

Duns Scotus: Ordinatio II d. 3 p. 1 q. 4*

**[Whether a material substance is
individual or singular through quantity]**

[66] Fourthly, I ask whether a material substance is individual or singular through quantity.

[The Principal Arguments]

[67] That it *is* [individual through quantity]: Boethius, *De Trinitate*:

The variety of accidents produces difference in number, for three men differ neither in species nor in genus, but in their accidents; for if we separate all the accidents by the mind, the places for each are still diverse, since we can in no way imagine one [place] for two of them: two bodies cannot obtain at the same place. Now [place] is an accident; thus they are numerically many insofar as there are many accidents.

Among all accidents, the primary accident is quantity, which he seem to express specially by ‘place,’ saying that we cannot imagine the same place [for two of them], and this is fitting for them in that they are quantities.

[68] Damascene, *Introductio dogmatum elementaris* ([PG 95 103B]):

Every thing in which the hypostasis differs from a hypostasis of the same species is called an ‘adventitious differentia’ and a ‘characteristic property’ and a ‘hypostatic quality.’ Moreover, this is an accident, just as one man differs from another because one is tall and the other short.

[69] Avicenna, *Met.* 5.2 [fol. 87va]:

A nature that requires matter—accidents and dispositions extrinsically advene on its being (*esse*), through which it is individuated.

[70] Against [the view that a material substance is individual through quantity]: As was argued in [*Ord.* 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 2 n. 46], primary substance is generated *per se* and operates *per se*, and this insofar as it is distinguished from secondary [substance], to which those [features] do not agree *per se*. But these [features] do not agree to a being *per accidens*: this is clear from

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Met. 6.2 [1026^b22–24] for the case of being generated; it is also clear for [the case of] operating, since a *per se* agent is one *per se* being, and this in one causal order.

[The Position of Thomas Aquinas]

[71] Here it is claimed that material substance is singular and individual through quantity.

[72] The argument that is given for this claim is that what agrees with something primarily and *per se* agrees to any other given thing through its account; but substance and quantity do not produce [something] one *per se*, but only [something] one *per accidens*; hence to whichever of these *divisibility into parts of the same account* agrees primarily and *per se*, *singularity* will also agree; and quantity is of this sort, since of itself it is such that it can be divided to infinity (*Met.* 5.13 [1020^a7–8]). Therefore, [*divisibility into parts of the same account* and hence *singularity*], agrees to quantity primarily and *per se*, and only agrees to another through its account. Such is the division of a species into its individuals, since the results of those dividings are not formally of another account the way the species dividing the genus are [formally of another account]. And what is more, *being divisible into parts of the same account* agrees with some account of quantity (*Met.* 5.13 [1020^a7–8]), and the principle of division in some nature and the [principle] of distinction of the divided parts are the same. Therefore, individuals are individually distinguished from each other through quantity. From this, it is inferred that the division into individuals agrees to a thing through quantity, to which such a distinction is appropriate; hence an individual is individual through quantity.

[73] Besides, this fire differs from that fire only as the form [of the one] differs from the form [of the other], and form differs from form only as [the form] is received in one part of matter and in another part of matter. But one part of matter [differs] from another part [of matter] only as it falls under a different part of quantity. Therefore, the entire distinction of this fire from that fire is reduced to quantity as the primary distinctive [factor].

[74] The argument [given in n. 73] is confirmed, since a generator generates another only according to a distinction of matter, but the matter of the generated is necessarily presupposed as an amount (*quanta*) and falls under a distinct quantity. That it is an amount is clear, since a natural agent cannot act on a non-amount. It is also clear that it is an amount by some quantity [of its own], since it cannot be an amount by means of the quantity of the generator. But the quantity [of the generated] naturally precedes

the being of the generated, and so [precedes] the distinction between the generator and the generated; however, it would not naturally precede it if it were not naturally required and as *per se* distinctive of it; therefore, [material substance is individual or singular through quantity].

[Disproof of Aquinas's Position]

[75] I argue against the conclusion [of n. 71, that material substance is individual or singular through quantity], in four ways: (*i*) from the identity of a numerical account, whether of individuation or singularity; (*ii*) from the order of substance to accidents; (*iii*) from the account of a categorical ordering—and these three ways generally prove that no accident can *per se* be an account through which material substance is individuated—(*iv*) in particular, I will argue against quantity with regard to the conclusion of the position; and (*v*) I will argue in particular against the arguments for the position.

