Notable Publications Here are some papers I have published. In one or two cases, the link is directly to a text or pdf file. In most, the link is to the e-journal. (You may need to log on: if your library does not have access, let me know.) Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense-Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) Here is a precis of Seeing, Doing, and Knowing -- cut down to 5% of its original length! Philosophy of Perception and Philosophy of Mind “Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 81, No. 7 (Jul., 1984), pp. 351-372. This paper argues that there is a notion of ‘error’ used in immunology that demands an ascription of function -- this notion of function is not reducible to other notions in the way proposed by Ernest Nagel, Jonathan Bennett. This is an early paper in what has come to be known as teleosemantics. “Biological Functions and Perceptual Content” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 5-27 Continuing from the above, it argues for a notion of “normal error”, and shows how a robust notion of biological function is useful for defining perceptual content. “The Disunity of Color,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 47-84. Argues, by reference to the species variability of colour vision, that colour is not a single real property, and cannot be defined by reference to a single kind of experience. Truly Blue Argues that individual differences in “unique blue” arises from differences in how the colours are represented by different individuals (or rather their colour vision systems). This paper appeared in Analysis. How Things Look explores the semantic structure of visual phenomenology. Reinterprets the phenomenon of perceptual constancy, and argues that sensory features available in a scene are attributed to multiple overlapping objects. This paper appeared in Bence Nanay (ed.) Perceiving the World OUP On the Diversity of Auditory Objects This paper is as it will appear in the Review of Phllosophy and Psychology. (This journal was formerly known as the European Review of Philosophy.) Feeling of Presence Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling. This paper will appear in Nivedita Gangopadhyaya and Finn Spicer (eds) Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Is Memory Preservation? What’s right and what’s wrong about the thesis that memory is preserved content. This paper appeared in Philosophical Studies Color Experience: A Semantic Theory argues that colour experience denotes colour in the way that words denote concepts. Our knowledge of colour properties arises analytically from an internal representation scheme for the colours. The paper appears in Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen (eds) Color Science and Color Ontology, MIT Press. Philosophy of Biology “Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), pp. 105-132. “Biological universals” such as species and limbs cannot be defined by similarity; they are homologies. So are mental kinds such as fear. This idea was published at about the same time as a similar suggestion by Paul Griffiths’ book What is Emotion?, and figures again in two further papers below. What is a Hand? What is a Mind? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (2000): 653-672. Develops the idea that mental kinds should be defined by reference to homologies. “Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection,” (with Andre Ariew) The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Feb., 2002), pp. 55-83. Argues for a “statistical” interpretation of the theory of natural selection, and against the view that this theory is a theory of forces. Selection and Causation (with Andre Ariew) The statistical interpretation has come in for quite a lot of criticism in the journals, often by authors who (we argue) (a) misuse tests of causation such as manipulation, and (b) adopt unmotivated, ontologically extravagant positions about natural selection. This paper is our reply to critics. It was published in Philosophy of Science 76/2 (2009). Drift and “Statistically Abstractive Explanation” is an extended treatment of a remark in “Two Ways of Thinking” that natural selection and random genetic drift are just two aspects of the same series of events. Here, I argue that “statistically abstractive explanation” mandates the omission of probabilitistically relevant factors in certain contexts of theoretical explanation. This is why these explanations admit of a certain variability of outcome. Drift is not a cause, and it is not separate from natural selection. This paper, which goes significantly beyond the original statistical viewpoint, appeared in Philosophy of Science 76/4 (2009). “Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory” (with Marc Ereshefsky) Philosophy of Science, 72 (January 2005) pp. 1–21. DOI: 10.1086/426848. Argues for Population Structure Theory, in which species are defined by history rather than similarity, and shows how, by contrast to Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, it is able to accommodate the changing and polymorphic character of species. “Defining Vision: What Homology Thinking Contributes” Biology and Philosophy 22: 675-689. Develops the argument of “Biological Universals” above. Argues that vision has a functional definition, but that the more specific kinds of vision -- e.g. mammalian vision -- are functionally more specific than vision as such, and have to be understood in terms of a lineage, or homology. Chickens, Eggs, and Speciation This paper argues that species-membership is relative to population-membership. It is published in Nous. Critical Notice of Denis Dutton.pdf Dutton argues that there is an art instinct, much like the “language instinct” of Pinker. I agree. He thinks that it is accounted for by sexual selection. I disagree: I argue that group selection is a better candidate explanation. He argues that art is a cluster concept. I express scepticism. Ancient Philosophy Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth In this paper, published in Phronesis in 1983, I argue that many Greek philosophers are committed to “predicative complexes” -- entities that combine a substantial object and an attribute. Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology This paper argues that the entire universe is a single substance, according to Aristotle. It was published in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy in 2001. The journal is not online. This is a poorly scanned version, but you should be able to print and read it. Please write to me if you want me to send you a xerox. Aristotle on Natural Teleology This is a piece I wrote for the Blackwell Companion to Aristotle. Why Does Earth Move to the Center? This appears, with minor changes, in a collection of essays about Aristotle’s De Caelo, edited by Alan Bowen and Christian Wildberg, Brill 2009: 119-138.

