"More than we bargained for?"
Understanding Unions as Democratic Organizations
Case Study Analysis

A one-act play and case study on union democracy Written and performed by:  Angelo DiCaro Amy Lavender Harris and Erin Jonasson All rights reserved. Do not use, reference, or perform without permission. Cente for Industrial Relations University of Toronto March 2005

1.      Conceptual Underpinnings

Our case study interrogates how union structure influences union democracy. Beginning with the widely documented observation that unions transform both structurally and functionally in efforts to remain relevant and even radical, we explore how such efforts are linked to dynamics in relations between local and parent unions, and consider the implications for union democracy as experienced by rank and file members, local and national unions, and the labour movement itself. This discussion paper provides a brief overview of how these three interwoven issues influenced our development of the case, followed by a consideration of our reasons for developing the case as a one-act play designed to be performed interactively.

1.1  Why (and how) unions transform themselves

The first element in our case study is an exploration of the phenomenon of frame extension within social movement theory (see Cornfield and Fletcher, 1998). A theory of frame extension attempts to account for why and how unions transform, revitalize, and sometimes decline in response to internal and external pressures, constraints, and opportunities. In a study of the American Federation of Labour’s legislative agenda until 1955, Cornfield and Fletcher found that the AFL progressively broadened its legislative agenda in response to changes in its institutional environment (principally shifts in labour market conditions and the political climate). They found that as employers became less dependent on AFL-member unions for labour supply and as the state became more accessible to lobby efforts, the AFL grew beyond its early focus on fighting for legal status and better wages and working conditions for unionized workers and enlisted the state in lobbying for social welfare, macroeconomic policies, and improvements in working conditions for union and non-union workers alike. By doing so, the AFL sought to improve collective bargaining outcomes and extend its appeal to current and potential adherents.

Our case study explored how fluctuating labour market conditions (especially in the service sector, where certain kinds of jobs are increasingly outsourced internationally, where part-time and contract work dominate, and where employers stridently oppose certification drives) and an unstable (and until recently explicitly hostile) legislative environment in Ontario might compel unions to shift or extend their focus. Although Cornfield and Fletcher concentrate on legislative outcomes, we wanted to focus on the process of agenda setting within unions. Our one-act play focused on a merger between two fictitious unions: the Retail Workers of Canada (RWC) and the United General Workers of Canada (RGWC). The union convention (at which the merger was announced to the membership, having been determined on their behalf by the executive committee) became a forum for exploring tensions arising from the merger, particularly – in the context of frame extension -- those associated with a shift from the RWC’s “bread and butter” service unionism toward the UGWC’s broader focus on social movement unionism (analogous, perhaps, to a shift from an ‘economic’ to more of a ‘social democratic’ orientation; see Godard, 2003: 202-212). Because frame extension is both a negotiated and contested process, we sought to highlight some of these tensions. Who benefits? Who pays? Who decides, and how? Will traditional objectives (wages, benefits, and working conditions) be forgotten amid a shift toward a broader human rights orientation? How broadly can bread be buttered? Must a union choose one or the other? In both the play and the discussion questions we left these issues deliberately open-ended because in our view there is no ‘right’ orientation for unions; indeed, the contested nature of frame alignment/extension is an inevitable and even positive preoccupation of democratic decision-making within unions.

1.2  Implications for relations between local and parent unions

Godard describes the role and functions of parent unions as including (1) taking wages out of competition; (2) organizing the unorganized; (3) collective bargaining and grievance handling; (4) strike assistance; and (5) representation of member interests (2003: 232-238). In reality, this list is incomplete to the extent that it implies a focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues (the original core issues of the labour movement, including wages, working conditions, and job security) and underplays parent unions’ engagement in broader ‘social movement unionism’ (such as lobbying for international social justice). As such, the list – and the merger between the RWC and UGWC – should also be read in conjunction with Godard’s five functions of unions (economic, democratization, integrative, social democratic, and class conflict / revolutionary (2003: 202-212)), and in the context of Frenkel’s meso and macro levels of organizational engagement (see Frenkel, 2003). In our play we sought to emphasize questions around the dynamics between the ‘parent’ UGWC and its new (ex-RWC) local, including the possibility that local concerns will be ignored or marginalized within the aggressively outward-looking UGWC. We raised the possibility that administrative alignments like mergers expose national unions to charges of ‘raiding’ or playing monopoly with existing memberships rather than organizing new members and locals (although at the same time, the 300,000 member UGWC might represent a powerful lobbying force for its members, including those in the retail sector, and might be more successful in retail worker organizing drives). We raised economic, geographic, and sectoral consequences of the merger, such as questions about how well the UGWC will be able to understand and represent ex-RWC members’ interests in grievance-handling and collective bargaining, and whether local strike actions will be supported and funded. We raised the possibility that the retail workers’ interests may simply be engulfed in the increasingly multi-layered UGWC, and whether ex-RWC interests will be locked in Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy. Finally, we sought to emphasize shifting power dynamics and discourses, particularly in terms of agenda-setting, especially if the merger is being used to impose the UGWC’s agenda on the smaller RWC.  In short, we sought to problematize parent-local relations in an effort to show that their respective roles and functions are constitutive of (and constitute) not only administrative and bureaucratic structures and functions, but also contested interests and objectives driven by internal and external pressures (budgets, dues-balances, sectoral differences, competition with other unions, power structures, etc.).