[76] First of all, I state what I understand by ‘individuation’ or ‘numerical unity’ or ‘singularity.’ [I understand] not the indeterminate unity by which anything in a species is said to be numerically one, but unity designated as a *this*. Thus, just as was said [in n. 48] that *being divided into subjective parts* is impossible with an individual and the reason for this impossibility is to be sought, so too I say that it is impossible with an individual not to be designated a *this* by this singularity—and the cause, not of singularity in general but of this singularity in particular, designated [singularity], is sought, namely as it is determinately a *this*.

[The First Way]

[77] Understanding singularity in this fashion, I argue in the first way [described in n. 75, namely from the identity of a numerical account, in a twofold manner. Firstly as follows: An actually existing substance, not changed by some substantial change, cannot become not-this from this, since that singularity ([understood] in the way stated [in n. 76]) cannot be present to the same substance now as one, now as another, while [the substance] remains the same and not substantially changed. But an actually existing substance, when no substantial change is made in it or [it is not] changed, can without contradiction fall under now one quantity, now another quantity, and [in fact can fall under] any given absolute accident. Therefore, in no such [absolute accident] is a substance formally designated a *this*, by this singularity.

[78] The minor [premiss of n. 77, namely “an actually existing substance, when no substantial change is made in it or it is not changed, can without

contradiction fall under now one quantity, now another quantity, and in fact can fall under any given absolute accident”, is clear, for it is not a contradiction that God conserve a substance that is an amount by one quantity and inform the same [substance] by another quantity; nor will such an actually existing substance be changed by a substantial change in this [action of God], since there will be no change except from [one] quantity to [another] quantity. Similarly, if a substance is changed by any given accident, it will not be changed by some substantial change; whether this is possible or impossible, it will not be formally *not-this* on that account.

[79] If you were to object that [the case described in n. 78] is a miracle and so does not count against natural reason, well, against this objection: There is no miracle with respect to contradictories, for which there is no potency. But it is a contradiction that a substance, while remaining the same, be two substances without a substantial change, and this whether successively or simultaneously. Yet it would follow that [a substance, while remaining the same, is two substances without a substantial change] if the substance were formally a *this* through some accident: then, with [one] accident succeeding [another] accident, the same substance, not changed [substantially], would be two substances.

[80] This is confirmed by an analogy with specific unity: it is impossible with remaining one substance, not substantially changed, that [the substance] be simultaneously or successively this species and not this species—and so analogously in the case at hand.

[81] Secondly, [I argue in the first way] as follows: there cannot be the same primary terminus of two complete productions into substantial being (*in esse substantiali*). Proof: since then each [of the two productions] would take perfect substantial being, from which each is complete, and thus the same thing would be produced completely twice. And even if those two productions were not simultaneous, the same substance actually existing *per se* would be produced when it already actually exists. Therefore, at least there cannot be the same terminus of two successive productions. Now this bread was the primary terminus of a generation of bread. However, the bread is transubstantiated while remaining the same in quantity. Therefore, another bread would be created, and it would be affected by the remaining quantity; it follows that the terminus of the creation will be this bread, [that is] the same as the bread that was the terminus of the [previous] generation, since the latter bread will be a *this* by the numerically same singular by which the former bread was a *this*. It further follows that this bread is the same as transubstantiated and not as transubstantiated—or rather, it follows that

no bread is transubstantiated, since neither the universal bread nor this singular bread [is transubstantiated], for by what is given [in the case described and the position stated in n. 71] the bread remains unchanged with respect to the quantity by which it formally was a *this*. Hence absolutely nothing is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which is a heretical claim.

[The Second Way]

[82] In the second way [mentioned in n. 75, namely from the order of substance to accidents], I argue as follows: Substance is naturally prior to every accident, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* 7.1 [1028^a10–1028^b2]. And he intends ‘substance’ [here] as one of those [things] that divide being (*ens*), so that to analyze ‘substance’ here as God or as primary substance is irrelevant to his intent. He proves that substance is primary just as he proves that substance is [one of] a number of [things] dividing being—that it is prior to every accident such that for determining everything that divides being it is sufficient to determine [the question] for substance, insofar as it is primary; knowledge of accidents is obtained in that they are attributed to substance. However, this is not relevant unless substance is taken in its total ordering. Hence nothing posterior to that ordering can be the formal account by which something is in that ordering. Therefore, the account of the priority of substance generally, as it is common, suffices for the determination of the ordering that is [an ordering] of primary substance (to which the feature *natural priority to every accident* agrees). Thus it agrees to primary substance from its account that it is a *this* naturally prior to what is determined by any accident.

