I say that that which primarily moves the intellect is not universal but singular, and hence the singular is primarily understood in the primacy of generation, as will be clear in [Ord. 1 d. 3 q. 5].

[ End of the Question ]