Duns Scotus: Ordinatio 2 d. 3 p. 1 qq. 5–6*

[ Q. 5: Whether a material substance is a “this” and individual through matter ]

[129] Fifth, I ask whether material substance is a this and individual through matter.

[ The Principal Arguments ]

[130] That it is: According to the Philosopher in Met. 5.6 [1016b32–33]:

Those [things] are numerically one whose matter is one. Therefore, [matter is the cause of numerical unity].

[131] To the contrary, from the Commentator (Met. 2 [com.1]):

Nothing is distinct in the foundation of a nature.

But what is neither diverse nor distinct in itself cannot be the primary account of diversity or distinction from another. But matter is the completely non-distinct and indeterminate foundation of a nature. Hence [matter] cannot be the primary account of diversity or distinction from another.

[ The Position of Others ]

[132] Here it is claimed that [a material substance is a this and individual through matter]. This position is held most of all according to many passages from Aristotle that seem to sound like this. Met. 7.8 [1034b4–8], saying that the generator generates another according to matter:

Callias and Socrates are diverse through matter (for that is diverse), but specifically the same (for the species is undivided).

[Therefore, numerical difference is on the part of the matter and specific unity on the part of the form.] Met. 7.11 [1037a32–1037b5]:

The what-it-was-to-be is the same as the thing in some substances. But whatever [things] are in matter, or taken along with matter, are not the same.

He seems to say the same thing in Met. 7.3 [1043b2–4]:

For the soul is the same as the soul’s esse. [But] man is not the same as man’s esse, unless the soul’s esse is also called ‘man.’

Hence it seems that matter is outside the account of the quiddity and of anything that primarily possesses the quiddity. Thus, since [matter] is something in the realm of beings, it seems to be [either]:

(i) a part of the individual
(ii) the individuation of the whole

Whatever is in the individual that is completely incompatible with the account of the quiddity can be held to be the primary account of individuating. Accordingly, etc.

[134] Aristotle proves in Met. 12.8 [1074a31–38] that there cannot be many heavens. He says:

If there were many heavens, as [there are many] men, the principle regarding any one [of them] would be specifically one but numerically many. But whatever [items] are numerically many have matter. However, the primary what-it-was-to-be does not have matter, for it is an entelechy. Therefore, the prime unmoved mover is one in account and in number.

The argument, by which the unity of the heavens is inferred from the unity of the mover—and the unity of the mover [is inferred] not only specifically but numerically, for the reason that [the mover] does not have matter—would not be valid unless numerical distinction came about through matter. Therefore, etc.

[135] De caelo et mundo 1.9 [278a10–15]:

When I say ‘heaven,’ I mean the form; when I say ‘this heaven,’ I mean the matter.

[Therefore, singularity is from the matter.]

[Scotus’s Refutation of the Position of Others]

[136] Against this [position], according to the Philosopher in Met. 7.11 [1037a5–10]:

It is obvious that soul is primary substance, whereas body is matter. Now man (or animal)—which is from both [soul and body]—is [from them] as [taken] universally. But Socrates and Coriscus [are from these] as [taken] singularly—if in fact ‘soul’ is said in two ways.

A little later he adds:

But if this soul and this body, [then] as the universal [is composite], so too is the singular.

[137] Slightly earlier, in Met. 7.10 1035b27–31:
Man and horse and whatever is such in singulars are not substance [taken] universally, i.e. as the form, but a certain whole simultaneously, i.e. as the composite, from this matter and this account—where by the ‘this’ [Aristotle] does not mean uniform and singular matter, but determinate [matter], since otherwise he would contradict himself when he adds there “[taken] universally.” Shortly afterwards [Aristotle] adds:

And Socrates is already [composed] of ultimate matter...

and so on.

The same point is also clear from Met. 12.5 [1071a27–29], where [Aristotle] wants principles to be the same as what follows from them. He says:

And [the principles] of those [things] that are in the same species [are] diverse—not [diverse] in species, but because [they are principles] that belong to singulars. Your matter and mover and species are one thing and mine another. Yet they are nevertheless the same in their universal account.

Hence [Aristotle] grants the distinctness of form in particulars, just as [he grants the distinctness] of matter [in particulars]. Thus [he grants] the unity of matter in general, just as [he grants the unity] of form [in general]. Therefore, it is still necessary to ask: by what is matter a this?

Furthermore, as is proved in many passages in Met. 7 while discussing the parts of the definition: matter belongs to the essence of a composite substance—e.g. it belongs to man—and a composite is not precisely such by the essence of the form. Hence just as the composite cannot be of itself a this (from [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 29]), so too neither will matter, which is a part of [the composite], be of itself a this, since the composite cannot be common and of the same account in diverse [things], but rather that all that which belongs to its essence could be of the same account as they are.

Besides, matter is the same in what is generated and in what is corrupted; hence it has the same singularity in what is generated and in what is corrupted.

If you were to object that [the matter] does not belong to the same species in what is generated and in what is corrupted, I argue against indeterminate quantity as I did before ([Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n. 100]): in that case there will be circular generation, first of fire from water, and second of
water from fire. The water that is corrupted in the first [generation] and the water that is generated [in the second generation] have the same matter and belong to the same species. Therefore, they are really this water. Therefore, the first [water] naturally returns as numerically the same—and this goes against them.

[ Q. 6: Whether material substance is individual through some beingness per se determining the nature to singularity ]

[142] The resolution of the passages from the Philosopher [in n. 130 and nn. 132–135] for the opposite position requires the solution of a sixth question, namely: What is it through which a material substance is completely individual? Hence I ask, sixth, whether material substance is individual through some positive beingness per se determining the nature to singularity.