[83] The consequence could be confirmed: when something is prior to something else, the maximally primary [element] of the former is prior to the latter; but the maximally primary [element] of substance in general is primary substance; hence it is simply prior to every accident, and so is a *this* prior to being determined in some way by something else.

[84] At this point [someone might] object that primary substance, even though it is prior to quantity in being (*in essendo*), nevertheless is not [prior] in dividing, just as secondary substance is prior in entity but not in divisibility.

[85] Against [the claim put forward in n. 84, I give four arguments]. First, the response [given in n. 84] is self-defeating, since if primary substance is naturally prior in being to that quantity, and primary substance cannot be understood in its being except inasmuch as it is a *this*; hence it is not prior in being except insofar as it is prior as a *this*; thus it is not a *this* through quantity.

[86] [Second]: Form is simply prior to the composite, according to the proof of the Philosopher in *Met.* 7.2 [1029^a5–7]; hence if quantity is the form of primary substance insofar as it is primary substance, then it will be simply prior to primary substance in being—for if it is not a form in being, so too [it is not a form] in dividing, nor [is it a form] in the unity appropriate to primary substance insofar as it is such a being. Indeed, any given entity follows proper unity, not having another proper cause of it than the cause of the entity.

[87] [Third]: Substance is naturally prior to every accident in the way in which it is a subject for any accident. Insofar as it is a subject, it is proved to be prior in definition to every accident, since in the order of definition it is placed [in the definition] of any given thing through addition; but as it is a subject, it is this substance: according to the Philosopher, in *Phys.* 2.3 [195^b25–26] and *Met.* 1.1 [981^a16–19], singulars are the causes of singulars in any given kind of cause, and so a singular subject is the cause of a singular accident. This is confirmed especially with regard to an accident per accidens, since that is present primarily in a singular, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* 5.9 [1017^b35–1018^a3].

[88] [Fourth]: Anything that is prior to another in nature is prior [to it] in duration, in the sense that *being able to be prior in duration to its posterior* is not contradictorily incompatible with it; the priority of nature generally includes in the prior ‘being able to exist without the posterior without contradiction’ (*Met.* 5.11 [1019^a2–4]). Hence any given substance, insofar as it is of itself, could without contradiction be prior in duration to any accident, and thus [prior in duration to] quantity.

[The Third Way]

[89] In the third way [mentioned in n. 75, namely from the categorial ordering], I argue as follows. In any given categorial ordering there are all the things that pertain to that ordering, putting aside anything else that is not some [element] of that ordering essentially. Proof: two orderings are primarily diverse, and so nothing of one [ordering] is such through the ordering of another. But with regard to that ordering insofar as it is finite both above and below (according to the Philosopher in *Post. an.* 1.20 [82^a21–24]), just as there pertains [to that ordering] some primary predicate of which nothing is predicated, so too there pertains a lowest subject to which nothing is a subject. Therefore the singular or individual is in any given ordering, and not by means of some [element] in another ordering.

[90] Secondly, [I argue in the third way as follows]: in any given ordering, putting aside anything in another ordering, there is the account of the

species—for no position imagines that a species is in some genus through an accidental account, speaking of absolute [accidents]; but it is characteristic of the account of the species that the species is predicable of many things differing numerically; thus in any given ordering something intrinsically individual and singular of which the species is predicated can be found—or at least something not predicable of many [but at least of one] can be found (otherwise in this ordering there will be no lowest species whose account is *being predicable*, if there is nothing able to be put as subject to it).

[91] Thirdly, [I argue in the third way as follows]: the lowest subject and the [lowest element] able to be put as subject receives *per se* the predication of anything predicable, just as the primary predicate is predicated *per se* of any given predicate of that order; but a being *per accidens*, insofar as it is *per accidens*, receives the predication of nothing *per se*; hence the lowest [element] able to be put as subject cannot be a being *per accidens* ([something] aggregating things of different genera is a being *per accidens*, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* 5.6 [1015^b16–36]).

[92] Fourthly, [I argue in the third way as follows]: when something is precisely apt to agree to something according to some account, anything it essentially agrees to according to that account it agrees to simply and essentially according to that account; but *being universal* in the ordering of the genus Substance agrees to something precisely insofar as it is of that ordering, putting aside everything that is of another [ordering]; hence what commonness essentially agrees to insofar as it is of the ordering [of the genus Substance], it agrees to simply and essentially. But howsoever much [commonness] is contracted by something of another genus, nothing pertaining to its own ordering is removed from it: howsoever much Socrates is determined by white or black (to which he was in potency), Socrates is no more determinately in the genus Substance than he was before, since before [any of these determinations] he was a *this*. Hence howsoever much a nature in the genus Substance is held to be contracted to individuals through something of another genus, that nature will remain formally common [when] contracted, as [when it is] not contracted—and so holding that the common becomes individual through something of another genus is to hold that it is simultaneously common and individual or singular, [which is impossible].

