Jess, me, Margo: Ontario, Summer 2009. Photo by Ariel Teplitsky
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
170 St George St, Toronto, ON M5R 2M8 Canada
1 416 978 3535; fax:1 416 978 8703
benj.hellie@utoronto.ca
Attention and gunk &darrA reductive account of attention in terms of the mereology of action. (I) Suggest as a primitive notion of attentiveness attentiveness of an act relative to an interval (not outside the time-span of that act). Roughly, if we screw up our eyes and look just at that interval, we see a light of attentiveness shining out from the action at some time in the interval. (II) Posit that what this consists in is the action having a part contained in that interval. Part in the "robust" Thompsonesque sense, as distinguished from a mere temporal "tranche" of the action. (III) With Thompson, every action has a part; if so, then attentiveness at an interval goes with gunkiness in the interval. (IV) Gunkiness crowds out competitors. This explains two key facts about attention: that it phenomenologically foregrounds attentions performed with it; and that it makes an act exquisitely sensitive to minutest changes in the environment.
Ignorance by acquaintance &darr(I) Run at great length through the apparatus of Chalmers's 'The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief'. (II) Discuss rather more briefly the relation between acquaintance-based and causal concepts of action---including a quick argument for the fundamentality of conscious life, on p11. (III) Expand and generalize the manoeuvre in 'Externalist's guide to inner experience' of endorsing the letter of Chalmers's theory and showing how the externalist can manipulate it to preserve world-involving experience.
Arguments for my view &darr(A) A phenomenological argument: can't think of standard "visual experiences" as exhausting consciousness once recognize the influence of attention; structured attention a la Sebastian Watzl + adverbialism a la Chris Mole + simplify gets you there (B) (improving on what I say here) (1) the K is a kind of action just if a K can occur attentively; (2) a K can occur attentively just if a K must occur consciously; (3) a K must occur consciously just if the K is a kind of experience.
Acting unintentionally &darrHow are intentions related to actions? Orthodoxy: to be one of the latter is to be behavior caused by one of the former. Michael Thompson: they are deeply identical (if perhaps superficially distinct in a way that motivates characterizing them with different vocabulary). Setiya raises some problems for this view; another is that it seems to make "unintentional action" impossible (Withnail: "We've gone on holiday by mistake!). Martinesque alternative: to be an intention to A is to be some action which is indiscriminable from Aing.
Launching into action &darr(A) Criticize the Davidson and Lewis arguments for theory-theory. (B) Criticize the classical belief-desire model of psychology. (C) Discuss Michael Thompson's argument for an action-first model of practical psychology.
Occurrences &darr(A) Talk about the topology of the real numbers. (B) Distinguish the four Vendlerian categories of occurrence: o is instantaneous just if there is only one instant at which it occurs; ongoing otherwise. K is a stative kind just if sometimes a (possible) K is instantaneous and sometimes a K is ongoing; otherwise dynamic. A dynamic kind K is "achievementive" just if every K is instantaneous. A nonachievementive dynamic kind K is "accomplishmentive" just if a K has a telos; otherwise "active". A state is an occurrence of a stative kind, an achievement is an occurrence of an achievementive kind, an accomplishment is an occurrence of an accomplishmentive kind, an activity is an occurrence of an active kind. (C) Discuss Ian Philips's argument that an experience of an ongoing occurrence is itself ongoing.
How experience became phenomenal &darrThe phenomenal state conception of experience: the kinds of experience are (1) passive (2) static (3) analogous to pain and "visual sensation" (4) narrow. Chain of succession: Ryle 1949 is rebutted by Place 1954; Place 1956 rebuts an imaginary opponent; Smart 1959 attempts to bolster Place 1956; Lewis 1966 attempts to bolster Smart 1959; Lewis 1966 sets the standard for current usage. Ryle rejects (1)--(4); Place 1954 rejects (1) and (2), accepts (3) and (4); Smart 1959 accepts (3) and (4) and is incoherent concerning (1) and (2); Lewis 1966 accepts (1)--(4). Place accepts (3) because he rejects the adverbial theory of attention; Place accepts (4) because he endorses the standard take on the argument from hallucination. Adverbialist disjunctivists can accept Ryle's view and reject the phenomenal state conception in toto.
Animations &darrAnimations contrasting my view with the phenomenal state conception of experience.
Long precis &darrA detailed description of the book as envisaged in August 2009.
Intro &darrSignificance of theory of meaning; language and representation; foundations of semantics, semantics, metasemantics; names and adjectives; what do sentences represent?; truth-conditions; a toy compositional truth-conditional theory; use-mention; recursion and scope; quantifier scope.
Frege &darrMain readings: 'Function and concept', 'On sense and reference', 'Concept and object'. Saturated and unsaturated entities; syntax-metaphysics isomorphism; the concept horse paradox; Frege and our toy theory; nonreferring names; Frege cases; sense as "cognitive"; sense and attitude reports; a hierarchy of senses?; what are senses; Evans on Frege; "sense determines referent".
Russell &darrMain reading: 'On denoting'. Using the theory of descriptions; worries about the theory of descriptions; Russell's three "puzzles"; the "Grey's Elegy" objection against "Frege".
Carnap &darrMain reading: Meaning and Necessity. Essence and empiricism; state-descriptions; L-truth and meaning; extension and intension; quantifying past the box; Carnap and the epistemology of essence; a Quinean dilemma; "individual concepts"; "Aristotelian essentialism".
Kripke I &darrMain reading: Naming and Necessity, Lecture I. The legend of Kripke; central themes in NnN; designators; rigidity; which intension does a designator have?; fundamentalism v rigidity; the "modal argument"; fixing the reference/giving the sense; initial baptism; epistemic intensions; two-dimensionalism; contingent a priori/necessary a posteriori.
Kripke II &darrMain reading: Naming and Necessity, Lecture II. Carnap on aligning apriority and necessity; semantics and metasemantics; metasemantical descriptivism; ignorance of unique descriptions; Godel/Schmidt; Feynman/Gell-Mann; "direct reference"; Strawsonian metasemantics; the "causal theory of reference"; descriptions v intensions; the fate of rational intuition.
Kripke III &darrMain reading: Naming and Necessity, Lecture III. Metaphysics of natural kinds; natural kind terms and proper names; contingent a priori/necessary a posteriori for natural kinds; explaining away illusions of contingency; theories of mind and body; Kripke against central state materialism; Chalmers against CSM and functionalism.