CV

Articles

An externalist's guide to inner experience &darrResources for direct realists who want to talk with representationalists. (a) Builds "rails to infinity" for the concept of phenomenal sameness epistemically, or via introspective indiscriminability; denies coherence of doing this metaphysically, or via natural kinds. (b) Explains a sense in which your experience can be discriminable from mine; acknowledges certain limitations, dismisses opponents as overreaching. (c) Explains the basic framework of Chalmers's 'The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief'. (d) Direct realism squeezes through a loophole in Chalmers's system: Descartes's "direct phenomenal concept" and vat-Descartes's "pseudo-direct phenomenal concept" both refer to acquaintance with a table because, as Hume taught us, we can't help assuming our experiences acquaint us with externalia. (e) Transparency says that our most basic concepts in the neighborhood of colors are demonstrative concepts of colors; inversion without illusion says that these concepts have Chalmers-Thompson-esque Fregean "property disposed to make me and now making me R" modes of presentation. (f) Fancy logic allows the sophisticate to extract infallible introspective concepts of qualia, a la early Shoemaker.
Forthcoming in Bence Nanay, editor, Perceiving the World (OUP, 2010).
The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination &darrDirect realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of hallucinating a white picket fence: is it representing a white picket fence? is it sensing white-picket-fencily? is it being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Forthcoming in Fiona MacPherson, editor, Hallucination (The MIT Press, 2011).
Factive phenomenal characters &darr The notion of "phenomenal character" is defective because overconstrained. It is supposed to be shared among introspectively indiscriminable experiences, but it is also supposed to be the way consciousness presents itself. But consciousness presents itself as acquaintance with tables and chairs, so the defectiveness follows from the argument from hallucination.
Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 21, 259--306 (2007).
That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact &darr An interpretation of the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', source of the 'transparency' and 'diaphaneity' passages. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a relation of conscious awareness. I dispel some myths: representationalism is Moore's main opponent; the discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, rebutting an objection to the phenomenological argument; the point of those passages is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent (though can seem to be).
European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15, 334--66 (December 2007).
'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness &darr I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', offering four candidates: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of its subject; (d) e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. Contra Eric Lormand, there's nothing perceptual about it.
The Philosophical Review, vol. 116, 441--63 (July 2007).
Beyond phenomenal naivete &darr Direct realism is threatened by the argument from hallucination, but supported by introspection. This support would be defeated if we made a shift of attention in introspecting: we shift from the object of (intentional) sight, which is external, to the relation born to sense-data.
The Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 6 nr. 2 (May 2006).
Noise and perceptual indiscriminability &darr The color of this paint chip is seen under a mode of presentation; this mode of presentation is inexact, can be satisfied by a small but nonzero range of colors; so this color might be any color in this range. Going by the modes of presentation of a's color and b's color, they might be the same and might be different. Going by the modes of presentation of b's color and c's color, they might be the same and might be different. But going by the modes of presentation of a's color and c's color, they must be different. This is the "nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability". Against Jackson and Pinkerton, Raffman, and Graff, there is no need to think this requires a change in us in two episodes of looking at the same paint chip. Modes of presentation are inexact because every signal is noisy. We can introspect this noise: close your eyes and note the flickering; it's still there, if weakly, when you open them.
Mind, vol. 114, 481--508 (July 2005).
Higher-order intentionality and higher-order acquaintance &darr If you are of the sort who thinks that consciousness requires one's awareness of some aspect of one's own condition, no need to think it requires self-representation: it could instead be acquaintance with one's own condition. This view is better because acquaintance can't be wrong.
Philosophical Studies vol. 134: 289--324 (July 2007).
Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument &darr The Knowledge Argument concludes that some truth---that seeing a red thing is F---is not "physical", and its form is valid (compare Stalnaker's Locke Lectures). Its central premiss, that Mary does not know what seeing a red thing is like, means that that truth of form seeing a red thing is F is unknown to Mary. This is unknown to Mary because the F-concept is acquaintance-based, and she lacks it. What if we grant her the concept? Then the Knowledge Argument succeeds only if physical spectral inversion is conceivable.
Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, editors, There's Something about Mary (MIT Press, 2004).