[93] Perhaps to avoid the arguments of the [second and third] ways, the position taking quantity [as that by which a material substance is individual] will be held in another way, namely in that just as the extension of this matter is of a nature other than the nature of the quantity of this matter, and adds nothing beyond the essence of the matter, so too the designation

of the matter—which it has causally through quantity—is other than the designation of the quantity, and naturally prior to the designation that it has through quantity; the designation [of the matter] is other than the [designation] of the quantity, but is not other than the substance, so that just as the matter does not have parts through the nature of quantity (since a part of matter is matter), so too designated substance is only substance, for ‘designation’ only expresses a mode that it is in.

[94] On the contrary, the [modified] position [stated in n. 93] seems to include a double contradiction. [First], it is impossible for something naturally depending on the posterior to be naturally the same as the prior, since then it would be prior and not prior; but substance is naturally prior to quantity, according to those [who hold this modified position]; therefore, nothing, no matter how it presupposes the nature of quantity, can be the same as substance. Thus that designation is not [a designation] of substance and nevertheless has been caused by quantity!

[95] Proof of the major [premiss of n. 94, namely that “it is impossible for something naturally depending on the posterior to be naturally the same as the prior”]: when there is true and real identity (even though it is not formal [identity]) it is then impossible for one to be and the other not to be, since then it would and would not be really the same; and so consequently [the prior] is especially free from what is naturally caused or destroyed by the posterior.

[96] [Second], that which is a necessary condition of a cause in causing cannot be had from what it causes, since then the cause—inasmuch as it suffices for causing—would be caused by what it causes, and what is caused would then be the cause of itself and, as such, could give to the cause the causation of itself; but singularity, or designation, is a necessary condition in substance for causing quantity, since (as argued [in n. 87]) a singular that is caused requires a singular cause; thus it is impossible for the designation of the designated or singular substance to be from a singular quantity or to be from what it causes, or [to be] from the substance insofar as it is singular.

[97] Furthermore, [against the modified position stated in n. 93]: what is it for the quantity to cause or destroy such a mode in the substance? If it is nothing but what existed before the quantity, then the designation is in no way through the quantity, for then the designation would simply precede the quantity naturally. However, if it is something else, I ask: how is it caused by quantity, and by what kind of cause? It seems that the only kind [of cause] that can be given [in reply] is the efficient cause; but quantity is not an active form; therefore, [quantity cannot function as an efficient

cause].

[98] Finally, [against the modified position stated in n. 93]: whence does quantity destroy such a mode in the substance, [which is] really the same as the substance, any more than a quality, for example whiteness? There seems no reason, for just as whiteness itself is the form of a surface, and is not the means of destroying some other form, so too quantity seems to be a form of the substance by which the substance is an amount, and never destroys another form.

[The Fourth Way]

[99] In the fourth way [mentioned in n. 75], I argue [in particular against quantity]: the quantity by which a substance is designated a *this*, is thus either a determinate quantity or an indeterminate quantity. It is not a determinate quantity, since that follows the being of the form in matter, and consequently [follows] the singularity of the substance—for if substance is the cause of it as determinately this quantity, [substance] is the cause of it determined as a *this*. If indeterminate quantity is the cause whence a substance is a *this*—against this: that quantity, *i. e.* indeterminate [quantity], remains the same in the generated and the corrupted; hence it is not the cause of some determinate designation.

[100] If you were to object that the [minor premiss of the last argument in n. 99, namely that “quantity remains the same in the generated and the corrupted, and hence is not the cause of some determinate designation”], does not follow, since quantity is only held to be the cause of singularity as it presupposes specific unity, but the generated and the corrupted are not of the same species—well, against this: Suppose that (*i*) fire is generated from water, and (*ii*) water is generated from fire. In (*i*) water [is] corrupted and in (*ii*) water is generated. [Suppose further that] it is the same quantity [of water], and not only [the same] indeterminate quantity but also [the same] determinate quantity [of water], since it can have the same determination from the form—or it at least suffices that it is the same indeterminate [quantity of water], and that, according to you [who hold this position], is the cause of singularity (presupposing specific unity). Hence the water in (*i*) and in (*ii*) is numerically the same as this water, which seems impossible, because numerically the same individual does not occur in [distinct cases of a] natural action, according to *Phys.* 5.4 [228^a4–6] and *De gen. et corr.* 2.11 [338^b16–18].

