

helped contribute to the growth of his popularity and his transformation into a “national icon” (p. 84).

The author clearly admires Powell (not unusual for a biographer vice his or her subject), and takes a dim view of many of the presidents he served, especially the Republican ones. At times, the narrative includes scathing criticism of almost everyone in an administration except Powell. In the end, though, the critical lens does come to focus on Powell, especially with regard to his performance as Secretary of State in the first term of the George W. Bush administration. Given his beliefs and the strength with which he defended them in earlier administrations, we are surprised and baffled by Powell’s failure to curb the Bush administration’s appetite for war in Iraq and his failure to stand up for his principles by either speaking out publicly or threatening to resign. “Given these apprehensions, why was Powell not more outspoken about the flawed military planning?” (p. 170). The author asks the hard questions and effectively shares a sense of mystery, but does not resolve the puzzle. In my view, the biggest single failing of this biography is, after framing this baffling sequence in the life of Colin Powell so effectively, that the author does not offer more than the thinnest of speculative explanations for his subject’s actions (or lack of action).

There are many biographies of Colin Powell. Why write this one? The author does not directly say. In the annotated bibliography that follows the main text, the author points out several high-quality works in the existing biographical material focused on Powell. The author is critical of the work describing many of the other players in the narrative, especially biographies of Ronald Reagan, for being “published or subsidized by conservative think tanks” and lacking appropriate objectivity (p. 202). This biography clearly does not have a conservative bias. The author notes the “remarkable and even unorthodox relationship” between Powell and *The Washington Post’s* Bob Woodward, mentioning that Powell gave Woodward hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews and that Powell features prominently in many of Woodward’s books (p. 85). In fact, a great number of the citations in this biography reference one of Woodward’s works, though the author questions Woodward’s methods more generally (p. 205). This book does have the benefit of retrospective over (presumably) Powell’s entire career of public service, and is a work of quality scholarship. However, the lack of author interviews with any of the principals leaves little to distinguish it from the pack.

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The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy by Bruce Gilley.
New York, Columbia University Press, 2009. 336 pp. \$34.50.

The question of legitimacy—who gets to rule and why—is perhaps one of the oldest problems in politics. From ancient tribal councils to the modern

European Union, rulers have always been preoccupied with transforming “strength into right and obedience into duty,” as Rousseau put it. Since naked coercion is difficult and costly, the right to rule has always come bundled with justifications that reflect the tenor of their times, from the divine right of kings to democratic consent in the present day.

The strange alchemy of transforming strength into right is the subject of Bruce Gilley’s book, and while the book offers interesting contributions in some areas, and even breaks new ground in others, it is not without some weaknesses. Gilley rightly notes that political scientists often either ignore legitimacy because it seems so nebulous an idea, or assume it away by folding it into bigger concepts. Max Weber’s famous definition of a state, for example, defines it as a territorial monopoly on legitimate violence, which forecloses further discussion of why some states are more legitimate than others.

Gilley aims to correct this shortcoming by succinctly dissecting the sources of legitimacy via a three-part definition. The first component is legality, or the state’s exercise of power according to established laws. The second is justification, or ruling in a way that reflects society’s moral consensus. Legality is insufficient because, as Gilley puts it, “Citizens may believe that states are following the rules but may have grave doubts about the rules themselves” (p .6). The third component is consent, actions like voting or paying taxes that express the citizen’s recognition of the state’s right to rule.

Based on this definition, Gilley aims to place a normally abstract concept onto a more empirical foundation. The book’s most-original contribution is a 72-country legitimacy index that incorporates citizen surveys, violence in political protests, the state’s reliance on easily avoidable taxes, and voter turnout. Some results are predictable; others less so. Western Europe dominates the top of the rankings, albeit with some significant variation. Japan comes in at a surprisingly low twenty-seventh place (fourteen spots behind China). Poor and developing states congregate toward the bottom, for the most part, with Russia coming in last.

The operationalization of legitimacy, laudable in its scope and ambition, is not without some flaws. The poorest and weakest states lack the data required for inclusion in the dataset, which biases the index (as Gilley acknowledges) toward stronger, richer, and thus more-legitimate countries. The African sub-sample consists of only five states, the Middle East of only seven, making it difficult to generalize across these regions (which does not, nevertheless, stop the author from doing so). Nor does the index track change over time; it is a frozen snapshot of legitimacy in the waning years of the twentieth century, which leads to some anomalies like Russia’s bottom placement despite Vladimir Putin’s sustained popularity since 1999. These are not crucial flaws, however, but reflections of the paucity of empirical data on this subject.

The book is on shakier ground when discussing the interaction of domestic and international legitimacy. For Gilley, the two move together; regimes that pursue domestic legitimacy will also create legitimate bilateral relationships

and international institutions. He does not discuss the more-interesting possibility of contradictions between the two projects. Strengthening domestic legitimacy through xenophobic nationalism or nuclear build-ups may actively undermine the state's legitimacy in the eyes of its peers. Nor is there much discussion of how external shocks affect domestic legitimacy. The Soviet collapse, for example, undermined the legitimacy of Communism while the Great Depression weakened the legitimacy of liberal capitalism in the 1930s. For Gilley, however, the factors shaping legitimacy are all internal, a shortcoming shared by many comparative studies of domestic transformations.

The book devotes one of its chapters to a detailed analysis of Uganda since 1986. And while the case study is useful for illuminating the mechanics of legitimation within a specific institutional context, the book would have been better served by a paired comparison of two otherwise-similar countries that differ in their legitimacy scores. For instance, why does corrupt and undemocratic Azerbaijan rank ninth while its neighbor and fellow ex-Communist state of Armenia ranks a lowly seventieth? Why are the Scandinavian countries, which occupy four of the top seven spots, such over-achievers compared to, say, France, at thirty-third? For a book interested in cross-country comparisons, focusing on a single country robs the case study of some analytical leverage.

In short, the book offers a useful and long-overdue attempt to define and measure the important idea of legitimacy, but falters in examining its sources and relationship with the international system. People interested in the concept might want to read the entire book; for everyone else, the first two chapters will suffice.

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Central Banking as Global Governance: Constructing Financial Credibility by Rodney Bruce Hall. *New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 278 pp. Cloth, \$90.00; paper, \$34.99.*

Money, so the old adage goes, makes the world go 'round. But who or what makes money go 'round, how do they do it, and what does this process entail in terms of its constitutive social relations? These are some of the fundamental questions of contemporary international political economy (IPE), that Rodney Bruce Hall sets out to answer in this authoritative and sophisticated book. The key to understanding monetary creation, value, and transmission, he tells us, borrowing from the institutional philosophy of John Searle, lies in the deontic powers of central banks, which are the status functions delegated to increasing numbers of independent central banks by governments. These are rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications that endow the central bank with social and economic power. This is the power of central banks to create and destroy money, to determine its