1.3  Implications for union democracy

Union democracy is a contested territory. Everybody thinks it is a good thing, but there is wide disagreement about whether unions do a good job of achieving it and how we might improve the prospects for genuine democracy within unions. In developing our case, we relied on Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin’s definition of a democratic union as requiring three core features: (1) a democratic constitution; (2) institutionalized opposition within the union; and (3) an active membership (1995: 830). To be considered effectively democratic, a union must meet all three tests. Using the play to ‘test’ these three criteria, we made reference to the sources and limits of union democracy outlined in Godard (2003: 242-249). In particular, we raised the issue of how union presidents are selected: both the RWC and UGWC presidents have held their titles for decades, suggesting that any lively democratic tradition within either union has failed to reach all levels of the organization. In this case, the RWC and UGWC may fail to meet both the first and third tests. We also considered whether the ‘self organized groups’ John McDonald refers to can become effective factions (meeting the second test) or whether they are likely to be reduced to member ghettos (as has often been the case with women’s ‘caucuses’, for one example, although sometimes such caucuses can become very effectively radical groups advocating for change within and beyond the union). We challenged assumptions about direct (one member, one vote) and representational (delegate-based) democracy, and pointed out some strengths and weaknesses in each system. The UGWC’s new mail-in ballot system might produce a low response (especially in the absence of communication and member education), but the RWC’s delegate system has itself foundered on apathy and low member awareness, if Sarah Porter’s uncertainty about the convention and her presence at it is any indication. Moreover, as cumbersome and inefficient as the triennial by-laws conventions may be, they are opportunities for members to meet in person to discuss issues confronting the union and labour in general. In this respect they are not just democratic forums but also valuable sites for member education, thus indicating that the ‘operational inefficiency’ Godard identifies as one limit to union democracy may also be a source of it, provided there is a commitment to communication, education, and consensus-building within the union.

2.      Commentary: Considerations in Developing the Case

In order to make these three interwoven issues prominent, we have designed the case to be performed as a one-act play. We have done so for a variety of reasons, chief among them the belief that questions about union (or indeed any organization’s) functioning are not dispassionate ones. In encouraging interactive engagement with the issues the case raises, we have wanted our colleagues to participate not only as students of industrial relations but as individuals and citizens whose experiences and lives are intertwined with our society and the ways the organizations within it function and are structured. Students are not asked to read the material passively as they might a third-person narrative; instead, they are invited to perform first-person roles, and (by engaging actively in both the content and the lived symbolism of the play) to enact a broader narrative that surrounds and includes or excludes them in almost every aspect of their lives within organizations. In seeking to bring to life the well-known aphorism that democracy is not a spectator sport, we have intended to enliven the ‘sociological imagination’ within the course, and to facilitate a learning experience that is more experiential than pedantic.

In drafting and revising the play, we engaged in a series of discussions about the issues we wanted to raise, and the ways we wanted to raise those issues. We carefully considered how the typical union convention set-up (in terms of agenda as well as spatial layout) might intimidate or silence individual members, and how it might favour the development of factions and insider groups. We consider gender dynamics: the RWC and UGWC National Presidents are deliberately male, as are most of the outspoken members. While the female characters’ speaking parts are brief, we did not see them as having minor roles in the play. Rather, we sought to emphasize how they are silenced by their outsider status (a status which might apply equally to other underrepresented groups at union conventions), and to underscore the courage it takes to speak up in such environments. Viewed critically (as we intended the discussion questions to encourage), the play exposes aspects of union democracy by their absence as much as by their presence.

3.      Conclusion

 In writing, performing, and discussing the case as a one-act play, we sought to incorporate prominent elements of the literature on frame extension and union democracy that seemed most relevant to the merger between the RWC and the UGWC. Although the case has its source in a (far more complicated) real union merger, we focused on core issues driving the merger (especially those rooted in or enabling frame extension) and the merger’s impacts on relations between the parent and local unions and on union democracy. In developing the case we deliberately chose to raise the issues in an open-ended manner. In our view, an objective of union democracy should not be only to resolve issues, tensions, and competing objectives, but also to bring them into open discussion through genuinely democratic processes.

Sources Cited

Cornfield, Daniel B. and Bill Fletcher, 1998. Institutional constraints on social movement “frame extension”: shifts in the

legislative agenda of the American Federation of Labour, 1881-1955. In Social Forces, 76(4): 1305-.

DiCaro, Angelo, Amy Lavender Harris, and Erin Jonasson, 2005. “More than we bargained for?”. A one-act play on

union democracy. Toronto: Centre for Industrial Relations.

Frenkel, Stephen J., 2003. The Embedded Character of Workplace Relations. In Work and Occupations, 30(2): 135-153.

Godard, John, 2003. Industrial Relations, the Economy, and Society. 2^nd ed. Concord, Ont.: Captus Press.

Stepan-Norris, Judith and Maurice Zeitlin, 1995. Union Democracy, Radical Leadership, and the Hegemony of Capital.

American Sociological Review, 60 (December): 829-850.

Additional Resources used in developing the case

Anderson, John C., 1978. A Comparative Analysis of Local Union Democracy. Industrial Relations, 17(3): 278-295.

Chaison, Gary N., 1982. Union Mergers and the Integration of Union Governing Structures. In Journal of Labor

Research, III(2): 139-151.

Stepan-Norris, Judith, 1997. The Making of Union Democracy. Social Forces, 76(2): 475-510.

Terry, Michael, 1996. Negotiating the Government of Unison: Union Democracy in Theory and Practice. British Journal

of Industrial Relations, 34(1): 87-110.

Credit for Witticism

The “How broadly can bread be buttered?” question (page 1) is credited to Peter Fruchter, M.A., L.L.B.