[101] Furthermore, if quantity primarily individuates substance, it is necessary that [quantity] in itself is primarily a *this*, and of itself numerically distinct from that, just as this substance [is numerically distinct] from that

one; but then your claim, namely “every formal difference is specific,” is not true: this quantity and that [quantity] are forms, and so differ specifically! [102] If you were to object that a quantity has from itself determinate place, and of itself is distinguished from another quantity in this regard—well, against this: What position are you speaking of? Either of categorical [position] (which is a certain category), and this [category, Position], is posterior to [the category] Quantity, or of position that is a differentia of quantity, as ‘quantity’ is said to consist in parts having position, and then there arises the same question as before [in n.101], namely whence the position of this quantity differs from the position of that quantity—which is the question how this quantity differs numerically from that one, and so it seems that you [who hold this view] give as a reason [that it differs] of itself. That the permanent and continuous parts of this whole are distinguished of themselves from the permanent and continuous parts of that whole (which two [features], namely continuity and permanence, include position as it is a differentia of quantity) is no more known than that this quantity differs of itself from that one.

[104] Besides, all the same arguments that were given against the first position in [Ord. 2 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.7–28], proving that a body is not of itself a *this*, can be used to prove that quantity is not of itself a *this*. It is obvious that the account of the line is of itself common to this line and to that one, and it is no greater contradiction to understand a line under the account of the universal than it is body. For line has some real unity less than numerical unity, just as body does, according to the same proofs that were given in [Ord. 2 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.9–28 in support of n.8]. It is also clear that line and surface are of the same account in this water and in that [water]: whence, then, is this water this water and singular? (I am not speaking of a vague and indeterminate singularity, but designated and determined [singularity].)

[Reply to the Arguments for Aquinas’s Position]

[105] I argue against the arguments for the position [given in nn. 72–73]. Against the first argument, [given in n. 72], that quantity is not the account of divisibility into individuals: whatever is the formal account of some divisibility is formally present in that which is divisible by that division; but quantity is not formally present in the species inasmuch as it is divisible into subjective parts; therefore, it is not the formal account of such a whole [as divided] into such parts.

[106] The argument [given in n.105] is confirmed: the universal whole,

which is divided into individuals and into subjective parts, is predicated of any of those subjective parts such that any given subjective part is it. However, quantitative parts, into which a continuous whole is divided, never receive the predication of the whole that is divided into them. And even though the division of a homogeneous whole into quantitative parts and the division of the species or of the universal whole into subjective parts (which parts are individuals) may concur, nevertheless, they are not [divisions] of the same divided whole, since the quantitative whole is divided by a quantitative division and is not predicated of any divided part, just as a heterogeneous amount [is not predicated] of its divided [parts]. In no case is a quantitative part the whole of which it is a part. But it is compatible with this that there are many individuals having the same common being—which common [being] is divided into those [individuals] by another division, and that common [being] was not the amount that was divided by a quantitative division. Therefore, there is another whole, [that is] divided by this division and that [other] division; and it [is divided] into the same parts per accidens, [which are] rather parts formally of another account with respect to the [quantitative] whole and the [universal whole], since with respect to the former [they are] integral [parts] and with respect to the latter [they are] subjective [parts]. According to the concurrence of the two divisions of the two wholes into parts, in which [divisions] the double account of part concurs, some persons thought that the two wholes are divided into parts of the same account.

[107] As for [the citation noted in n. 72] taken from the Philosopher [Met. 5.13 1020^a7–8], it should be said that the Philosopher does not say that an amount is divided into parts of the same account, but that “an amount is divisible into those [elements] that are present [in it], [any] single one or either of which is apt to be something, and a this-something (*hoc aliquid*).” He says that [an amount is divisible] into those things that are present [in it] inasmuch as they are components of the whole in which they are present, and so not [as divisible] into subjective parts, which are not present [in it]; either of which (if the division is into two) or any single one [of which] (if [the division] is into many) is apt to be in something, namely [something] *per se* existing in the way [in which] the whole [does], since inasmuch as something is a quantitative dividing part it can *per se* exist just as the divided whole [does], and [he adds] this against the division of the composite into matter and form, and something concrete, [which he adds] against the division of the genus into species. If a number were composed of diverse numbers, the account of the number would not prevent it from being divided into numbers of another account; in the same way, nothing would

prevent the forearm¹ from being divided into parts of another account if it were composed of *two-foot-long* and of *three-foot-long*—which differ in species; so too quantity, [if it were composed of parts of another account], would not prevent the division of its subject into parts of another² account.

