INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

(ECO 310: Fall-Winter 2010-11) 

PROBLEM SETS

PROBLEM SET #1 SOLUTION TO PROBLEM SET #1

PROBLEM SET #2

 

LECTURE NOTES (in PDF format)

1.  Lecture 1: Introduction to the second part of the course

2.  Lecture 2: CLASS NOTES. Dynamic Games and First Mover Advantage

       Lecture 2: SLIDES. Dynamic Games and First Mover Advantage

3.  Lecture 3: CLASS NOTES. Market Entry and Entry Deterrence

       Lecture 3: SLIDES: Market Entry and Entry Deterrence

4.  Lecture 4: CLASS NOTES. Entry Deterrence and Predatory Conduct

       Lecture 4: SLIDES: Predatory Conduct

5.  Lecture 5: SLIDES. Collusion and Repeated Games

6.  Lecture 6: SLIDES. Collusion Detection and Public Policy

7.  Lecture 7: CLASS NOTES. Introduction to Empirical Industrial Organization

8.  Lecture 8: CLASS NOTES. Introduction to Empirical Industrial Organization  (2)

       READING:         Bresnahan, Timothy (1982): "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, vol. 10, 87-92.

 

9.  Lecture 9: CLASS NOTES. Conjectural Variations Approach

       READING: Genesove, David, and Wallace Mullin (1998): “Testing static oligopoly models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 1998. 355-377.

 

       READING: Bresnahan, Timothy (1982): "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, vol. 10, 87-92.

 

10.      Lecture 10: CLASS NOTES. Demand and Supply of Differentiated Products

       READING: Berry, Steven (1994): “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 25(2), 242-262.

11.     Lecture 11: CLASS NOTES. Demand and Supply of Differentiated Products  (2)

12.      Lecture 12: Empirical applications on price discrimination

       READING: Graddy, Kathryn (1995): “Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market," RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 1995. 75-92.

 

       READING: Leslie, Phillip (2004): “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater,” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2004. 520-541.

 

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OTHER TOPICS READINGS

Lecture 13: Empirical applications on collusion

       READING: Porter, Robert (1983): “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1990-1886,” Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1983, 301-314.

 

Lecture 14: Empirical applications on entry deterrence

       READING:  Ellison, Glenn and Sara Ellison (2007) : “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of  Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration,” NBER Working Paper #13069.