[ The Principal Arguments ]

[143] [First Negative Argument] That it is not: [First], in that case, the determinant would be related to the [specific] nature as act is [related] to potency. Hence from the specific nature and that determinant, there would be really and properly one composite. This result is inadmissible, for the determinant is either (a) matter; (b) form; or (c) something composed of [matter and form]. Whichever [of these alternatives] may be granted, the result is inadmissible. [If (a) were granted], there would be matter in the composite that differs from the matter that is part of the nature. [If (b) were granted], there would be a form [in the composite] different from the [form] that is held to be part of the nature. [If (c) were granted], there would be a composite different from that which is the composite of the nature.

[144] [Second Negative Argument] In that case, the singular, composed out of the nature and the per se determinant, would be one per se, and hence intelligible per se—which seems to lead to two inadmissible consequences. [First], this seems contrary to the Philosopher in De an. 2.5 [417b22–23] and Met. 7.10 [1035b33–1036a8], where he seems to explicitly hold that understanding is of the universal and sense and sensation is of the singular.

[145] [Second], if [the singular] were intelligible per se, there could be demonstration and science with regard to it, and so there could be a proper science of singulars insofar as they are singulars—which the Philosopher denies in Met. 7.10 [103b33–1036a8].

[146] [Third Negative Argument] If the [singular] were to include the specific nature and the per se determinant, then it could be defined per se by these
two [factors] included per se in its account. Hence there would be one definition of the individual and another [definition] of the species—at any rate, [the definition of the individual] would add something beyond the definition of the species, as the definition of the species adds something beyond the definition of the genus.

[147] [Positive Argument] For the opposite view: Anything lower-level includes per se something that is not included in the understanding of the higher-level. Otherwise, the concept of the lower-level would be just as common as the concept of the higher-level, and then the per se lower-level would not be per se lower-level, since it would not be beneath the common and the higher-level. Therefore, something is included per se in the account of the individual that is not included in the account of the nature. Now what is included is a positive beingness, by [Ord. 2 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.57]. [This positive beingness], along with the nature, produces [something] per se one, by [Ord. 2 d.3 p.1 q.4 n.111]. Hence [this positive beingness] per se determines the nature to singularity, or to the account of the lower-level.

[ The View of Godfrey of Fontaines ]

[148] Here [Godfrey of Fontaines] holds that: (G1) the specific nature is of itself a this; (G2) through quantity the [specific] nature can be common to many singulars—that is, quantity can be the account whereby many singulars can fall under the same nature.

[149] Now (G1) [in n.148] is supported in the following ways. [First], the most specific species is of itself atomic; therefore, it is indivisible. [Second], if there were some reality in the individual beyond just the reality of the specific nature, the species would not express the whole esse of its individuals—and this is contrary to Porphyry ([Isagoge 2]).

[150] This is confirmed by a passage from Porphyry, [Isagoge 2]:

When we have descended from the most generic to the most specific, Plato commands us to halt.

But if it were possible that there be a further division of the nature, one would not then halt at the [specific] nature. Therefore, [the specific nature is of itself a this].

[151] Likewise by Boethius, De divisione [877B]. [Boethius] enumerates all divisions, not only per se [divisions] but also per accidens [divisions]; yet he does not mention the division of the species into individuals. Hence the specific nature is not a this through something else.

[152] [Second], if there were some reality in the individual beyond just the reality of the specific nature, the species would not express the whole esse of its individuals—and this is contrary to Porphyry ([Isagoge 2]).

[153] (G2) [in n.148] is supported [as follows]. Although quantity is not
the formal account of the division of something into subjective parts, nevertheless when a quantitative whole is divided into quantitative parts it is divided per se into [items] that are of the same account. Now the principle of division into some [items] is the same as the principle of distinction for the [items] that divide it. Therefore, just as quantity itself is the principle of the division, so too it is the principle of distinction for the [items] that divide it. However, the latter are subjective parts of the common nature. Therefore, quantity is the principle of distinction for such parts.

[154] How (G1) and (G2) can obtain together is clear by an example. According to the Philosopher (Phys. 1.2 [185a32–185b5]), substance is of itself indivisible (speaking of [divisibility] into parts of the same account). Yet once quantity advenes [on substance], it is partitionable into such parts—or rather, it then has such parts. Hence in this way the nature of the species can be of itself a this, and nevertheless it can be this and that by a nature advening on it extrinsically.

[ Refutation of Godfrey’s View ]

[155] There seem to be two possible interpretations of [Godfrey’s] view. The first is [as follows]. A material substance, insofar as it is essentially distinguished from quantity, remains entirely the same and not distinct according to the ratio of its proper and essential beingness. Yet the [material substance] receives many quantities. And in receiving them, it constitutes along with them many wholes simultaneously. In plain words, this is to say that the same material substance, in itself not divided and not distinct, is informed by many quantities, and on this basis there are many individuals falling under the species.

[156] [Godfrey’s view] can also be interpreted [as follows]. A material substance—which, putting aside every quantity, would be of itself a this—will be this and that when the postulated quantity informs it, such that it not only receives distinct quantities but also has a distinction in itself in its proper substantial beingness. As a result, the substance that is put as the subject to a quantity and is essentially distinguished from it is not the same as the [substance] that is put under another quantity and distinguished from that [other quantity] essentially—although nevertheless the fact that this one is not that one cannot be so without quantity in this one and in that one.