[108] I concede as a matter of fact in every case that even though [the notion of] ‘whole’ does not require that it is divided into parts of the same³ account, still, [the notion of ‘whole’] does not require that they be of distinct accounts [either], since insofar as they are parts of an amount they are not of another account: although the head, hand, and heart are quantitative parts and of another account, nevertheless they are not of another *ratio* insofar as they are precisely parts of an amount.

[109] Thus in the way in which it is true that an amount is divided into parts of the same account (even though this cannot be taken from the Philosopher, [as argued in n. 107 above]), it is completely irrelevant to the case at hand, since [an amount] is not divided into parts in which the account of what is divided is included, but into the parts that were present in what is divided—and they have one account, not of [what is divided], but of something common to this and that [divided part]. The species, however, is divided into parts of the same account, namely because [the parts] include the account of what is divided and not something else that is of another account, common to what is divided and the divided [parts].

[110] I argue against the second argument [for the position, given in n. 73]: the generating insofar as it is the generating (putting aside all else) is distinguished from the generated insofar as it is generated (putting aside all else other than the generated), for it is not intelligible that the same thing generate itself; even in [the case of] the divine, a Person does not generate itself. But the generating insofar as it is the generating does not include quantity as a proper generative principle; nor does the generated insofar as it is the generated include quantity as a *per se* or formal term of the generation. Hence putting aside each quantity (namely [the quantities] of the generating and of the generated), this substance is numerically distinguished from that one.

[111] Therefore, I grant the conclusions of all the arguments [given in nn. 76–110], namely that it is impossible for substance to be individual through some accident, *i. e.* that through some accident it is divided into

¹ Reading *ulnae* for *uniuersali*.

² Reading *alterius* for *eiusdem*.

³ Reading *eiusdem* for *alterius*.

subjective parts and by this being not-this is incompatible with it.

[Replies to the Arguments for Aquinas's Position]

[112] With regard to the first argument [stated in n. 72] for the position [that a material substance is individual through quantity], it is clear from [what has been said in nn. 105–109] how it incorrectly uses the minor [premiss, namely “*being divisible into parts of the same account*” agrees to some account of quantity], and what cannot be taken from the Philosopher; and the way in which the minor [premiss] can be true is irrelevant to what is put forward about the division of a whole into quantitative parts.

[113] When the [argument] later accepts the claim that something is divisible and is distinguished through its dividing parts by the same [principle]—this is false, for the common nature is divisible of itself into individuals, but the dividing [elements, *i. e.* individuals], are not distinguished by the account of the nature but from their distinguishing properties. This is apparent in the genus, since the genus is divisible in itself into many genera and into many species, and yet the genus is not the account of the distinction of the species; rather, the differentiae constituting the species [provide the account of the distinction of the species].

[114] With regard to the second argument [stated in n. 73], it is clear [from n. 110] how the conclusion that the same thing generates itself may be drawn from it, [which is impossible]. But with regard to the logical form of the argument, I state that both premisses are false: even though forms differ in different matter, nevertheless the form is not different by the otherness of the matter, but just as the entity of the form is prior [to matter] so too is its otherness. Similarly, the other premiss [of n. 73], namely that parts of matter differ according to different parts of quantity, is false, since whether there is a distinction among parts of matter in themselves quantitative or not, the distinction among the parts of matter is prior to quantity, for the subject of an accident of this sort is concrete.

[115] With regard to the proof [given in n. 74], when it is said that the generating generates only with regard to the matter, the amount by another quantity—whether this is so or not (concerning this see [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 qq. 5–6 n. 208]), at least in the parts of matter distinct according to the form of quantity I say that unity is a metaphysical attribute such that the unity of [the matter] naturally precedes any given account of quantity. The account of quantity precedes the generating in such a natural way, so that [generating] requires, outside [itself], its matter from which it generates and it requires the quantity as a concomitant distinction of matter from matter.

It would need to be proved that quantity is the proper *ratio* of such unity, namely of singularity in substance, and it was proved [in n. 74] that it is a *sine qua non* account with respect to [the generated]; hence this argument has no force.

