Volume

4

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

George Thomas Kurian, EDITOR IN CHIEF

James E. Alt
Simone Chambers
Geoffrey Garrett
Margaret Levi
Paula D. McClain
ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Prepared with the assistance of the American Political Science Association

CQ PRESS
A Division of SAGE
Washington, D.C.

ven voter is a member. In the *a priori* voting power indices, e concept of swing plays an important role. A voter has a ing in coalition S, for instance, if S is winning when the oter is its member, but nonwinning when the voter is not a ember. The Banzhaf indices equate voting power of a voter ith the number of the voter's swings when all coalitions are nsidered. The absolute Banzhaf index, also known as the nrose-Banzhaf index, divides the number of the voter's ings by 2^{n-1}, while the normalized Banzhaf index uses the m of all voters' swings as the divisor.

The Shapley-Shubik index, in turn, focuses on permu-tions of voters, i.e. ordered sequences of them. The total mber of all possible sequences of n voters is given by $n! =$ $(n-1)(n-2)\ldots 1$. Among these, a voter's power index value is tained as the number of such sequences in which the voter s a swing when the winning coalition is formed by adding ters one at the time from the beginning of the sequence. his is the same as giving each swing of a voter in a coalition with s members the weight $(s!)(n-s)!/n!$ and summing these mbers over all coalitions in which the voter has a swing

The two Banzhaf indices and the Shapley-Shubik index are e best-known indices of a priori voting power, but not the ly ones. Another index, the public goods index shares the sic rationale of the Banzhaf indices, but instead of swings in nning coalitions, the number of swings in minimal winning alitions is counted. Minimal winning coalitions differ from nning ones in that all members in them have a swing.

More recent indices are based on spatial voting games .e., they assume voter ideal points in policy space). A voter's wer, according to these indices, is measured by the distance f (game-theoretic) equilibrium outcomes and the voter's eal point.

e also *Coalition Formation; Coalition Theory; Power.*

. . . . HANNU NURMI

BLIOGRAPHY

nzhaf, John F. "Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis." *Rutgers Law Review* 19 (1965): 317–343.

ams, Steven J. *Game Theory and Politics.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

senthal, Dan S., and Moshe Machover. *The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes.* Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1998.

ller, M. J., ed. *Power, Voting and Voting Power.* Würzburg, Ger.: Physica Verlag, 1982.

ruelle, Annick, and Federico Valenciano. "Inequality in Voting Power." *Social Choice and Welfare* 22, no. 2 (2004): 413–431.

pel, Stefan, and Mika Widgrén. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis: A Unified Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16, no. 4 (2004): 517–538.

nrose, Lionel. "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 109, no. 1 (1946): 53–57.

th, Alvin, ed. *The Shapley Value.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

pley, L. S., and Martin Shubik. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System." *American Political Science Review* 48, no. 3 (1954): 787–792.

unenberg, Bernard, Dieter Schmidtchen, and Christian Kobold. "Strategic Power in the European Union." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11, no. 3 (1999): 339–366.

Power Sharing

Power sharing refers to a set of institutional arrangements that secures every major political force a position in government. Proportional representation, which encourages the coexistence of multiple political parties in the legislature, is a prominent example. Power sharing arrangements, however, are often a combination of mechanisms that ensure political diversity not only in legislatures, but also in executive offices—national or subnational.

Institutions of power sharing are almost always adopted as a response to actual or potential armed conflict, reflecting an attempt to manage violent rivalries of ethnic, religious, or purely political roots. Two or more parties share control of political power when the exclusion of one party would induce rebellions or escalate into civil war. Different combinations of power sharing institutions result from different types and territorial configurations of conflict.

The parliament was the main locus for power sharing in the earliest cases in the modern world—involving the introduction of minority representation in nineteenth-century Western Europe and Latin America. Such institutional innovation was oligarchic governments' response to divisions within the elite, or to the emergence of mass political parties. Power sharing at the level of the executive power has a subnational and a national formula: federalism, which is especially suited for managing conflict among geographically concentrated political forces, and grand coalition governments, which grant every significant party a position in the national cabinet and veto power over major decisions. Both mechanisms are core elements of various peace proposals in multiethnic settings in contemporary Africa.

See also *Federalism, Comparative.*

. . . . SEBASTIÁN MAZZUCA

Power Transition Theory

In international politics, power transition theory is a theory about the causes of major interstate wars. It emphasizes shifts in relative power among the dominant states as a primary catalyst for conflict. First set out by A. F. K. Organski in a 1958 textbook, power transition theory uses the metaphor of a pyramid to describe the hierarchy of states within the international system. At the top of the pyramid is a hegemon or a dominant power, whose supremacy is defined not only by a preponderance of material resources but also by political stability. Hegemonic ascendance is impermanent, however, and beneath the hegemon are a roiling clutch of *great powers*, or states that represent potential rivals to the hegemon and play their own part in shaping the international system, ever eager to assume the top spot. Beneath those are the middle powers, which may possess some regional significance, followed by the small powers.