[ Disproof of the First Interpretation ]

[157] The First Interpretation [of Godfrey’s view] seems impossible, since it entails absurdities in theology, metaphysics, and natural science.
[158] [First Theological Absurdity] In theology, [the First Interpretation] entails the absurdity that it is not proper to the infinite Divine Essence to be a this. That is to say, that the [Divine Essence], existing as one and in itself not distinguished, can be in many distinct supposits. Yet the [Divine Essence] is understood to be common only with respect to the Persons, who are distinct only relatively. However, [according to the First Interpretation], it would be maintained that one substantial nature that is in no way distinguished in itself would have many supposits that are distinct by an absolute thing.

[159] [Second Theological Absurdity] Secondly, it follows [from the First Interpretation] that the substance of wine cannot be transubstantiated into the Body and Blood [of Christ] unless the whole substance of the wine were transubstantiated. For the wine would only be transubstantiated in its substance (since the quantity remains the same [during transubstantiation]). And, according to you, the substance that is in this wine is the same as the substance that is in that wine. But [the wine] is not both transubstantiated and not transubstantiated. Therefore, etc.

[160] [First Metaphysical Absurdity] In metaphysics [the following] absurdisties are entailed. First, it would postulate the Idea even more than Plato did. Plato held that the Idea is a substance existing per se, a separated nature without accidents (as the Philosopher imputes to him), in which there is the whole nature of the species. This [Idea], according to what Aristotle imputes to [Plato], would be said of any given individual by a formal predication that states “This is this.” However, [Godfrey’s] view maintained that this substance is said of any [individual] belonging to the species by a [formal] predication that states “This is this,” and yet it falls under this accident and that one. Therefore, [Godfrey’s] view postulates as much commonness as Plato postulated in the Ideas.

[161] [Second Metaphysical Absurdity] Second, according to those [who hold this position], two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same subject (if they be absolute accidents). For, according to them, a plain contradiction would follow, namely that the same [thing] would be in act and in potency in the same respect. But the opposite [conclusion] follows from [the First Interpretation], since the same nature is in act according to many [different] acts of the same species.

[162] According to the [line of reasoning in n.161], another impossibility (in mathematics) can be inferred (inasmuch as ‘amount’ falls under the mathematician’s consideration), namely that two dimensive quantities of the same account would perfect the same subject. This is opposed to the

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proper account of dimensive quantities of the same account, speaking math-
ematically.

[163] [First Physical Absurdity] Third, two absurdities in natural science fol-
low [from the First Interpretation]. The first is that no material substance
can be generated or corrupted. [Proof that a material substance is] not
generated: If this stone exists, then every substance that can be in any
stone will be in it. Yet the substance of the stone can acquire a given
quantity and [also] a given quantity that is numerically different. However,
the acquisition of a new quantity is not generation; this point is clear from
the termini of generation. Therefore, etc. [Proof that a material substance
is not corrupted]: Likewise, so long as this stone remains, the specific nature
stone remains in it. But every nature stone is this nature. Therefore, so
long as this nature remains, every nature remains. Therefore, no material
substance can be corrupted so long as the stone remains, even though the
quantity or quality is not the same.

[164] [Second Physical Absurdity] The second [absurdity in natural science]
is [as follows]. [The First Interpretation] entails that, although in accordance
with that accursed Averroës’s fiction about the unity of the intellect in
all [men] one can imagine [the same thing] about your body and mine as
about this stone and that one, nevertheless, holding one intellective soul
to differ from another—not only according to faith but also according to
necessary philosophy—human nature cannot be of itself atomic and yet be
this [man] and that one through quantity. For in this man and in that one
there is [respectively] one substantial form and another, [that differ] by an
otherness that naturally precedes quantity. Hence they do not address this
counterargument—although it is insoluble—but instead turn their attention
to other homogeneous [substances], like water and stone. Nevertheless, if
were to have anything in their favor from the account of an atomic specific
nature, they would draw the conclusion in the case of man just as [they do]
in the case of stone. And so they can see that the principles from which
they proceed are nothing, since obvious impossibilities follow from them.

[ Disproof of the Second Interpretation ]

For that which is of itself a *this*—in the way in which ‘something being
of itself a *this*’ was explained earlier [in Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 2 n. 48 and
Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n. 76]—that is, with which *being divided per se into many subjective parts* is incompatible and with which *being of itself not-this*
is incompatible—cannot be divided into many parts through anything ad-
vancing on it. For if *being divided* is incompatible with it of itself, *receiving*

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something through which it becomes not-this is incompatible with it from itself. Therefore, to say that the nature is of itself a this (in the sense of ‘nature that is of itself a this’ explained earlier [in nn. 155–156]) and yet that [the nature] can be this [individual] and that one through something advening on it, is to say contradictory things.

[166] This is clear in the case of the example given [in n. 154] for [Godfrey’s] view. Although a material substance is not of itself divided into parts of the same account, nevertheless it is not of itself indivisible into such parts. For if it were of itself indivisible (i.e. if division were incompatible with it), it could not receive the quantity by which it is formally divided into such parts. This point is apparent, because the soul (or an angel), which is of itself indivisible in this way, cannot receive quantity, just as neither [can it be divided into] parts.

[167] Hence there seems to be an error in the consequence:

It is not of itself such-and-such; hence of itself it is not such-and-such.

