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2618-565 Sherbourne Street
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Research Interests Macroeconomics, Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics

Teaching Interests

Graduate level: Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Search Theory, Contract Theory
Undergraduate level: Macroeconomics, Microeconomics

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Toronto, Canada (expected in 2010)

Thesis: *Essays on Dynamic Contracts*

Committee: Shouyong Shi (Supervisor), Ettore Damiano, Gueorgui Kambourov

MA in Economics, Osaka University, Japan, 2005

MA in Economics, University of British Columbia, Canada, 2003

BA in Economics, Doshisha University, Japan, 2002

Summer Student, University of California - Berkeley, USA, 6/2001 - 8/2001

Exchange Scholar, Middlebury College, USA, 9/2000 - 5/2001

Research Papers

“Repeated Moral Hazard with Worker Mobility via Directed On-the-Job Search” (Job Market Paper)

“An Advice Game with Reputational and Career Concerns”

“A Welfare Analysis of Child Labour: Dynamic Implications”

Research in Progress

“Repeated Adverse Selection and Directed Search on the Contract,” with Shouyong Shi

“Unemployment Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Aggregate Productivity”

“Optimal Retention Strategies for Wage-Tenure Contracts”

Conference Presentations

“Repeated Moral Hazard with Worker Mobility via Directed On-the-Job Search”

- Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting (Istanbul, July 2009)

- Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (Tokyo, August 2009)

- European Meeting of the Econometric Society (Barcelona, August 2009)

- Midwest Theory Meetings (Iowa City, May 2009)

- Midwest Macro Meetings (Bloomington, IN, May 2009)

- Search Theory Conference (Osaka, February 2009)

- General Equilibrium Theory Workshop in Asia (Tokyo, July 2009)

- Decentralization Conference (Tokyo, August 2009)
- Canadian Economic Association Annual Conference (Toronto, May 2009)
- CIREQ Ph.D. Students' Conference (Montreal, May 2009)

“A Welfare Analysis of Child Labour: Dynamic Implications”

- Spring Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association (Kyoto, June 2005)
- World Congress of the International Health Economic Association (Barcelona, July 2005)

Professional Experience

Teaching Assistant: University of Toronto

- Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D., 2008, 2009): Tutorial, office hour, and grading
- Macroeconomic Theory I, II (Ph.D., 2008, 2009): Tutorial and grading
- Economic Theory (Micro) (MA, MFE, 2007, 2008): Tutorial, office hour, and grading
- Financial Economics I (MFE, 2007): Grading
- Money, Banking, and Financial Markets (Undergraduate, 2009): Grading
- Macroeconomic Theory (Undergraduate, 2008, 2009): Tutorial, office hour, and grading
- Quantitative Methods (Undergraduate, 2008): Grading
- International Trade (Undergraduate, 2007): Grading

Teaching Assistant: Osaka University

- Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate, 2005): Grading

Research Assistant

- Professor Ettore Damiano at University of Toronto, Summer 2006
- Professor Kazuo Mino at Osaka University, Spring 2005
- Professor Yasushi Ohkusa at Osaka University, Fall 2001 - Summer 2002

Intern

- IMF Institute at the International Monetary Fund, Summer 2008

Honors and Awards

Lawrence and Tracey Smith Bursary in Economics, University of Toronto, 2009
Doctoral Thesis Completion Grant, University of Toronto, 2009 - 2010
Maurice Cody Research Fellowship, University of Toronto, 2008
University of Toronto Graduate Fellowship, 2007 - 2009
Distinction in Comprehensive Exam (Macroeconomics), University of Toronto, 2006
Japan - IMF Scholarship for Advanced Study, 2005 - 2007
College Scholar, Middlebury College, 2001
Doshisha - Middlebury Exchange Student Program, 2000 - 2001

Professional Affiliations

American Economic Association
Canadian Economic Association
Econometric Society,

Citizenship

Japanese (Permanent Resident of Canada)

Languages

English (fluent), Japanese (native)

References

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Dissertation Abstract

Repeated Moral Hazard with Worker Mobility via Directed On-the-Job Search (Job Market Paper)

This paper develops a search theoretic model of employment contracts with repeated moral hazard and analyzes how workers' incentives inside a firm interact with their mobility in the labor market. In equilibrium, the firm's incentives to induce effort as well as to retain the worker generate an optimal long-term wage contract that has an increasing wage-tenure profile. The optimal incentive compatible effort level and the resulting worker productivity both increase with tenure. In addition, the theory makes predictions about how the contractual structure interacts with macroeconomic behaviors. In particular, it highlights a mechanism by which incentives and search frictions generate workers' career concerns and productivity dispersion among ex ante identical agents. Moreover, it shows that a temporary reduction in workers' cost to exerting effort propagates through equilibrium dynamics and yields persistent effects on the economy's average productivity.

Repeated Adverse Selection and Directed Search on the Contract (in progress; joint with Shouyong Shi)

This paper studies a long-term insurance contracting problem and asks how the possibility of leaving for another contract affects the incentive structure of the current contract. It also analyzes how such mobility affects the household's long-term welfare profile and, more generally, how the natural desire for mobility affects wealth inequality in the economy. We construct a model of repeated adverse selection where households receive a stochastic endowment each period and moneylenders offer a long-term insurance contract. Even if already on a contract, a household is allowed to look for another contract in the frictional insurance market. This frictional on-the-contract search endogenously assigns otherwise identical households to contracts that offer different values. The theory suggests that allowing households to search on the contract decreases the discipline of contracts and increases wealth inequality.

An Advice Game with Reputational and Career Concerns

This paper characterizes the equilibrium of a two-period advice game when the informed agent has *reputational* and *career* concerns. The model extends Morris' (2001) *Political Correctness* paper, and at the end of the first period, the decision maker can choose whether to retain his advisor or fire him and hire a new advisor from the outside market. This possible replacement creates career concern for the advisor, and he has an incentive to lie for maintaining the position. If career concern is very important, the unique equilibrium is the one in which good advisor gives the politically correct advice regardless of the signal observed. Even in such a case, I find a condition under which the principal can still be better off by offering a random replacement mechanism such that a good advisor truthfully reports the signal despite the risk of being fired.