Here are some papers I have published. In one or two cases, the link is directly to a text or pdf file. In most, the link is to the e-journal. (You may need to log on: if your library does not have access, let me know.)

Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense-Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005)

Here is a precis of Seeing, Doing, and Knowing -- cut down to 5% of its original length!

Philosophy of Perception and Philosophy of Mind

“Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 81, No. 7 (Jul., 1984), pp. 351-372. This paper argues that there is a notion of ‘error’ used in immunology that demands an ascription of function -- this notion of function is not reducible to other notions in the way proposed by Ernest Nagel, Jonathan Bennett. This is an early paper in what has come to be known as teleosemantics.

“Biological Functions and Perceptual Content” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 5-27 Continuing from the above, it argues for a notion of “normal error”, and shows how a robust notion of biological function is useful for defining perceptual content.

“The Disunity of Color,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 47-84.

Argues, by reference to the species variability of colour vision, that colour is not a single real property, and cannot be defined by reference to a single kind of experience.

Truly Blue Argues that individual differences in “unique blue” arises from differences in how the colours are represented by different individuals (or rather their colour vision systems). This paper appeared in Analysis.

How Things Look explores the semantic structure of visual phenomenology. Reinterprets the phenomenon of perceptual constancy, and argues that sensory features available in a scene are attributed to multiple overlapping objects. This paper appeared in Bence Nanay (ed.) Perceiving the World OUP

On the Diversity of Auditory Objects This paper is as it will appear in the Review of Phllosophy and Psychology. (This journal was formerly known as the European Review of Philosophy.)

Feeling of Presence Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling. This paper will appear in Nivedita Gangopadhyaya and Finn Spicer (eds) Perception, Action, and Consciousness.

Is Memory Preservation? What’s right and what’s wrong about the thesis that memory is preserved content. This paper appeared in Philosophical Studies

Color Experience: A Semantic Theory argues that colour experience denotes colour in the way that words denote concepts. Our knowledge of colour properties arises analytically from an internal representation scheme for the colours. The paper appears in Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen (eds) Color Science and Color Ontology, MIT Press.

Philosophy of Biology

“Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), pp. 105-132. “Biological universals” such as species and limbs cannot be defined by similarity; they are homologies. So are mental kinds such as fear. This idea was published at about the same time as a similar suggestion by Paul Griffiths’ book What is Emotion?, and figures again in two further papers below.

What is a Hand? What is a Mind? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (2000): 653-672. Develops the idea that mental kinds should be defined by reference to homologies.

“Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection,” (with Andre Ariew) The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Feb., 2002), pp. 55-83. Argues for a “statistical” interpretation of the theory of natural selection, and against the view that this theory is a theory of forces.

Selection and Causation (with Andre Ariew) The statistical interpretation has come in for quite a lot of criticism in the journals, often by authors who (we argue) (a) misuse tests of causation such as manipulation, and (b) adopt unmotivated, ontologically extravagant positions about natural selection. This paper is our reply to critics. It was published in Philosophy of Science 76/2 (2009).

Drift and “Statistically Abstractive Explanation” is an extended treatment of a remark in “Two Ways of Thinking” that natural selection and random genetic drift are just two aspects of the same series of events. Here, I argue that “statistically abstractive explanation” mandates the omission of probabilitistically relevant factors in certain contexts of theoretical explanation. This is why these explanations admit of a certain variability of outcome. Drift is not a cause, and it is not separate from natural selection. This paper, which goes significantly beyond the original statistical viewpoint, appeared in Philosophy of Science 76/4 (2009).

“Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory” (with Marc Ereshefsky) Philosophy of Science, 72 (January 2005) pp. 1–21. DOI: 10.1086/426848. Argues for Population Structure Theory, in which species are defined by history rather than similarity, and shows how, by contrast to Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, it is able to accommodate the changing and polymorphic character of species.

“Defining Vision: What Homology Thinking Contributes” Biology and Philosophy 22: 675-689. Develops the argument of “Biological Universals” above. Argues that vision has a functional definition, but that the more specific kinds of vision -- e.g. mammalian vision -- are functionally more specific than vision as such, and have to be understood in terms of a lineage, or homology.

Chickens, Eggs, and Speciation This paper argues that species-membership is relative to population-membership. It is published in Nous.

Critical Notice of Denis Dutton.pdf Dutton argues that there is an art instinct, much like the “language instinct” of Pinker. I agree. He thinks that it is accounted for by sexual selection. I disagree: I argue that group selection is a better candidate explanation. He argues that art is a cluster concept. I express scepticism.

Ancient Philosophy

Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth In this paper, published in Phronesis in 1983, I argue that many Greek philosophers are committed to “predicative complexes” -- entities that combine a substantial object and an attribute.

Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology This paper argues that the entire universe is a single substance, according to Aristotle. It was published in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy in 2001. The journal is not online. This is a poorly scanned version, but you should be able to print and read it. Please write to me if you want me to send you a xerox.

Aristotle on Natural Teleology This is a piece I wrote for the Blackwell Companion to Aristotle.

Why Does Earth Move to the Center? This appears, with minor changes, in a collection of essays about Aristotle’s De Caelo, edited by Alan Bowen and Christian Wildberg, Brill 2009: 119-138.