[116] If it were objected that from the confirmation [in n. 74] at least it can be held that quantity naturally precedes the individuation of substance (which is contrary to the conclusion of the second way of disproving the position, [in nn. 82–83]), for if generating first requires an amount of matter before it generates, then a quantity of matter is presupposed by the individuation of the generated—well, I answer [this objection as follows]: I state that the individuation of the generated presupposes the quantity of the corrupted and [indeed] all the accidents of the corrupted, in the order of duration, since the corrupted exists beforehand with all its parts; but nothing follows from this with regard to [the claim that quantity naturally precedes the being of the generated], or with regard to the individuation of the substance in which there is the quantity—for the accidents of the corrupted, which temporally precede the generated, are subsequent to the substance in which they are (and also to that [substance] as singular), and in the same way the accidents of the generated are subsequent to the generated substance.

[117] Yet two further arguments are adduced [in support of the position that quantity individuates material substance]. [First]: Quantity not only precedes the generated (as in the corrupted), but naturally precedes the form of the generated in the generated. Proof: for otherwise, at the instant at which the generating induces the form, it would induce [the form] in a non-amount, which seems contrary to the proposition “a particular agent does not come into contact with the substance of matter, but comes into contact with it precisely inasmuch as [the substance] is an amount [of matter].” [Second]: Similarly, this seems contrary to Averroës in his *De substantia orbis*, where he seems to want to hold that the quantity remains the same in the generated and the corrupted, for otherwise the generating would generate a body from a non-body.

[118] Against these arguments I argue as follows. First, it seems that the first argument [in n. 117] should not be adduced in support of the position [stated in n. 71], since [Godfrey of Fontaines], who seems to be the founder of this position, seems to hold [views] against [the argument in n. 117]. He holds that quantity is not the first act of matter, nor that some form of corporeity remains the same in the generated and the corrupted. He says, speaking of corporeity in the genus Substance, that no quantity remains

numerically the same in the former and the latter, [*i. e.* in the generated and the corrupted]. Also, since he holds that [quantity] directly perfects the composite (and not the matter) as a subject, he should hold that the quantity of the generated, [which is other than that of the corrupted], is naturally posterior to the generated, just as the [quantity] of the corrupted is naturally posterior to the corrupted—and so the inference from the priority of form to substance or [the priority of form] to the generated, regardless of Averroës, is not [part] of the opinion of the one holding the position. All this *ad hominem*. But with regard to the thesis [of n. 117] in itself, I say along with it that if no form of corporeity remains formally the same in the fire and the water, then absolutely no accident that requires a composite substance as its subject can remain numerically the same, but any given [accident] will either be in the corrupted as in a subject or in the generated as in a subject; and thus quantity, and any other given accident, will be naturally posterior to substance. Hence the quantity of the corrupted, and any other of its accidents, were naturally posterior to the corrupted substance.

[119] With regard to the proposition [cited in n. 117, namely “a particular agent does not come into contact with the substance of matter, but comes into contact with it precisely insofar as the substance is an amount of matter”], I don’t much care about it, since it seems impossible: the agent coming into contact with the patient in the account of the patient seems to be nothing other than [the agent] inducing an act in [the patient] by which it is perfected. Moreover, a particular agent induces the substantial form by which the matter inasmuch as it is matter is perfected, and not matter inasmuch as it is an amount, such that quantity is the account mediating between the agent and the patient; hence a natural agent comes into contact with matter in its pure essence, as the patient is directly changed around by it.

[120] As for [the citation of] Averroës [in n. 117], I say with regard to it that a body might sometimes be generated from a non-body, but perhaps that a natural agent could not generate a body from a non-body as from the corrupted. But from that which was a body up to the instant of generation, with this quantity inhering in it, a natural agent can generate another amount in that instant by another quantity, since just as [a natural agent] can produce a substance that did not previously exist so too it can produce all the accidents following upon it.

[121] If you were to object that although [the agent] does not produce a body from a non-body as from the corrupted, nevertheless it would produce an amount of body from matter as a non-amount, I reply that the composite

must come about or be produced from the non-composite as a part, or [the process] will go on *ad infinitum*; hence some body can be produced from matter, in its substance absolutely as a part, and concomitantly an amount of substance, for quantity is a characteristic of a composite substance (this reply denies that numerically the same indeterminate dimensions remain in the generated and the corrupted, concerning which, if it comes up elsewhere, [I will speak] at greater length—but it is touched upon now according to [its role] in the arguments [in nn. 118–121]).

[Response to the Principal Arguments]

[122] With regard to the first principal argument [in n. 67], from Boethius, I concede that the variety of accidents produces numerical difference in substance in the way in which form is said to produce a difference, since all distinct forms thus produce some difference in the things in which they are. However, accidents cannot produce specific difference in the substance in which they are (*Met.* 10.9 [1058^a29–1058^b25]); hence they produce difference in substances, and this [difference] is numerical; yet they do not produce a primary difference (but there is another [difference] prior to numerical difference), nor do they alone produce a numerical difference. And the citation [from Boethius in n. 67] makes neither of these [last] two [claims], and unless one of them holds, it is not relevant to the case at hand as intended.

