Name  Lecture  Office hours  Contact  
Instructor  Marcin Pęski  Monday, 68pm, SS2127  Monday 2.304.30 am, Max Gluskin 207  mpeski@gmail.com 
TA  Kevin Fawcett  Tutorial: Monday, 89pm, SS2127  Wed, 12pm, 313 
Date  Topic  Readings  Theory topics  Important games/Extras 
1109  Lecture 1. Games. Dominant strategies↓  1,2.12.5, 2.9 
Key problem of game theory.
Definition of a game. Examples. Strictly (weakly) dominated strategies (SD). Dominant strategies. 
Plurality voting↓. 
1809  Lecture 2. Iterated elimination and rationalizability↓  12.24* (see comment below) 
Rationality, knowledge of rationality.
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESD). Best responses. Best responses against beliefs. Relation between dominated strategies and never best responses. 

2509  Lecture 3. Nash equilibrium↓  2.62.8, 3.1 
Nash equilibrium. Relation between Nash equilibrium and SD or IESD.
Multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Equilibrium selection. 
Cournot duopoly.

0210  Lecture 4. Nash equilibrium – examples↓  3.2, 3.5 
Cournot oligopoly.
Bertrand duopoly.
Bertrand with differentiated products. 

1610  Lecture 5. Mixed strategies↓  4.14.5, 4.9  Mixed strategies. Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
Penalty shot.
Traffic game. 
2310  Midterm↓ (in class, during the regular class hours)  
3010  Lecture 6. Extensive form games. Subgame perfection↓  5.15.5, 6.16.2 
Extensiveform game. Strategies.
Nash equilibrium. Subgame Perfect equilibrium. 

1311  Lecture 7. Extensive form games – examples↓  7.17.2, 7.67.7 
Ultimatum game.
Alternating offer bargaining. Holdup model. Entry game. 

2011  Lecture 8. Repeated games↓  14.114.2, 14.414.6, 14.7.1., 14.10.1  Repeated games. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma followed by Coordinated Investment.
Finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
2711  Lecture 9. Games with incomplete information↓  9.19.3  Infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
412  Lecture 10. Games with incomplete information II↓  9.49.5, 7.6  Battle of Sexes with uncertain preferences.  
712**  Lecture 11. Auctions↓  3.5, 9.6 
Cournot oligopoly with uncertain costs.


TBA  Final exam↓  First, secondprice and allpay auctions. 
Kicker \ Goalie  L  C  R 
L  0.6  0.9  0.9 
C  1  0.4  1 
R  0.9  0.9  0.6 
Pl.1\Pl.2  L  C  R 
U  4,5  1,2  3,0 
M  3,1  2,3  3,6 
D  0,4  3,3  4,3 
C  D  
C  ( − 1, − 1)  ( − 10, 0) 
D  (0, − 10)  ( − 5, − 5) 
Nice  Not nice  
Nice  (2, 2)  (0, − 2) 
Not nice  ( − 2, 0)  ( − 1, − 1) 
Outcome if vote for c  Case  Outcome if vote for a 
A, (n’_{a} = n_{a} > n’_{b} = n_{b}, n’_{c} = n_{c} + 1)  n_{a} > n_{c} + 1, n_{b}  A (n’_{a} = n_{a} + 1 > n’_{b} = n_{b}, n’_{c} = n_{c}) 
AB  n_{a} = n_{b} > n_{c} + 1  A 
ABC  n_{a} = n_{b} = n_{c} + 1  A 
AC  n_{a} = n_{c} + 1 > n_{b}  A 
B  n_{b} > n_{a}, n_{c} + 1  AB or B 
BC  n_{b} = n_{c} + 1 > n_{a}  AB or B 
C  n_{c} + 1 > n_{a}, n_{b}  does not matter 
q_{2} = 0  q_{2} > 0, q_{2} = (1)/(2)(α − c − q_{1})  
q_{1} = 0  Strategies: q_{1} = 0, q_{2} = 0 Pl.1 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{2})^{2} ≤ f⟹(1)/(4)(α − c)^{2} ≤ f Pl.2 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{1})^{2} ≤ f⟹(1)/(4)(α − c)^{2} ≤ f  \strikeout off\uuline off\uwave off Strategies: q_{1} = 0, q_{2} = (1)/(2)(α − c) Pl.1 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{2})^{2} ≤ f⟹(1)/(16)(α − c)^{2} ≤ f Pl.2 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{1})^{2} ≥ f⟹(1)/(4)(α − c)^{2} ≥ f 
q_{1} > 0, q_{1} = (1)/(2)(α − c − q_{2})  Strategies: q_{1} = (1)/(2)(α − c), q_{2} = 0 Pl.1 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{2})^{2} ≥ f⟹(1)/(4)(α − c)^{2} ≥ f Pl.2 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{1})^{2} ≤ f⟹(1)/(16)(α − c)^{2} ≤ f  Strategies: q_{1} = (1)/(3)(α − c), q_{2} = (1)/(3)(α − c) Pl.1 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{2})^{2} ≥ f⟹(1)/(9)(α − c)^{2} ≥ f Pl.2 EC (1)/(4)(α − c − q_{1})^{2} ≥ f⟹(1)/(9)(α − c)^{2} ≥ f 