

## Exercise on Overlapping Generation Model

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SHUFE

**Question 1:** Consider Diamond's (1965) model of overlapping generations. Let the production function be  $F(K, L) = K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$ ,  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ , and let the utility function  $U(c^1, c^2)$  satisfy:

$$\frac{U_1(c^1, c^2)}{U_2(c^1, c^2)} = H\left(\frac{c^2}{c^1}\right),$$

where  $H' > 0$ ,  $H(0) = 0$  and  $H(\infty) = \infty$ . Denote the inverse function of  $H$  as  $h$ . That is, for any  $x \in (0, \infty)$ ,  $h(H(x)) = x$ . Assume that  $xh'(x)/h(x) < 1$  for all  $x \in (0, \infty)$  and that  $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} x/h(x) < \infty$ .

In each period  $t$ , the government imposes a proportional tax on labour income (of the young) at a constant tax rate  $\tau$  ( $< 1$ ). This tax revenue is given to the old agents in the same period as a subsidy which is proportional to the old agent's capital income. That is, each old agent in period  $t$  receives a subsidy  $\sigma_t r_t k_t^s$ , where  $k_t^s$  is the agent's saving (in period  $t-1$ ). The rate  $\sigma_t$  is determined by:

$$\sigma_t r_t \bar{k}_t^s L_{t-1} = \tau w_t L_t,$$

where  $\bar{k}_t^s$  is the amount of savings by each agent born at  $t-1$ . The rate  $\tau$  is not necessarily positive. When  $\tau < 0$ , it is a subsidy to labour income, financed by a tax on capital income. Individual agents take the rates  $(\tau, \sigma)$  as given, although in equilibrium  $\sigma$  depends on  $(K, r)$ . Denote:

$$\hat{w}_t = (1 - \tau)w_t, \quad \hat{r}_{t+1} = (1 + \sigma_{t+1})r_{t+1}, \quad \hat{R}_t = 1 + \hat{r}_t.$$

1. Formulate the maximization problem of an individual young agent born in period  $t$ . Derive the savings function  $s_t = s(\hat{w}_t, \hat{R}_{t+1})$  (use the function  $h$ ).
2. Show that the following equation holds in equilibrium:

$$\sigma_t = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \tau, \quad \text{for all } t.$$

3. Use the result from 2 to rewrite the saving function as  $s_t = g(w_t, r_{t+1}, \tau)$ . Show that  $0 < \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial w_t} < 1 - \tau$ ,  $\frac{\partial s_t}{\partial r_{t+1}} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial s_t}{\partial \tau} < 0$ .
4. Derive the dynamic equation for  $r$  in equilibrium as  $r_t = m(r_{t+1}, \tau)$ . Show that a steady state of  $r$  exists. Under what condition is this steady state dynamically stable?
5. Assume dynamic stability. Suppose that the government chooses a level of  $\tau$ , denoted  $\tau^o$ , to achieve the golden rule  $f'(k) = n$ , in the steady state. Find the equation that characterizes  $\tau^o$ . Find the conditions under which  $\tau^o > 0$ . (There should not be any endogenous variable in the equation for  $\tau^o$  or the condition for  $\tau^o > 0$ )
6. Explain the economics behind the condition for  $\tau^o > 0$  in 5.