This is a fallacy of the consequent. Indeed, substance (according to a certain view) genuinely does not have of itself parts of the same account. Yet it does not of itself not have parts of the same ratio, such that having parts is incompatible with it, since then it could not formally receive such parts through something advening on it. Thus the nature of the lowest species is not of itself a this, just as anything divisible from its nature is not of itself a this. Yet [the nature of the lowest species] is not of itself not-this, such that being divided into many parts is incompatible with it of itself, since in that case it could not receive anything through which such a division would be formally appropriate to it.

[ Scotus’s View ]

[168] Therefore, to the question [whether material substance is individual through some positive beingness per se determining the nature to singularity], I answer that it is.

[169] I support this [answer] by the following [two] arguments. [First], just as unity in general is per se consequent upon beingness in general, so too any given unity is per se consequent upon some beingness. Therefore, unity simpliciter—such as the unity of the individual, frequently described above, i.e. [the unity] with which the division into many subjective parts is incompatible and with which not being designated as ‘this’ is incompatible—if it [actually] exists in beings, as every view assumes, is per se consequent upon some per se beingness. But [the unity of the individual] is not consequent upon the per se beingness of the nature, since there is some proper and per
There is a real unity of the [nature], as proved in [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 30]. Therefore, [the unity of the individual] is consequent upon some other beingness that both (i) determines [the nature], and (ii) along with the nature produces [something] per se one. For the whole to which this unity belongs is perfect of itself.

[170] [Second], every differentia of different [items] is ultimately reduced to some primarily diverse [factors]. Otherwise, there would be no stopping-point in differentiae. But individuals properly differ, since they are “diverse beings that are something the same”. Therefore, the differentia of [individuals] is reduced to some primarily diverse [factors]. Now these primarily diverse [factors] are not ‘the nature in this [individual]’ and ‘the nature in that [individual],’ since that by which they formally agree is not the same as that by which they really differ, although the same [item] can be [both] really distinct [from something] and really agree [with it]. Indeed, there is a great difference between being distinct and being that by which something is primarily distinguished (and hence it will be so in the case of unity). Therefore, beyond the nature in this [individual] and in that one, there are some primarily diverse [factors], by which the one and the other differ—this [factor] in this one and that [factor] in that one, [respectively]. These [primarily diverse factors] cannot be negations, according to [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 2 n. 57] Nor are the [primarily diverse factors] accidents, according to [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n. 111]. Therefore, the [primarily diverse factors] will be some positive beingnesses that per se determine the nature.

[171] Against the first argument [given in n. 169], an objection is raised. If there is some real unity that is less than numerical unity, it belongs to something either in numerically the same [individual] or in something else. It is not in numerically the same [individual], since whatever is in numerically the same [individual] is numerically one. Nor is it in two [individuals], since there is nothing really one in them. For this is proper to the Divine Persons [alone] (as Damascene’s statement was explained in [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 39]).

[172] I reply that just as it is stated in [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 34] that the nature is naturally prior to this nature, so too [its] proper unity—consequent upon the nature as nature—is naturally prior to its unity as this nature. (Under this account there is the metaphysical consideration of the nature, and its definition is given, and there are per se primo modo propositions [about it].) Therefore, in the same [individual] that is numerically one:

(a) there is some beingness upon which a unity lesser than numerical unity is consequent

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(b) [this unity] is real
(c) that to which such unity belongs is formally of itself one by numerical unity

Therefore, I grant that real unity does not belong to anything existing in two individuals, but in one.

When you raise the objection [in n. 171] “whatever is in numerically the same individual is numerically the same”—I reply first in a different but more obvious parallel case, [as follows]. Whatever is in specifically one [item] is specifically one. Hence the color in whiteness is specifically one. But [the conclusion] ‘therefore, it does not have a unity less than specific unity’ does not follow. The reason for this is [as follows]. It is noted elsewhere (namely in [Ord. 1 d. 8 n. 214]) that something can be called ‘animate’ [in two ways]:

(i) denominatively—e. g. the body [is called ‘animate’ denominatively]
(ii) per se primo modo—e. g. man [is called ‘animate’ per se primo modo]

Thus a surface is called ‘white’ denominatively [according to (i)], and a white-surface is called ‘white’ per se primo modo [according to (ii)] (since the subject includes the predicate). Thus I say [in the case at hand] that the potential, which is contracted by the actual, is ‘informed’ by the actual, and through this it is informed by the unity consequent upon that actuality or that act. Thus [the potential] is one by the unity proper to the actual. But in this way [the potential] is [only] denominatively one, whereas in this way it is not of itself one, nor [is it one] per se primo modo, nor [one] through an essential part.

Therefore, color in whiteness is specifically one. But it is not specifically one of itself or primarily or per se, but only denominatively. However, the specific differentia is primarily one, since ‘being divided into specifically many [items]’ is primarily incompatible with it. Whiteness is specifically one per se but not primarily, since [it is specifically one] by something intrinsic to it (namely by the differentia).

I therefore grant that whatever is in this stone is numerically one—either (i) primarily, (ii) per se, (iii) denominatively, [as follows]:
- ‘primarily’: perhaps as that by which such unity is suitable to the composite
- ‘per se’: as this stone, of which what is primarily one by this unity is a per se part
- ‘merely denominatively’: as the potential that is perfected by this actual, which (as it were) denominatively looks toward its actuality.

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To further clarify my solution [to Question 6]—what that beingness is by which [individual] unity is perfected can be made clear by a parallel to the beingness from which the specific differentia is taken. The specific differentia, or the beingness from which the specific differentia is taken, can be compared to that which is (i) below it; (ii) above it; (iii) on the same level as it.