Shorter things

Introspection despite transparency &darr Expanded version of section 3 of 'An externalist's guide to inner experience'.
University of Barcelona, June 2009.
Helen Steward's 'Concepts of causation' &darrPerspectives on Ontology, University of Leeds, September 2008.
Experience as a limit &darrThere could be "weak zombies", creatures physically and qualitatively like us, but without a perspective on the world.
Consciousness and Thought, Interuniversity Center, Dubrovnik, August 2008.
Jenann Ismael's 'Probability and physics' &darrArizona Ontology Conference, January 2008.
How to color McTaggart &darrInversion without illusion meets Kit Fine-style metaphysical relativism.
Consciousness on the Beach, ANU, February 2007.
Christopher Peacocke's 'Concepts of conscious states' &darrPeacocke Week, University of Toronto, October 2006.
Representationalism &darrTim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilkin, editors, Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009).
Acquaintance &darrTim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilkin, editors, Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009).
Justin Fisher's 'Color representations as hash-values' &darrCentral APA, 2006.
Visual form, attention, and binocularity &darrA "spectral inversion" style thought experiment involving someone whose right and left images blend unusually in the visual field shows that the visual mode of presentation of space is under possible locations of the attentional spotlight.
Consciousness and representationalism &darrEncyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan, 2002).

Resources

The transparency of experience: annotated bibliography (.bib)
My BibTeX database
My PhilPapers presence
For the Record














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Jess, me, Margo: Ontario, Summer 2009. Photo by Ariel Teplitsky

Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
170 St George St, Toronto, ON M5R 2M8 Canada
1 416 978 3535; fax:1 416 978 8703

Conscious Life &darrThe central theses of the Conscious Life research program are: (I) the kinds of experience are the kinds of action; (II) whole experiences are more fundamental than their parts, so that one's most fundamental experience is a single big long action, one's conscious life.
Conscious Life forthcoming OUP.

Arguments for my view &darr(A) A phenomenological argument: can't think of standard "visual experiences" as exhausting consciousness once recognize the influence of attention; structured attention a la Sebastian Watzl + adverbialism a la Chris Mole + simplify gets you there (B) (improving on what I say here) (1) the K is a kind of action just if a K can occur attentively; (2) a K can occur attentively just if a K must occur consciously; (3) a K must occur consciously just if the K is a kind of experience.
Acting unintentionally &darrHow are intentions related to actions? Orthodoxy: to be one of the latter is to be behavior caused by one of the former. Michael Thompson: they are deeply identical (if perhaps superficially distinct in a way that motivates characterizing them with different vocabulary). Setiya raises some problems for this view; another is that it seems to make "unintentional action" impossible (Withnail: "We've gone on holiday by mistake!). Martinesque alternative: to be an intention to A is to be some action which is indiscriminable from Aing.
Launching into action &darr(A) Criticize the Davidson and Lewis arguments for theory-theory. (B) Criticize the classical belief-desire model of psychology. (C) Discuss Michael Thompson's argument for an action-first model of practical psychology.
Occurrences &darr(A) Talk about the topology of the real numbers. (B) Distinguish the four Vendlerian categories of occurrence: o is instantaneous just if there is only one instant at which it occurs; ongoing otherwise. K is a stative kind just if sometimes a (possible) K is instantaneous and sometimes a K is ongoing; otherwise dynamic. A dynamic kind K is "achievementive" just if every K is instantaneous. A nonachievementive dynamic kind K is "accomplishmentive" just if a K has a telos; otherwise "active". A state is an occurrence of a stative kind, an achievement is an occurrence of an achievementive kind, an accomplishment is an occurrence of an accomplishmentive kind, an activity is an occurrence of an active kind. (C) Discuss Ian Philips's argument that an experience of an ongoing occurrence is itself ongoing.
How experience became phenomenal &darrThe phenomenal state conception of experience: the kinds of experience are (1) passive (2) static (3) analogous to pain and "visual sensation" (4) narrow. Chain of succession: Ryle 1949 is rebutted by Place 1954; Place 1956 rebuts an imaginary opponent; Smart 1959 attempts to bolster Place 1956; Lewis 1966 attempts to bolster Smart 1959; Lewis 1966 sets the standard for current usage. Ryle rejects (1)--(4); Place 1954 rejects (1) and (2), accepts (3) and (4); Smart 1959 accepts (3) and (4) and is incoherent concerning (1) and (2); Lewis 1966 accepts (1)--(4). Place accepts (3) because he rejects the adverbial theory of attention; Place accepts (4) because he endorses the standard take on the argument from hallucination. Adverbialist disjunctivists can accept Ryle's view and reject the phenomenal state conception in toto.
Animations &darrAnimations contrasting my view with the phenomenal state conception of experience.
Long precis &darrA detailed description of the book as envisaged in August 2009.