Date | Main topics and lecture notes | Smaller topics | Readings | Extras |
13.01 | Classic matching theory. | Marriage matching with strict preferences. Structure of stable matchings. Uniqueness and existence of stable solution. | lecture notes*, [18], [39] | |
13-20.01 | Other matching models | Matching with transferrable and partially transferrable utility. | , | |
Marriage matching with weak preferences (school allocation problem). | [1], [3], [16]*, [2], | |||
Matching with married workers | [25], [34] | |||
Roommate problem. | [12], [35] | |||
Kidney exchange. | [24], [38], | |||
27.01 | Many-to-one matching models | Many-to-one matchings (and matchings with married couples) | [25], [20]*, [10] | |
27.01-3.02 | Large matching models with random utility, Large matching (Dagsvik model) | Distributions over observable characteristics. | ||
Dynamic matching models, | lecture notes*, [40], [5] | |||
Presentation: Barter | Dynamic centralized matching | |||
10.02 | Object allocation models | [8][30]*, [11], | ||
Large matching models. | Uniqueness and strategy-proofness. | [22],[27], [37], [29] | ||
Network formation | [23] | |||
Presentations: Network origins of fluctuations, Strategic interactions,Key player, | Position on networks. | [6]*, [4]*, [15], | ||
17.02 | Bargaining | Trade and bargaining. | [17], [31], | |
Job search | Job search. | [9] | * |
[1] : “The Boston Public School Match”, American Economic Review, pp. 368—371, 2005. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/000282805774669637.
[2] : “Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match”, American Economic Review, pp. 1954—78, 2009. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.5.1954.
[3] : “The New York City High School Match”, American Economic Review, pp. 364—367, 2005. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/000282805774670167.
[4] : “The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations”, Econometrica, pp. 1977—2016, 2012. URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA9623/abstract.
[5] : “Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs”, Econometrica, pp. 667—680, 2006.
[6] : “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player”, Econometrica, pp. 1403—1417, 2006. URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00709.x/abstract.
[7] : “A Theory of Marriage, Part I”, Journal of Polictical Economy, pp. 813—846, 1973. URL http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808.
[8] : “A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem”, Journal of Economic Theory, pp. 295—328, 2001.
[9] : “The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality”, The American Economic Review, pp. 426—454, 2004. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592937.
[10] : “Stable Matching in Large Economies”, , 2015.
[11] : “Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms”, Econometrica, pp. 1625—1672, 2010.
[12] : “The Roommate Problem - Is More Stable Than You Think”, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014.
[13] : “Who Marries Whom and Why”, Journal of Political Economy, pp. 175—201, 2006.
[14] : “Aggregation in Matching Markets”, International Economic Review, pp. 27—58, 2000.
[15] : “Financial Networks and Contagion”, American Economic Review, pp. 3115—53, 2014. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.10.3115.
[16] : “What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice”, American Economic Review, pp. 669—89, 2008. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.3.669.
[17] : “Financial Networks”, American Economic Review, pp. 99—103, 2007. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.2.99.
[18] : “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”, American Mathematical Monthly, pp. 9—15, 1962.
[19] : Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models, 2012. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1804623.
[20] : “Matching with Contracts”, American Economic Review, pp. 913—935, 2005.
[21] : “Marriage, honesty, and stability”, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL ACM-SIAM SYMPOSIUM ON DISCRETE ALGORITHMS (SODA, pp. 53—-62, 2005. URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.84.2411.
[22] : “Marriage, honesty, and stability”, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL ACM-SIAM SYMPOSIUM ON DISCRETE ALGORITHMS (SODA, pp. 53—-62, 2005. URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.84.2411.
[23] : Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press, 2010.
[24] : “Getting More Organs for Transplantation”, American Economic Review, pp. 425—30, 2014. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.5.425.
[25] : “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. qjt019, 2013.
[26] : “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets”, American Economic Review, pp. 608—627, 2009. URL http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/61663.
[27] : “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets”, American Economic Review, pp. 608—627, 2009. URL http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/61663.
[28] : On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets, 2014. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2464401.
[29] : “Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets”, , 2012.
[30] : Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets ∗. 2012.
[31] : “Bargaining in Stationary Networks”, American Economic Review, pp. 2042—80, 2011. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.5.2042.
[32] : “Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems”, accepted at Econometrica, 2014. URL http://homepages.nyu.edu/~km125/large_matching.pdf.
[33] : Cohabitation versus Marriage: Marriage Matching with Peer Effects, 2014. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2541895.
[34] : Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities. 2014. URL http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~nguye161/.
[35] : Large Roommate Problem with Non-Transferrable Random Utility, 2015. URL http://individual.utoronto.ca/mpeski/papers/roommate.pdf.
[36] : “The Average Number of Stable Matchings”, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, pp. 530, 1989. URL http://link.aip.org/link/SJDMEC/v2/i4/p530/s1&Agg=doi.
[37] : “The Average Number of Stable Matchings”, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, pp. 530, 1989. URL http://link.aip.org/link/SJDMEC/v2/i4/p530/s1&Agg=doi.
[38] : “Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences”, American Economic Review, pp. 828—851, 2007. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.3.828.
[39] : Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
[40] : “Assortative Matching and Search”, Econometrica, pp. 343—369, 2000.
[41] : Topics in Optimal Transportation. American Mathematical Society, 2003.