With regard to (i) [in n. 176]: being divided into what are essentially many in species or in nature is incompatible per se with the specific differentia and with specific beingness. For this reason, [such a division] is incompatible with the whole of which the [specific] beingness is a per se part. Analogously, in the case at hand, being divided into any subjective parts whatsoever is primarily incompatible with individual beingness. For this reason, such a division is incompatible per se with the whole of which the [individual] beingness is a part. The only difference [between the two cases] is that the unity of the specific nature is less than the unity [of the individual], and for this reason the [unity of the specific nature] does not exclude every division that is into quantitative parts but only the division that is into essential parts, whereas the [unity of the individual] does exclude every [division].

The case at hand is well-confirmed by this point, since from the fact that any given unity less than [numerical] unity has a proper beingness upon which it is consequent per se, it does not seem plausible to deny to the most perfect unity, [namely to numerical unity], a proper beingness upon which it is consequent.

With regard to (ii) [in n. 176], comparing the specific nature to that which is above it: I state that the reality from which the specific differentia is taken is actual in respect of the reality from which the genus, or the ratio of the genus, is taken, such that the one reality is not formally the other. Otherwise, there would be a pointless repetition in the definition, and [the definition] would sufficiently define only the genus (or the differentia), since it would indicate the whole beingness of what is defined. At times, nevertheless, the contracting [factor] is other than the form from which the account of the genus is taken—[namely] when the species adds some reality above and beyond the nature of the genus. At other times, however, [the contracting factor] is not another thing, but only another formality or another formal concept of the same thing. For this reason, some specific differentia has a concept that is not simply-simple (namely one that is taken from the form), whereas another [specific differentia] has a concept that is simply-simple ([namely] one that is taken from the ultimate abstraction.
of the form). (With regard to this distinction among specific differentiae, [Ord. 1 d. 3 nn. 159–161] says how some specific differentiae include being and others do not.)

[180] As for the case at hand, the individual reality is analogous to the specific reality, for it is (as it were) an act that determines the reality of the species as though possible and potential. Yet there is this disanalogy: [the individual reality] is never taken from an added form, but precisely from the ultimate reality of the form.

[181] There is another disanalogy in the case at hand. The specific reality constitutes the composite of which it is a part in quidditative esse, since it is itself a certain quidditative beingness, whereas the individual reality is primarily diverse from any quidditative beingness. Proof: In understanding any given quidditative beingness (speaking here of limited quidditative beingness), [such a quidditative beingness] is common to many, nor is it incompatible with it to be said of many of which any given one is it. Hence [the individual] beingness, which is of itself a beingness other than the quiddity or the quidditative beingness, cannot constitute the whole of which it is a part in quidditative esse, but rather in esse that has another account, [namely contracted esse].

[182] In the Philosopher’s writings, the quiddity is often called ‘form.’ This point is clear in Met. 5.2 [1013a26–28] (and elsewhere in [Met. 5]), and in Met. 7.11 [1037a32–1037b5] where [he says] that [the passage]:

In any things whatsoever in which there is no matter, the what-it-is is about matter and form (as will be explained [in nn. 204–207 below]). Also, in his writings, anything that has a contracted quiddity is called ‘material.’ Boethius, in his De Trinitate 2.28–48, holds that no form can be the subject of an accident, since ‘form’ is said in quid of everything else. And if humanity is a subject, nevertheless [being a subject] is not suitable to it insofar as it is a form. Humanity is not the form of just one part of the composite—for example, of the form, or of the matter—but rather it is [the form] of the entire composite that has the contracted quiddity, or in which there is a contracted quiddity. Therefore, every specific reality constitutes [something] in formal esse, since it [constitutes something] in quidditative esse. [However], the individual reality constitutes [something] precisely in material esse, that is, in contracted esse. From this it follows logically that the [specific reality] is essentially formal and the [individual reality] is essentially material, since the latter constitutes [something] in the account being able to be put as subject and the former [constitutes something] precisely in the...
ratio being able to be put as predicate. Furthermore, the formal predicate has the account form, whereas the subject has the account matter.

[183] With regard to (iii) [in n. 176], comparing the specific differentia to what is at the same level as it, namely another specific differentia: Although sometimes one [specific differentia] could be not primarily diverse from another one, as is the case for the beingness that is taken from the form, nevertheless an ultimate specific differentia is primarily diverse from another one, namely one that has a simply-simple concept.

[183] With regard to the case at hand, I state that the individual differentia is analogous to the specific differentia taken universally, since any individual beingness is primarily diverse from any other one.

[184] From the discussion, it is clear how to answer an objection that goes like this:

“This [individual] beingness and that one are either:

(A) of the same account

(B) not [of the same account]

“If (A), then some beingness can be abstracted from them, and this will be a specific [beingness]. In this case we should ask through what [that specific beingness] is contracted to this [individual beingness] and to that one. If [it is contracted] of itself, then by the same reasoning there could be a stopping-point at the nature stone. If [it is contracted] by another, there will therefore be an infinite regress.

“If (B), then [each individual beingness] would be constituted by a different ratio, and so they would not be individuals of the same species.”

[185] I answer [the objection in n. 184 as follows]: Ultimate specific differentiae are primarily diverse, and hence nothing that is one per se can be abstracted from them. Nevertheless, it does not follow on account of this that [ultimate specific differentiae] are constituted primarily as diverse and not of some one account. That some [items] are ‘equally distinguished’ can be understood in two ways:

(i) because they are equally incompossible (namely since they cannot be present in the same [item])

(ii) because they do not equally agree in anything

According to (i), it is true that the distinguished [items] are equally as diverse as the [factors] distinguishing them; the [factors] distinguishing them cannot be incompossible unless the distinguished [items] are incompossible.
According to (ii), it is impossible in every case, since the distinguished items not only include the factors distinguishing them, but also something else that is, as it were, potential with respect to the distinguishing factors, and yet the distinguishing factors do not agree in it. And just as the objection was answered for the case of primarily diverse differentiae, so too for the case of individual beingnesses I reply that they are primarily diverse—that is, they agree in nothing that is the same. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the distinguished individuals be simply diverse.