According to power transition theory, the likelihood of stability and therefore peace, is greatest when a hegemon has established a clear and credible dominance over the system. Hegemonic powers maintain global order; more precisely, they use their military and economic strength to set up global or regional regimes that increase their own security while promoting systemic stability. These regimes, which typically include a bundle of international political and economic institutions (but also, less formally, norms of global behavior), are designed to benefit both the dominant power and other states that agree to play by the rules of the hegemonic order. Such rule abiders are defined as *status quo states*, opposed to revisionist states that are dissatisfied with their place in the international order and wish to change the rules by which the international system functions.

Power transition theory emphasizes the dynamic and cyclical nature of international relations. Hegemons cannot stay on top for long—inescapable differences in rates of growth, institutional sclerosis brought on by the growth of vested interests at home, and the lure of imperial overstretch abroad all contribute to the eventual decline of the dominant power. According to power transition theory, the probability of war is greatest when a declining hegemon is being overtaken by a rising great power. Thus, if dominance keeps peace, a decline in dominance or confusion over the hegemon's status leads to war. In the dangerous period of power transition, the impulse toward war may come from either the hegemon or the challenger. The hegemon may see a benefit in waging a preventive war to thwart the challenger's imminent ascent; the challenger, meanwhile, may be eager to correct the perceived imbalance in the international system and give itself a place in the sun commensurate with its rising status. Either way, such hegemonic wars at the point of power transition usually create a new hegemonic power and a new order after the transition, leaving the hegemonic cycle to begin anew. Hegemonic wars alter the international system in accordance with the new distribution of power, eliminating the ambiguity that arises when a rising power challenges a dominant state.

Power transition theory is typically contrasted with balance of power theory, which arrives at fundamentally different conclusions despite starting with some common fundamental assumptions. Both theories emphasize the role of power and material interests in shaping international outcomes; both assume that states are the primary actors in global politics. Where the two theories fundamentally diverge, however, are on the consequences of power distribution. Power transition theory finds stability in the imbalance of power and argues that greater imbalances lead to greater stability. Balance of power theory, on the other hand, argues that stability is best achieved when power distribution is approximately symmetrical, precisely where power transition theory expects conflict to be greatest. While balance of power theory emphasizes the lack of order in the international system and the difficulty of hegemonic bids, power transition theory instead views international relations as episodes of stability within a hierarchical global system interrupted by bouts of hegemonic wars.

The two views may be usefully reconciled by noting that the likelihood of war may be greatest in times of transition between very imbalanced and very balanced systems—in other words, that both extreme inequality and extreme equality of power produce a degree of certainty, and thus decrease the likelihood of war, while systems between those two extremes are more prone to war. As a matter of historiography, balance of power theory traditionally focuses on European land-based military competition, while power transition theory often focuses on the international system as a whole, with a greater emphasis on naval superiority; this disjunction in scope may explain some of the disconnect between the two theories.

See also *Balance of Power; Hegemony; Power Cycle Theory.*

. . . . VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kugler, Jacek, and A. F. K. Organski. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation." In *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. New York: Routledge, 1989.

Levy, Jack S. "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 139–165.

Organski, A. F. K. *World Politics.* New York: Knopf, 1958.

Tammen, Ronald, ed. *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century.* New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000.

Pragmatism

The term pragmatism refers to a theory of meaning, justification, and inquiry that was developed in the United States in the later nineteenth century. It has since enjoyed broad, if sometimes sporadic, influence in philosophy, political science, sociology, legal studies, and, more recently, in literary theory, and also the humanities more generally speaking.

MAIN IDEAS

Pragmatic thought begins with the so-called pragmatic maxim, which says, "There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice." The pragmatist holds that any meaningful belief commits one to a particular set of expectations regarding the likely consequences of a given course of action. For example, if one believes that something (e.g., a diamond) is hard, then one is committed to the expectation that it will not be scratched by other substances under normal conditions.

If the meaning of a belief consists in the consequences that are expected to follow from acting on it, its validity depends on whether or not those expectations are met in practice. To the extent that they are not, one is said to be in a state of doubt with respect to that belief. For example, if one believes that a given stone is a diamond, and finds that it fails to scratch glass, then that belief will be thrown into doubt. Doubt for the pragmatist is always practical doubt; that is, to be in doubt is to be uncertain about what to do—just as to have a belief is to be disposed to do things in a certain way. The response to doubt is to posit a new belief—a hypothesis—that would account for the doubts, identifying the consequences that would be expected to follow if that belief were correct, and then acting—experimenting—in such a way to see whether those consequences follow in practice. The pragmatic theory