Toward an Aristotelian Liberalism

The aim of my dissertation is to develop a legally relevant theory of artistic value, based on which a judge can reliably determine whether a work has sufficient such value to be granted constitutional protection, even though it would otherwise count as obscene. Within this framework I argue that a moral flaw can count as an aesthetic virtue in a narrative work, at least when the audience learns something from the immoral imaginings that the work prescribes. Since expert testimony is sometimes required in legal cases about artistic value, I also develop a legally applicable theory of aesthetic testimony, such that expert testimony can be used to determine the valence of aesthetic properties, which is essential in determining a work's overall artistic value. My theory of which properties of works are relevant to their aesthetic evaluation depends both on which categories the work is appreciated in, and on the conventions of those categories. I address these issues within Canadian and American legal contexts.

Committee: Daniel Bonevac (chair), Jonathan Dancy, A.P Martinich and Stephen White. Outside Member: Thomas Hurka (Toronto).

Research Interests

My research is primarily in
political and legal philosophy and normative ethics.

I am also interested in
ancient philosophy,
business ethics, and bioethics.

Dissertation Summary

Three-page Dissertation Summary

Future Research

Reason, Virtue and Supererogation

The Function of Rights

Adjudication, Discretion and Equity

Measuring Freedom

Epigenetics and Harm to Future Persons

 

Abstracts

A New Instrumental Theory of Rights
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2009

My goal in this paper is to advance a long-standing debate about the nature
of moral rights. The debate focuses on the questions: In virtue of what do persons
possess moral rights? What could explain the fact that they possess moral rights? The
predominant sides in this debate are the status theory and the instrumental theory. I aim
to develop and defend a new instrumental theory. I take as my point of departure the
influential view of Joseph Raz, which for all its virtues is unable to meet the challenge to
the instrumentalist that I will address: the problem of justifying the enforcement of rights.
I then offer a new instrumental theory in which duties are grounded on individuals’
interests, and individuals’ rights exist in virtue of the duties owed to them. I argue that
my theory enables the instrumentalist to give the right sort of justification for enforcing
rights.

Unresolved Problems in the Service Conception of Authority
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming 2010

Joseph Raz’s Service Conception of Authority is one of the most influential
contemporary accounts of the conditions under which the powerful exercise their power
legitimately. Raz has recently clarified various aspects of his view, and responded to
many of the objections to his position that have accrued over the years. Problems do
remain, however, which those of us who wish to defend the Service Conception, or
something very close to it, must address. My goal in this paper is to resolve some of
these problems by integrating the insights of the Service Conception into a broader
framework for understanding moral rights and duties which I have articulated and
defended elsewhere. I introduce three problems which a complete account of legitimate
authority must answer, and which are not addressed by Raz’s view. I then summarize
the view of moral duties that will serve as the background for a more robust account
of legitimate authority. By incorporating the main elements of the Service Conception
into this view, I construct a theory of legitimate authority with the resources needed
to provide solutions to the problems I introduce. I conclude by resolving each of the
problems from the perspective of this new theory.

Instrumental Reasoning in Novel Circumstances
Currently Under Review

In this article, I address the problem of modeling rational deliberation under novel circumstances--circumstances in which the range of potential outcomes is unknown. I begin by outlining the account offered by Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler, which they call Case- Based Decision Theory (CBDT). I offer a number of criticisms of their account, which suffice to undermine their claim to have successfully modeled the decision-making of a rational agent in these circumstances. I then sketch an alternative account, based on Frank Ramsey’s work in expected-utility theory. At the core of my account is the idea that a rational agent facing novel circumstances makes a judgment of how probable it is that the outcomes of his available actions, whatever they may turn out to be, will be as preferable as each of the outcomes appearing in his preference-ranking. This probability judgment may be updated in the light of evidence of various kinds. I argue that my account suffers none of the defects of CBDT, and outline a number of its distinct advantages.