[186] Yet just as the individual beingnesses are incompossible, so too are the individuals that have these beingnesses.

[187] If you were to ask me what the individual beingness is from which the individual differentia is taken, if it is not the matter or the form or the composite: I answer as follows. Every quidditative beingness—whether partial or total—that belongs to any genus is of itself indifferent as quidditative beingness to this individual beingness and that one, such that as quidditative beingness it is naturally prior to the beingness as it is a this. To the extent that [the quidditative beingness] is naturally prior, just as being a ‘this’ does not agree to it, so too the opposite of it, [namely being a ‘not-this’], is not incompatible with it from its account. And just as the composite insofar as it is the nature does not include its [individual] beingness by which [the composite] is formally a this, so too neither does the matter insofar as it is the nature include its [individual beingness by which it is this matter], nor does the form insofar as it is the nature include its [individual beingness by which it is this form].

[188] Therefore, this [individual] beingness is neither matter nor form nor composite, insofar as any one of these is the nature. Instead, [the individual beingness] is the ultimate reality of the being that is the matter, or that is the form, or that is the composite. The result is that anything that is common and yet determinable can still be distinguished, no matter how much it may be one thing, into many formally distinct realities, of which this one is formally not that one. This one is formally the beingness of singularity, and that one is formally the beingness of the nature. Nor can these two realities be as thing and thing, in the way in which the reality from which the genus is taken and the reality from which the differentia is taken can be. (The specific reality is taken from the latter [realities].) Instead, in the same [item]—whether in a part or in the whole—they are always formally distinct realities of the same thing.
From the discussion, the response to the first principal argument [in n. 143] is clear. When it is inferred [in n. 143] that every individual in which the nature is contractible is more composite than the nature itself—I state that ‘composition’ can be understood:

(i) strictly—as the [composition] of an actual thing and a potential thing

(ii) less strictly—as the [composition] of a reality and an actual and potential reality in the same thing

According to (i), an individual is not composite with respect to the specific nature, since it does not add any reality [to the specific nature]—for it adds neither matter nor form nor composite, as the argument then establishes. According to (ii), on the other hand, an [individual] is necessarily composite, since the reality from which the specific differentia is taken is potential with respect to the reality from which the individual differentia is taken, as if they were thing and thing. The specific reality does not of itself have the wherewithal to include by identity the individual reality. Instead, only some third [thing] includes by identity both [the specific reality and the individual reality], [namely the concrete individual composite].

This is the sort of composition that cannot obtain along with the perfect divine simplicity. In fact, the [divine simplicity] is not only incompatible with the composition of a thing and an actual and potential thing ([as in (ii)]), but [it is also incompatible] with [the composition] of an actual reality and a potential reality ([as in (i)]). Comparing any essential [feature] to any other in the divine, the essential [feature] is formally infinite. Therefore, of itself it has the wherewithal to include by identity whatever can be along with it (as often touched upon in Ord. 1). The extremes are not precisely perfectly the same, because some third [thing] perfectly includes them both, [namely the formal infinity of one or the other of the extremes]. But in the case at hand, the specific beingness does not include by identity the individual beingness, nor conversely. Instead, only some third [thing], of which both of these are (as it were) per se parts, includes by identity both of them. Therefore, the most perfect composition, which is that of thing and thing, is lacking [in the case at hand]. Yet not every [composition is lacking]. For universally, any given nature that is not of itself a this but rather determinable to being a this—whether in such a way that it is determined by another thing (which is impossible in every case), or in such a way that it is determined by another reality—is not simply-simple.
[191] With regard to the second [argument in n. 144], I grant that the singular is intelligible per se, on its part. However, if [the singular] is not intelligible per se to some intellect—for instance, to ours—see [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 2 q. 1 n. 294] regarding this point. At any rate, there is no impossibility on the [singular’s] part for it to be able to be understood, just as there is no impossibility on the part of the Sun for seeing and for vision in the night-owl [in sunlight], but the [impossibility] is on the part of the night-owl’s eye.

[192] With regard to the [remarks] about definition [in n. 146], I state that if some account could express anything concurrent with the individual beingness, the account will still not be a perfect definition, since it does not express the what-it-was-to-be—and, according to the Philosopher in Top. 1.5 [101b39]:

The definition completely expresses [the essence].

Therefore, I grant that the singular is not definable by some definition other than the definition of the species. The [singular] is nevertheless per se a being, adding some beingness to the specific beingness. However, the per se beingness that [the singular] adds [to the specific beingness] is not quidditative beingness.

[193] From these remarks, the reply to the [second inadmissible consequence in n. 145], concerning demonstration and science, is clear. The definition of the subject is the middle [term] in the most powerful sort of demonstration. However, the singular does not have a proper definition, but only the definition of the species. Thus there is no proper demonstration concerning [the singular]. Instead, there is only demonstration that concerns the species (for [the individual] does not have a proper attribute, but only the attribute belonging to the species).