[123] But what is Boethius's intent? I declare that Boethius intended to prove that there is no numerical difference in the divine Persons. Even though scattered throughout the beginning of his book *De Trinitate* propositions such [as the two noted in n. 122] can be found, nevertheless he seems to argue as follows:

- (1) The variety of accidents produces difference in number.
- (2) But in the divine Persons there is no such variety of accidents, since a simple form cannot be a subject.

Therefore: There is no numerical difference in [the divine Persons].

[124] The argument seems invalid unless Boethius means that accidents alone can distinguish numerically; if there could be numerical distinctness through something else, the denial of numerical distinctness would not thence follow from the denial of accidents. I say that every numerical distinctness accompanies the distinctness of accidents, and hence where there is no variety of accidents there can be no numerical distinctness. Boethius's argument can hold due to this, namely that since there cannot be any ac-

cident in the divine [Persons], nor variety of accidents, there cannot be numerical distinctness or difference there—not as [the inference] from a cause precisely denied to the denial of that of which it is the cause, but inasmuch as [the inference] from a necessary concomitant to the denial of that which is necessarily concomitant.

[125] But how is it true on this interpretation [of Boethius] that “the variety of accidents produces numerical difference”? I declare that [the variety of accidents] produces some difference, though not primary, and that it necessarily accompanies every [difference]; and ‘produces numerical difference’ has to be understood in this way. Nor does this gloss seem to do violence to the text. The text forces the reading upon us, although those [who hold the position that material substance is individuated by quantity] necessarily must hold that Boethius is here hinting at place. Yet place is primary in distinguishing individuals from one another, neither speaking of place as characteristic of the locating nor [speaking] of place as characteristic of the located (as the ‘where’ destroyed in the located). If, therefore, according to their position they must take ‘place’ [here] as quantity, what is wrong with taking ‘producing difference’ as ‘producing a non-primary [difference], but producing some [difference] concomitant with the primary [difference]’?

[126] With regard to the second [principal argument], from Damascene, [in n. 68]: It is clear according to him in the end of the chapter [from which the citation is drawn], where he states how he understands ‘accident’ here, saying that “whatever that is in some of those things that are hypostases of one species and not in others are accidents and adventitious.” Thus I concede that whatever is *per se* beyond the account of the specific nature and is not *per se* consequent to that nature is an accident of such a nature; and in this way anything held to be individuating is an accident—nevertheless, it is not strictly an accident, as others think.

[127] That [Damascene] does not understand ‘accident’ here strictly is clear according to him in his *Sententiae* 1.8:

We intend that Peter and Paul are of the same account.

Later, he says:

Many hypostases are separate in themselves; they are divided by the mind in virtue, in form (*i. e.* shape), in disposition, in complexion, in worth, and from one another in all characteristic properties

and, notably, he adds that

All those things. . . that are not related in themselves are separated; whence men are called ‘two’ and ‘three’ and ‘many.’

Note especially: he says that, more than in their characteristic properties, any given created hypostases differ in not being related but separate in themselves; and in contrast he says:

The holy hypostases of the Trinity are related in themselves of which the cause is the unity of nature, presupposed by personal distinctness (from *Ord.* 1 d. 2 [nn. 376–387]). Therefore, the division of nature in created suppositis is the primary and greatest reason for the distinction.

[128] With regard to the third principal argument from Avicenna, [in n. 69], I say that he most principally considers the quiddity insofar as it does not include anything relevant *per se* to its account, and in this way “horseness is just horseness, and neither one nor many.” Howsoever much its unity is not another added thing, but is necessarily consequent upon that entity (just as for any being, according to whatever entity, its unity is consequent [upon that entity]), and is a quasi-attribute consequent upon the quiddity—anything such is called an ‘accident’ by him. And the Philosopher sometimes uses ‘accident’ in this way (which is why “the fallacy of accident” is so-called) for all that which is beyond the formal account of something (anything such is extraneous to that to which it is compared); in one way [of interpreting the text] there is a fallacy of accident, and in the other the genus accrues to the differentia, [which is absurd, since the differentia accrues to the genus]—and whatever is individuating accrues to the specific nature, but not as those [who hold this position] understand ‘accident.’ And so here there is an equivocation on ‘accident.’

[End of the Question]