[ Replies to the Arguments for Godfrey’s View ]

[194] Now, as regards the arguments for [Godfrey’s] view [in nn. 149–153], first, when it is said [in n. 149] that the species is atomic, I state that [the species] is atomic, that is, it is indivisible into many species. Yet [the species] is not purely atomic, that is, simply indivisible. For indivisibility into many species is compatible with divisibility into many [individuals] of the same species.

[195] When indivisibility is proved according to Plato’s remark, which Porphyry reports [in n. 150], I state that a division in accordance with the rules of the art [of logic] has a stopping-point at the most specific species. For to go on any further is to go on to infinity, which “ought to be left to one side” by the art [of logic], according to [Porphyry] ([Isagoge 2]). Indeed, it
is not due to the individuals [themseves] that there be a definite number of them; they can be infinite, which is not incompatible with their account.

[196] If ‘division’ [in nn.150–151] is taken strictly insofar as it occurs in what requires parts that are determinate in multitude and magnitude, [then] in this sense the species is not divided into individuals. On the one hand, the genus requires a determinate multitude of species. For, according to Boethius ([De divisione 878B–880A]), the [genus] is primarily divisible into two [species]). On the other hand, an amount requires a determinate magnitude. When the [determinate magnitude] is presupposed, there are halves in the whole that encloses [the amount], since there are two. If ‘division’ is taken strictly insofar as it is into parts that have a proportion to the whole, one which they either constitute or are contained under in a determinate multitude or magnitude, then the species is not divided per se into individuals. Porphyry as well as Plato can be explained by this. If, however, ‘division’ is taken broadly insofar as it is into any given [items] that participate in the nature of what has been divided—whether they have such a proportion to the whole in making it up or in being put as subjects to it ([as in n. 196]), or not—then the species is per se divided into individuals. This division [of the species into individuals] is classified under the [division] of a genus in Boethius’s writings, [contrary to the claim in n. 151], since the conditions and properties that Boethius assigns to the division of a genus are all suitable to this division of the species into individuals.

[197] With regard to the [second argument in n.152], [and in particular with regard to the proposition] “the species expresses the whole esse [of its individuals]”: I state that ‘esse’ is taken [in this proposition] for ‘quidditative esse,’ as Porphyry says in Isagoge 3, where he holds that the differentia per se does not receive ‘more’ and ‘less.’ He proves this:

The esse of any one whatsoever is one and the same, receiving neither intensification nor diminution.

[Porphyry] takes ‘esse’ in this passage for the quiddity, as the Philosopher does in Met. 8.3 [1045b2–3]:

The soul is the same as the soul’s esse.

Since the beingness that the singular adds beyond the species is not a quidditative beingness ([according to n. 181 and n. 192]), I state that the entire quidditative beingness that is in the individual is specific beingness. For this reason, the species expresses the whole esse of its individuals. However, the genus does not express the whole esse of the species in this way, since the species does add further quidditative beingness [to the genus].

[198] As for the argument [in n.153], I state that the proposition:
The principle of divisibility is the same as [the principle] of distinction for the things that divide it is false. The concept of what is in itself common to the species is the account of the divisibility into species [that pertains to the genus]. But this is not the account for distinguishing species from one another. Rather, this species is distinguished from that one by the differentia. Now in a quantitative division, the whole quantity, insofar as it confusedly contains all the parts, is the account of divisibility into the whole amount. Still, it is not in this way the ratio for the distinction of the parts from one another; rather, as this quantity is distinctly in act [by itself], it is not that [quantity] that is in act in the whole.

When it further inferred [in n. 153] that if a whole homogeneous amount is divided, the division is by quantity, well, let this be so. Nevertheless, that [quantitative] division is not the primary division of individuals. Rather, this substance and that one have a division and distinction from each other—insofar as they are this and that—that is naturally prior to the [quantitative] distinction, insofar as they were parts of a distinct amount per accidens. (For being parts was accidental to them.) Yet once the division is made according to quantitative parts, the division according to subjective parts happens per accidens.

[ Resolution of Question 5 ]

With regard to Question 5 [in n. 219], about matter, the solution is clear from the arguments [in nn. 194–199] against [Godfrey’s] view. I grant that matter absolutely, insofar as it is a nature, is not the ratio of distinction or individuation. For whatever is a nature, be it total or partial, in any genus whatsoever is not of itself a this. Therefore, one must look into by what a [nature] is a this.

With regard to the passage from the Philosopher [in n. 130], namely (Met. 5.6 [1016b32–33]):

Those [things] are numerically one [whose matter is one]

I reply as follows. I state that [Aristotle] takes ‘matter’ in this passage for the individual beingness that constitutes [something] in material esse—but not in formal esse, insofar as the quiddity is called ‘form,’ since that beingness is not quidditative. This analysis is manifest by what [Aristotle] adds next ([1016b33–35]):

[Those things are] specifically [one] whose account is one.

Here ‘account’ is taken for the quiddity, which is called the ‘form’ with

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respect to individual esse.

[202] The reply to the passage [in n. 135] about heaven and this heaven (De caelo et mundo 2.9 [278a10–15]), is clear on the same basis. And this passage confirms what was presented [in n. 201].

[203] The reply to the passage [in n. 134], from Met. 12.8 [1074a31–38], is also clear on the same basis. I grant that there cannot be many prime movers, since there is no matter in the prime mover—i.e. there is nothing in [the prime mover] that contracts it, such as matter, or something else. Instead, [the prime mover] is of itself a this, without anything else that contracts it. For such a contraction does not go along with perfect simplicity. Therefore, the quiddity of the prime [mover] is of itself a this.

[204] With regard to the passage [in n. 133], namely (Met. 7.11 [1037a32–1037b5]):

In these [things] that exist without matter, the what-[it-is] of the thing is the same as that to which it belongs—

I state that the essence of a thing can be compared to that to which it belongs:

(i) per se and primarily

(ii) per se but not primarily

In each case, the way in which it belongs to something is the way in which it is the same as it. For, as the Philosopher argues (Met. 7.6 [1031a17–18]):

The singular [does not seem to differ from its own substance], and the what-it-was-to-be is called the substance of the singular.

Indeed, if the what-it-is is not a being, nothing is; the what-it-is is that which a thing is primarily. Therefore, that to which the what-it-is belongs per se is the same as it per se. That to which [the what-it-is] belongs per accidens is the same as it only per accidens, and hence is not simply the same as it. Accordingly, [Aristotle] maintains that in things said per accidens the what-it-is is not the same as that to which it belongs (Met. 7.6[1031a19–21])—no wonder, since he declared that nothing is the what-it-is or the definition for [things said per accidens] ([Met. 7.4 1029b12–1030a17]).

[205] Now the possessor of the what-it-is can be understood either as:

(a) the nature itself, to which the what-it-is belongs primarily

(b) a suppositum of the nature, to which [the what-it-is] belongs per se but not primarily

According to (a), the what-it-is, in material [things] as well as in immaterial ones, is the same as that to which it belongs—it also [belongs] primarily, since it primarily possesses the what-it-is. According to (b), the possessor
[of the what-it-is] is not the same [as the what-it-is] when it includes some beingness outside the ratio of its quiddity. Indeed, in this case the [possessor of the what-it-is] is not the same as the what-it-is primarily, since the what-it-is does not belong to it primarily due to the fact that the possessor [of the what-it-is] includes some beingness outside the ratio of what is the what-it-is primarily.

[206] Hence, with regard to what the Philosopher proposed [in Met. 7.11 1037a32–1037b5], I state that in the case of [things] that are not conceived with matter—i.e., not with an individual beingness that contracts the quiddity—the what-it-is is primarily the same as that to which it belongs, since the kind to which it belongs has no account outside the ratio of what is the what-it-is. On the other hand, in the case of [things] that are conceived with matter—i.e., with an individual beingness that contracts the quiddity—the what-it-is is not primarily the same as that to which it belongs, since what is conceived in this way primarily would not possess the what-it-is of itself but only through a part, namely through the nature that is contracted by that individual beingness.

[207] Therefore, one does not get from this passage that the matter that is one of the parts of the composite is outside the account of the quiddity per se. Instead, the matter genuinely pertains to the quiddity. The species (and the possessor of the form in every instance) primarily possesses the what-it-is and is primarily the same as it. Therefore, it does not follow that the matter that is one of the parts of the composite is what individuates. Rather, this only follows for the matter that is the beingness contracting the quiddity, which I granted [in n. 206]. In [Ord. 2 d. 3 p. 1 q. 7 nn. 238–239] I will deal with whether the lack of the matter that is one of the parts [of the composite] entails the lack of this sort of individual beingness, according to the Philosopher.

[208] With regard to the Philosopher’s remark [in n. 132] that the generator generates another according to matter ([Met. 7.8 1034a4–8]), I state that the Philosopher’s intent here is that the Ideas are not necessary for generation. The reason for this is that (i) the distinction of the generator from what is generated, as well as (ii) the assimilation of what is generated to the generator—both of which are required for univocal generation—can be had without Ideas. From its form, a particular agent has the wherewithal to assimilate the patient to itself, and the generator [has the wherewithal to assimilate] what is generated. From the matter, [the generator] has the feature that it be distinct from what is generated. [The generator] does not [have this feature] principally [from the matter], even though it necessarily

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follows that it is distinguished by matter from what is generated, since [the generator] perfects not its own matter but a different [matter] by the form that terminates the generation. (Indeed, [the generator’s] own [matter] is already perfected by a form.) From the fact that [the generator] assimilates through the form, [the generator] perfects a matter different from its own, and so its [matter] is different from that which is deprived of such a form. However, anything that has different matter is, in virtue of the fact that the matter is an essential part of the thing, is different from it.

[209] I state, then, that the principal account of the assimilation or likeness is the form shared by the generator and what is generated. This is so not according to individual unity and identity insofar as it is this form, but according to the lesser unity and identity insofar as it is form. The account of generating is in accordance with this. The form is also the more principal account of the distinction than the matter. For just as the form is more principally that by which a composite is than the matter, so too [the form] is more principally that by which a composite is one and, consequently, in itself it is not distinguished [but] it is distinguished from another.

[210] Yet the form is properly assimilative—contradistinguishing ‘assimilative’ and ‘distinctive’—in a way that the matter, strictly, is not, since [the matter] is not a substantial or accidental quality. On the other hand, the matter is distinctive (properly speaking), since it necessarily—in virtue of the fact that it lacks form—is distinguished\(^1\) from the matter that possesses the form initially, and in this way [one] composite [is distinguished] from [another] composite.

[211] There is also another way that composite can be understood to be ‘other’ due to matter, [namely] as due to a pre-existent cause of otherness. The form of what is generated, although it is the more principal cause of otherness in the composite than the matter is, nevertheless is not a pre-existent cause of this otherness. But the matter [is such a pre-existent cause], since it pre-exists as deprived [of the form]. Therefore, [the matter of what is generated] cannot be the same as the informed matter [that pre-exists in the generator].

[End of the Question]

\(^1\) Reading *distinguitur* for *distinguit*.